Air Defense: The Missile War In Ukraine

Archives

July 12, 2024: In Ukraine the Russians use a large number of S-400 SAM (Surface to Air Missile) systems to protect their forces and the bases located on the Russian side of the Ukrainian border. In theory, S-400 should be able to protect itself from any aerial threat, including high-speed ballistic missiles. Ukrainian tactics against S-400s involve use of the ATACMS missiles they received from the United States. Most ATACMS have a range of 300 kilometers while some have a range of 165 kilometers. Ukrainians are using the 300 kilometer version which is capable of changing its trajectory after launch, and deploys hundreds of bomblets over the target.

The ATACMS long-range version’s mid-flight change of trajectory breaks any target lock Russian SAM radars, including the S-400, have on them so those have too little time to reacquire the ATACMS warhead and lock on to it. Plus the S-400 radar does not notice the bomblets because they are too small for the radar to bother with. The bomblets land in a large area and manage to destroy the S-400 radar, the fire control operators truck as well as several missile launchers, each containing four missiles, The ATACMS also manages to avoid getting shot down by an S-400 missile by at least a dozen drones being sent in first and, as the S-400 was shooting down drones, at least five ATACMS were launched to release 300 or 800 bomblets over the target area, where the S-400 battery was deployed. These tactics managed to destroy an S-400 system that was situated too close to the Ukrainian border. Normally S-400 batteries are based further to the rear but the Russians wanted to take out aerial targets farther inside Ukraine and positioned this S-400 battery too close to the front line to protect itself from Ukrainian tactics.

Russia began the war with fifty S-400 batteries. By mid-2024 about a quarter of those batteries were destroyed or severely damaged. Russia has had to remove S-400 batteries protecting areas deeper inside Russia and move them in closer to prevent Ukrainian warplanes, especially the new American F-16s, from being a problem, and to shoot down the growing number of missiles being fired at Russian targets. This led the Ukrainians to develop tactics that would reduce the number of operational S-400 batteries making Ukrainian air space dangerous for Ukrainian aircraft or Ukrainian missiles fired at Russian targets.

Ukrainians were not the first to discover how to deceive and destroy S-400 air defense batteries. In 2018 Russia announced that the last component of the S-400 SAM system, the 40N6 long 400 kilometer range missile, had been accepted into service and that there were plans to build a thousand of them. Russia currently has 41 battalions/batteries, both terms are used, with at least 330 operational truck-mounted launchers. What makes a group of launchers, usually 4-8, a battery is the search radar and command center. After twenty years of development, all the initially specified components of the S-400 system are in service.

The S-400 is advertised as the most modern and cost-effective SAM system available. An S-400 battery sells for about half what a comparable American Patriot battery does. The major difference between Patriot and S-400 is not cheaper price or much more impressive specifications but combat experience. The S-400 has none and the Patriot has lots and is gaining more every month in Saudi Arabia and Israel. The S-400 is attractive to buyers because it looks good and costs a lot less than combat-proven systems. Another major factor is the quality of the crews and the training they receive as well as the capabilities of air defense commanders who decide how the SAM systems are used, and the ability of the commanders and their crews to quickly adapt to enemy capabilities and tactics.

Patriot export customers get experienced and demanding instructors. If their students do not try or are not trainable for one reason or another, the Americans will make an issue of it because the performance of the Patriot depends on crew effectiveness. Russia is more understanding of such problems. Russia can provide skilled and exacting instructors but will back off if the customer is not interested in paying for that degree of instruction. If crews end up poorly prepared to handle S-400 in action, Russia will also quietly provide Russian crews who will be called something else like maintenance advisors but stand ready to take charge if the S-400 has to perform well. Russia is also accommodating when it comes to paying large sales commissions as bribes to get the sale and handle follow-up training and maintenance support. So for many reasons, few of which a buyer would want to be publicized, the S-400 is a more attractive purchase than Patriot. These sales tactics are nothing new for Russia and were common during the Cold War, especially when Russia was offering high tech weapons to corrupt dictatorships who appreciated a supplier who understood their needs.

Historically the ineptest users of Russian SAMs have been, and apparently still are, the Syrians while the most effective users of similar Western systems are the Israelis and Americans. The Saudis are building quite a record with their use of Patriot systems against Iranian supplied ballistic missiles fired by Yemen Shia rebels. The Saudi Patriots have shot down nearly all the 100 or so Iranian, and some older Russian ballistic missiles, fired at Saudi Arabia. The only success the Syrians have had using the older S-200 system is to shoot down a slow, four-engine Russian maritime reconnaissance aircraft off the coast. The S-200 entered service in the 1960s and has been updated since. The S-300 entered service in 1978 and has had no combat kills. The S-400 entered service in 2007 and is also without any combat experience. The Syrians didn’t mean to shoot down the Russian aircraft. They were aiming at Israeli aircraft which were already back in Israel. Russia, to demonstrate how attentive it is to customer needs, agreed with the Syrians and blamed Israel even though the Russians knew exactly what happened.

Syria also holds the dubious distinction of having their Russian air defense system wiped out in 1982 by the Israelis, who suffered no losses while doing so. Those Russian air defense weapons are not really that ineffective. In 1999 Serbian crews, using some of the same systems the Syrians had, managed to avoid destruction and even shoot down an F-117 stealth aircraft by being adaptive and more imaginative than the Syrians in 1982. Two other factors are important. After the Cold War ended in 1991 the United States was able to purchase some S-300 systems, tear down some of them and get others operational and actually use them in realistic testing. This data was shared with the Israelis. This showed that the S-300 was a potentially effective system, but a lot depended on the crews and their commanders.

The Russians have also learned from experience and because of that the S-400 and later post-Cold War S-300 systems use a lot more automation for the operators, making the systems less dependent on crew skill. But there is still the question of commander quality and the ability of the commanders to adapt to combat conditions. Finally, there is the fact, it is no secret, that post-Cold War Russian weapons suffer from serious quality control problems during manufacturing and several of the new Russian missile and electronic systems have suffered embarrassing failures when put to use. No wonder the S-400s are so cheap. They are priced to sell, not actually work in combat. But in the hands of competent and adaptive users, the S-400 and other Russian systems can be a lot more effective than those operated by poorly trained and led operators.

An S-400 battalion/battery has eight launchers, each with two or four missiles, plus a control center and radar and 16 missiles available as reloads. All equipment is mobile. S-400 was originally known as the S-300PMU3, SA-21, and was renamed S-400 because it turned out to be far more than just another upgrade of the S-300 and was considered sufficiently different to warrant a name upgrade.

The S-400 entered service in 2007 when the first units were deployed around Moscow. Russia claimed the S-400 could detect stealth aircraft, implying that the hypothetical enemy was the United States. Russia also claims the S-400 can knock down short-range ballistic missiles, those with a reentry speed of up to 5,000 meters a second, in the same way the similar U.S. Patriot system does. Russia immediately offered the S-400 for export, an effort that is hampered by a lack of combat experience for the system. Patriot has knocked down aircraft and ballistic missiles, S-400 has not. Moreover, Russia anti-aircraft missile systems have a spotty history, especially when confronted by Western electronic countermeasures. The first S-400s were based around Moscow as part of a project to rebuild the Soviet-era air defense system, which has fallen apart since the early 1990s.

During the first six years of use, between 2006 and 2012, Russia put 12 S-400 battalions into service. Before the crash in oil prices and sanctions over attacking Ukraine hit in 2014, Russia was planning to have 56 S-400 battalions in service by 2020. That was not hurt much by budget cuts as there were about 40 battalions in service by mid-2017. Even before then, the Defense Ministry ordered more of the older S-300V system in 2012. This seems to indicate that the S-400 was having problems; it has certainly encountered many delays but these were apparently cleared up. The S-400 appears to have not only matured technically but has undergone frequent upgrades and modifications. Nevertheless, the S-400 had not yet experienced any actual combat although it has performed well in tests.

The S-400 claims to be superior to the U.S. Patriot and is expensive by Russian standards. By 2012 Russia was pushing the S-400 as an export item, despite all the advanced technology in it. Most S-400 missiles weigh 1.8 tons each, are 8.4 meters long, and about 50cm in diameter. There are actually four different missiles, each with a different range; 9M96E is 40 kilometers, the 9M96E2 is 120 kilometers, 48N6 is 250 kilometers and 40N6 is 400 kilometers. All missiles can reach targets as high as 30 kilometers. The missile has a 145.5 kg warhead. The target acquisition radar has a range of 700 kilometers. S-400 missiles can hit short range ballistic missiles up to 60 kilometers away. Belarus and Algeria already had some S-400 equipment delivered and active. China ordered six battalions, India five and Turkey four. Several other countries were negotiating purchase deals.

The S-400 has more range than the 160 kilometers of the American Patriot, weighs twice as much, and claims far more capabilities. The S-400 anti-missile capability is limited to shorter range, under 3,500 kilometers an hour incoming speed, ballistic missiles. That would mean a warhead coming in at about 5,000 meters a second. The longer the range of a ballistic missile, the higher its re-entry speed.

The S-400 system actually has two types of missiles, one of them being smaller with a shorter range of 40 and 120 kilometers and two larger missiles with much more range of 250 and 400 kilometers. The 40/120 kilometers range missiles are deployed four to a launcher, like S-300 systems. The S-400 has no experience against Western countermeasures but U.S. intelligence believes that tests these systems have undergone indicate it is a capable air defense weapon. Just how capable won't be known until it actually gets used in combat. None of the S-300 series systems have any combat experience either but some models have performed well in tests.

The S-400 is to be complemented and eventually replaced by the S-500. This system was perpetually stuck in development, and also had several embarrassing delays announced. In 2009 S-500 was declared on track to enter service in 2012. That deadline was missed and the service date was moved to 2014, then 2015 and currently 2020 or “the early 2020s”. The original S-300 was known to NATO, during the Cold War, as the SA-10. This system entered service in the late 1970s and was subsequently upgraded several times. One major upgrade came to be called the SA-12 and it entered service in the late 1980s.

 

X

ad

Help Keep Us From Drying Up

We need your help! Our subscription base has slowly been dwindling.

Each month we count on your contributions. You can support us in the following ways:

  1. Make sure you spread the word about us. Two ways to do that are to like us on Facebook and follow us on Twitter.
  2. Subscribe to our daily newsletter. We’ll send the news to your email box, and you don’t have to come to the site unless you want to read columns or see photos.
  3. You can contribute to the health of StrategyPage.
Abonnieren   Contribute   Schließen Sie