Does the frequency of pay-for-performance payment matter?--Experience from a randomized trial

Health Serv Res. 2010 Apr;45(2):553-64. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.01072.x. Epub 2009 Dec 31.

Abstract

Objective: To examine the effects of incentive payment frequency on quality measures in a physician-specific pay-for-performance (P4P) experiment.

Study setting: A multispecialty physician group practice.

Study design: In 2007, all primary care physicians (n=179) were randomized into two study arms differing by the frequency of incentive payment, either four quarterly bonus checks or a single year-end bonus (maximum of U.S.$5,000/year for both arms).

Data collection/extraction methods: Data were extracted from electronic health records. Quality measure scores between the two arms over four quarters were compared.

Principal findings: There was no difference between the two arms in average quality measure score or in total bonus amount earned.

Conclusions: Physicians' responses to a P4P program with a small maximum bonus do not differ by frequency of bonus payment.

Publication types

  • Randomized Controlled Trial
  • Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.

MeSH terms

  • California
  • Group Practice
  • Humans
  • Medical Audit
  • Medicine
  • Primary Health Care / economics*
  • Program Evaluation*
  • Quality Indicators, Health Care
  • Quality of Health Care / economics*
  • Reimbursement, Incentive*