Abstract
We examine how the market power of physician groups affects the form of their contracts with health insurers. We develop a simple model of physician contracting based on 'behavioral economics' and test it with data from two sources: a survey of physician group practices in Minnesota; and the physician component of the Community Tracking Survey. In both data sets we find that increases in groups' market power are associated with proportionately more fee-for-service revenue and less revenue from capitation.
Publication types
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Research Support, U.S. Gov't, P.H.S.
MeSH terms
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Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Plans / economics*
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Blue Cross Blue Shield Insurance Plans / organization & administration
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Capitation Fee / statistics & numerical data
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Contracts / economics
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Contracts / standards
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Economic Competition
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Fee-for-Service Plans / economics*
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Fee-for-Service Plans / statistics & numerical data
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Group Practice / economics*
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Group Practice / organization & administration
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Group Practice / statistics & numerical data
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Health Care Surveys
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Humans
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Managed Care Programs / economics*
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Managed Care Programs / organization & administration
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Marketing of Health Services / economics
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Marketing of Health Services / organization & administration
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Minnesota
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Models, Economic
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Regression Analysis