The proponents of the somatic marker hypothesis presume that rational decision making is guided by emotional reactions that are developed from prior experience. Supporting evidence for the hypothesis comes almost exclusively from the short-term affective reactions that are learned during the course of a hypothetical decision-making task--the gambling task (GT). We examined GT performance and affective reactions to choices when those choices were biased by words that had preexisting affective value. In one experiment, affectively valued words directly signaled good and bad choices. A congruent relation between affective value of word and choice outcome improved GT performance, whereas an incongruent relation greatly interfered with performance. In another experiment, affectively valued words were maintained as a working memory (WM) load between GT choices. A WM load with affectively positive words somewhat improved GT performance, whereas affectively negative words interfered with performance. Somatic markers-indicated by differential anticipatory skin conductance response (SCR) amplitude for good and bad choices-appeared at a point in the GT session when choice performance was superior. However, differential SCR developed during the session after good choice performance was already established. These results indicate that preexisting affective biases can influence GT decision making. In addition, the somatic markers that are regular accompaniments of GT decision making appeared to be temporally lagging indicators of choice performance.