Excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical industry: adding another string to the bow of EU competition law

Health Econ Policy Law. 2021 Jan;16(1):64-75. doi: 10.1017/S1744133120000109. Epub 2020 May 21.

Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of excessive price abuse under Article 102(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), by drawing inspiration from a recent stream of cases (developed first at the national and then at the EU level) involving pharmaceutical companies marketing off-patent drugs. In particular, the two 'most advanced' cases are analysed: Aspen in Italy and Pfizer/Flynn in the United Kingdom. This new-found attention towards exploitative practices in the form of excessive and unfair pricing by dominant undertakings that have traditionally been subject to a cautious antitrust scrutiny seems worth exploring for a number of reasons, as illustrated in the paper. Ultimately, it is argued that this further 'interference' of competition law into the realms of regulation may be actually justified, albeit subject to precise conditions for enforcement, and may pursue policy objectives in the wider context of EU health law.

Keywords: Abuse of dominance; EU competition law; excessive prices; pharmaceutical pricing regulation.

MeSH terms

  • Antitrust Laws / economics*
  • Commerce / legislation & jurisprudence*
  • Drug Costs / legislation & jurisprudence*
  • Drug Industry / economics*
  • Drug Industry / legislation & jurisprudence*
  • Economic Competition / legislation & jurisprudence*
  • European Union / economics*
  • Humans
  • Italy
  • United Kingdom