Principles for priority setting in health care are typically forged by experts influenced by the normative literature on priority setting. Meanwhile, their implementation is subject to democratic deliberation, political pressures, and administrative bureaucracy. Sometimes expert proposals are democratically rejected. This points towards a problem: on the one hand, the fact that a majority shares a moral belief does not inherently validate this belief. On the other hand, when justifying a position to others, we cannot expect much success without engaging with their moral judgments. In this work we examine the possibility of including so-called popular views in a reflective equilibrium process. In reflective equilibrium processes, we are usually interested in considered judgments rather than mere intuitions. Popular views, arguably, often do not meet this standard. To mitigate this, we propose to bolster popular views by linking them with theoretical frameworks echoing similar moral perspectives. We use illness severity as a case study and show that a set of popular accounts can provide considered judgments that merit inclusion in a publicly informed reflective equilibrium process. This is plausibly a way forward in the search for priority setting principles that are both normatively sound and acceptable to the public. Our method provides a general framework for refining available data on popular views on moral questions, including when we cannot assess the consideredness of such views.
Keywords: Considered judgments; Experimental ethics; Illness severity; Popular views; Priority setting; Reflective equilibrium.
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