@article{Moss20051101APa, __markedentry = {[afeld]}, abstract = {The week before last I had lunch with a foreign correspondent who asked me if there was corruption in PR in China. Although I was only providing background, and not speaking to him on the record, I was, to put it politely, diplomatic in my answer. Ever mindful of the brand that graces my business-card, it’s an issue that I tend to tread lightly upon. I did, however, send him on to a friend who has been here longer than me and who works independently and is, therefore, inclined to be more forthcoming about such things. But the topic arose again last week, courtesy of bloggers Bingfeng, of Bingfeng Teahouse, and Myrick, of Asiapundit. Bingfeng fired the first shot in a post telling foreigners who complain about China’s media restrictions to find something better to do with their time. The crux of his argument was the blocking of any individual site affects only a few thousand people. However, a pervasive culture of media corruption fostered by “foreign MNCs” (multinational corporations) affects everyone in China: As we all know, the blocking of these web sites, in its worst situation, influence the life of a few thousands in china, while at the same time, the corrupt journalists/media taking money from firms and various organizations and writing misleading articles to fool the public is a everyday story in china, as i know, the norm of taking money from firms to make favorable media exposures was cultivated by many MNCs in china, which bribe chinese journalists in the name of "media PR" or "marketing PR" activities, and bribe them when they have a "PR crisis". such collusion affects the lives of millions of people and you could do something to change it, especially a lot of them are related with MNCs in china. There is some truth in what Bingfeng wrote. On this site I have previously written, tongue somewhat in cheek, of the “transportation claim” commonly paid to journalists who attend press events in China. According to the journalist I had lunch with, foreign technology companies originated this practice about ten years ago. I don’t know the detailed history. Anyone who does is invited to comment. So I agree with Bingfeng to some extent. However, before he makes me his “star of the week” again, he needs to read on, because I’m going to bite later. Myrick posted a rather interesting response to Bingfeng. First, he pointed out that he, a foreign correspondent by day, was recently offered 500 RMB (about US$60) himself while attending an event sponsored by a nameless European telecommunications firm. He mentioned that, although he refused the money, three Chinese journalists who were present accepted. I suspect that this was vanilla “transportation claim” (车马费) as 500 RMB is the amount typically offered to journalists who attend an event from out of town, while 200 RMB is the going rate for journalists from in town. If Myrick was attending an event in the town he is based in, then there is some inflation happening. I would like to point out that whoever offered Myrick the money, even if it was simply transportation claim, was an idiot or badly trained. Foreign correspondents work differently than Chinese ones on many levels. Any PR firm, local or foreign, that doesn’t train their staff on these differences is courting trouble. In my company we often dissuade clients from mixing local and foreign journalists not only because it makes things like the transportation claim awkward, but because we often have different messages for domestic and overseas audiences. In a rebuttal to Bingfeng that I agreed with, Myrick wrote the following: Bingfeng is correct that this is a serious problem for China - a 2003 study by the Institute for Public Relations [proxy link – WM] puts China dead last in a list of 66 countries in a study on the acceptability of bribery for coverage. Still, by citing the existence of this problem as a criticism of free-speech advocates he is making a common fallacy of argument by evading the issue. This is also known as the Chewbacca defense. That last link is from the blocked-in-China Wikipedia. I regret that readers here won't be able to access it without a proxy. The problems of censorship in and press bribery in China are related issues, both shape the content of news here. But to say that censorship of a website is something that only affects a "few thousand" is a gross understatement. While it may be only a handful of residents who are affected by a block on a single blogspot site, the control of information in China promotes ignorance, retards democratic development and prevents the building of an educated civil society. This affects 1.3 billion. The report that Myrick points to is well worth looking at. The reason why I agree with Myrick’s response, besides correctly calling out the “Chewbacca defense”, is that it points out that there is a relationship between corruption of the media and censorship. I think that relationship is quite deep, and has to do with how the media have evolved here and what Chinese societal expectations of the media are. I also think that relationship should be looked at in terms of corruption in general. Not to be dissuaded, Bingfeng came back with the following: [The] so-called "bribery for coverage" is more than just giving money to get favorable media exposures, thanks to the cultivatons of MNCs in china, the collusion between media and business has evolved into more sophisticated forms that influence/manipulate the public and they are unfortuantely followed by more and more organizations and individuals. khodorkovski-style chinese firms are on the horizons and their agents are already very active. this imposes an immediate threat to the emerging "civil society" in china, not the censorship. "free speech/press fighters" could do something to change the media corruptions, but in the short term i don't see their chant could do anything to reduce the media censorships. MNCs are the one who set the norms of media bribery, government "PR", media "PR", marketing "PR", etc. and our "free speech/press fighters" could do something to ask them to change the norms or even follow a more strict business ethics. this is a more approachable goal. like many things in china, the dysfunctional part of the system is not removed directly through a confrontational approach, but through the cultivations of incremental parts of the system. a less corrupt media will forster an environment that leads to less censorship. the only disadvantage of a different roadmap is that hte process will be less satisfying for the moral superiority of some westerners and perhaps doesn't fit into the political agendas of some of them. Here again, Bingfeng is half right. There is “collusion between media and business [that] has evolved into more sophisticated forms that influence/manipulate the public.” We call that public relations, and it’s what I do for a living. But no matter how distasteful you might find it, it is not necessarily corrupt, and seems not to have undermined civil society in most of the rest of the world. The origins of the transportation claim notwithstanding, blaming MNCs and PR companies for corruption in the Chinese media is absurd. Complicit though they may sometimes be, it’s like blaming vultures for the death of your horse in the desert. This argument is the reframing of a victimization theme I often see wielded against foreigners and multinationals when discussing problems in China. It plays well on nationalist sentiments and often does a really good job of deflecting attention away from serious, underlying issues worthy of scrutiny. The Chewbacca defense, as Myrick pointed out. Furthermore, to suggest that a cleaner media will lead to fewer restrictions on free speech is, quite simply, to put the cart before the horse. I believe the exact opposite is true. Free speech and a less fettered press are much more likely to be effective weapons against corruption. Who Are You Calling Corrupt? Chinese companies and institutions, as anyone who lives here rapidly learns, are quite capable of corruption without any foreign influence whatsoever. Corruption, in the media or anywhere else, isn’t something that springs up spontaneously, or as the result of the wicked influence of foreign MNCs, who are perennial favorite targets of Chinese nationalism. Corruption is like a gas. It’s always there and it expands to fill the shape and volume of the space available for it. The volume of space available for corruption is created by lack of transparency and by well established patterns of government and commercial behavior. While many countries, including the United States, have corruption, China leaves a comparatively wide-open space for it. For some details, sift through Transparency International’s website, which ranks China at number 78, alongside such illustrious company as Morocco, Sri Lanka, Senegal and Suriname. Or this more recent article (subscription) by Andrew Yeh, one of the Financial Times’ Beijing-based journalists, on the OECD’s assessment on the impact of widespread corruption in China. However, this isn’t to say that some MNCs won’t collude with corruption. MNCs tend to be amoral beasts that adapt themselves superbly to any environment in which they need to operate. Many governments are aware of this, which explains laws like the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Companies like mine often help to clean up the mess when MNCs get caught misbehaving. Bingfeng may be shocked to learn how often those cleanup efforts involve absolutely no bribes. For the record, in my time in the PR industry in China, I have never witnessed anything I felt to be corrupt. I have never seen anyone in my company do anything I felt was corrupt. Nor, in the course of their work with me, have any of my clients, all MNCs, done anything I felt was corrupt or even borderline. One of my clients’ policies on separating advertising and paid coverage from PR is so strict that we don’t even help with advertorial copy, something I did all the time in Singapore. If I was asked to do something I felt was wrong, I would decline to do it and warn whoever was asking me of the consequences. If necessary, I would resign before compromising myself, my colleagues or my company. I don’t think this is likely to happen, so it doesn’t keep me up nights. Our (Chinese) finance director is one of the most scrupulous and careful men I have ever met. He is constantly reminding us of our financial disclosure and probity obligations as part of a listed, international media conglomerate. Furthermore, despite the occasional ghastly scandal, there is no company as aware of the value of its reputation as a global PR company. None of this, however, means that Bingfeng is wrong about there being corruption in the media or in PR in China. Within our office, it’s the local, Chinese PR firms that take the most flack for corruption. Chinese consultants in my office have spoken to me many times of what they perceive as the distinctly lower ethical standards of local firms. This may simply be their pride talking, or just empty gossip. Although given how close many of our Chinese consultants are to Chinese journalists, they’d be in a position to hear about anything that happens. Now, allow me to pose a hypothetical scenario. If you’re MNC X, and you want to buy some coverage savaging your bitter competitor, MNC Y, in the China market, which of the two following PR firms would you use to arrange it? The SOX compliant multinational PR firm with public company accounting requirements and an international reputation to protect or, The privately held, locally owned firm with no international reputation or financial disclosure obligations. Simple risk management suggests the latter would be a better choice. Now perhaps, was this to actually happen, it would be a case of a wicked MNC leading an otherwise chaste Chinese PR company down the dark path of corruption. More likely, it would be willing buyer/willing seller. Furthermore, I’d be shocked Smurf blue to hear that Chinese companies, forever battling their own corruption demons, would turn up their noses at these methods. I don’t think they’d need to learn the trick from foreign MNCs. In case you are wondering, although I think it’s a bad idea, I don’t feel that the transportation claim is corrupt. Media corruption thrives in the dark, when its influence is hidden. The transportation claim is completely matter-of-fact and auditable. You can follow the trail, from our cost estimate for events to our invoices to clients to the list of exactly which journalists showed up at a press event, and their sign-in signatures. It’s never guaranteed us good coverage, or even attendance at events. Frankly, I think it’s a desperate waste of money, and it will be a good day for the maturity of Chinese media when it is abolished. But that will only happen when the Chinese media decide for themselves to abolish it, or when all companies with PR efforts in China, both local and foreign, decide to abolish it together. It would take a company with a large risk appetite indeed to unilaterally decide no longer offer the transportation claim, especially while their competitors still did. Is my position hypocrisy? Or rationalization? Maybe. What is this Media of which You Speak? I have been working in China for just over a year, and I, as an individual, am not an expert on the Chinese media. But I have been involved in media-related work, one way or another, for thirteen years, my graduate degree is in media studies, and I work in an industry whose stock in trade is an understanding of media. With that disclosure, you may take the following observations as you will. The problem with Chinese media is not that it is being corrupted by ne’er-do-well foreign MNCs or PR firms. Rather, it is that the Chinese media are in transition from explicit state control to something subtler and more reflective of modern Chinese society. It has become something that isn’t developed country media, but which looks like it from a distance. Bound up in this transition are the ongoing changes in China’s media regulations as the government tries to figure out what it wants Chinese media to be, and shifting public expectations of what role the media should play in Chinese society. The tremors of this transition have been documented in Chinese media, overseas media and, not least, by the China blogging community. An interesting recent example includes ESWN’s post on fraudsters representing themselves as journalists. If all this seems like a recipe for confusion…it is. This shows in, yes, the opportunities for corruption and, more mundanely, in how the media relate to authority, to multinationals and, of course, to PR firms. There is a relationship aspect to PR work everywhere. It’s formalized. We call it, surprisingly enough, “media relations”. An ability to build good relationships with journalists is one of our marketable skills. Here in China, our relationships with journalists are especially cozy. Not corrupt, mind you, just cozy. This coziness isn’t unique to China any more than media corruption or the influence of corporate or state parent organizations. Anyone who thinks that the US, for example, is immune to this hasn’t been following the salacious Plamegate affair. This has done wonders to illuminate the shameful coziness that greases the operations of both the Washington DC press corps and the spin-obsessed White House. But in China this coziness is more pervasive. Although I never did PR in the US, I did do it in Singapore, which also has state-controlled media often accused of pliancy. Even in Singapore, no matter how good my personal relationships with journalists were (and they were pretty good), there was often an adversarial quality to the professional relationship. That wasn’t necessarily expressed in hostility or bad press, but in healthy skepticism, tough questions, and wariness of spin. All qualities of a decent press corps. Here in China I find, on average, that it is much easier for us to control a line of questioning or set it in advance, review coverage and quotes before they go to press, suggest themes and anticipate the tone of stories. Journalists here often expect us to package stories quite completely for them, giving us yet more room to set the agenda. We have stenographers at most media events, and send complete transcripts of press conferences and round tables to the journalists who attend them, often on the same day. It is expected that we will do this. When we can package a story more completely, we can dictate its tone more effectively. Among my Chinese team members, the nickname for pliant journalists is “rabbits”. Not the image of ferocity. Now, I want to stress two important things. First, relationships are not a red carpet. We flacks in China are not excused from having to come up with good pitches and interesting events. And we’re not immune to bad press, by any stretch of the imagination. We also have real PR challenges that are unique to doing business in China. It’s just that the relationships are more central to how we work. In the land of guanxi, this is not so surprising. Second, and most important, my observations above are industry generalizations. I know many extremely bright and motivated Chinese journalists who take real pride in their work. They are capable of asking dynamite questions, picking up killer angles, and writing hard-hitting and intelligent stories. Chinese journalists have suffered and died for their commitment to their work, and for their integrity and many are worthy of the highest respect. (Contrary to what you might think, most PR people are news junkies and really appreciate dynamite journalism, as long as it isn’t causing trouble for our own clients.) Even many of the “rabbits” are good, smart people working in an established system. Please do not interpret my observations as a condemnation of Chinese journalists. Some Chinese media pliancy may simply be a result of a wildly booming industry that is hungry for content. The seller of a product that is in high demand, such as particular content, exerts more control. That’s why Hollywood publicists can dictate question lists for stars, whereas corporate flacks like me seldom can. But I think some of it also descends from the Chinese media’s recent legacy of control and management from above. Chinese media are still evolving their editorial standards and modes of operation. PR firms, multinationals and Chinese firms will all figure out how best to operate and achieve their goals in this environment. That might be cynical, and you don’t have to like it, but it isn’t corrupt. Ruthlessly separating my preferences as a media consumer from my objectives as a PR pro, I am under no obligation to tell a journalist to ask tougher questions of my client. Mouthpieces or Watchdogs? What does China want from its media? Let me return to the idea that started it all off: the relationship between free speech and corruption. The media can be a potent weapon in fighting corruption, given the space to do so. A few years ago, Jiang Zemin appeared to recognize this when he cited media as one of the country’s great tools in its perennial war against corruption. Of course the media themselves were fighting their own corruption demons in ways that went far beyond low-rent payola for good coverage, as 2004 busts of senior editorial staff from the well known Southern Metropolis News and Nanfang Daily Group showed. But beyond media’s own corruption problems, counting on them to help unmask corruption demands independence and a culture of enterprise that needs room to grow. The current government seems to have different ideas, as this recent article from The Economist (subscription) reports: The Chinese government's increasingly hardline stance is encapsulated in Document 16, promulgated this spring. Among other things, this banned the practice of yidi baodao, or “reports from non-local places”, with journalists travelling to distant cities where, free of their local minders, they could write harder-hitting stories about corrupt local officials or social unrest. “This was the best hope for China developing an open press,” says Mr [Nicolas] Becquelin [of human-rights group HRIC]. In Hong Kong, papers critical of China, like Apple Daily, are complaining that advertisers are fleeing because of threats to their mainland businesses. Journalists there are suddenly finding it harder to get visas for travel to the mainland. These regulations were also covered nicely by the invaluable Chinese media blog, Danwei. Even more worrying, some suggest that anti-corruption drives in China are simply tools to clean out the lingering remnants of the previous power structure and, bizarrely, to implement monetary policy, as suggested by this Asia Times Online article. So, even in their role as corruption fighters, the Chinese media face the specter of being cynically deployed tools of state policy. Media can, of course, be effective weapons against corruption, whether that’s corruption in government, business or within their own industry. Even if, for no other reason than fulfilling their own business objectives by attracting eyeballs, most publications love nothing more than to break a big scandal wide open. But that will never happen here unless the government can decide what role the media should fill in society: mouthpieces or watchdogs. They can’t be both. You can’t state-manage a media industry to effectiveness as anti-corruption crusaders, and keep it muzzled at the same time. You have to do the opposite. Give them space, in the form of freedom of the press, which is just another way of saying freedom of speech. That will help to lift the veil on corruption everywhere including, yes, in the media itself. So when we arrogant foreigners rail against the restrictions on the Chinese media, we aren’t ignoring the problem of corruption in the media, or anywhere else. In fact, we are advocating for the unleashing of China’s most potent weapon against corruption. A truly free media. Filed under: China, PR & Media (Old)}, added-at = {2008-06-01T16:51:41.000+0200}, author = {Moss, William}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68/acf}, description = {May08}, interhash = {d87ba8998b19991a07ad3d8b608e1693}, intrahash = {e76652b006f9f9d12ace68c97e73ab68}, journal = {Imagethief (Blog)}, keywords = {China Chinese_media PR PR&media Public_Relations Shanghai blog corruption fun}, month = {29.01.8:14 AM}, note = {Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his agency. For more information see "About Imagethief", below.}, owner = {afeld}, review = {re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Tuesday, November 01, 2005 8:26 AM by Myrick Great post. To clarify (as I did with a link, but I can't seem to find your trackback URL) I do think the payments are payola, or at least they started out as such and have become something a little different. I expect companies feel they have to offer them because it is the norm, not because it buys favorable coverage. And I expect that local media companies will assume that they can keep salaries low by noting that reporters will make extra from press conferences ("Sure, 2000 yuan a month seems low - but you'll make at least 600 extra a week from press conferences on top of that.") As for the inflation, they were all Shanghai reporters at a local event. I was once offered 300 yuan once back in April, so I hardly have a real basis for comparison, but perhaps it's just another example of Shanghai being the more-expensive city. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Tuesday, November 01, 2005 9:35 AM by Ian Lamont Imagethief is touching upon issues that journalists in many countries encounter. In the United States media ethics are taken very seriously, and reporters and editors who get too cozy with PR folks or colleagues who sell advertising are viewed with suspicion by other journalists. There is, in fact, a term for writers that are viewed to be in the pockets of others, and/or aren't good journalists: "Hacks." The dim view of hacks is the result of numerous factors, ranging from our "free press" system, to historical encounters with Yellow Journalism and McCarthyism, to Internet journalism sites (Romenesko et al) where media scandals, no matter how minor, are rapidly disseminated to thousands of other American journalists. China also has a long media history, but it has been influenced by a different set of factors. The press is officially subservient to the state and society, and can only play a limited watchdog role. From the early 1950s to the early 1980s it was devoid of any commercial influence. Now commercial- and circulation-supported news has come back with a vengeance, and Chinese journalists are dealing with new pressures. They may not see any problem with getting too close to PR flacks -- I believe a widespread awareness of journalism ethics in China has been stunted by the state, which doesn't want a watchdog press. I also would hypothesize that the hong bao trend in Chinese media that Imagethief and others have described may have migrated from Taiwan. I worked in the Taiwanese media in the mid 1990s, first as a television newswriter and later as a newspaper reporter and editor, and press conferences sponsored by large companies sometimes distributed hong bao with cash or department store gift certificates inside (many pressers were held at department stores). The first time I saw this, I questioned one of my Taiwanese colleagues, a television reporter, about the practice. He didn't seem surprised, said it was common, and gladly pocketed the cash (typically a few thousand $NT, or about US$60-$90). He was surprised that I didn't do the same. His reports, incidentally, were largely "fluff pieces," and I hear now he's a spokesman for a major Taiwanese political party. I know Taiwanese PR folks and journalists have crossed over to China to start businesses, and I wouldn't be surprised if they introduced their media practices to Chinese colleagues. I am curious if anyone who has worked in Hong Kong media has similar experiences. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Tuesday, November 01, 2005 12:44 PM by David It WAS a long post, but well worth it. Great job, Will. I'll say here what I told the foreign correspondent mentioned in paragraph one when he called me. I told him that in an increasingly commercial and competitive media environment, MNCs operating in China and their agencies have other means at their disposal to do their jobs than payola. Plainly speaking, that is a) understanding the interests of journalists and editors and b) providing them with information and insights that they can use as raw material to build compelling stories they have in inerest in writing and publishing. It CAN be done. We PR people deign to call ourselves "professionals." There is no individual deserving of that appellation who does not feel a twinge of nausea every time a red envelope is handed over - whether the amount inside is RMB100 or if its RMB 500. Regardless of the origin or original justification of the practice, we have a moral obligation to start the process to put an end to transportation reimbursements, not to mention any residual "pay for publish" practices that remain in the market. Doing so can only improve the quality of journalism and the journalistic profession and, in the end, redound to the benefit of all. The onus to do so falls equally upon MNCs and agencies. But the agencies have to take the first step. And that means the professionalization of the PR business in China. The international agencies cannot carry this standard alone agains the tide of thousands of local agencies who feel no compunction about paying high transportation fees and in some cases up to 1RMB a word for routine coverage. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Tuesday, November 01, 2005 8:00 PM by will David, I am reminded of something that you have discussed separately: that MNCs should strive to set examples of superb corporate governance in China, and distinguish themselves by their leadership. I think the reality still falls somewhat short. Many still find it easier to preach --as poorly received as that often is-- than to lead through action, with the hard choices that might entail. Also, you raise an interesting issue here in the role that the PR industry --especially the international PR industry-- has in helping to shape the Chinese media positively. I realize that many people might scoff at the thought. But remember what I wrote in the post; most PR people are news junkies and/or ex journalists who appreciate the value of a great press. But that might be a topic for another post. # A Primer on Public Relations in China Wednesday, November 02, 2005 3:07 AM by The Peking Duck This is a monumental post from Imagethief, and as usual there's little I can add. Topics include what it's like working with the Chinese media, government censorship, the "transportation fee" we PR people dole out to Chinese reporters and other... # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Wednesday, November 02, 2005 4:16 AM by Martyn Top notch post mate, what a pleasure to read. Hope it receives the links it so richly deserves. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Wednesday, November 02, 2005 4:36 AM by Zhuanjia As someone who worked for a Chinese newspaper (China Daily) I can say that the description of rabbits is very apt. I don't think that corruption is a big deal - there is the "transport money" thing, but that's small change compared to the advertorial deals that are done by the management. Beijing Weekend, for example, has run a long series of puff pieces for a cheesy dance spectacular called "Burn the Floor" - because they were advertisers. Likewise they did a flattering story about an overseas Chinese philanthropist, fr the same reason. On general assigments the reporters just went along to the press conference, picked up the press pack and re-wrote the into (sometimes not even that) before filing it as a story. No curly questions or even basic reporting skills applied. Why? I don't know. Laziness? Cultural factors? Or just the fact that they could get away with it so long as they didn't write anything to offend either the authorities or the advertisers. I think it is simply because there just isn't a tradition of grassroots indpendent media. There are no independent local newspapers for reporters to cut their teeth on. They come straight from a state-controlled journalism school [where they have been taught the "right" way to do a story] to a state-controlled newspaper. And when they are pressured to create interesting material, they think it involves stuff like photos of body painting. The vibrant press in Taiwan and Hong Kong show it's not a cultural difference thing - and it has nothing to do with MNCs corrupting influence. It's still that China's media is still basically very backward and operating under heavy restrictions. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Wednesday, November 02, 2005 4:38 AM by will Thanks, Martyn. A pleasure to see you back here. It has, indeed, got some fair attention from the usual suspects,and a couple of unusual suspects. It seems I can't escape this issue. I have something coming based on Simon's post this morning, which discussed press freedom in Singapore. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Wednesday, November 02, 2005 4:56 AM by will Zhuanjia, that's a great comment, and its nice to get an observation from someone who has worked inside the Chinese media (even English language Chinese media). I think the key truth that we keep bumping into here is that the press in China has evolved from very different roots and operates in a very different governmental and regulatory framework than those we grew up with. I don't think individual laziness is the problem. The government, the media environment and editors set the expectations, and journalists operate according to those expectations. It's a shame. There is a lot of brainpower here going to waste. It may be why we get so many bright ex-journalists in our agency. We may be Sinister Agents of Evil, but we do have to think. # re: Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media? Wednesday, November 02, 2005 7:41 PM by Filthy Stinking No.9 Very interesting story ... though to be honest, I think I learned more about the PR industry than I did about China! # Thursday PR Blog: American Internet Firms in Chinese Peril Thursday, November 10, 2005 12:39 AM by Imagethief I like talking with journalists because, naturally, they have a way of asking interesting questions.... # Weekend PR blog: Why do China flacks ignore foreign correspondents? Sunday, April 09, 2006 6:59 AM by Imagethief On Friday, Imagethief got an e-mail from a Beijing-based correspondent for an international business... # Weekend PR blog: Why do China flacks ignore foreign correspondents? Sunday, April 09, 2006 10:58 AM by Imagethief On Friday, Imagethief got an e-mail from a Beijing-based correspondent for an international business... # Last week in China PR and communication... Sunday, August 05, 2007 10:12 PM by Imagethief There is a lot going on now that I want to write about but I've found myself a bit busy to go in-depth}, timestamp = {2008-06-01T16:52:31.000+0200}, title = {Are PR and MNCs Corrupting Chinese Media?}, url = {http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2005/11/01/4968.aspx}, year = 20051101 } @article{Moss20070129WEC, __markedentry = {[afeld]}, abstract = {How did I miss this? The Washington Post's Ed Cody has written a fascinating story (via David Wolf's Silicon Hutong) about a syndrome we in the PR business in China run into regularly: the practice of media extortion in China. I can't comment extensively right now, but this is a very real issue. Cody gets into the history and consequences of the practice: In many ways, blackmail journalism grew naturally out of a system in which Communist Party censors control the news rigorously, barring reports that could be seen as unfavorable to the party or contrary to the government's political goals. If the ruling party distorts the news for political reasons, blackmailing reporters have concluded, why wouldn't they do it themselves for financial reasons? In addition, local party officials, long used to manipulating information, have been complicit in the payoff system when it suits their needs. In the everybody-does-it atmosphere, even non-reporters have found ways to get in on the take by posing as journalists. After the August 2005 mine disaster, for instance, reporters and their friends in Henan province dispatched a flurry of cellphone messages as soon as they heard the news -- not because they were eager to report on it, but because they knew local officials would be eager to hush it up. By the time Fan Youfeng of the Henan Business News arrived at the mine, in a village in Jiliao county, local officials said they had already given money to so many reporters and phony reporters that the coffers were dry. But still more people showed up, Fan wrote, and the officials sought more cash, pressing the mine owners to chip in. Journalists and poseurs lined up to get their handouts, he said, with some pushing and jumping the queue. Over several days, the extortionists carried away 200,000 yuan, or more than $25,000, he reported, quoting officials and a list signed by those who got the cash. Encouraged by Ma, his editor, Fan wrote a story for the Henan Business News about what had happened. It was the first open discussion of what had become a widespread if secretive practice, Ma said with a note of pride. As a result, however, an official from the central government propaganda department visited from Beijing and accused Ma of publishing an "inappropriate" and "false" story. The newspaper was suspended for a month, Ma was forced to retire and Fan was reprimanded, Ma said. The death toll from the mine disaster was never reported, he added. Don't miss David's own post on this issue. David is a former colleague of mine and veteran of public relations in China. David explains how companies fall into this trap and lays down a very clear policy for avoiding it. He writes: There's only one way to avoid [falling into this trap]: Repeat after me: "No matter what my PR people, my PR agency, or anyone else tells me, OUR COMPANY WILL NEVER PAY FOR COVERAGE, either directly or indirectly." I wonder how many of our agencies follow that very sound advice.}, added-at = {2008-06-01T16:51:41.000+0200}, author = {Moss, William}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0/acf}, description = {May08}, interhash = {b7abe8b909adf69763526ea0c991afed}, intrahash = {c2a53c370cf8baeb2bb5c97129e6dcc0}, journal = {Imagethief (Blog)}, keywords = {China Chinese_media PR PR&media Public_Relations Shanghai blog corruption fun}, month = {29.01.8:14 AM}, note = {Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his agency. For more information see "About Imagethief", below.}, owner = {afeld}, timestamp = {2008-06-01T16:52:31.000+0200}, title = {WaPo's Ed Cody on media bribery in China}, url = {http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2007/01/29/8308.aspx}, year = 20070129 } @article{Moss20070203SPb, __markedentry = {[afeld]}, abstract = {Colleagues from American and European offices often ask Imagethief how PR in China is different from PR in the west. Usually I give a two-part answer. First I tell them that were they to step into our offices in China they would see many things that they would instantly recognize as garden variety PR. We write press releases, organize events, craft angles and pitch stories to competitive publications and journalists, develop communication strategies and train executives in how to handle the media, among other things. But then I tell them about what's different, usually sticking to the highlights. In the best diplomatic, spin-doctorese I tell them that the Chinese media's "ethical framework is not entirely developed". By which I mean that it is, in many ways, a corrupt swamp. (This is something of a theme in the foreign media recently, having been covered by the Washington Post, New York Times and AP with the Lan Chengzhang case as catalyst.) The other difference is that the government has explicit power over the media agenda. Most of the time, self-censorship is the rule. However the propaganda ministry --中宣部-- also sends out guidance on sensitive issues to major media. Editors who want to keep their jobs are expected to toe the line. Occasionally an acute issue will motivate a directive to halt coverage of a topic, as when media were directed to layoff the Foxconn-Apple scandal of last year. (Recently this has led to proscribed topics sloshing over into journalists' and editors' blogs, but that's a topic for ESWN.) We were reminded of the realities of government management of the media agenda recently, shortly after arranging an interview between one of our MNC clients and a Chinese business magazine. The magazine in question had requested the interview, with an eye on exploring our client's business and investments in China. The discussion was vigorous but reasonably balanced and we were expecting a decent article as a result, with publication planned prior to Chinese New Year. About two weeks after the interview, one of the editors involved called us and said the story would be "delayed". Apparently the magazine had just received guidance from the Propaganda Ministry to be more "sensitive" in publishing stories that involved foreign investment, particularly around certain industries or well-known Chinese brands. We had not, at first blush, considered the story we were developing to be particularly risky or sensitive. But the journalists and editors at the magazine were, as you would expect, taking the ministerial guidance extremely seriously. So we had to wait, and so did our client. But clients who make busy senior (foreign) executives available expect explanations about these kinds of things. "Hey, dude, it's China," doesn't really cut it, so we did a little poking around. The back-story is illustrative of one of the challenges of the PR biz in China. Anyone who follows current affairs in China will know that these are delicate times for discussing the topic of foreign investment. Questions are being raised about the quality of foreign investment and the intent behind it. Early last November the 11th Five Year Plan was published. It put a great deal of emphasis on the quality of foreign investment. In this English Xinhua article about the plan, the money graf --as far as we were concerned-- is the very last one: In response to the rising concern over foreign acquisitions of leading Chinese firms in critical sectors, the document says China will speed up legislation and step up the supervision of sensitive acquisitions and takeovers to ensure critical industries and enterprises remain under Chinese control. Shortly thereafter, it seems the initial guidance to treat reporting around this topic sensitively was passed on to at least some Chinese media. The publication we were dealing with was government-linked, and had little wiggle-room as far as interpreting this directive to be "sensitive". Unfortunately, apparently, they had somehow missed the memo and in their previous issue published an article that had raised eyebrows upstairs. This had resulted in a ministerial reminder to toe the line, which descended, Rumsfeldian snowflake fashion, into the in-boxes of the editors of the magazine we were working with the day before they called to tell us that they had to postpone. My initial response when the Chinese media-relations guru on my team told me that the magazine had to postpone the story because of a government directive was to assume they were giving me a polite brush-off. Similar, perhaps, to what you might get if a Western editor didn't like the story a journalist had put together on your client, and the journalist in question wanted to tell you something more polite than, "The editor thinks your interview was crap on a stick." "Are they yanking our chain?" was the first question I asked her. Some of our other Chinese team members, including one of our government relations people, had the same first reaction, so it wasn't just foreigner-itis. But after some research and phone calls turned up the story above I changed my opinion. At the very least, if it was an excuse, it was a damn well substantiated one with abundant face-saving for everyone. In which case, my face duly saved, I could sleep well at night. The net result, however, is that our story went on the back burner, where it remains until the publication feels that it can once again broach the topic of foreign investment in certain industries, or hell freezes over (whichever comes first). And now I have one more piece of due-diligence to do when identifying Chinese media to work with in future. Such is one of the many things that make PR in China such a rush. Filed under: China, PR & Media (Old)}, added-at = {2008-06-01T16:51:41.000+0200}, author = {Moss, William}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/231c2dc3afd89ea8229cd71b41f6478db/acf}, description = {May08}, interhash = {dd605e8f29a090710cfab54d844621fa}, intrahash = {31c2dc3afd89ea8229cd71b41f6478db}, journal = {Imagethief (Blog)}, keywords = {PR Public_Relations Shanghai blog fun olympics}, month = {03.02. 4:20 AM}, note = {Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his agency. For more information see "About Imagethief", below.}, owner = {afeld}, review = {comments re: Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story Saturday, February 03, 2007 8:04 AM by Paul Will........... You have been in SH for some time now and I keep waiting for your comparison to BJ. Surely you find SH more suited to a Cal boy?? Anyway, I'll be there for a few days over spring festival. Paul # re: Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story Saturday, February 03, 2007 11:21 AM by will Paul...stay tuned. It's coming! SH for a Cal boy? Maybe. It's nice, but Beijing has a certain familiar grunginess that I identify with. I'll be in Singapore over Spring Festival myself, enjoying a little thaw. # re: Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story Saturday, February 03, 2007 8:52 PM by Charlie That's an interesting story. From my State-media hack perspective it sounds like it has all the doings of a very conservative editor, rather than micro-management by a propaganda official. Particularly if the magazine in question had any relationship/affiliation with any government branch, which most of them do, then anything likely to even so much as make the censors think twice is likely to be a loss of face and do damage to promotion prospects. All that truly matters to most editors here, older and more part of the system as they are, is that they make no mistakes. Why run a minutely-risky but interesting story when you can run a tedious one that no-one is interested in AND be seen to be doing a better job? # re: Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story Sunday, February 04, 2007 11:59 PM by doug So is your job to help the government or help the client? Who pays you, the client or the government? # re: Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story Monday, February 05, 2007 3:28 AM by will Doug, are you asking me an ironic question? I somehow feel I should be insulted. My job is to help the client. One way to help your foreign client in China is to ensure that they don't needlessly piss off the government, especially if they operate in an area the government is sensitive about, or alienate the editors of major, state-owned business publications. There is always a plan-B, even in this case. # re: Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story Wednesday, February 07, 2007 10:18 AM by jbs A Chinese editor friend put it this way: If you go hard, do 99 things right and one thing wrong, you'll only be remembered by your failure, which will be made complete and utter. I you cruise along doing 50 -- putting in half-daze, and not caring, you'll not make a mistake and never a failure. I get it sometimes from MS JBS, who makes me a Zhongguo nushu. She's ingrained with the blame game which is no fun at times of furry. It's so ingrained this "blaimocracy" and so stultifying. Many people are so afraid of being blamed for something, they can't bring themselves to do the right thing. Do I digress? I mean to agree with Charlie's comments. yrs, JBS}, timestamp = {2008-06-01T16:52:30.000+0200}, title = {Saturday PR blog: I'm sorry, the government has killed your story}, url = {http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2007/08/14/jim-yardley-on-the-olympics-and-politics.aspx}, year = 20070203 } @article{Moss20070814JYO, __markedentry = {[afeld]}, abstract = {Jim Yardley, of the New York Times and International Herald Tribune, sums up the situation facing Beijing nicely in a "Letter from China" column in the IHT: [If] anything was evident last week when Beijing staged a one-year countdown to the 2008 Games, it was that eliminating politics from the Olympics was about as likely as eliminating medals. Beijing may have envisioned a public relations opportunity, but so did an array of advocacy groups that spent the week whipsawing China on human rights violations, press freedom and Tibet. If a few stunts were daring - protesters unfurled a "Free Tibet" banner on the Great Wall - the criticisms were not new. What did change was the way the Olympics amplified the dissent, even for a nonevent like the one-year countdown. Media attention intensified merely because the Olympics were in town. "All of these voices are going to become stronger and stronger, not weaker and weaker, as the Games approach," said John MacAloon, an Olympic historian who has advised the Beijing Olympic committee on managing the traditional torch relay. "All Olympic Games are, of course, highly politically charged and sensitive in some regions of the world. How could they not be?" For about as long as the modern Games have existed, they have served as a stage for politics as much as sport. Berlin 1936 was Hitler and Jesse Owens. Helsinki 1952 was the beginning of the Cold War. Mexico City 1968 was the Black Power salute. The blood of 11 slain Israeli athletes stained Munich 1972. Moscow 1980 meant boycotts, as did Los Angeles 1984. It's worth a read, and reaffirms some of the challenges I've noted here. One thing noted in this article that I've noted before is that the Olympics have essentially always been political. Step one in solving a problem is acknowledging you have one. Once Beijing reconciles itself to the idea that the Olympics will be politicized, and starts working out how to manage that as constructively as possible, its path will become smoother. Also, unremarked in the PR roundup I did for last week was that another politician, Maxine Waters of California, has floated the Olympic boycott idea (joining presidential candidate Bill Richardson). For what its worth, Imagethief thinks that is a stupendously bad idea and about as likely as sending a US team composed entirely of poodles. But ideas like that will gain more visibility in the next year. Previously (and growing by the week): Bang! China shoots its own Olympic PR in the foot Does BOCOG need to raise China's Olympic PR game? Don't politicize the Olympics? It's much too late for that... AP: China watching NGOs prior to Olympics Democratic presidential candidates kick around the Olympic boycott football Did the "Genocide Olympics" influence China? Filed under: China, Public Relations and Media, Olympics}, added-at = {2008-06-01T16:51:41.000+0200}, author = {Moss, William}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2251cc6cb9348105ebf48212a670dce2f/acf}, description = {May08}, interhash = {475ebaf11b64550a5e9e88ee95ab8951}, intrahash = {251cc6cb9348105ebf48212a670dce2f}, journal = {Imagethief (Blog)}, keywords = {PR Public_Relations Shanghai blog fun olympics}, month = {14. August 7:17 AM}, note = {Imagethief is William Moss, a public relations professional and writer working in China since 2004. The opinions in this blog are his own, not those of his agency. For more information see "About Imagethief", below.}, owner = {afeld}, timestamp = {2008-06-01T16:52:30.000+0200}, title = {Jim Yardley on the Olympics and politics}, url = {http://news.imagethief.com/blogs/china/archive/2007/08/14/jim-yardley-on-the-olympics-and-politics.aspx}, year = 20070814 } @article{Feldmann2005Siemens, added-at = {2008-05-04T04:10:01.000+0200}, author = {Feldmann, Anja}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/20cd116210259b63d5c55d97a83f26bfe/acf}, day = 13, edition = {01:09}, howpublished = {online}, interhash = {75f3bcf38884d47c0dd5a1cad89c33ad}, intrahash = {0cd116210259b63d5c55d97a83f26bfe}, journal = {Lausitzer Rundschau Online / dpa}, keywords = {China Shanghai industry news}, month = {12}, owner = {test1}, timestamp = {2008-05-04T04:10:09.000+0200}, title = {Siemens investiert in chinesische Medizin. Zentrum für Ausrüster und Krankenpflege geplant. }, year = 2005 } @article{lagerkvist:fla, added-at = {2008-03-29T10:25:44.000+0100}, author = {Lagerkvist, A.}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/22277049143ef2f0187d34fefb28272bd/acf}, interhash = {dc8a2d83460df3919892732c9374caf6}, intrahash = {2277049143ef2f0187d34fefb28272bd}, journal = {The ESF-LiU Conference}, keywords = {conference media shanghai}, timestamp = {2008-03-29T10:25:45.000+0100}, title = {{Future Lost and Resumed: Media and the Spatialization of Time in Shanghai}}, year = 2006 } @article{feldmann(2004)F1, added-at = {2008-03-26T13:45:39.000+0100}, address = {Duesseldorf}, annote = {Mit der Rennstrecke, die am Sonntag Formel 1-Austragungsort ist, hat die chinesische Metropole Schanghai eine Touristenattraktion geschaffen - und kokettiert mit sich selbst.}, author = {Feldmann, Anja}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2a0b8987c7f83bac109bd7a347a6804fd/acf}, day = 24, edition = {weekend}, interhash = {3475075bc408f19457d8f785993b3d76}, intrahash = {a0b8987c7f83bac109bd7a347a6804fd}, journal = {Handelsblatt, Weekend Journal}, keywords = {China F1 Formel1 Freizeit Shanghai Sport Tourismus news}, month = {09}, pages = 9, timestamp = {2008-03-26T13:45:39.000+0100}, title = {Formel1 im Yuyuan-Garten}, year = 2004 } @article{feldmann(2005)siemens, added-at = {2008-03-26T11:49:12.000+0100}, author = {Feldmann, Anja}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/21117c75b25a92cb08aef94a720cd4373/acf}, day = 13, edition = {01:09}, howpublished = {online}, interhash = {81d191fe8185ee4cd107d17ef3386c39}, intrahash = {1117c75b25a92cb08aef94a720cd4373}, journal = {Lausitzer Rundschau Online / dpa}, keywords = {China Shanghai industry news}, month = {12}, timestamp = {2008-03-26T11:49:13.000+0100}, title = {Siemens investiert in chinesische Medizin. Zentrum für Ausrüster und Krankenpflege geplant. }, year = 2005 } @techreport{CDHK03, added-at = {2008-03-26T11:38:59.000+0100}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/208c92b1a49f378706a34cc55576e1bff/acf}, editor = {Feldmann, Anja}, interhash = {e3e870470f04ae7c5558852eda789725}, intrahash = {08c92b1a49f378706a34cc55576e1bff}, keywords = {CDHK China DAAD Shanghai Tongji newsletter university}, number = 3, timestamp = {2008-03-26T11:38:59.000+0100}, title = {CDHK-aktuell Nr. 3}, year = 2003 } @techreport{CDHK02, added-at = {2008-03-26T11:31:24.000+0100}, address = {Siping Lu 1239, 200092 Shanghai}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/29d41b106f6198dd499c58efb9f616ab2/acf}, editor = {Feldmann, Anja}, interhash = {f30d6525b1844c5050bcaeb040349522}, intrahash = {9d41b106f6198dd499c58efb9f616ab2}, keywords = {CDHK DAAD Tongji china shanghai university}, number = 2, timestamp = {2008-03-26T11:31:24.000+0100}, title = {CDHK-aktuell Nr. 2}, year = 2002 } @techreport{CDHK01, added-at = {2008-03-26T11:27:30.000+0100}, address = {Siping Lu 1239, 200092 Shanghai}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/2c183fd71f96ec07ff7b215eaff2eb7fe/acf}, editor = {Feldmann, Anja}, interhash = {975449c40d01324efe5dca650138328f}, intrahash = {c183fd71f96ec07ff7b215eaff2eb7fe}, keywords = {CDHK China DAAD Shanghai Tongji newsletter university}, number = 1, timestamp = {2008-03-26T11:27:30.000+0100}, title = {CDHK-aktuell Nr. 1}, year = 2002 } @article{feldmann(2006)tiefseehafen, abstract = {Transport: Eine 32 km lange Brücke verbindet den neuen Containerumschlagplatz in der Bucht von Hangzhou mit der boomenden Industrie auf dem Festland VDI nachrichten, Shanghai, 1. 9. 06, Si - Chinas größter Containerhafen strebt weltweit den Spitzenplatz an. Innerhalb von drei Jahren hat Shanghai seinen Containerumschlag schon mehr als verdoppelt. Nach der ersten Ausbaustufe des neuen Tiefwasserhafens Yangshan will die Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) im kommenden Jahr mit geplantem Börsengang und Auslandsbeteiligungen die Nr. 1 werden. Shanghais neuer Tiefwasserhafen ist eine Touristenattraktion. Rund 6 € kostet der Halbtagsausflug mit dem Bus, den die Shanghaier Behörde für Industrietourismus anbietet. Erster Stopp ist die Fotoausstellung über 1271 Tage Brückenbau im Besucherzentrum von Lingang - rund 50 km südlich von Shanghai. 32 km zieht sich von hier die sechsstreifige Brücke über das Ostmeer zur Felseninsel Yangshan. Dort wurde eine Aussichtsplattform eingerichtet, von der die Besucher einen guten Blick auf die Containerschiffe am 1600 m langen Kai des Terminal 1 haben. Bereits 2007 werde Shanghai größter Containerhafen der Welt, prognostiziert Henrik Anker Olesen, Logistikexperte für Asien-Pazifik bei IBM Business Consulting Services in Shanghai. Mit der ersten Ausbauphase des Tiefwasserhafens sei Shanghai diesem Ziel ein gutes Stück näher gerückt. Mit einem Gesamtinvestitionsvolumen von 100 Mrd. RMB (rd. 10 Mrd. €) ist der Tiefwasserhafen Yangshan eines der großen Infrastrukturprojekte Chinas und neben den Vorbereitungen auf die Expo 2010 einer der Konjunkturmotoren, die der Stadt überdurchschnittliche Wachstumsraten bescheren. 12,6 % legte die Shanghaier Wirtschaft im ersten Halbjahr 2006 zu - gegenüber dem nationalen BIP-Wachstum von 10,9 %. Bis 2020 sollen insgesamt 50 Containerlandestellen auf der Insel entstehen und Shanghai endgültig zum asiatischen Schifffahrtsdrehkreuz machen. Gerade erst bewilligten die Behörden eine Tankfarm für Erdöl und Erdölprodukte mit einer Kapazität von 400 000 m3. 21 Mio. TEU (20-Fuß-Standardcontainereinheit) will Hafenbetreiber Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) in 2006 abwickeln, 3 Mio. TEU steuern allein die fünf neuen Ladeplätze in Yangshan I bei. Damit liefert sich Shanghai ein Kopf-an-KopfRennen mit den führenden Containerhäfen Singapur (23,2 Mio. TEU) und Hongkong (22,4 Mio. TEU). Bereits im ersten Halbjahr war die 10-Mio-TEU-Schwelle überschritten worden - 2003 war dies noch der gesamte Jahresumschlag an Containern. Ohne Yangshan mit seinen mehr 15 m tiefen Anlegeplätzen wäre diese Entwicklung nicht denkbar. Ein solcher Hafen will jedoch erst einmal bezahlt sein. Voraussetzung dafür war die Öffnung des chinesischen Logistikmarktes für ausländische Investoren im Zuge des WTO-Beitritts. Kurz nach der Eröffnung von Yangshan I wurde Ende 2005 das Betreiberkonsortium des zweiten Containerterminals gewählt. Für die zweite, 4 Mrd. RMB teure Ausbaustufe sind mit AP Moeller Maersk und Hutchinson Wampoa zwei internationale Logistikschwergewichte mit jeweils 32 % eingestiegen. Die restlichen Anteile werden von SIPG (16 %) sowie den Logistikkonzernen Cosco Pacific und China Shipping Group (beide 10 %) gehalten. SIPG, 2003 hervorgegangen aus der ehemaligen Shanghai Port Authority, will nun weitere Finanzmittel für den Hafenbau und andere Projekte über die Börse beschaffen. Mittels eines Aktientauschs mit der Tochter Shanghai Port Group plant SIPG für Ende September ihren Gang an die Shanghaier Börse. Die Anteilseigner hatten dem Rückkaufsplan für die Port Group bereits Anfang August zugestimmt, nun steht noch die behördliche Genehmigung für den Börsengang aus. Die Shanghai International Port Group, die zu 50 % der Stadt gehört, geht damit den Weg vieler großer Staatskonzerne. Töchter werden von der Börse genommen, um die ganze Gruppe an den Aktienmarkt zu bringen. Die damit verbundenen Veröffentlichungsauflagen sollen für mehr Transparenz in der Unternehmensführung sorgen. Nach dem Shanghaier Börsengang sollen weitere 25 % von SIPG an die Hongkonger Börse gebracht werden. Nach Schätzungen der South China Morning Post soll das mehr als 800 Mio. Dollar in die Kasse bringen. Es geht längst nicht mehr allein um das lokale Geschäft. "Go west" und "go global" heißt das Motto, mit dem im Rahmen des 11. Fünfjahresplans eine stärkere Internationalisierung der SIPG-Aktivitäten angestrebt wird. "Es ist unser strategisches Ziel, ein multinationaler Hafenbetreiber zu werden", sagte Wang Qingwei, Sprecher des SIPG-Vorstands, im Juli in einem Dow-Jones-Interview. Inzwischen hat SIPG die ersten Sondierungen abgeschlossen und steht vor einer möglichen Minderheitsbeteiligung am Containerterminal im belgischen Zeebrügge, dem sechstgrößten Hafen Europas, der sich davon wiederum Zuwächse im Warenverkehr mit China erhofft. Die Shanghai International Port Group würde damit ihre bisherigen Allianzen vertiefen: APM-Terminals in Zeebrügge gehören zur dänischen Moeller-Maersk-Gruppe. Beim belgischen Pilotprojekt wird es nicht bleiben. SIPG will in den kommenden Jahren in europäischen und amerikanischen Häfen entlang der wichtigsten Schifffahrtsrouten investieren, um vom ausländischen Know-how zu profitieren und sein eigenes Management zu modernisieren. Sie ist damit Pionier unter den chinesischen Hafenbetreibern. China ist zwar schon heute der weltweit drittgrößte Logistikmarkt nach den USA und Japan, hat aber nach den Worten von Olesen Nachholbedarf in Ausbildung, Kostenstruktur, Managementkultur, Infrastruktur, Lagerwesen und Informationstechnologie. Die Logistikkosten in China seien mehr als vier Mal so hoch wie in Europa oder den USA. Das rasante Handelswachstum der vergangenen Jahre hat in den Regionen Begehrlichkeiten geweckt. Mit dem steigenden Preisniveau und Sättigungsgrad in Südchina und Shanghai wird die Yangtse-Zone schon als künftiger Wirtschaftsmotor gesehen - hier sind die Märkte noch aufnahmefähig, die Arbeitskraft noch billig. So hat bereits eine Wanderbewegung von Herstellern beispielsweise aus der Automobilproduktion in diese Region eingesetzt. Die lokalen Yangtse-Anrainerprovinzen sowie Küstenstädte spekulieren daher auf steigende Einnahmen aus dem Hafengeschäft und bauen kräftig aus. Beispielsweise erhalten Chongqing und Wuhan größere Hafenkapazitäten, insgesamt werden 28 große innerchinesische Häfen am Yangtse gezählt. Am Geschäft dieser Zubringerhäfen will SIPG teilhaben. Inzwischen übersteigen die lokalen Pläne die nationalen Vorgaben, wie Wang Ming, stellvertretender Generaldirektor des Instituts für Transport in der zentralen Planungsbehörde National Development and Reform Commission im Sommer laut Shanghai Daily feststellte. Einerseits dürfen im Schiffsverkehr keine Engpässe entstehen, andererseits will man vermeiden, dass ein unkontrollierter Ausbau von Hafenkapazitäten die Renditen älterer Investments verwässert. Schon macht beispielsweise der neue Yangshan-Tiefwasserhafen mit niedrigeren Gebühren dem alten Waigaoqiao-Hafen Konkurrenz. Übrigens: Die meisten Hafenbesucher sind keine hartgesottenen Logistikfans. Sie lockt vor allem die Neustadt Luchao Harbor City in Lingang. Erbaut nach Masterplänen der Hamburger Architekten gmp verheißt Luchao neue Immobiliengeschäfte, schließlich entsteht hier Wohnraum für 300 000 Einwohner. Auch Schenker China ist hier bereits vertreten. Der Logistikdienstleister hat ein 12 000 m2 großes Lager angemietet und seinen Europa-Frachtverkehr nach Lingang verlagert. Das entspricht rund 50 % des Shanghai-Geschäfts. ANJA FELDMANN/Si}, added-at = {2008-03-25T12:53:08.000+0100}, author = {Feldmann, Anja}, biburl = {https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/27afa9a34cac7361942b63be59d3b556a/acf}, day = 01, interhash = {ecd7d45868202571983e8ff55b99b970}, intrahash = {7afa9a34cac7361942b63be59d3b556a}, journal = {VDI nachrichten}, keywords = {China Shanghai industry logistik transport transportation}, month = {09}, timestamp = {2008-03-25T12:53:09.000+0100}, title = {Neuer Tiefwasserhafen bringt Shanghai an die Weltspitze}, url = {http://www.vdi-nachrichten.com/vdi_nachrichten/aktuelle_ausgabe/akt_ausg_detail.asp?source=volltext&cat=2&id=29422}, year = 2006 }