Farey v Burvett: Difference between revisions

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{{Short description|Judgement of the High Court of Australia}}
{{Use Australian English|date=November 2017}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=November 2017}}
{{Infobox court case
| name=Farey v Burvett
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| date decided=8 June 1916
| full name=
| citations={{Cite AustLII |year=1916 |court=HCA |num=36 |parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916) 21 {{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}} 433]}}
| judges= [[Samuel Griffith|Griffith]] [[Chief Justice of Australia|CJ]], [[Edmund Barton|Barton]], [[Isaac Isaacs|Isaacs]], [[H. B. Higgins|Higgins]] [[Frank Gavan Duffy|Gavan Duffy]], [[Charles Powers|Powers]] & [[George Rich|Rich]] [[Justices|JJ]]
| prior actions=
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'''(5:2)''' The defence powers of the Commonwealth were sufficient to permit the Governor-General to make regulations and orders fixing the maximum price for bread.<small>per Griffith CJ, Barton, Isaacs, Higgins & Powers JJ.</small>
}}
'''''Farey v Burvett''''',<ref name="Farey">{{Cite AustLII |litigants=Farey v Burvett |year=1916 |court=HCA |num=36 |parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433]}}</ref> is an early [[High Court of Australia]] case concerning the extent of the [[Section 51(vi) of the Constitution of Australia|defence power]] of the Commonwealth.<ref name="Defence power"/> The majority of the Court took an expansive view of the defence power in a time of war, holding that the defence power extended to fixing the maximum price for bread. The Court adopted a different approach to the interpretation of the defence power which emphasised the purpose of the legislation, the defence of Australia, rather than the subject matter. As the law fell within a Commonwealth power, whether the law was necessary or appropriate for the defence of Australia was a matter for Parliament.
 
== Background ==
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<blockquote>51 The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to:
:(vi) the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth;
:(xxxii) the control of railways with respect to transport for the naval and military purposes of the Commonwealth;<ref name="Defence power">[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/s51.html section 51(vi) & (xxxii)] Commonwealth Ofof Australia Constitution.</ref>
 
114. A State shall not, without the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military force ...<ref>[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/s114.html section 114] Commonwealth Ofof Australia Constitution.</ref>
 
119. The Commonwealth shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.<ref>[http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/coaca430/s119.html section 119] Commonwealth Ofof Australia Constitution.</ref></blockquote>
The effect of these provisions is that the defence power is exclusive to the Commonwealth.
 
===The Act, regulations and order===
 
In October 1914 the Australian Parliament enacted the [[War Precautions Act 1914|''War Precautions Act'' 1914]] which authorisedauthorized the Governor-General to "make regulations for securing the public safety and the defence of the Commonwealth, and for conferring such powers and imposing such duties as he thinks fit, with reference thereto, upon the Naval Board and the Military Board and the members of the Naval and Military Forces of the Commonwealth".<ref name="1914 Act">{{cite web|title=''War Precautions Act'' 1914 |url=https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1914A00010 |publisher=Commonwealth of Australia}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Commonwealth Parliament from 1901 to World War I |url=http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1415/ComParl#_Toc418157288 |author1=Rob Lundie |author2=Dr Joy McCann |publisher=Parliamentary Library |date=4 May 2015}}</ref>
 
Pursuant to this power, the Governor-General (in Council) made the ''War Precautions (Prices Adjustment) Regulations'' 1916,<ref name="1916 Regs No 40">{{cite web|title=''War Precautions (Prices Adjustment) Regulations'' 1916 No 40 |url=https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1916L00040 |publisher=Commonwealth of Australia |date=24 March 1916}}</ref> which proclaimed various areas, including "(c) The area comprised within a radius of ten miles from the General Post Office, Melbourne, in the State of Victoria." and provided that <blockquote>9.(1) The Governor-General may from time to time, on the recommendation of the Board—
:(a) determine the maximum prices which may be charged for flour and bread sold in any proclaimed area;
:(b) determine the conditions under which flour and bread may hebe sold therein.
(2) Any such determination shall be published in the Gazette, and shall from the date specified in the Gazette have the force of law.</blockquote>
 
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==Argument==
Farey was represented by [[William Irvine (Australian politician)|Sir William Irvine]] {{post-nominals|country=AUS|KC}} and [[Hayden Starke]] who argued that the existence of war did not supersede the express limitations of the Constitution, including the reserved powers doctrine, and the defence power was the same whether there be peace or war. The law of necessity overrides the constitutional limitations, however whether the necessity exists is a question of fact to be determined by the courts. The defence power did not extend to matters which are indirectly conducive to the naval or military defence.<ref name="Farey argument">''Farey v Burvett'' [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433] at pp. 434-8434–8.</ref>
 
Burvett, an Inspector in the [[Department of the Treasury (Australia)|Commonwealth Treasury]], argued that defence including attacking all resources at the disposal of the enemy and conserving the resources of the Commonwealth. The export of the wheat surplus was desirable both for supplying troops and funding the war.<ref name="Farey argument"/>
 
== Decision ==
The majority of the High Court, Griffith CJ, Barton, Isaacs, Higgins & Powers JJ held that the defence powers in sub-section 51(vi) of the Constitution was sufficient during the war for the Commonwealth to fix the maximum price for bread. In doing so the majority adopted a different method of interpretation from that adopted in dealing with the other heads of power in section 51, in that they treated the defence power as a purpose to which the legislation must be addressed while other powers require that the legislation is directed to the subject matter or answers the description of the head of power, and to disregard the purpose or object.<ref>{{cite journal web|author=Geoffrey Sawer |title=The Defence Power of the Commonwealth in Time of War |url=http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=20%20Australian%20Law%20Journal%20295}} |journal=(1946) 20 [[Australian Law Journal|ALJ]] 29 |page=296}}.</ref> Gavan Duffy & Rich JJ dissented in a joint judgement.
 
===Necessity===
 
The Court held that it was no answer to the ''War Precautions Act'' to say that a method was not necessary because the end might be attained by other means because the choice of means was a matter for parliament.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://legalopinions.ags.gov.au/legalopinion/opinion-1699 |title=Opinion No. 1699: Proposed Uniform Federal Income Tax Scheme |author=E M Mitchell KC |author-link=Ernest Mitchell |via=Australian Government Solicitor |date=1 May 1942}}</ref> Griffith CJ rejected the concept of necessity as overriding the Constitution and that the court may make inquiry into the facts, holding that the Court was concerned with the existence of the power and whether it was necessary or desirable was a matter for Parliament.<ref name="Farey Griffith"/> Barton J similarly held that once it was determined that a law was authorizedauthorised by the Constitution, whether it was wise and expedient was a political question for the Parliament, not a judicial question for the Courts.<ref name="Farey Barton">''Farey v Burvett'' [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433] at pp. 445-6445–6 per Barton J.</ref> Higgins J in his separate judgement also held that it was enough that the Act was capable of aiding the defence of the Commonwealth and that whether it did so was not for the Court to decide.<ref name="Farey Higgins">''Farey v Burvett'' [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433] at pp. 457-461457–461 per Higgins J.</ref>
 
Neither Isaacs J, with whom Powers J agreed,<ref name="Farey Isaacs"/> nor the dissenting judges, Gavan Duffy & Rich JJ,<ref name="Farey Gavan Duffy"/> expressed any opinion on this issue.
 
===Extent of the defence power===
Griffith CJ disposed of the suggestion that the defence power was in some way limited holding "As to the suggested limitation by the context, the words "naval" and "military" are not words of limitation, but rather of extension, showing that the subject matter includes all kinds of warlike operations."<ref name="Farey Griffith"/> Barton J argued from the perspective that the safety of Australia depended on the success of the [[British Empire]] in the war, holingholding that the defence of Australia was not limited to the operations of troops and warships, but extended to the use of every resource of the nation to injure the enemy or help Australia's allies. Barton J held that the Act and regulations were a valid exercise of the defence power in times or war, but not in time of peace.<ref name="Farey Barton"/>
 
Isaacs J also saw the war as a battle for the continued existence of Australia, holding that all other powers were necessarily dependent on the effective exercise of the defence power for the purpose of preserving Australia and the States at all hazards and by all available means.<ref name="Farey Isaacs"/> Higgins J the ambit of the defence power was "not merely to make laws for the control of the forces, but to make laws (not for, but) " with respect to " naval and military defence, and to matters incidental to that power". The nature of defence may require a national effort to preserve Australia's existence, requiring the whole force of the nation.<ref name="Farey Higgins"/>
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===Reserved Powers===
One of the challenges for Griffith CJ and Barton J was how to accommodate the doctrine of reserved powers. If the Commonwealth Parliament was unable to regulate the brewing industry,<ref name="Petersweld">{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Peterswald v Bartley]] |year=1904 |court=HCA |num=21 |parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1904/21.pdf (1905)&nbsp;1&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;497]}}.</ref> conditions for railway employees,<ref name="Railway servants">{{cite AustLII |litigants=Railway servants case |link=Federated Amalgamated Government Railway & Tramway Service Association v NSW Rail Traffic Employees Association |year=1906 |court=HCA |num=94 |parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/94.pdf (1906)&nbsp;1&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;488]}}.</ref> manufacturers of agricultural machinery,<ref name="Barger">{{cite AustLII |litigants=[[R v Barger]] |year=1908 |court=HCA |num=43 |parallelcite=
[http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1908/43.pdf (1908)&nbsp;6&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;41]}}.</ref> or unfair competition by corporations,<ref name="Huddart">{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead]] |year=1909 |court=HCA |num=36 |parallelcite=[http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1909/36.pdf (1909)&nbsp;8&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;330]}}.</ref> how could the Commonwealth's powers extend to directly fix a maximum price for bread?
 
Griffith CJ held that "The power to make laws with respect to defence is, of course, a paramount power, and if it comes into conflict with any reserved State rights the latter must give way."<ref name="Farey Griffith">''Farey v Burvett'' [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433] at pp. 442-5442–5 per Griffith CJ.</ref> Barton J distinguished between powers in peace and war, holding that "If an activity belongs solely to a State in time of peace it does not follow that it is not a means of defence for Commonwealth hands in time of war."<ref name="Farey Barton"/>
 
Isaacs J doubted that it was permissible to give legal prominence to any one Commonwealth power, even one as necessary as defence, maintaining his previous rejection of the reserved powers doctrine,<ref name="Barger Isaacs">{{cite AustLII |litigants=[[R v Barger]] |year=1908 |court=HCA |num=43}}; [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1908/43.pdf (1908)&nbsp;6&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;41] at p. 84 per Isaacs J.</ref> holding the limits of the defence power "are bounded only by the requirements of self-preservation. It is complete in itself, and there can be no implied reservation of any State power to abridge the express grant of a power to the Commonwealth". His Honour acknowledged that the Commonwealth was entering a legislative area normally outside of its powers, holding that <blockquote>I do not hold that the Legislature is at liberty wantonly and with manifest caprice to enter upon the domain ordinarily reserved to the States. In a certain sense and to a certain extent the position is examinable by a Court. If there were no war, and no sign of war, the position would be entirely different. But when we see before us a mighty and unexampled struggle in which we as a people, as an indivisible people, are not spectators but actors, when we, as a judicial tribunal, can see beyond controversy that coordinated effort in every department of our life may be needed to ensure success and maintain our freedom, the Court has then reached the limit of its jurisdiction. If the measure questioned may conceivably in such circumstances even incidentally aid the effectuation of the power of defence, the Court must hold its hand and leave the rest to the judgment and wisdom and discretion of the Parliament and the Executive it controls-for they alone have the information, the knowledge and the experience and also, by the Constitution, the authority to judge of the situation and lead the nation to the desired end.<ref name="Farey Isaacs">''Farey v Burvett'' [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/36.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433] at pp. 453-6453–6 per Isaacs J, Powers J agreeing.</ref></blockquote>
 
Higgins J similarly maintained his rejection of the reserved powers doctrine,<ref name="Baxter Higgins">{{cite AustLII|litigants=[[Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW)]] |year=1907 |court=HCA |num=76}}; [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1907/76.pdf (1907)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;1087] at p. 1165 per Higgins J.</ref> holding that the constitutional question was limited to the interpretation of the express defence power and rejected the suggestion that the defence power was paramount, holding "All the subjects for legislation in sec. 51 are on the same logical level: there is no hierarchy in the powers, with the power as to defence on the top."<ref name="Farey Higgins"/>
 
Gavan Duffy & Rich JJ in their dissent placed emphasis on the powers of the States, holding that <blockquote>The enumerated powers entrusted by the States to the Commonwealth are stated in language adopted after prolonged and meticulous discussion. The powers distributed and reserved were intended to enable the individual States and the federation of States to move, each in its own orbit, in a complete and permanent harmony.<ref name="Farey Gavan Duffy">''Farey v Burvett'' [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1916/361.pdf (1916)&nbsp;21&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;433] at p. 462, 469 per Gavan Duffy & Rich JJ.</ref></blockquote>
 
==Subsequent consideration==
In ''[[Stenhouse v Coleman]]''<ref name="Stenhouse"/> [[Owen Dixon|Dixon J]] explained the difference in approach to the defence power arising from ''Farey v Burvett'' as follows:
<blockquote>Some of the difficulties which have been felt in the application of [the defence power] seem to me to be due to the circumstance that, unlike most other powers conferred by s. 51 of the Constitution, it involves the notion of purpose or object. In most of the paragraphs of s. 51 the subject of the power is described either by reference to a class of legal, commercial, economic or social transaction or activity (as trade and commerce, banking, marriage), or by specifying some class of public service (as postal installations, lighthouses), or undertaking or operation (as railway construction with the consent of a State), or by naming a recognized category of legislation (as taxation, bankruptcy)•In In such cases it is usual, when the validity of legislation is in question, to consider whether the legislation operates upon or affects the subject matter, or in the last else answers the description, and to disregard purpose or object. ... But 'a law with respect to the defence of the Commonwealth' is an expression which seems rather to treat defence or war as the purpose to which the legislation must be addressed.<ref name="Stenhouse">{{cite AustLII |litigants=[[Stenhouse v Coleman]] |year=1944 |court=HCA |num=35}} [http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/download.cgi/cgi-bin/download.cgi/download/au/cases/cth/HCA/1944/36.pdf (1944)&nbsp;69&nbsp;{{abbr|CLR|Commonwealth Law Reports}}&nbsp;457] at p. 471 per Dixon J.</ref></blockquote>
 
== See also ==
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== References ==
{{reflist|30em|refs=}}
 
[[Category:High Court of Australia cases]]