Scientific formalism: Difference between revisions

'''Scientific formalism''' is a broad term for a family of approaches to the presentation of [[science]]. It is viewed as an important part of the [[scientific method]], especially in the [[physical sciences]].

There are multiple levels of scientific formalism possible. At the lowest level, scientific formalism deals with the symbolic manner in which the information is presented. To achieve formalism in a [[scientific theory]] at this level, one starts with a well defined set of [[axiomsaxiom]]s, and from thesethis follows a [[formal system]].

Some actual formal theories on [[fact]]s have been proposed.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/formal-theories.html|title=Facts > Some Formal Theories in the Literature (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)|website=plato.stanford.edu|access-date=19 April 2018}}</ref>

The scientific climate of the twentieth century revived these questions. From about the time of [[Isaac Newton]] to that of [[James Clerk Maxwell]] they had been dormant, in the sense that the physical sciences could rely on the status of the [[real number]]s as a description of the [[Continuum (theory)|continuum]], and an agnostic view of [[atom]]s and their structure. [[Quantum mechanics]], the dominant physical theory after about 1925, was formulated in a way which raised questions of both types.

In the [[Classical mechanics|Newtonian]] framework there was indeed a degree of comfort in the answers one could give. Consider for example the question of whether the [[Earth]] really goes round the [[Sun]]. In a [[frame of reference]] adapted to calculating the Earth's orbit, this is a mathematical but also tautological statement. [[Newtonian mechanics]] can answer the question, whether it is not equally the case that the Sun goes round the Earth, as it indeed appears to Earth-based astronomers. In Newton's theory there is a basic, fixed frame of reference that is [[inertial]]. The 'correct answer' is that the point of view of an observer in an [[inertial frame of reference]] is privileged: other observers see artifacts of their acceleration relative to an inertial frame (the [[Fictitious force|inertial forces]]). Before Newton, [[Galileo]] would draw the consequences, from the [[Nicolaus Copernicus|Copernican]] [[heliocentric]] model. He was, however, constrained to call his work (in effect) scientific formalism, under the old 'description' '''saving the phenomena'''. To avoid going against authority, the elliptic orbits of the heliocentric model could be labelled as a more convenient device for calculations, rather than an actual description of reality.

In [[general relativity]], Newton's inertial frames are no longer privileged. In quantum mechanics, [[Paul Dirac]] argued that physical models were not there to provide semantic constructs allowing us to ''understand'' microscopic physics in language comparable to that we use on the familiar scale of everyday objects. His attitude, adopted by many [[theoretical physicist]]s, is that a good model is judged by our capacity to use it to calculate physical quantities that can be tested experimentally. Dirac's view is close to what [[Bas van Fraassen]] calls [[constructive empiricism]].<ref>http{{cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/constructive-empiricism/|title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|first1=Bradley|last1=Monton|first2=Chad|last2=Mohler|editor-first=Edward N.|editor-last=Zalta|date=19 April 2018|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=19 April 2018|via=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

Duhem also wrote on saving the phenomena. In addition to the [[Copernican Revolution]] debate of "[[saving the phenomena]]" ([[Greek language|Greek]]: σῴζειν τὰ φαινόμενα, ''sozein ta phainomena''<ref name= "sozein ta phainomena">An ancient view (attributed to [[Plato]] by [[Simplicius of Cilicia]]) on hypotheses, theories and phaenomena, on what scientists, or more historically accurately (ancient) astronomers, are for, are supposed to do; see

| chapter-url=httphttps://books.google.com/books?id=HPBE3RbeceQC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA49#v=onepage&q&f=false

Wherein "The oldest extant text in which the expression "save the phenomena" is only of the first century A.D. namely Plutarch's ''On the Face in the Orb of the Moon''", hence see also (in Greek) [[Plutarch]], [httphttps://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0356%3Astephpage%3D923a De faciae quae in orbe lunae apparet, 923a] (or [httphttps://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2008.01.0357%3Asection%3D6 in English]) at the [httphttps://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/ Perseus Project]</ref>)<ref>Cf. {{Cite book

}} ([httphttps://wwwbooks.amazongoogle.com/Pierre-Duhem-History-Philosophy-Science/dp/0872203085/refbooks?id=sr_1_1#reader_0872203085UofBybolmREC&lpg=PP1&pg=PA131 excerpt on pg. 132]).</ref><ref>Cf. [[Andreas Osiander]]'s [[De_revolutionibus_orbium_coelestiumDe revolutionibus orbium coelestium#Ad_lectoremAd lectorem|''Ad lectorem'' introduction]] to [[Copernicus]]'s ''[[De revolutionibus orbium coelestium]]''.</ref> versus offering explanations<ref>[[Pierre Duhem]] thinks "[[Kepler]] is, unquestionably, the strongest and most illustrious representative of that tradition," i.e., the tradition of [[Scientific realism|realism]], that physical theories offer explanations in addition to just "saving the phenomena."</ref> that inspired Duhem was [[St. Thomas Aquinas|Thomas Aquinas]], who wrote, regarding [[Deferent and epicycle|eccentrics and epicycles]], that<blockquote>Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle [...]. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astronomy the theory of [[Deferent and epicycle|eccentrics and epicycles]] is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. [...]<ref>''[[Summa Theologica]]'', [http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1032.htm#article1 I q. 32 a. 1] ad 2</ref></blockquote>

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