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{{short description|
{{About|the theory of action in general|[[Ludwig von Mises]]' work on this subject|Human Action{{!}}''Human Action''|the concept in sociology|Social action}}{{Agency sidebar}}
▲An '''action''' is an event that an agent performs for a purpose, that is guided by the person's [[intention]].<ref name="Wilson">{{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=George |last2=Shpall |first2=Samuel |last3=Piñeros Glasscock |first3=Juan S. |title=Action |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2016}}</ref><ref name="Honderich">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Action}}</ref> The first question in the [[Action theory (philosophy)|philosophy of action]] is to determine how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like involuntary reflexes.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Action}}</ref> According to [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], it involves discovering "[w]hat is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm".<ref>{{cite web |title=Action theory |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/action-theory |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=1 March 2021 |language=en}}</ref> There is broad agreement that the answer to this question has to do with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to do so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant theory of the relation between the intention and the behavior is ''causalism'':<ref name="Wilson"/> driving the car is an action because it is ''caused'' by the agent's intention to do so. On this view, actions are distinguished from other events by their causal history.<ref name="Honderich"/> Causalist theories include [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s account, who defines actions as bodily movements caused by intentions in the right way, and volitionalist theories, according to which [[Volition (psychology)|volitions]] or tryings form a core aspect of actions. Non-causalist theories, on the other hand, often see intentions not as the action's cause but as a constituent of it.
An important distinction among actions is between non-basic actions, which are done by doing something else, and basic actions, for which this is not the case. Most philosophical discussions of actions focus on physical actions in the form of bodily movements. But many philosophers consider mental actions to be a distinct type of action that has characteristics quite different from physical actions. Deliberations and decisions are processes that often precede and lead to actions. Actions can be rational or irrational depending on the reason for which they are performed. The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do.
== Conceptions ==
Conceptions of action try to determine what all actions have in common or what their essential features are. Causalist theories, like [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s account or standard forms of volitionalism, hold that causal relations between the agent's mental states and the resulting behavior are essential to actions. According to Davidson, actions are bodily movements that are caused by intentions in the right way. Volitionalist theories include the notion of volitions in their account of actions. Volitions are understood as forms of summoning of means within one's power and are different from merely intending to do something later. Non-causalists, on the other hand, deny that intentions or similar states cause actions.
=== Davidson's account ===
The most well-known account of action, sometimes simply referred to as the ''standard account'', is due to
One difficulty with theories of action that try to characterize actions in terms of causal relations between mental states and bodily movements, so-called ''causalist theories'', is what has been referred to as ''wayward'' causal chains.<ref name="Audi"/> A causal chain is ''wayward'' if the intention caused its goal to realize but in a very unusual way that was not intended, e.g. because the skills of the agent are not exercised in the way planned.<ref name="Wilson"/> For example, a rock climber forms the intention to kill the climber below him by letting go of the rope. A wayward causal chain would be that, instead of opening the holding hand intentionally, the intention makes the first climber so nervous that the rope slips through his hand and thus leads to the other climber's death.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Enç |first1=Berent |title=Causal Theories of Intentional Behavior and Wayward Causal Chains |journal=Behavior and Philosophy |date=2004 |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=149–166 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ENCTO}}</ref> Davidson addresses this issue by excluding cases of wayward causation from his account since they are not examples of intentional behavior in the strict sense. So bodily behavior only constitutes an action if it was caused by intentions ''in the right way''.
One important objection to Davidson's theory of actions is that it does not account for the agent's role in the production of action. This role could include reflecting on what to do, choosing an alternative and then carrying it out.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> Another objection is that mere intentions seem to be insufficient to cause actions, that other additional elements, namely volitions or tryings, are necessary. For example, as [[John Searle]] has pointed out, there seems to be a causal gap between intending to do something and actually doing it, which needs an act of the will to be overcome.<ref name="Stuchlik"/>
=== Volitionalism ===
''
''Volitionalism'' as a theory is characterized by three core theses: (1) that every bodily action is accompanied by a trying, (2) that tryings can occur without producing bodily movements and (3) that in the case of successful tryings, the trying is the cause of the bodily movement.<ref name="Stuchlik"/><ref name="Craig"/> The central idea of the notion of ''trying'' is found in the second thesis. It involves the claim that some of our tryings lead to successful actions while others arise without resulting in an action.<ref name="Kühler2">{{cite book |last1=Kühler |first1=Michael |last2=Rüther |first2=Markus |title=Handbuch Handlungstheorie: Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven |publisher=J.B. Metzler |isbn=978-3-476-02492-3 |url=https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476024923 |language=de |chapter=7. Handlungsversuche|date=27 October 2016 }}</ref> But even in an unsuccessful case there is still something: it is different from not trying at all.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> For example, a paralyzed person, after having received a new treatment, may test if the treatment was successful by trying to move her legs. But trying and failing to move the legs is different from intending to do it later or merely wishing to do it: only in the former case does the patient learn that the treatment was unsuccessful.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> There is a sense in which tryings either take place or not, but cannot fail, unlike actions, whose success is uncertain.<ref name="Kühler2"/><ref name="Audi"/> This line of thought has led some philosophers to suggest that the trying itself is an action: a special type of action called ''basic action''.<ref name="Wilson"/> But this claim is problematic since it threatens to lead to a [[vicious regress]]: if something is an action because it was caused by a volition then we would have to posit one more volition in virtue of which the first trying can be regarded as an action.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Brent"/>
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=== Non-causalism ===
''Non-causalist'' or ''anti-causalist'' theories deny that intentions or similar states [[Causality|cause]] actions.<ref name="
An important challenge to non-causalism is due to Davidson.<ref name="Schlosser"/><ref name="Hu5">{{cite book |last1=Hu |first1=Jiajun |title=Actions Are Not Events: An Ontological Objection to the Causal Theory of Action |date=2018 |url=https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6549&context=utk_graddiss |chapter=5. A Davidsonian Challenge }}</ref> As he points out, we usually have many different [[Motivation#Motivational reasons and rationality|reasons]] for performing the same action. But when we perform it, we often perform it for one reason but not for another.<ref name="Hu5"/><ref name="Queloz"/> For example, one reason for Abdul to go for cancer treatment is that he has prostate cancer, another is that they have his favorite newspaper in the waiting area. Abdul is aware of both of these reasons, but he performs this action only because of the former reason. Causalist theories can account for this fact through causal relation: the former but not the latter reason causes the action. The challenge to non-causalist theories is to provide a convincing non-causal [[explanation]] of this fact.<ref name="Hu5"/><ref name="Queloz"/>
== Individuation ==
The problem of
== Types ==
=== Basic and non-basic ===
An important distinction among actions is between
It is often assumed that bodily movements are ''basic actions'', like the pressing of one's finger against the trigger, while the consequences of these movements, like the firing of the gun, are ''non-basic actions''.<ref name="Audi"/> But it seems that bodily movements are themselves constituted by other events (muscle contractions)<ref name="Craig"/> which are themselves constituted by other events (chemical processes). However, it appears that these more basic events are not actions since they are not under our direct volitional control.<ref name="Wilson"/><ref name="Craig"/> One way to solve these complications is to hold that ''basic actions'' correspond to the most simple commands we can follow.<ref name="Kühler"/> This position excludes most forms of muscle contractions and chemical processes from the list of basic actions since we usually cannot follow the corresponding commands directly. What counts as a basic action, according to this view, depends on the agent's skills.<ref name="Kühler"/> So contracting a given muscle is a basic action for an agent who has learned to do so. For something to be a basic action it is not just important what the agent can do but what the agent actually does. So raising one's right hand may only count as a basic action if it is done directly through the right hand. If the agent uses her left hand to lift the right hand then the raising of the right hand is not a basic action anymore.<ref name="Wilson"/><ref name="Craig"/>
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=== Physical and mental ===
Philosophers have investigated the concept of actions mostly in regard to physical actions, which are usually understood in terms of bodily movements.<ref name="Noa"/><ref name="Brent"/> It is not uncommon among philosophers to understand bodily movements as the only form of action.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> Some volitionists, on the other hand, claim that all actions are mental because they consist in volitions. But this position involves various problems, as explained in the corresponding section above. However, there is a middle path possible between these two extreme positions that allows for the existence of both physical and mental actions.<ref name="Brent"/> Various mental events have been suggested as candidates for non-physical actions, like imagining, judging or remembering.<ref name="Brent"/>
One influential account of mental action comes from [[Galen Strawson]], who holds that mental actions consist in "triggering the delivery of content to one's field of consciousness".<ref name="Brent">{{cite journal |last1=Brent |first1=Michael |last2=Upton |first2=Candace |title=Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=2019 |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=52–71 |doi=10.1080/09515089.2018.1514491 |s2cid=149891767 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BREMAT-9}}</ref><ref name="Strawson">{{cite journal |last1=Strawson |first1=Galen |title=Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |date=2003 |volume=103 |issue=3 |pages=227–257 |doi=10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00071.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STRMBO}}</ref> According to this view, the events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions.<ref name="Brent"/> Mental actions, in the strict sense, are ''prefatory'' or ''catalytic'': they consist in preparing the mind for these contents to arise.<ref name="Strawson"/> They foster hospitable conditions but cannot ensure that the intended contents will appear.<ref name="Brent"/> Strawson uses the analogy of jumping off a wall, in which the jumping itself (corresponding to the triggering) is considered an action, but the falling (corresponding to the entertaining of a content) is not an action anymore since it is outside the agent's control.<ref name="Brent"/><ref name="Strawson"/> Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent object that this account of mental actions is not complete.<ref name="Brent"/> Taking their lead from mental activities taking place during [[meditation]], they argue that Strawson's account leaves out various forms of mental actions, like maintaining one's attention on an object or removing a content from consciousness.<ref name="Brent"/>
One reason for doubting the existence of mental actions is that mental events often appear to be involuntary responses to internal or external stimuli and therefore not under our control.<ref name="Brent"/> Another objection to the existence of mental actions is that the standard account of actions in terms of intentions seems to fail for mental actions. The problem here is that the intention to think about something already needs to include the content of the thought. So the thought is no longer needed since the intention already "thinks" the content. This leads to a vicious regress since another intention would be necessary to characterize the first intention as an action.<ref name="Brent"/> An objection not just to mental actions but to the distinction between physical and mental actions arises from the difficulty of finding strict criteria to distinguish the two.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Levy |first1=Yair |title=What is 'Mental Action'? |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=2019 |volume=32 |issue=6 |pages=971–993 |doi=10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427 |s2cid=198595347 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LEVWIM-2}}</ref>
== Related concepts ==
=== Deliberation and decision ===
=== Explanation and rationality ===
Behavior that does not have a reason is not an action since it is not intentional. Every action has a reason but not every action has a good reason. Only actions with good reasons are considered
=== Responsibility ===
The problem of
=== Perception ===
In [[enactive|enactivism]] theory, perception is understood to be [[Sensory-motor coupling|sensorimotor]] in nature. That is, we carry out actions as an essential part of perceiving the world. [[Alva Noë]] states:
'We move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us... [we]: crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses or draw near to get a better look...'
=== Problem of mental causation ===
Some philosophers (e.g. [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]<ref>"Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001a.</ref>) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} Those who hold the belief that mental properties are reducible to physical properties are known as token-identity reductionists.<ref>{{Citation|last1=van Riel|first1=Raphael|title=Scientific Reduction|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/scientific-reduction/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-03-10|last2=Van Gulick|first2=Robert}}</ref> Some have disagreed with the conclusion that this reduction means the mental explanations are causally impotent while still maintaining that the reduction is possible.<ref name=":0">{{Citation|last1=Robb|first1=David|title=Mental Causation|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/mental-causation/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-03-10|last2=Heil|first2=John}}</ref> For example, Dretske has put forward the viewpoint of reasons as structuring causes.<ref name=":0" /> This viewpoint maintains that the relation, intentional properties that are created in the process of justifying one's actions are causally potent in that the process is
== See also ==
* [[Ability]]
* [[Action theory (philosophy)|Action theory]]
* [[Direct action]]
* [[Enactivism]]
* [[Praxeology]]
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[[Category:Determinism]]
[[Category:Free will]]
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