Content deleted Content added
→Problem of mental causation: fill 1 bare URL ref |
No edit summary Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit |
||
(15 intermediate revisions by 11 users not shown) | |||
Line 1:
{{short description|
{{About|the theory of action in general|[[Ludwig von Mises]]' work on this subject|Human Action{{!}}''Human Action''|the concept in sociology|Social action}}{{Agency sidebar}}
▲An '''action''' is an event that an agent performs for a purpose, that is guided by the person's [[intention]].<ref name="Wilson">{{cite web |last1=Wilson |first1=George |last2=Shpall |first2=Samuel |last3=Piñeros Glasscock |first3=Juan S. |title=Action |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2016}}</ref><ref name="Honderich">{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Action}}</ref> The first question in the [[Action theory (philosophy)|philosophy of action]] is to determine how actions differ from other forms of behavior, like involuntary reflexes.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Craig">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Action}}</ref> According to [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]], it involves discovering "[w]hat is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm".<ref>{{cite web |title=Action theory |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/action-theory |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |access-date=1 March 2021 |language=en}}</ref> There is broad agreement that the answer to this question has to do with the agent's intentions. So driving a car is an action since the agent intends to do so, but sneezing is a mere behavior since it happens independent of the agent's intention. The dominant theory of the relation between the intention and the behavior is ''causalism'':<ref name="Wilson"/> driving the car is an action because it is ''caused'' by the agent's intention to do so. On this view, actions are distinguished from other events by their causal history.<ref name="Honderich"/> Causalist theories include [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s account, who defines actions as bodily movements caused by intentions in the right way, and volitionalist theories, according to which [[Volition (psychology)|volitions]] or tryings form a core aspect of actions. Non-causalist theories, on the other hand, often see intentions not as the action's cause but as a constituent of it.
An important distinction among actions is between non-basic actions, which are done by doing something else, and basic actions, for which this is not the case. Most philosophical discussions of actions focus on physical actions in the form of bodily movements. But many philosophers consider mental actions to be a distinct type of action that has characteristics quite different from physical actions. Deliberations and decisions are processes that often precede and lead to actions. Actions can be rational or irrational depending on the reason for which they are performed. The problem of responsibility is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do.
Line 17 ⟶ 16:
=== Volitionalism ===
''Volitionalists'' aim to overcome these shortcomings of Davidson's account by including the notion of ''volition'' or ''trying'' in their theory of actions.<ref name="Stuchlik">{{cite journal |last1=Stuchlik |first1=Joshua |title=From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action |journal=Philosophia |date=2013 |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=867–886 |doi=10.1007/s11406-013-9414-9 |s2cid=144779235 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STUFVT}}</ref> ''Volitions'' and ''tryings'' are forms of affirming something, like ''intentions''. They can be distinguished from intentions because they are directed at executing a course of action in the here and now, in contrast to intentions, which involve future-directed plans to do something later.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> Some authors also distinguish ''volitions'', as acts of the will, from ''tryings'', as the summoning of means within one's power.<ref name="Stuchlik"/><ref>{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Volution}}</ref> But it has been argued that they can be treated as a unified notion since there is no important difference between the two for the theory of action because they play the same explanatory role.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Adams |first1=Frederick |last2=Mele |first2=Alfred R. |title=The Intention/Volition Debate |journal=Canadian Journal of Philosophy |date=1992 |volume=22 |issue=3 |pages=323–337 |doi=10.1080/00455091.1992.10717283 |s2cid=142465441 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ADATID}}</ref> This role includes both the experiential level,<ref name="Craig"/> involving the trying of something instead of merely intending to do so later, and the metaphysical level, in the form of mental causation bridging the gap between mental intention and bodily movement.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=Trying}}</ref><ref name="Stuchlik"/>
''Volitionalism'' as a theory is characterized by three core theses: (1) that every bodily action is accompanied by a trying, (2) that tryings can occur without producing bodily movements and (3) that in the case of successful tryings, the trying is the cause of the bodily movement.<ref name="Stuchlik"/><ref name="Craig"/> The central idea of the notion of ''trying'' is found in the second thesis. It involves the claim that some of our tryings lead to successful actions while others arise without resulting in an action.<ref name="Kühler2">{{cite book |last1=Kühler |first1=Michael |last2=Rüther |first2=Markus |title=Handbuch Handlungstheorie: Grundlagen, Kontexte, Perspektiven |publisher=J.B. Metzler |isbn=978-3-476-02492-3 |url=https://www.springer.com/de/book/9783476024923 |language=de |chapter=7. Handlungsversuche|date=27 October 2016 }}</ref> But even in an unsuccessful case there is still something: it is different from not trying at all.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> For example, a paralyzed person, after having received a new treatment, may test if the treatment was successful by trying to move her legs. But trying and failing to move the legs is different from intending to do it later or merely wishing to do it: only in the former case does the patient learn that the treatment was unsuccessful.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> There is a sense in which tryings either take place or not, but cannot fail, unlike actions, whose success is uncertain.<ref name="Kühler2"/><ref name="Audi"/> This line of thought has led some philosophers to suggest that the trying itself is an action: a special type of action called ''basic action''.<ref name="Wilson"/> But this claim is problematic since it threatens to lead to a [[vicious regress]]: if something is an action because it was caused by a volition then we would have to posit one more volition in virtue of which the first trying can be regarded as an action.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Brent"/>
Line 44 ⟶ 43:
=== Physical and mental ===
Philosophers have investigated the concept of actions mostly in regard to physical actions, which are usually understood in terms of bodily movements.<ref name="Noa"/><ref name="Brent"/> It is not uncommon among philosophers to understand bodily movements as the only form of action.<ref name="Stuchlik"/> Some volitionists, on the other hand, claim that all actions are mental because they consist in volitions. But this position involves various problems, as explained in the corresponding section above. However, there is a middle path possible between these two extreme positions that allows for the existence of both physical and mental actions.<ref name="Brent"/> Various mental events have been suggested as candidates for non-physical actions, like imagining, judging or remembering.<ref name="Brent"/>
One influential account of mental action comes from [[Galen Strawson]], who holds that mental actions consist in "triggering the delivery of content to one's field of consciousness".<ref name="Brent">{{cite journal |last1=Brent |first1=Michael |last2=Upton |first2=Candace |title=Meditation and the Scope of Mental Action |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=2019 |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=52–71 |doi=10.1080/09515089.2018.1514491 |s2cid=149891767 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BREMAT-9}}</ref><ref name="Strawson">{{cite journal |last1=Strawson |first1=Galen |title=Mental Ballistics or the Involuntariness of Spontaniety |journal=Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |date=2003 |volume=103 |issue=3 |pages=227–257 |doi=10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00071.x |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STRMBO}}</ref> According to this view, the events of imagining, judging or remembering are not mental actions strictly speaking but they can be the products of mental actions.<ref name="Brent"/> Mental actions, in the strict sense, are ''prefatory'' or ''catalytic'': they consist in preparing the mind for these contents to arise.<ref name="Strawson"/> They foster hospitable conditions but cannot ensure that the intended contents will appear.<ref name="Brent"/> Strawson uses the analogy of jumping off a wall, in which the jumping itself (corresponding to the triggering) is considered an action, but the falling (corresponding to the entertaining of a content) is not an action anymore since it is outside the agent's control.<ref name="Brent"/><ref name="Strawson"/> Candace L. Upton and Michael Brent object that this account of mental actions is not complete.<ref name="Brent"/> Taking their lead from mental activities taking place during [[meditation]], they argue that Strawson's account leaves out various forms of mental actions, like maintaining one's attention on an object or removing a content from consciousness.<ref name="Brent"/>
One reason for doubting the existence of mental actions is that mental events often appear to be involuntary responses to internal or external stimuli and therefore not under our control.<ref name="Brent"/> Another objection to the existence of mental actions is that the standard account of actions in terms of intentions seems to fail for mental actions. The problem here is that the intention to think about something already needs to include the content of the thought. So the thought is no longer needed since the intention already "thinks" the content. This leads to a vicious regress since another intention would be necessary to characterize the first intention as an action.<ref name="Brent"/> An objection not just to mental actions but to the distinction between physical and mental actions arises from the difficulty of finding strict criteria to distinguish the two.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Levy |first1=Yair |title=What is 'Mental Action'? |journal=Philosophical Psychology |date=2019 |volume=32 |issue=6 |pages=971–993 |doi=10.1080/09515089.2019.1632427 |s2cid=198595347 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LEVWIM-2}}</ref>
== Related concepts ==
=== Deliberation and decision ===
Line 55 ⟶ 54:
=== Explanation and rationality ===
''Explanations'' can be characterized as answers to why-questions.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Mayes |first1=G. Randolph |title=Theories of Explanation: 4. Contemporary Developments in the Theory of Explanation |url=https://iep.utm.edu/explanat/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=1 March 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |author-link=Brad Skow|last1=Skow |first1=Bradford |title=Reasons Why |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford University Press UK |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/SKORW |chapter=2. From Explanations to Why-Questions}}</ref> Explanations of actions are concerned with why the agent performed the action. The most straightforward answer to this question cites the agent's desire. For example, John went to the fridge ''because'' he had a desire for ice cream. The agent's beliefs are another relevant feature for action explanation.<ref name="Audi"/> So the desire to have ice cream does not explain that John went to the fridge unless it is paired with John's belief that there is ice cream in the fridge. The desire together with the belief is often referred to as the ''reason'' for the action.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Craig"/> ''Causalist theories'' of action usually hold that this reason explains the action because it ''causes'' the action.<ref name="Audi"/><ref name="Stuchlik"/>
Behavior that does not have a reason is not an action since it is not intentional. Every action has a reason but not every action has a good reason. Only actions with good reasons are considered ''rational''.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Alvarez |first1=Maria |title=Reasons for action, acting for reasons, and rationality |journal=Synthese |date=1 August 2018 |volume=195 |issue=8 |pages=3293–3310 |doi=10.1007/s11229-015-1005-9 |language=en |issn=1573-0964|doi-access=free }}</ref> For example, John's action of going to the fridge would be considered irrational if his reason for this is bad, e.g. because his belief that there is ice cream in the fridge is merely based on [[wishful thinking]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sturdee |first1=P. G. |title=Irrationality and the Dynamic Unconscious: The Case for Wishful Thinking |journal=Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology |date=1995 |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=163–174 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/STUIAT-2}}</ref>
=== Responsibility ===
The problem of ''responsibility'' is closely related to the philosophy of actions since we usually hold people responsible for what they do. But in one sense the problem of responsibility is wider since we can be responsible not just for doing something but for failing to do something, so-called [[Omission (law)|omission]]s.<ref name="Audi">{{cite book |last1=Audi |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTCD-2 |chapter=action theory|year=1999 }}</ref><ref name="Honderich"/><ref name="Craig"/> For example, a pedestrian witnessing a terrible car accident may be morally responsible for calling an ambulance and for providing help directly if possible. Additionally to what the agent did, it is also relevant what the agent could have done otherwise, i.e. what powers and capacities the agent had.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Talbert |first1=Matthew |title=Moral Responsibility |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=1 March 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> The agent's intentions are also relevant for responsibility, but we can be responsible for things we did not intend. For example, a chain smoker may have a negative impact on the health of the people around him. This is a side-effect of his smoking that is not part of his intention. The smoker may still be responsible for this damage, either because he was aware of this side-effect and decided to ignore it or because he should have been aware of it, so-called [[negligence]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=King |first1=Matt |title=The Problem with Negligence |journal=Social Theory and Practice |date=2009 |volume=35 |issue=4 |pages=577–595 |doi=10.5840/soctheorpract200935433 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KINTPW}}</ref>
=== Perception ===
In [[enactive|enactivism]] theory, perception is understood to be [[Sensory-motor coupling|sensorimotor]] in nature. That is, we carry out actions as an essential part of perceiving the world. [[Alva Noë]] states:
'We move our eyes, head and body in taking in what is around us... [we]: crane our necks, peer, squint, reach for our glasses or draw near to get a better look...'
=== Problem of mental causation ===
Some philosophers (e.g. [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]<ref>"Davidson, D. Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001a.</ref>) have argued that the mental states the agent invokes as justifying his action are physical states that cause the action.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} Problems have been raised for this view because the mental states seem to be reduced to mere physical causes.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} Their mental properties don't seem to be doing any work.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} If the reasons an agent cites as justifying his action, however, are not the cause of the action, they must explain the action in some other way or be causally impotent.{{citation needed|date=May 2018}} Those who hold the belief that mental properties are reducible to physical properties are known as token-identity reductionists.<ref>{{Citation|last1=van Riel|first1=Raphael|title=Scientific Reduction|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/scientific-reduction/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-03-10|last2=Van Gulick|first2=Robert}}</ref> Some have disagreed with the conclusion that this reduction means the mental explanations are causally impotent while still maintaining that the reduction is possible.<ref name=":0">{{Citation|last1=Robb|first1=David|title=Mental Causation|date=2019|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/mental-causation/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-03-10|last2=Heil|first2=John}}</ref> For example, Dretske has put forward the viewpoint of reasons as structuring causes.<ref name=":0" /> This viewpoint maintains that the relation, intentional properties that are created in the process of justifying one's actions are causally potent in that the process is
== See also ==
* [[Ability]]
* [[Action theory (philosophy)|Action theory]]
* [[Direct action]]
Line 96:
{{wikitionary|action}}
{{wikiquote|Action}}
*{{
{{DEFAULTSORT:Action (Philosophy)}}
Line 103:
[[Category:Determinism]]
[[Category:Free will]]
|