Diminished responsibility: Difference between revisions

Diminished capacity is a partial defense to charges that require that the defendant act with a particular state of mind.<ref>See e.g., ''State v. Shank'', 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988) and ''State v. Gerald'', 304 N.C. 511, 284 S.E.2d 312, (1981)</ref> For example, if the [[felony murder rule]] does not apply, first degree murder requires that the state prove beyond a [[reasonable doubt]] that the defendant acted with premeditation, deliberation, and the specific intent to kill—all three are necessary elements of the state's case.<ref>''State v. Shank'', 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988)</ref> If evidence exists, sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant because of mental illness or "defect" possessed the capacity to premeditate, deliberate or form the specific intent to kill then the state cannot convict the defendant of first degree murder.<ref>See generally, {{cite journal|first=John |last=Rubin |title=The Diminished Capacity Defense |journal=Administration of Justice Bulletin |publisher=North Carolina School of Government |year=1989}}</ref> This does not mean that the defendant is entitled to an acquittal. The defendant still might be convicted of [[second -degree murder]] which only requires that the defendant act with general malice.<ref>Malice means that the defendant acted with one of three "man-endangering" states of mind: intent to kill, intent to inflict serious bodily injury or with a "depraved" heart. Although malice thus required a specific state of mind, courts have not considered this fact as making second degree murder a specific intent crime.</ref>

The defense's acceptance in American jurisdictions varies considerably. The majority of states have adopted it by statute or case decision, and a minority even recognise broader defenses such as "[[irresistible impulse]]". Some U.S. states restrict the defense to the charge of murder only where a successful defense will result in a manslaughter conviction instead of murder. Until recently, the Republic of Ireland did not accept the partial defense. The Irish Supreme Court had rejected the existence of the defense in ''DPP v O'Mahony''.<ref>''The People (DPP) v Joseph O' Mahony'' [1984] ILRM 244</ref> The case was recently [[Repeal|abrogated]], however, by enactment of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006, effective June 1, 2006. The act, in pertinent part, specifically adopted the partial defense for the charge of murder where a successful defense will result in a manslaughter conviction instead of murder.

The defense is to be contrasted with insanity which is a complete but [[affirmative defense]]. In most jurisdictions a defendant would be acquitted on the grounds of insanity if the defendant established to the satisfaction of the jury that he suffered from such a mental disease or defect that he was unable to appreciate the consequences of his actions or did not know what he was doing was wrong.<ref>See e.g., ''State v. Silvers'', 323 N.C. 646, 655, 374 S.E.2d 858, 864 (1989)</ref> As noted a successful insanity defense will result in acquittal although a number of jurisdictions have adopted the [[guilty but insane]] verdict. The defense of insanity and diminished capacity although clearly distinct are not inconsistent defenses and both may be at issue in the same case.<ref>See e.g., ''State v. Rose'', 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988)</ref> The critical distinctions are that diminished capacity is a partial, negating defense (negates an element of the state's case) with the burden on the state to show that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind while insanity is a complete but affirmative defense—the defendant bearing the burden of proving that he was legally insane.

This is an aspect of a more general [[insanity defense]] (see the [[M'Naghten rules]]). The defense "was first recognized by [[Scotland|Scottish]] [[common law]] to reduce the [[punishment]] of the {{'}}''partially insane''{{'}}."<ref>{{cite journal |last=Arenella |first=Peter|date=October 1977|title=The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage|journal=Columbia Law Review|volume=77|issue=6|page=830|doi=10.2307/1121980|jstor=112198}}</ref> It developed from the practice of juries in the 19th century of returning verdicts of guilty with a recommendation as to mercy or mitigation of sentence to reflect any extenuating circumstances. In a series of decisions, given mainly by [[George Deas, Lord Deas|Lord Deas]], a doctrine grew that various types of mental weakness could have the effect of reducing what would otherwise be a conviction for [[murder]] (which attracted [[capital punishment]]) to one for culpable homicide (where the courts had greater discretion in sentencing). An example of a "diminished capacity" might be extremely low [[intelligence (trait)|intelligence]]. In the English case of ''R v Raven'',<ref>''R v Raven'' (1982) Crim. LR 51</ref> a man who had a physical age of 22 years but a mental age of only 9 years felt provoked by homosexual advances and killed his perceived attacker. His mental deficiency was not in dispute and, since a child of 9 years would not have been criminally responsible (see s50 [[Children and Young Persons Act 1933]]), and his mental responsibility for his acts was substantially impaired, manslaughter was the only realistic verdict. The rationale of the defense is that, as a precondition to [[punishment]], the criminal law requires conduct to be voluntary. If something interferes with the capacity of the individual to choose to break the law, this should be reflected by an excuse or exculpation. The law should balance the need to be fair to the individual wrongdoer, but equally offer some protection to [[society]] from a person who may not have complete control over their behavior.

The effect of the defense varies between the [[jurisdiction]]s and depends on the offence charged. In some cases, it will result in full excuse and therefore produce a verdict of "[[guilt (law)|not guilty]]". In others, it offers only exculpation to a degree, resulting in the substitution of a lesser offence (e.g., [[manslaughter]] instead of murder) or a mitigated [[Sentence (law)|sentence]].

In NSW, the partial defence of 'diminished responsibility' was replaced by the partial defence of "substantial impairment" in 1998.<ref name="s23 NSW Crimes act">{{cite Legislation AU|NSW|act|ca190082|Crimes Act 1900|23A}}.</ref> The burden is on the defendant to prove the defence, on the balance of probabilities. There are three conditions that the defendant must prove. The first is the defendant must be suffering from an abnormality of the mind at the time of the acts/omissions causing death;<ref name="s23 NSW Crimes act"/> see also the case of Byrne for the definition of ‘abnormality'abnormality of the mind’mind'.<ref>''R v Byrne'' (1960) 2 QB 396.</ref> Second, the abnormality must be the result of an underlying condition.<ref name="s23 NSW Crimes act"/> Third, the impairment must be so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter.<ref name="s23 NSW Crimes act"/>

[[California]] was the first state in the U.S. to adopt the diminished capacity defense, beginning with ''People v. Wells''<ref>''People v. Wells'' 202 P.2d 53 (1949)</ref> and ''People v. Gorshen''.<ref>''People v. Gorshen'' 336 P.2d 492 (1959)</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://myweb.wvnet.edu/~jelkins/lawpsy04/diminished.html |title=ArchivedDiminished copyCapacity |access-date=2006-05-16 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060909112146/http://myweb.wvnet.edu/~jelkins/lawpsy04/diminished.html |archive-date=2006-09-09 }}</ref> The doctrine would soon be abolished by [[ballot initiative]] in 1982 following the negative publicity surrounding the case of [[Dan White]], who had [[Moscone–Milk assassinations|killed George Moscone and Harvey Milk]]. While White's defense team did argue successfully for a ruling of diminished capacity, resulting in a verdict of [[voluntary manslaughter]] rather than [[murder]], an [[urban legend]] that the defense had blamed White's actions on the ingestion of sugar and [[junk food]] (the so-called "[[Twinkie defense]]") sprang up out of inaccurate media coverage.<ref name="Myth">{{cite web

* {{cite journal |first1=Kimberly Reed |last1=Thompson |url=http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article546.pdf |format=PDF |title=The Untimely Death of Michigan's Diminished Capacity Defense: People vs. Carpenter |journal=Michigan State Bar Journal |date=February 2003 |access-date=May 22, 2013}}