Prudence: Difference between revisions

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[[File:Saint-Denis (93), basilique, monument funéraire de Louis XII et Anne de Bretagne, 1515, la Prudence.JPG|thumb|200px|Prudentia, with her attributes of mirror and snake, detail from the 1514 monument of King Louis XII in St Denis, Paris]]

'''Prudence''' ({{lang-la|prudentia}}, [[Contraction (grammar)|contracted]] from {{lang|la|providentia}} meaning "seeing ahead, sagacity") is the ability to govern and discipline oneself by the use of [[reason]].<ref>[http{{cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prudence Prudence - Definition and More from the Free |title=prudence|website=Merriam-Webster Dictionary]. Merriam-webster.com (31 August 2012). Retrieved on 2013-07-19.}}</ref> It is classically considered to be a [[virtue]], and in particular one of the four [[Cardinalcardinal virtues]] (which are, with the three [[theological virtues]], part of the [[seven virtues]]). '''Prudentia''' is an allegorical female personification of the virtue, whose attributes are a mirror and snake, and who is frequently depicted as a pair with [[Justitia]], the Roman goddess of Justice.

The word derives from the 14th-century [[Old French]] word ''{{lang|fro|prudence''}}, which, in turn, derives from the Latin ''{{lang|la|prudentia''}} meaning "foresight, sagacity". It is often associated with [[wisdom]], [[insight]], and [[knowledge]]. The Invirtue thisof case, the virtueprudence is the ability to judge between virtuous and vicious actions, not only in a general sense, but with regard to appropriate actions at a given time and place. Although prudence itself does not perform any actions, and is concerned solely with knowledge, all virtues had to beare regulated by it. DistinguishingFor example, distinguishing when acts are [[courage]]ous, as opposed to [[Recklessness (psychology)|reckless]] or [[Cowardice|cowardly]], is an act of prudence, and for this reason it is classified as a cardinal (pivotal) virtue.

In modern [[English language|English]], the word "prudence" has become increasinglyclosely [[synonym]]ousassociated with cautiousness. In this sense, prudence names a reluctance to take risks, which remainsis a virtue withthat respectinvolves totaking unnecessarycalculated risks, but, whenexcessive unreasonably extended into over-cautiousness,caution can become thea [[vice]] of cowardice.

In the ''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'', [[Aristotle]] gives a lengthy account of the virtue {{transliteration|grc|[[phronesis]]}} ({{lang-grc|ϕρόνησις}}), traditionally—traditionally translated as "prudence", although this has become increasingly problematic as the wordmodern hasusage fallenof outthat ofword commonhas usagechanged. More recently {{lang-grc|ϕρόνησις}} has been translated by such terms as "[[Phronesis|practical wisdom]]", "practical judgment", or "rational choice".

Prudence was considered by the [[Ancient Greece|ancient Greeks]] and later on by [[Christian philosophy|Christian philosophers]], most notably [[Thomas Aquinas]], as the cause, measure, and form of all virtues. It is considered to be the ''{{lang|la|auriga virtutum''}} or the charioteer of the virtues. It is mentioned in the fifth of the [[Principal Doctrines]] of [[Epicurus]], and in his Letter to Menoeceus, where he says: "Prudence is the foundation of all these things and is the greatest good. Thus it is more valuable than philosophy and is the source of every other excellence."<ref>{{cite book|author=[[Epicurus]]|chapter=Epicurus to Menoeceus|editor-last=Laërtius|editor-first=Diogenes|editor-link=Diogenes Laërtius|chapter-url=https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/diogenes-laertius/the-lives-and-opinions-of-eminent-philosophers/c-d-yonge/text/book-10|url=https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/diogenes-laertius/the-lives-and-opinions-of-eminent-philosophers/c-d-yonge|title=The Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers}}</ref>

ItPrudence is thefoundational cause in the sense that theto virtues, which are definedunderstood to be the "perfected ability"abilities of man as a spiritual person (spiritual personhood in the classicalhuman westernspirit. understandingThis meansperfection havingis [[intelligence]] and [[free will]]), achieve their "perfection" onlyachieved when theyvirtues are founded uponon prudence, that is to say uponor the perfected ability to make the right decisions. For instance, a person can live [[Temperance (virtue)|temperancetemperately]] when he has acquired the habit of deciding correctly the actions to take in response to his instinctual cravings.

ThePrudence functionprovides ofguidance prudenceon isthe to point out whichappropriate course of action is to be taken in anyspecific concrete circumstancessituations. It hasdoes nothingnot to do with directly willing''will'' the good that it discerns. Prudence has a directive capacity with regard to the other virtues. It lights the way and measures the arena for their exercise. Without prudence, bravery becomes foolhardiness;, mercy sinks into weakness, free self-expression and kindness into censure, humility into degradation and arrogance, selflessness into corruption, and temperance into fanaticism. CultureThe andpurpose disciplinedof actions should be about the beneficial action. Its officeprudence is to determineconsider for each in practice thosethe circumstances of time, place, and manner, etc.that whichare shouldrelevant bein observedany given situation, andknown whichas the''medium Scholasticsrationis'' comprise underin the termScholastic "medium rationis"tradition. So it is that while it qualifies the intellect and not the will, it is nevertheless rightly styled a moral virtue.<ref name="delany">[http{{cite book| url=https://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12517b.htm |last=Delany, |first=Joseph. "|chapter=Prudence." |title=The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. |volume=12. |location=New York: |publisher=Robert Appleton Company, |year=1911. 2 May 2014]}}</ref>

Prudence is considered the measure of moral virtues since it provides a model of ethically good actions. "The work of art is true and real by its correspondence with the pattern of its prototype in the mind of the artist. In similar fashion, the free activity of man is good by its correspondence with the pattern of prudence." ([[Josef Pieper]]) For instance, a [[stockbroker]] using his experience and all the data available to him decides that it is beneficial to sell stock A at 2PM tomorrow and buy stock B today. The content of the decision (e.g., the stock, amount, time, and means) is the product of an act of prudence, while the actual carrying out of the decision may involve other virtues like fortitude (doing it in spite of fear of failure) and justice (doing his job well out of justice to his company and his family). The actual act's "goodness" is measured against that original decision made through prudence.<ref>Although Aristotle himself would have considered this way of making money contemptiblename=": 0"[T]hose who ply sordid trades...and those who lend small sums and at high rates...take more than they ought and from wrong sources. What is common to them is evidently sordid love of gain...[A]ll such forms of taking are mean." (''[[Nicomachean Ethics]]'' 1121b31)</ref>

InAccording to Greek and Scholastic philosophy, "'form"' is the specificunique characteristic of a thing that makes it what it is. WithIn this languagesense, prudence confers upongives other virtues thetheir formspecific ofcharacter itsas innervirtues, essence;by thatproviding is,a itsstandard specificagainst characterwhich asthey acan virtuebe judged. For instanceexample, not all acts of telling the truth are considered goodvirtuous, consideredbut asthose that are done with theprudence virtuewould ofbe honesty.considered Whatexpressions makes tellingof the truth a virtue isof whetherhonesty. it is done with prudence.

In [[Christianity|Christian]] understanding, the difference between prudence and cunning lies in the intent with which thea decision of the context of anto actionact is made. The Christian understanding of the world includes the existence of [[God]], the [[natural law]], and [[Morality|moral]] implications of human actions. In this context, prudence is different from cunning in that it takes into account the supernatural good. For instance, the decision of persecuted Christians to be [[martyr]]ed rather than deny their faith is considered prudent.

According to [[Thomas Aquinas]], judgments usingthat reasonstake fora reasonable form, but are aimed at evil ends or usingthat use evil means, are considered to be madeexamples throughof "cunning" and "false prudence" and not through prudence.<ref name="delany"/> However "imprudence" was not be considered a sin since it was not voluntary.<ref>St Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, Volume 3 (Part II, Second Section) 1602065578 2013 - p 1409 "It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine;* whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin"</ref>

The Ancient Greek term for prudence is synonymous with "forethought". People, the Ancient Greeks believed, must have enough prudence to prepare for worshiping the Olympian gods.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Homer |title=The Iliad of Homer |date=2011-01-01 |publisher=University of Chicago Press |isbn=978-0-226-47049-8 |location=Chicago London |language=English |translator-last=Lattimore |translator-first=Richmond}}</ref>

Prudence is the application of universal principles to particular situations.<ref name="mcmanaman">[{{cite web| url = https://www.catholiceducation.org/en/education/catholic-contributions/the-virtue-of-prudence.html| last=McManaman, |first=Douglas. "|title=The Virtue of Prudence", |website=Catholic Education Resource Center]|date=February 2006}}</ref> "Integral parts" of virtues, in [[Scholasticism|Scholastic philosophy]], are the elements that must be present for any complete or perfect act of the virtue. The following are the integral parts of prudence:

*; ''{{lang|la|[[Memoriamemoria]]''}} : accurate memory; that is, memory that is true to reality; an ability to learn from experience;<ref name="mcmanaman"/>

*; ''Docilitas''{{lang|la|docilitas}} : an open-mindedness that recognizes variety and is able to seek and make use of the experience and authority of others;<ref name="mcmanaman"/>

*; ''Intelligentia''{{lang|la|intelligentia}} : the understanding of [[first principle]]s;

*; ''Sollertia''{{lang|la|sollertia}} : shrewdness or quick-wittedness, i.e. the ability to evaluate a situation quickly;

*; ''{{lang|la|[[RatioReason|ratio]]''}} : Discursivediscursive reasoning and the ability to research and compare alternatives;

*; ''{{lang|la|[[Providentiaprovidentia]]''}} : foresight&nbsp;– i.e. theforesight—the capacity to estimate whether particular actions can realize goals;

*; ''Circumspection''circumspection : the ability to take all relevant circumstances into account;

*; ''[[:wikt:caution|Cautioncaution]]'' : the ability to mitigate risk.

[[File:Titian - Allegorie der Zeit.jpg|thumb|''[[Allegory of Prudence]]'' by [[Titian]]. To Titian, prudence was preparation, foresight and judgement from experience and human history. The three faces in the painting represent the passing of human generations, with the young facing the light while the oldest fade into shadow; the faint inscription above their heads may be translated as "From the past, the present acts prudently, lest it spoils future action".<ref name=":0">David{{cite book|first=David|last=Summers (|year=1987), ''|title=The Judgment of Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the Rise of Aesthetics'', |publisher=Cambridge University Press ({{ISBN|isbn=978-0-521-32675-9}}).</ref>]]

In ethics, a "prudential judgment" is one where the circumstances must be weighed to determine the correct action.<ref>{{Cite web Generally,|first=Trent|last=Horn|title=What itis a Prudential Judgment? |url=https://www.catholic.com/qa/what-is-a-prudential-judgment |access-date=2022-10-12 |website=Catholic Answers}}</ref> This applies to situations wherein which two people could weigh the circumstances differently and ''ethically'' come to different conclusions.

For instance, in the theory of [[just war]], the government of a nation must weigh whether the harms they suffer are more than the harms that would be produced by their going to war against another nation that is harming them; the decision whether to go to war is therefore a prudential judgment.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Just and Unjust Wars Summary {{!}} PDF {{!}} Just War Theory {{!}} Preemptive War |url=https://www.scribd.com/document/295701096/Just-and-Unjust-wars-summary |access-date=2023-10-19 |website=Scribd |language=en}}</ref>

InAs another caseexample, a patient who haswith a terminal illness with no conventional treatment may hear of an experimental treatment. with Tono decideconventional whetheralternatives. to take itThey would requirehave weighingto weigh, on the one hand, the cost, time commitment, possiblepotential lack of benefit, and possible pain, disability, and hastened death, and on the other hand, the possiblepotential benefit and the benefitbenefits to others ofthat could be gained from what could be learned from histheir case.

{{transliteration|grc|[[Phronesis]]}}, or practical wisdom, holds an important place in [[Rhetoric|rhetorical theory]] as a central aspect of judgment and practice. [[Nicomachean Ethics#Practical judgement (phronesis)|Aristotle]]'s notion of {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}}]] fits with [[Rhetoric (Aristotle)|his notestreatise on rhetoric]] because neither, in his estimation, could be reduced to an ''{{transliteration|grc|[[episteme]]''}} or a ''{{transliteration|grc|[[techne]]''}}, and both deal with the ability to deliberate about contingent, variable, or indeterminate matters.<ref>{{citationcite neededbook|dateauthor=MarchAristotle|title=[[Nicomachean 2016Ethics]]|at=[https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/aristotle/nicomachean-ethics/f-h-peters/text/book-6#chapter-6-1-7 VI.7]}}</ref>

[[Cicero]] defined ''{{lang|la|prudentia''}} as a rhetorical norm in ''[[De Oratore]]'', ''[[De officiis]]'', ''[[De Inventione]]'', and ''[[De re publica]]''. He contrasts the term with ''{{lang|la|imprudens''}}, young men failing to consider the consequences before they act. The ''{{lang|la|prudens''}}, or those who had prudence, knew when to speak and when to stay silent. Cicero maintained that prudence was gained only through experience, and while it was applied in everyday conversation, in public discourse it was subordinated to the broader term for wisdom, ''{{lang|la|sapientia''}}.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hariman |first=Robert |title=Prudence: classical virtue, postmodern practice |publisher=The Pennsylvania State University Press |year=2003 |page=37}}</ref>

In the contemporarymodern era, rhetorical scholars have tried to recover a robust meaning for the term. They have maintained consistency with the ancient orators, contending that prudence is an embodied persuasive resource.<ref name="Jasinski">{{cite book |last=Jasinski |first=James |year=2001 |title=Sourcebook on Rhetoric |publisher=Sage Publications |page=463}}</ref> Although sets of principles or rules can be constructed in a particular culture, scholars agree that prudence cannot be derived from a set of timeless principles. Instead, through gauging the situation and through reasoned deliberation, a speaker should determine the set of values and morals by which to base his or her actions. Furthermore, scholars suggest theThe capacity to take into account the particularities of the situation asis vital to prudential practice. For example, as rhetorical scholar Lois Self explains, "both rhetoric and {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} are normative processes in that they involve rational principles of choice-making; both have general applicability but always require careful analysis of particulars in determining the best response to each specific situation; both ideally take into account the wholeness of human nature; and finally, both have social utility and responsibility in that both treat matter of the public good".<ref>{{cite book |first=Lois |last=Self |chapter=Rhetoric and Phronesis: The Aristotelian Ideal |title=Philosophy and Rhetoric |publisher=Penn State University Press |year=1979 |page=14}}</ref> [[Robert Hariman]], in his examination of [[Malcolm X]], adds that "aesthetic sensibility, imitation of a performative ideal, and improvisation upon conventions of presentation" are also components of practical reasoning.<ref>{{cite book |last=Hariman |first=Robert |title=Theory without Modernity |year=1991 |page=28}}</ref>

SmallRhetorical differencesscholars emergediffer between rhetorical scholars regardingon definitions of the term and methods of analysis. [[Hans-Georg Gadamer]] asserted that prudence materializes through the application of principles and can be evaluated accordingly.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Gadamer|first=Hans-George |title=Truth and Method |journal=Crossroad |year=1982 |page=7}}</ref> InJasinski hisargues analysis ofthat [[Andrew Cuomo]]'s speech to the Catholic Church of Notre Dame, James Jasinskicannot contendsbe thatjudged prudencesolely cannoton {{clarifythe span|bebasis calculatedof by formal matters likeits consequences|date=February, 2015}}since as itprudence is not areducible to ''episteme'' (knowledge or understanding) or ''techne''; instead(technique or art). Rather, he contends, it isshould be judged accordingbased toon its embodied rhetorical performance — that is, how it is perceived by those who experience it. So, for example, one might evaluate the speech based on how persuasive it was, how emotionally moving it was, or how well it captured the audience's attention.<ref name="Jasinski"/> Thus, while Gadamer would judgejudges prudence based on thea executionset of contingent principles, Jasinski would examineemphasizes the artistry of communication inand its culturalreception milieuby betweenits accommodationaudience. For Jasinski, communication should balance ([[compromise]]) and audacity ([[courage]]).{{clarify|date=February, 2015}}rather than merely achieving a specific result.

In his study of [[Machiavelli]], examining the relationship between prudence and moderation, rhetorician Eugene Garver holds that there is a middle ground between "an ethics of principles, in which those principles univocally dictate action" and "an ethics of consequences, in which the successful result is all".<ref name="Garver">{{cite book |last=Garver |first=Eugene |title=Machiavelli and the History of Prudence |publisher=University of Wisconsin Press |year=1987 |isbn=0-299-11080-X}}</ref> His premise stems from Aristotle's theory of virtue as [[golden mean (philosophy)|an "intermediate"]], in which moderation and compromise embody prudence. Yet, because valorizingelevating moderation is not an active response, prudence entails the "transformation of moderation" into a fitting response, making it a flexible situational norm. Garver also asserts that prudential reasoning differs from "algorithmic" and "[[heuristic]]" reasoning because it is rooted in a political community, the context in which common problems regarding stability and innovation arise and call for prudential reasoning.<ref name="Garver"/>

If a risk-averse consumer has a [[utility function]] <math>u(x)</math> over consumption ''<math>x''</math>, and if <math>u(x)</math> is [[Derivative|differentiable]], then the consumer is not prudent unless the third [[derivative]] of utility is positive, that is, <math>

u^{'''}\left(x\right)>0

</math>.<ref>{{cite journal |first=A. |last=Sandmo |year=1970 |title=The Effect of Uncertainty on Saving Decisions |journal=[[Review of Economic Studies]] |volume=37 |issue=3 |pages=353–360 |doi=10.2307/2296725 |jstor=2296725 }}</ref>

-\frac{u^{'''}\left(x\right)}{u^{''}\left(x\right)}

</math>. Similarly, '''relative prudence''' is defined as absolute prudence, multiplied by the level of consumption. These measures are closely related to the concepts of absolute and relative [[risk aversion]] developed by [[Kenneth Arrow]] and [[John W. Pratt]].<ref>{{cite journal |first=MMiles S. |last=Kimball |year=1990 |title=Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large |journal=[[Econometrica]] |volume=58 |issue=1 |pages=53–73 |doi=10.2307/2938334 |jstor=2938334 |s2cid=153558057 |url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w2848.pdf }}</ref>

In [[accounting]], prudence was longhistorically consideredregarded oneas ofa the "fundamental accountingprinciple concepts"for indetermining itsthe determinationappropriate timing of the time for [[revenue recognition]].<ref>[http{{cite web|url=https://www.hmrc.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/bimmanualbusiness-income-manual/bim31030.htm |title=Tax and accountancy: 'fundamentalconcepts accountingand concepts'],pervasive principles|website=[[HMRC]], UK.Business RetrievedIncome 2011-04-12.Manual}}</ref> The rule of prudence meantmeans that gains should not be anticipated unless their realisation was highly probable. However, recent developments in [[Generally Accepted Accounting Principles]] have led academic critics to accuse the internationalInternational standardStandard-settingSetting bodyBody, [[IASB]], of abandoning prudence.<ref>[http{{cite journal|first=Mario|last=Christodoulou|url=https://www.accountancyage.com/aa2010/news08/180809424/iasb-has-abandoned-prudence-professor-warns /|title=IASB has abandoned prudence, professor warns], ''|journal=[[Accountancy Age]]'', |date=24 August 2010.}}</ref> In the [[Generally Accepted Accounting Practice (UK)|British reporting standard]] FRS 18, prudence, along with consistency, was relegated to a "desirable" quality of financial information rather than fundamental concept.<ref>[{{cite web|url=http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/bimmanual/bim31032.htm|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101022160758/http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/bimmanual/BIM31032.htm|archive-date=22 October 2010|title=Tax and accountancy: development of accountancy concepts and new objectives: FRS18], |website=HMRC. Retrieved |access-date=2011-04-12.}}</ref> Prudence was rejected for IFRS because it was seen as compromising accounts' neutrality.<ref name="Lords">Rose{{cite journal|first=Rose|last=Orlik, [http|url=https://www.accountancyage.com/aa2011/analysis04/203998804/lords-took-a-leap-on-international-standards /|title=Lords took a leap on international standards], ''|journal=[[Accountancy Age]]'', |date=4 April 2011. Retrieved |access-date=2011-04-12..}}</ref>

In a 2011 report on the [[financial crisis of 2007–08]], the British [[House of Lords]] bemoaned the demotion of prudence as a governing principle of accounting and [[Financial audit|audit]]. TheirHowever, their comments, however, were disputed by some leadingprominent practitioners.<ref name="Lords" />

* {{annotated link|[[Prudence (given name)]]}}