Army Ground Forces: Difference between revisions

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Army Ground Forces traced theirits origins back to General Headquarters, United States Army (GHQ), which were activated on 26 July 1940.<ref name="Moenk1972">{{harvnb|Moenk|1972|p=13}}</ref> Although inactive before this date, GHQ had long featured in mobilization plans created as far backearly as 1921 as a headquarters for directing US field armies overseas, similar to that of the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] in [[World War I]].<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=5}}</ref> This was not realized in practice because the war was fought in many theaters, so overall direction was exercised by the War Department's General Staff. GHQ also did not become the equivalent of a theater command for the Zone of Interior; administrative authority was exercised by the G-4 of the War Department's General Staff through the Corps Areas and Service Commands. Instead, GHQ was drawn into the enormous task of raising and training an army.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=8}}</ref>

This eventually brought the entire training program down. In 1941, replacements were produced by [[Replacement Training CentersCenter]]s (RTCs). As new divisions were mobilized, they took their manpower directly from reception centers.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|pp=171–172}}</ref> The RTCs provided replacements for filler, and were organized to provide replacements in the proportion of units in the army. Army Ground Forces was responsible for training replacements for the four statutory arms (infantry, cavalry, field and coast artillery) and the three new pseudo-arms (armor, antiaircraft artillery, and [[tank destroyer]]). Replacements for the other arms and services were handled by the Army Service Forces.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|pp=173}}</ref> Casualties in combat units, particularly infantry units, exceeded the capacity of the RTCs to replace them. By February 1944, some 35,249 men had been taken from combat units in training for use as replacements; another 29,521 had been transferred from low priority units to fill up units preparing to move overseas.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|p=201}}</ref> Between April and September 1944, as casualties in Normandy began to bite, some 91,747 men were stripped from twenty-two divisions in the United States.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|p=208}}</ref> Maintaining 700,000 men in infantry units required 1,800,000 men in the infantry arm by April 1945.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=245}}</ref> Over 1,000,000 replacements were shipped between September 1943 and August 1945, of whom 82% were infantry.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|p=218}}</ref> Volunteers for the infantry were accepted from other arms and services.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|pp=422–423}}</ref> By 1944, all new inductees were being sent to RTCs, where they were trained for 13 to 17 weeks before being sent to combat units. As casualties mounted, a massive comb-out began as the Army Ground Forces struggled to provide replacements. Personnel from non-combat assignments were pulled from duty, hastily trained, and then reassigned to units as combat infantry replacements.

If the plans for building and training this division had been carried out as originally laid down by General McNair and his staff, the 65th when it moved overseas in 1945 might have been the most battleworthy of the long line of divisions produced by the Army Ground Forces. For into the planning of the organization, training, and equipment of this unit was poured the accumulated experience of four years' intensive effort. But, mainly because ofpersonnelof personnel exigencies the control of which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces, the 65th was about the least ready for combat of all divisions trained in World War II. Its regiments had never worked with their supporting battalions of artillery in field exercises. The division commander had never maneuvered his command as a unit; in fact, the division had never been together, except for reviews and demonstrations, and its composition had changed greatly from one assembly to another. In the infantry regiments, only one man in four had been with the division for a year, and almost every fourth man had joined his unit within the past three months. The division was more of a hodgepodge than a team.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=487–488}}</ref>

While Army Ground Forces endeavored to provide the troops with the best equipment available, they were not always able to provide better equipment than the German enemy. This was particularly apparent with respect to armor. American commanders tended, when forced to make a choice, to prefer mobility to firepower. The result was a number of uninspiring designs. In particular, the [[M6 Heavy Tank]] was a dud which convinced Army Ground Forces that heavy tanks were no good and [[Ordnance Corps (United States Army) Ordnance Corps|Ordnance Department]] that Army Ground Forces did not really want one. The [[M4 Sherman]] medium tank found itself out-performed by German tanks which began appearing in 1943.<ref>{{harvnb|Green|Thomson|Roots|1955|pp=236–239, 278–287}}</ref> Opposition from Army Ground Forces was one of the primary factors for the late and limited introduction of the [[M26 Pershing]] into the European Theater.

The [[tank destroyer battalions (United States)|tank destroyer arm]] was probably the most controversial. Tank destroyers based on the [[M3 Half-track]] proved too vulnerable in the [[North African campaign]] and a decision was made that half of all tank destroyer battalions would be equipped with towed guns, emphasizing the defensive role.<ref>{{cite web| work=Leavenworth Papers |title=Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army tank destroyer Doctrine in World War II |first1= Christopher R. |last1=Gabel |url=httphttps://wwwapps.dtic.mil/cgi-binsti/pdfs/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA532138.pdf}}</ref> This decision was reversed after the towed battalions lost large numbers of guns over-run or stuck in mud and snow during the Ardennes offensive. Later, good self-propelled gun carriages became available, but massed enemy armor became scarce and most tank destroyer units began operating as field artillery. Some 25 tank destroyer battalions were inactivated to fill depleted infantry and armoured divisions.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=423–434}}</ref>

* [[Lieutenant General (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Lesley J. McNair]] 9 March 1942 – 13 July 1944

* [[Lieutenant General (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Ben Lear]] 14 July 1944 – 20 January 1945

* [[General (United States)|General]] [[Joseph Stilwell]] 22 January 1945 – 22 June 1945

* [[General (United States)|General]] [[Jacob L. Devers]] 29 June 1945 – 9 March 1948

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* [http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF001/index.htm Origins of the Army Ground Forces General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940–1942]. 1946. At the [[United States Army Center of Military History]]

* [http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/AGF002/index.htm A Short History of the Army Ground Forces]. 1946. At the [[United States Army Center of Military History]]

* [http://www.history.army.mil/books/agf/agf23.htm Training in Mountain and Winter Warfare]. 1946. At the [[United States Army Center of Military History]]