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{{Short description|Component of the US Army during World War II}}
{{Lead too short|date=August 2010}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=
{{Infobox military unit
|unit_name=Army Ground Forces
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|caption=
|country={{flag|United States|1912}}
|allegiance=
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|specialization=
|command_structure=
|size= 780,000 (1942)<br>2,200,000 (1943)
|current_commander=
|garrison=
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==Origins==
Army Ground Forces traced
General Headquarters was constituted in the [[Regular Army (United States)|Regular Army]] on 15 August 1927 and allotted to [[United States Army Adjutant General's Corps|the Adjutant General]] for mobilization responsibility. It was partially organized 9 August 1932 at [[Washington, D.C.]] GHQ (Initial) (Enlisted) was allotted 1 October 1933 to the [[Second Corps Area]] for the mobilization of enlisted personnel. The Adjutant General retained mobilization responsibility for officer personnel. The GHQ (Initial) (Enlisted) was further allotted 2 September 1939 to the Trenton ([[New Jersey]]) Military District. The headquarters was partially activated on 26 July 1940 at the [[United States Army War College]], Washington, D.C. The Headquarters Company, GHQ, was constituted 8 July 1941 and activated 14 July 1941 at the Army War College.
The Army’s [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Chief of Staff]] was designated as the commanding general of GHQ. After the activation of GHQ, General [[George C. Marshall]] chose to exercise actual command of the Army’s tactical units through the War Department General Staff rather than through GHQ. Marshall delegated only the training functions to GHQ and charged its chief of staff [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] (later [[Major general (United States)|Major General]]) [[Lesley J. McNair]] with the authority for supervision of the training of the Army’s mobile units. However, since Marshall saw McNair infrequently and seldom visited GHQ, it was in practice McNair who directed GHQ.
In March 1942, there was a sweeping reorganization of the Army that reduced the number of officers reporting to the Chief of Staff. Under Executive Order 9082 [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16227 "Reorganizing the Army and the War Department"] of 28 February 1942 and War Department Circular No. 59 of 2 March 1942, GHQ became Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and opened at the Army War College on 9 March 1942. The posts of the chiefs of the four traditional combat arms – Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery – were abolished and their functions, duties, and powers were transferred to the Army Ground Forces. McNair also became responsible for four new 'pseudo-arms' – airborne, armor, anti-aircraft and tank destroyer. He had the power to reorganize the ground army, cutting across traditional lines without branch rivalries.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=152}}</ref>▼
As World War II approached, the role of GHQ remained a training function and a few months after Pearl Harbor, the command was redesignated as HQ, Army Ground Forces in recognition of its revised mission.<ref>{{cite book|last=Clay|first=Steven E.|date=2010|title=U.S. Army Order of Battle, 1919-1941, Volume 1. The Arms: Major Commands and Infantry Organizations, 1919-41|location=Fort Leavenworth, KS|publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press|page=95, 97}}{{source-attribution}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=6}}</ref> The concept of a general headquarters was not realized in practice because the war was fought in many theaters, so overall direction was exercised by the War Department's General Staff. GHQ also did not become the equivalent of a theater command for the Zone of Interior; administrative authority was exercised by the G-4 of the War Department's General Staff through the Corps Areas and Service Commands. Instead, GHQ was drawn into the enormous task of raising and training an army.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=8}}</ref>
Since later commands, such as the Continental Army Command and Forces Command were redesignations of their predecessors, they celebrated their birthday as 9 March 1942, the day Army Ground Forces were established.<ref name="Moenk1972" />▼
▲In March 1942, there was a sweeping reorganization of the Army that reduced the number of officers reporting to the
==Organization of Ground Troops==▼
In 1942, it was estimated that between 200 and 350 divisions would be required to defeat Germany and Japan.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=198}}</ref> However, only 89 divisions were ultimately readied. This was partially because requirements for service troops and overhead was greater than anticipated, and because the Army's overall strength became fixed at a lower level than expected. Army strength was fixed at 7,500,000 enlisted men in 1942<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=216–217}}</ref> and was subsequently cut to 7,004,000 enlisted men in 1943.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=226}}</ref> Further cuts of 433,000 men were made by March 1945.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=242}}</ref> As a result, divisions scheduled for activation in the second half of 1943 were postponed to 1944, then canceled entirely, and no new divisions were formed after June 1943.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=244–246}}</ref>▼
▲Since later commands, such as the Continental Army Command and Forces Command were redesignations of their predecessors, they celebrated their birthday as 9 March 1942, the day Army Ground Forces were established.<ref name="Moenk1972"
▲In 1942, it was estimated that between 200 and 350 divisions would be required to defeat Germany and Japan.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=198}}</ref>
By May 1945, 96% of all tactical troops were overseas. No new units were forming and there were no reserves. Fortunately, these sufficed to bring about the defeat of Germany and Japan, largely because the [[Soviet Union]] carried most of the burden of fighting the German Army on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]]. However, it also meant that divisions were kept in the line longer than anticipated and took heavier casualties. In three months of intensive combat, an infantry division could expect 100% casualties in its three infantry regiments. Units were maintained by a continuous flow of individual replacements. Such conditions placed great strain on the combat soldier who remained in action until he became a casualty.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=193–194}}</ref>
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Energetic and painstaking efforts were made by Army Ground Forces to optimize the divisions for combat operations. Non-essential troops and equipment were eliminated. The principle was established that a unit would have only the equipment that it would normally need. Other economies were also made. For example, trucks were replaced, wherever possible, by trailers. While admittedly not as useful as trucks, not only were they cheaper to produce, but they required less personnel to maintain, and less space to ship. As a result of economies, 89 divisions were active in 1945 for the same number of personnel as required to man 75 in 1943.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=318}}</ref> General [[Douglas MacArthur]] pointed out that the division, while initially well-balanced, soon became unbalanced in combat as the infantry took casualties faster than other arms, requiring the relief of the entire division when most of its components were capable of further effort.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|pp=227–229}}</ref>
This eventually brought the entire training program down. In 1941, replacements were produced by [[Replacement Training
The result was that divisions embarking for overseas in late 1944 and early 1945 had much less training than those leaving earlier. The last division to depart for overseas, the [[65th Infantry Division (United States)|65th Infantry Division]], fared worst of all:
{{cquote|
If the plans for building and training this division had been carried out as originally laid down by General McNair and his staff, the 65th when it moved overseas in 1945 might have been the most battleworthy of the long line of divisions produced by the Army Ground Forces. For into the planning of the organization, training, and equipment of this unit was poured the accumulated experience of four years' intensive effort. But, mainly because of personnel exigencies the control of which lay beyond the jurisdiction of the Army Ground Forces, the 65th was about the least ready for combat of all divisions trained in World War II. Its regiments had never worked with their supporting battalions of artillery in field exercises. The division commander had never maneuvered his command as a unit; in fact, the division had never been together, except for reviews and demonstrations, and its composition had changed greatly from one assembly to another. In the infantry regiments, only one man in four had been with the division for a year, and almost every fourth man had joined his unit within the past three months. The division was more of a hodgepodge than a team.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=487–488}}</ref>
}}
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The [[European Theater of Operations]] (ETO) favored a larger airborne division than Army Ground Forces, developing a larger division with two parachute infantry regiments, a [[glider infantry]] regiment almost identical to a standard infantry regiment and more support units, a total of 12,979 men. Airborne divisions in ETO were reorganized on this establishment. The 11th Airborne Division in the [[South West Pacific Area]] (SWPA) remained on the old AGF establishment. With a strength of only 8,500 men, it had one parachute infantry regiment and two smaller glider infantry regiments.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|p=349}}</ref>
===Anti-
No arm was in such urgent demand in 1942 as anti-aircraft units, and these units were shipped at high priority as soon as, and sometimes even before, they were fully trained. Once the Allied Air Forces began to get the upper hand, demand tapered off and it became apparent that anti-aircraft units had been over-produced. Many units were then broken up for infantry replacements.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=418–423}}</ref>
===Armor===
While Army Ground Forces endeavored to provide the troops with the best equipment available, they were not always able to provide better equipment than the German enemy. This was particularly apparent with respect to armor. American commanders tended, when forced to make a choice, to prefer mobility to firepower. The result was a number of uninspiring designs. In particular, the [[M6 Heavy Tank]] was a dud which convinced Army Ground Forces that heavy tanks were no good and [[
In 1942, the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff estimated that, by the end of 1943, 140 divisions would be mobilized, of which 46 would be armored. A severe shortage of shipping space, combined with Army Ground Forces doubts about whether this was the correct ratio of infantry armored units, led to this being revised downward to just 16 armored divisions actually being active in 1943.<ref>{{harvnb|Greenfield|Palmer|Wiley|1947|pp=392–394}}</ref>
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===Artillery===
Although also frequently out-ranged by their German counterparts, American artillery built up a reputation for effectiveness and the infantry increasingly relied on the artillery to get them forward. The War Department General Staff ignored the Army Ground Force's recommendations for a powerful heavy artillery arm, authorizing only 81 medium and 54 heavy non-divisional artillery battalions instead of the 140 and 101 recommended by Army Ground Forces, only to have combat experience in [[Italian
===Cavalry===
Two horse cavalry divisions existed in 1941. The [[1st Cavalry Division (United States)|1st Cavalry Division]] was shipped to Australia, where it was originally envisioned that it could operate in the mounted role. However, by the time it embarked, the defense of Australia was no longer paramount and it served in the [[South West Pacific Area]] in the dismounted role.<ref>{{harvnb|Hofmann|2006|p=289}}</ref> The [[U.S. 2nd Cavalry Division|2nd Cavalry Division]] was formed twice. Originally a bi-racial division, its white components were broken up to provide troops for armored units. It was reformed as a colored division only to be broken up again to provide service units.<ref>{{harvnb|Palmer|Wiley|Keast|1948|pp=55, 493}}</ref> Two non-divisional cavalry regiments served as infantry in the [[South West Pacific Area]] and [[China Burma India Theater of World War II|China Burma India]]. All other cavalry units were converted to the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance role. However, they only spent about 6% of their time on reconnaissance tasks, leading to a postwar consensus that either they lacked the combat power to perform their assigned role or had simply been misused altogether.<ref>{{harvnb|Hofmann|2006|pp=387–388}}</ref>
===Tank
The [[tank destroyer battalions (United States)|tank destroyer arm]] was probably the most controversial. Tank destroyers based on the [[M3 Half-track]] proved too vulnerable in the [[North African campaign]] and a decision was made that half of all tank
==Post-
Army Ground Forces survived the post-war reorganization of the War Department. It became Army Field Forces in 1948, [[United States Army Forces Command|Continental Army Command]] (CONARC) in 1955, and was ultimately divided into [[United States Army Forces Command]] (FORSCOM) and [[United States Army Training and Doctrine Command]] (TRADOC) in 1973. FORSCOM wears the former Army Ground Forces' [[shoulder sleeve insignia]] to this day.
==Commanders==
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==Notes==
{{reflist
==References==
*
| last = Green
| first = Constance McLaughlin
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| year = 1955
| work=US Army in World War II
▲* {{Citation
| last = Greenfield
| first = Kent
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| year = 1947
| work= United States Army in World War II
| oclc = 6993009 }}
*
| last = Hofmann
| first = George F.
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| year = 2006
| isbn = 0-8131-2403-4 }}
*
| last = Moenk
| first = Jean R.
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| year = 1972
}}
*
| last = Palmer
| first = Robert R.
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==Further reading==
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[[Category:American Theater of World War II]]
[[Category:United States Army in World War II]]
[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1942]]
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