Content deleted Content added
Tags: Manual revert Reverted |
GreenC bot (talk | contribs) Reformat 4 archive links. Wayback Medic 2.5 per WP:URLREQ#iaboterr |
||
| (9 intermediate revisions by 8 users not shown) | |||
Line 12:
== History ==
Clausewitz was among those intrigued by the manner in which the leaders of the [[French Revolution]], especially [[Napoleon]], changed the conduct of war through their ability to motivate the populace and gain access to the full resources of the state, thus unleashing war on a greater scale than had previously been seen in Europe. Clausewitz believed that moral forces in battle had a significant influence on its outcome. Clausewitz was well
A wealth of historical examples is used to illustrate its various ideas. Napoleon and [[Frederick II of Prussia|Frederick the Great]] figure prominently for having made very efficient use of the terrain, movement and the forces at their disposal.
Line 37:
* The military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm" the enemy: "to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent."
* All else being equal, the course of war will tend to favor the party with the stronger emotional and political motivations, especially the defender.<ref name="Cla08" />
<!--
Some of the key ideas (not necessarily original to Clausewitz or even to his mentor, [[Gerhard von Scharnhorst]]) discussed in ''On War'' include<ref>This list is from "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/faqs.htm#Ideas Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz]," ''ClausewitzStudies.org'', edited by Christopher Bassford.</ref> (in no particular order of importance):
Line 54:
* "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
* the essential unpredictability of war
* simplicity: Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Ratcliffe |first1=Susan |title=Oxford Essential Quotations, Karl von Clausewitz 1780–1831 |url=https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00003050 |website=Oxford Reference |publisher=Oxford |access-date=December 7, 2021}}</ref>
* the "[[fog of war]]"
* "friction"
Line 69:
It has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and the Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz, who did not actually use the term "total war", had merely foreseen the inevitable development that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic wars{{Citation needed|date=December 2022}}. They resulted (though the evolution of war has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times".<ref>Robert Osgood, 1979.</ref>
Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticized by other military theorists, like [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=The influence of Clausewitz on Jomini's Précis de l'Art de la Guerre - p. 3/30 |url=http://www.homepage.bluewin.ch/abegglen/papers/clausewitz_influence_on_jomini.pdf |last=Christoph Abegglen |publisher=King's College London |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926204024/http://www.homepage.bluewin.ch/abegglen/papers/clausewitz_influence_on_jomini.pdf |archive-date=2007-09-26 |access-date=April 30, 2020}}</ref> in the 19th century, [[B. H. Liddell Hart]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=CLAUSEWITZ IN ENGLISH - The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America - Chapter 15. J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart |url=https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/CIE/Chapter15.htm |last=Christopher Bassford |publisher=Clausewitz Com |access-date=April 30, 2020}}</ref> in the mid-20th century, and [[Martin van Creveld]]<ref name="macr">{{Cite web |title=Clausewitz vs. The Scholar: Martin Van Creveld's Expanded Theory Of War |url=https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/FKM.htm |last=K. M. French |publisher=Global Security |access-date=April 30, 2020}}</ref> and [[John Keegan]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=Clausewitz and the"New Wars" Scholars |url=https://www.clausewitz.com/opencourseware/Schuurman-NewWars.pdf |last=Bart Schuurman |publisher=Clausewitz Com |access-date=April 30, 2020 |archive-date=March 7, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210307225641/https://www.clausewitz.com/opencourseware/Schuurman-NewWars.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> more recently.<ref>{{Cite web |title=B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (1954) |url=https://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html |last=Bradley Potter |date=January 19, 2016 |publisher=Classics of Strategy and Diplomacy, Johns Hopkins University SAIS |access-date=April 30, 2020 |archive-date=May 14, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200514202526/https://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy-1954.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> ''On War'' is a work rooted solely in the world of the [[nation state]], states historian Martin van Creveld, who alleges that Clausewitz takes the state "almost for granted", as he rarely looks at anything before the [[Peace of Westphalia]], and mediaeval warfare is effectively ignored in Clausewitz's theory.<ref name=macr/> He alleges that Clausewitz does not address any form of intra/supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state.<ref name="Cormier 2013">{{Cite journal |last=Cormier |first=Youri |year=2013 |title=Fighting Doctrines and Revolutionary Ethics |url=http://jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/519 |journal=Journal of Military and Security Studies |volume=15 |issue=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140729225332/http://jmss.synergiesprairies.ca/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/519 |archive-date=July 29, 2014 |accessdate=August 12, 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Previous kinds of conflict were demoted to criminal activities without legitimacy and not worthy of the label "war". Van Creveld argues that "Clausewitzian war" requires the state to act in conjunction with the people and the army, the state becoming a massive engine built to exert military force against an identical opponent. He supports that statement by pointing to the conventional armies in existence throughout the 20th century. However, revolutionaries like [[Karl Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels]] derived some inspiration from Clausewitzian ideas.<ref name="Cormier 2013"/>
Line 76:
* 1873. Graham, J.J. translator. Republished 1908 with extensive commentary and notes by [[Victorian era|Victorian]] [[imperialist]] F.N. Maude.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Carl von Clausewitz, trans. James John Graham |url=http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm |year=1873 |access-date=2013-10-30}}</ref>
* 1943. [[O. J. Matthijs Jolles]], translator (New York: [[Random House]], 1943). This is viewed by some modern scholars{{who|date=September 2017}} as the most accurate existing English translation.
* 1968. Edited with introduction by [[Anatol Rapoport]]. [[Viking Penguin]]. {{ISBN|0-14-044427-0}}
* 1976/1984. [[Michael Howard (historian)|Michael Howard]] and [[Peter Paret]], editors and translators. [[Princeton University Press]]. {{ISBN|0-691-05657-9}}.
* 1989. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors and translators. Princeton University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-691-01854-6}}.
Line 94:
* ''[[Epitoma rei militaris]]'' by [[Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus]]
* ''[[Infanterie Greift An]]'' by [[Erwin Rommel]]
* ''Mes Rêveries'' by [[Maurice de Saxel]]
* ''[[Storm of Steel]]'' by [[Ernst Jünger]]
* ''[[Strategikon of Maurice]]'' by [[Maurice (emperor)|Byzantine Emperor Maurice]]
Line 111 ⟶ 112:
* Bassford, Christopher, 1994. [http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/CIE/TOC.htm ''Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America''. Oxford University Press.]
* [[Bernard Brodie (military strategist)|Bernard Brodie]], 1976. ''A guide to the reading of "On War."'' Princeton University Press.
* Clausewitz, Carl von (2018). ''Napoleon's 1796 Italian Campaign.'' Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. {{ISBN|978-0-7006-2676-2}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von (2020). ''Napoleon Absent, Coalition Ascendant: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 1.'' Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. {{ISBN|978-0-7006-3025-7}}
* Clausewitz, Carl von (2021). ''The Coalition Crumbles, Napoleon Returns: The 1799 Campaign in Italy and Switzerland, Volume 2.'' Trans and ed. Nicholas Murray and Christopher Pringle. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. {{ISBN|978-0-7006-3034-9}}
==Further reading==
Line 119 ⟶ 123:
* Erfourth M. & Bazin, A. (2014). ''[https://medium.com/the-bridge/clausewitzs-military-genius-and-the-human-dimension-960c2da46140 Clausewitz’s Military Genius and the #Human Dimension.] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160408012208/https://medium.com/the-bridge/clausewitzs-military-genius-and-the-human-dimension-960c2da46140 |date=2016-04-08 }}'' The Bridge.
* Hughes, R. Gerald. "Clausewitz, still the Master of War?: On Strategy in the Twenty-first Century." ''War in History'' 26.2 (2019): 287-296 [ online].
* Kornberger, Martin, and Anders Engberg-Pedersen. "Reading Clausewitz, reimagining the practice of strategy." ''Strategic Organization'' (2019): [http://www.academia.edu/download/60889086/Reading_Clausewitz_Reimagining_the_Practice_of_Strategy20191013-41187-nrcekv.pdf online]{{dead link|date=
* LeMay, G.H.L. "Napoleonic Warfare" ''History Today'' (Aug 1951), Vol. 1 Issue 8, pp 24-32.
* Simpson, Emile. "Clausewitz's Theory of War and Victory in Contemporary Conflict." ''Parameters'' 47.4 (2017): 7-18.
Line 146 ⟶ 150:
[[Category:Works about the theory of history]]
[[Category:Works about warfare]]
[[Category:Carl von Clausewitz]]
| |||