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m Clarifying that Manassas was not a city at that time. |
Reverted 1 edit by 136.33.208.74 (talk): The Union did typically have better artillery, it is saying here the situation was reversed |
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After two days of marching slowly in the sweltering heat, the Union army was allowed to rest in [[Centreville, Virginia|Centreville]]. McDowell reduced the size of his army to approximately 31,000 by dispatching Brig. Gen. [[Theodore Runyon]] with 5,000 troops to protect the army's rear. In the meantime, McDowell searched for a way to [[flanking maneuver|outflank]] Beauregard, who had drawn up his lines along Bull Run. On July 18, the Union commander sent a [[division (military)|division]] under Brig. Gen. [[Daniel Tyler]] to pass on the Confederate right (southeast) flank. Tyler was drawn into a [[Battle of Blackburn's Ford|skirmish at Blackburn's Ford]] over Bull Run and made no headway. Also on the morning of 18 July Johnston had received a telegram suggesting he go to Beauregard's assistance if possible. Johnston marched out of Winchester about noon, while Stuart's cavalry screened the movement from Patterson. Patterson was completely deceived. One hour after Johnston's departure Patterson telegraphed Washington, "I have succeeded, in accordance with the wishes of the General-in-Chief, in keeping General Johnston's force at Winchester."<ref>Ballard, p. 9.</ref>
For the maneuver to be successful McDowell felt he needed to act quickly. He had already begun to hear rumors that Johnston had slipped out of the valley and was headed for Manassas Junction. If the rumors were true, McDowell might soon be facing 34,000 Confederates
of 22,000. Another reason for quick action was McDowell's concern that the ninety-day enlistments of many of his regiments were about to expire. "In a few days I will lose many thousands of the best of this force", he wrote Washington on the eve of battle. In fact, the next morning two units of McDowell's command, their enlistments expiring that day, would turn
a deaf ear to McDowell's appeal to stay a few days longer. Instead, to the sounds of battle, they would march back to Washington to be mustered out of service.<ref>Ballard, p. 10.</ref>
Becoming more frustrated, McDowell resolved to attack the Confederate left (northwest) flank instead. He planned to attack with Brig. Gen. [[Daniel Tyler]]'s division at the [[Stone Bridge (Manassas)|Stone Bridge]] on the [[U.S. Route 29|Warrenton Turnpike]] and send the divisions of Brig. Gens. [[David Hunter]] and [[Samuel P. Heintzelman]] over Sudley Springs Ford. From here, these divisions could outflank the Confederate line and march into the Confederate rear. The brigade of [[Colonel (United States)|Col.]] [[Israel B. Richardson]] (Tyler's Division) would harass the enemy at Blackburn's Ford, preventing them from thwarting the main attack. Patterson would tie down Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley so that reinforcements could not reach the area. Although McDowell had arrived at a theoretically sound plan, it had a number of flaws: it was one that required synchronized execution of troop movements and attacks, skills that had not been developed in the nascent army; it relied on actions by Patterson that he had already failed to take; finally, McDowell had delayed long enough that Johnston's Valley force,
===Prelude to battle===
On July 19–20, significant reinforcements bolstered the Confederate lines behind Bull Run. Johnston arrived with all of his army
McDowell was getting contradictory information from his intelligence agents, so he called for the balloon [[Enterprise (balloon)|''Enterprise'']], which was being demonstrated by Prof. [[Thaddeus S. C. Lowe]] in Washington, to perform aerial reconnaissance.
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