Friedrich Dollmann: Difference between revisions

|death_date={{death date and age|1944|6|2829|1882|2|2|df=y}}

|birth_place=[[Würzburg]], [[German Empire|Germany]]

|rank=[[File:Generaloberst (Wehrmacht) 8.svg|30px25px]] ''[[Generaloberst]]''

|branch= [[File:Balkenkreuz.svg|20px]] [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|HeerGerman Army]]

|commands=[[7th Army (Wehrmacht)|Seventh7th Army]]

|battles=[[World War I]]<br/>[[World War II]]

'''Friedrich Karl Albert Dollmann''' (2 February 1882{{spaced ndash}}2829 June 1944)<ref name="reynolds">Reynolds, M: ''Steel Inferno'', p. 163. Dell Publishing, 1997.</ref><ref name="deste">D'Este, C: ''Decision in Normandy'', pp. 241–242. Penguin Books, 2004.</ref> 1944) was a German general during [[World War II]] who commanded the [[7th Army (Wehrmacht)|7th Army]] during the [[Battle of France|Invasion of France]] and the early phases of the [[Allied invasion of Normandy]] until his death in June 1944.

Born in 1882, Dollmann joined the army in 1899.<ref name="Mitcham 2012 p. 120">Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’sHitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', p. 120.</ref> He studied in the War Academy for General Staff starting in 1909. He served as an aerial observer for the first two years of the First World War.<ref>Hackl (1989). ''Die Bayerische Kriegsakademie (1867–1914)'', p. 424.</ref> Dollmann was assigned to the wartime General Staff on 5 November 1917, as part of the 6th Infantry Division. He was transferred to the Bavarian General Staff, where on 21 January 1918 he took command of the [[6th Army (German Empire)|6th Army]].<ref>Bradley ed., (1994). ''Die Generale des Heeres 1921–1945. Die militärischen Werdegänge der Generale, sowie der Ärzte, Veterinäre, Intendanten, Richter und Ministerialbeamten im Generalsrang'', Vol. 3, p. 178.</ref> In March 1919, he was appointed to the Ministry of Military Affairs and then onto the Peace Commission of the General Staff.<ref name="Mitcham 2012 p. 120"/>

Once this assignment was completed, Dollmann served in the central office of the General Staff. Starting 1 October 1919, he worked as a staff officer in the newly created ''[[Reichswehr]]'' Group Command IV of the Provisional ''Reichswehr'' in Munich, a post he retained for one year. On 1 October 1920, he was briefly employed as Adjutant of the Artillery Commander XXI before being assigned commander of the VII Artillery Division. Dollmann was transferred to the staff of the 7th (Bavarian) Division on 1 April 1923. Promoted to lieutenant colonel by this point, Dollmann thentook wentover fromas thecommander of First Division of the 7th (Bavarian) Artillery Regiment at Würzburg and on 1 February 1928, he took over as commander of this unit. Following this assignment, Dollmann then returned to a former unit, and became Chief of the General Staff of the 7th (Bavarian) Division. During the next few years, Dollmann held various positions, spent some time in the higher artillery command of the ''Reichswehr'', commanded the 6th (Prussian) Artillery Regiment from 1 February 1931 in Minden, and rose to the rank of lieutenant general in 1933.<ref name="Mitcham 2012 p. 120"/>

He took over as Chief of Artillery in the Defense Ministry on 1 February 1933. Subsequent his brief time as commander of army service Kassel in October 1934, he was appointed Commander of the Military District IX (Hesse-Thuringia West) on 1 May 1935.<ref>Bradley ed., (1994). ''Die Generale des Heeres 1921–1945. Die militärischen Werdegänge der Generale, sowie der Ärzte, Veterinäre, Intendanten, Richter und Ministerialbeamten im Generalsrang'', Vol. 3, pp. 177–179.</ref> Having distinguished himself, Dollmann was promoted at the end of 1936 to the rank of full general, along with 11 other officers of the twelve ''[[Wehrkreise]]''.<ref>Telford Taylor named the others promoted to Generalgeneral (of which Dollmann is included) in the following order: von Brauchitsch, Blaskowitz, von Witzleben, List, Geyer, von Kluge, von Reichenau, von Kleist, Dollmann, Knochenhauer, Ulex, and Kress von Kressenstein. See: Taylor (1995)[1952]. ''Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich'', p. 107.</ref>

Many historians{{who|date=July 2021}} who have analyzed Dollmann's career and life noteassert that, while he did exhibit on occasion a pro-[[Nazi]] attitude, they assert that he was not a committed Nazi.<ref>Brett-Smith (1976). ''Hitler's Generals'', p. 102.</ref> On the other hand, historian {{illm|Klaus-Jürgen Müller (historian)|lt=Klaus-Jürgen Müller|de|Klaus-Jürgen Müller}} notes that Dollmann's orders were imbued with a discernible Nazi impetus. He therefore believes that Dollmann had a stronger inclination to National Socialism than otherwise presumed.<ref>Müller (1969). ''Das Heer und Hitler'', pp. 193–202.</ref> A directive from Dollmann dated 8 February 1935 shows that he instructed his officers to cooperate fully with the authorities of the [[NSDAP]]. There is also evidence that he demanded that all his officers should fully support the Nazi Party and admonished them to adjust their opinions accordingly; he even insisted that his officers’officers' wives should actively participate in the [[National Socialist Women's League]]. Along similar lines, Dollmann expected his officers to hang pictures of the ''[[Führer]]'' in their offices and in the mess hall instead of pictures of the Kaiser.<ref>Müller (1969). ''Das Heer und Hitler'', p. 193.</ref> In 1937, Dollmann harangued Catholic chaplains for not being fervent enough in their support of the Nazi regime, telling them that as members of the [[Wehrmacht]] and bearers of National Socialism, they should always display "a clear and unresolved acknowledgment of the ''Führer'', State, and People!"<ref>Brett-Smith (1976). ''Hitler's Generals'', pp. 102–103.</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-052-1435-16, Oberrhein, Befestigung am Isteiner Klotz.jpg|thumb|Dollman inspects an artillery observation post that bears his name, near the French border, 1940.]]

During the [[Battle of France|invasion of France]] in 1940, Dollmann’sDollmann's assignment placed him at the southern edge of the [[Siegfried Line]],<ref>The defensive line constructed along the western frontier of Germany before World War II. It was also known as the Hindenburg Line.</ref> opposite the [[Maginot Line]]. While the French Maginot Line had proven impregnable to frontal assault in the past, Hitler was unconcerned, as its defenses were easily outflanked during the invasion.<ref>Kershaw (2001). ''Hitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis'', p. 265.</ref> Throughout the invasion of France, Dollmann’sDollmann's 7th Army was not placed on the offensive until most of the French army had been destroyed, at which point he linked up with the [[1st Panzer Division (Wehrmacht)|1st Panzer Division]] of [[Panzer Group Guderian]], encircling 400,000 French troops in the [[Vosges]] Mountains – an action which was followed by a French surrender.<ref>Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’sHitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', pp. 121–122.</ref> Hitler rewarded the participating generals with promotions for their part in this mission, including Dollmann, who thereby attained the rank of ''[[Generaloberst]]'' (Colonelcolonel Generalgeneral).<ref name="Mitcham 2012 p. 122">Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’sHitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', p. 122.</ref>

In the wake of the French defeat, Dollmann's 7th Army remained in the West. Along with ''[[Generalfeldmarschall]]''Field Marshal [[Erwin von Witzleben]], Dollmann was the only commander of the western campaign who did not see service against the Soviet Union along the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]]. MilitaryThe historianshistorian suggest[[Peter Lieb]] suggests that the reason might be that Dollmann was considered too inflexible and technically unsuitableunsuited for the warfare in the East.<ref>Lieb (2007). ''Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg. Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44'', pp. 87–88.</ref> For reasons that remain unknown, Dollmann began having serious doubts about the Nazi regime and where his country was headed. Dollmann did not keep up with contemporary tactical military developments nor did he follow the course of the war all that closely. Instead he became complacent, overweight, and followed the lead of his immediate superior, Field Marshal [[Gerd von Rundstedt]], neglecting the coastal defenses of France in the process.<ref name="Mitcham 2012 p. 122"/> Rundstedt believed that the best strategy was to allow the Allies to land, build up their forces, and wait for them to advance inland. The Germans could then destroy the Allies in [[blitzkrieg]] maneuvers as they attempted to make their way deeper into France. This way, the Germans would be well out of the range of Allied naval guns and could easily secure an advantage.<ref>Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’s Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', pp. 122–123.</ref>

[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-300-1865-10, Nordfrankreich, Dollmann, Feuchtinger, Rommel.jpg|thumb|left|Dollmann (left) in conversation with Lieutenant-General [[Edgar Feuchtinger]] (2nd from right) and [[Erwin Rommel]], France 1944]]

Several days prior to the invasion, the Germans received intelligence reports about the activities occurring across the channel. Deception measures by the Allied intelligence services kept the Germans convinced that the attack would occur near Norway or close to [[Calais]].<ref>Evans (2010). ''The Third Reich at War'', p. 623.</ref> Although reconnaissance reports as late as 5 June 1944 indicated that something significant was afoot, none of this intelligence was relayed to the [[Oberkommando der Wehrmacht|OKW]] at Berchtesgaden, nor was it forwarded to Dollmann’sDollmann's 7th Army.<ref>Kershaw (2001). ''Hitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis'', p. 638.</ref> It is doubtful whether this would have led to a redistribution of forces, since Hitler remained convinced that the main Allied attack would occur at Pas de Calais.<ref name="Goerlitz 1985 p. 458">Goerlitz (1985). ''History of the German General Staff, 1657–1945'', p. 458.</ref>

On 5 June 1944, under the cover of darkness, the invasion at Normandy began. By nightfall June 6, up to 130,000 troops and 20,000 Allied tanks {{Citation needed|date=June 2023}} were ashore under a curtain of naval bombardment.<ref name="Goerlitz 1985 p. 458"/> On Dollmann's orders, a series of mapping war games washad been underway in [[Rennes]], which meant that he, as well as hisDollmann's corps and division commanders, were not with their respective units at the time of the attack.<ref>Mitcham (1997). ''The Desert Fox in Normandy: Rommel's Defense of Fortress Europe'', p. 64.</ref>

Dollmann tried to organize an immediate counter-attack with the [[21st Panzer Division]]. Lieutenant General [[Fritz Bayerlein]] protested; he felt a column march in daytime was merely an invitation to the Allied air forces to decimate his division. He suggested alternative plans, but Dollmann remained adamant.<ref name="Mitcham 2012 p. 123"/> This proved a costly mistake. Throughout the night of 6–7 June 1944, the Allies used their knowledge of the location of the German columns and flares to illuminate the enemy to find suitable targets to attack from the air. The 21st Panzer Division lost 5five tanks, 40 tank trucks, and 84 other vehicles destroyed.<ref>Brett-Smith (1976). ''Hitler's Generals'', p. 104.</ref> The depleted Panzer division left Rommel at a disadvantage in trying to arrange a counterattackThus, and so it was not until 9 June 1944 that heRommel was able to muster his forces.<ref>Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’s Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', p. 124.</ref> Obtaining naval support or aerial cover from the [[Luftwaffe]] proved to be impossible. Not only were the Germans under-equipped compared to the Allies, the command and control requirements for coordinated attack and defense were hindered by a labyrinthine military and administrative bureaucracy, and the highest offices of leadership remained intransigent about the actual strategic situation. These factors made Rommel’s job of coastal defense nearly impossible.<ref>Magenheimer (2003). ''Hitler’s War: Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions, 1940–1945'', pp. 245–253.</ref> Despite the desperate circumstances, Rommel, Rundstedt, and Dollmann kept fighting.

Inaccurate Wehrmacht intelligence reports and Hitler's assurance that a second invasion was due at any moment left the equivalent of an entire German Army Group, comprising 5five Luftwaffe divisions, two Panzer divisions, and 24 infantry divisions, sitting immobile awaiting further instructions. In the meantime, the German High Command issued orders for Rommel and Rundstedt to launch a massive armored counterattack against an Allied force of "929,000 men, 177,000 vehicles, and 586,000 tons of materiel,", an order which was impossible to obey.<ref>Mitcham (1997). ''The Desert Fox in Normandy: Rommel's Defense of Fortress Europe'', p. 142.</ref>

The French port of [[Cherbourg]] fell on 26 June 1944, andwhen it was surrendered by Lieutenant General [[Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben]]. This enraged Hitler and prompted a court-martial investigation from Field Marshal [[Wilhelm Keitel]]. Hitler summoned Rundstedt and Dollmann to Berchtesgaden on 28 June 1944 and insisted that Dollmann be court-martialed. Rundstedt rejected this idea since Dollmann was no more accountable for the failure than himself. Still unsatisfied, Hitler demanded that Dollmann at the very least should be relieved of command, which stimulated another defense, this time from Rommel. Undeterred, Hitler waited until the men left to relieve Dollmann of command, replacing him with SS-''[[ObergruppenführerPaul Hausser]]'' of the [[Paul HausserWaffen-SS]].<ref>Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’s Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', pp. 124–125.</ref> Hitler relieved Rundstedt of command a short time later.<ref>Barnett (2003). ''Hitler’s Generals'', p. 200.</ref>

Unaware that he had been relieved of command, Dollmann was nonetheless worn out and stressed. He died on 29 June 1944. The exact circumstances of thehis death of Dollmann remain controversial. Some sources say he suffered a heart attack, while others claimsay he committed suicide by taking poison.<ref name="reynolds"/><ref>Meyer, H: ''The 12th SS'', p. 425. Stackpole Books, 2005.</ref><ref name="deste" /> In 1973, Dollmann's last chief of staff Lieutenant General [[Max-Josef Pemsel]], wrote that on 29 June at around 3:00 am in the morning, Dollmann bid farewell to his staff and committed suicide in his command post.<ref name="Pemsel">Max Pemsel: ''Generaloberst Friedrich Dollmann.'' In: ''Deutsches Soldatenjahrbuch (German soldier's yearbook).'' (1974).</ref> In 2003, a theory was put forward that like Rommel, Dollmann was forced to commit suicide by Hitler.<ref name="Reißmüller">[[Johann Georg Reißmüller]]: ''Generalprobe für die Beseitigung Rommels. Ist Friedrich Dollmann, der Oberbefehlshaber der 7. Armee, am 28. Juni 1944 auf Weisung Hitlers ermordet worden? ('' In: ''Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.'' Nr. 191. (19. August 2003). S. 33.</ref> He was buried in France on 2 July 1944, where the field marshals Rundstedt, Rommel and [[Hugo Sperrle]] were present. On the same day, he received posthumously the [[Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves]]. Later, Hitler delivered a laudatory obituary on behalf of Dollmann.<ref>Mitcham & Mueller (2012). ''Hitler’sHitler's Commanders: Officers of the Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, and the Waffen-SS'', p. 125.</ref> He is buried at the [[Champigny-Saint-André German war cemetery]].

==ReferencesCitations==

'''==Bibliography'''==

|origyearorig-year=1986

|language=Germande

* [[Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb|Leeb, Wilhelm von]] (1976). ''Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Lagebeurteilungen aus zwei Weltkriegen''. Edited by Georg Meyer. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

* [[Lieb, Peter]] (2007). ''Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg. Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich 1943/44''. München: R. Oldenbourg.

|language=Germande

|language=Germande

[[Category:PeopleMilitary personnel from Würzburg]]

[[Category:German militaryArmy personnel of World War I]]

[[Category:GermanMilitary Romanpersonnel Catholicsfrom the Kingdom of Bavaria]]