Geoje POW camp: Difference between revisions

{{closeUse paraphrasingdmy dates|date=OctoberNovember 20142021}}

After the surprise [[Battle of Inchon|Inchon landings]] on 15 September 1950 and the follow-up Eighth Army [[Pusan Perimeter Offensive|breakout from the Pusan Perimeter]], the North Korean [[Korean People's Army]] (KPA) began to retreat north pursued by UN forces in the [[UN September 1950 counteroffensive]]. Large numbers of KPA were taken prisoner in the swift maneuver and sent to the rear. The number of prisoners rose from under a thousand in August 1950 to over 130,000 in November. Unfortunately, little provision had been made for so many prisoners and facilities to confine, clothe and feed them were not available. In addition, there were not enough men on hand to guard the prisoners nor were the guards assigned adequately trained for their mission. The quantity and quality of the security forces continued to plague the UN prison-camp commanders in the months that lay ahead. While the prisoners were housed near [[PusanBusan]] (Pusan), there was a tendency for former [[Republic of Korea Army]] (ROK) soldiers who had been impressed into the KPA and later recaptured by the UN to take over the leadership in the compounds. Since these ex-ROK soldiers professed themselves to be anti-[[Communist Party of Korea|Communist]] and were usually favored by the ROK guards, they were able to win positions of power and control.<ref name=Hermes>{{cite book|last=Hermes|first=Walter|title=United States Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front|publisher=United States Army Center of Military History|year=1992|url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/020/20-3/index.html|isbn=9781410224842|page=233}} {{PD-notice}}</ref>{{rp|233}}

As the prisoner total reached 137,000 in January 1951, the UN decided to isolate captured personnel on [[Geoje|Koje-do]] (or Kŏje-do), an island off the southern coast of Korea. But before the move was made, the South Korean prisoners were segregated from the North Koreans. This left a power vacuum in many of the compounds that were abruptly deprived of their leaders. On Koje-doGeoje, security problems were reduced, but there were serious engineering obstacles to be overcome. Since there were little or no natural water resources on the island, Col. Hartley F. Dame, the first camp commander, had to build dams and store rainwater to service the 118,000 locals, 100,000 refugees, and 150,000 prisoners. Construction began in January on the first enclosure of UN Prisoner of War Camp Number 1 and by the end of the month over 50,000 POW's were moved from the mainland to Koje-doGeoje. Swiftly, in two rock-strewn valleys on the north coast, four enclosures, each subdivided into eight compounds, were built. Originally intended to hold 700-1700–1,200 men apiece, the compounds were soon jammed to five times their capacity. Since available land was at a premium on the island, the space between the compounds soon had to be used to confine the prisoners too. This conserved the construction of facilities and the number of guards required to police the enclosures, but complicated the task of managing the crowded camp. Packing thousands of men into a small area with only barbed wire separating each compound from the next permitted a free exchange of thought and an opportunity to plan and execute mass demonstrations and riots. With the number of security personnel limited and usually of inferior caliber, proper control was difficult at the outset and later became impossible. But the elusive hope of an imminent [[Korean Armistice Agreement#Armistice discussions|armistice]] and a rapid solution of the prisoner problem delayed corrective action.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|233-4233–4}}

Although there were frequent instances of unrest and occasional outbreaks of resistance during the first months of the Koje-doGeoje POW camp's existence, much of the early trouble could be traced to the fact that ROK guards were used extensively. Resentment between ROK and KPA soldiers flared into angry words, threats, and blows very easily. Part of the tension stemmed from the circumstance that at first the prisoners drew better rations than the guards, but eventually this discrepancy was adjusted. In the internecine disputes the [[United States Army]] (US) security troops operated at a disadvantage since they knew little or no [[Korean language]] and were reluctant to interfere. Bad blood between guards and prisoners, however, formed only one segment of the problem. Although the United States had not ratified the [[Geneva Convention of 1949]] on prisoners of war, it had volunteered to observe its provisions. The Geneva Convention, however, was designed primarily to protect the rights of the prisoners. It completely failed to foresee the development of organized prisoner groups such as those that grew up on Koje-doGeoje in 1951-521951–52 or to provide protection for the captor nation(s) in dealing with stubborn resistance. The drafters spelled out in detail the privileges of the prisoners and the restrictions upon the captor nation(s), but evidently could not visualize a situation in which the prisoners would organize and present an active threat to the captor nation(s). Under these conditions, every effort at violence by the prisoners that was countered by force reflected badly upon the UN command. Regardless of the provocation given by the prisoners, the UN appeared to be an armed bully abusing the defenseless captives and the Communists capitalized on this situation. The outbreaks of dissension and open resistance were desultory until the negotiations at [[Kaesong]] got underway. Then the prisoners realized that their future was at stake. Many had professed strong anti-Communist sentiments and were afraid to return, while others, anticipating repatriation, swung clearly to the side of Communist groups in the compounds. From North Korea, agents were sent to the front lines and permitted themselves to be captured so that they could infiltrate the POW camps. Working through refugees, civilians, and local guerrillas, the agents were able to keep in touch with their headquarters and to plan, organize, and stage incidents at will. Inside the camps, messages were passed visually by signals, hurled by rocks from compound to compound, or communicated by word of mouth. The hospital compound served as a clearinghouse for information and was one of the centers of Communist resistance. Although the agents wielded the actual power in the compounds, they usually concealed themselves behind the nominal commanders and operated carefully to cloak their identities. Behind the agents stood their chiefs, Lt. Gen. [[Nam Il]] and Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho, the principal KPA delegates to the armistice conference. The close connection between the Armistice negotiations and the POW camps showed the North Korean efforts in using every possible measure to exert pressure upon the course of the armistice talks.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|234-7234–7}}

As the Communists struggled for control of the compounds, a defensive countermovement was launched by the non-Communist elements. Former [[Kuomintang|Chinese Nationalist]] soldiers and North Korean anti-Communists engaged in bloody clashes with their opponents, using fists abdand home made weapons.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Williamson|first=Lucy|date=2013-07-27|title=South Korea's POW island revisited|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23468045|access-date=2020-09-02}}</ref> [[Kangaroo court]]s tried stubborn prisoners and sentences were quick and often fatal. Since UN personnel did not enter the compounds at night and the prisoners were usually either afraid or unwilling to talk, the beatings and murders went unpunished. Even if the beaten prisoners had been willing to give evidence against their attackers, as sometimes happened, the camp commander was not in a position to prosecute. He was not permitted by his superiors in [[Washington D.C.]] to institute judicial procedures against the culprits. Deprived of this weapon of disciplinary control, the prison command was forced to operate under a distinct disadvantage. Another instance in which higher headquarters contributed unwittingly to the discontent of the POW camp stemmed from an information and education program instituted in 1951 to keep the prisoners occupied profitably. For the Communists, the orientation course became the chief target of criticism and abuse. Although attendance at these lectures was purely voluntary, the subject matter contrasted the advantages of democracy with the fallacies of communism in an unmistakable manner and the Communists protested vehemently. By far the greater portion of the education program aimed at assisting the prisoners in developing vocational and technical skills to help them after their release. The Communists readily accepted the instruction in metalworking and soon began to produce weapons of all varieties instead of sanitation utensils, stoves, and garden tools and used these arms to gain interior control in the compounds whenever they could.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|237}}

The first collective violence against camp guards occurred on 18/19 June 1951, when some North Korean officers protested having to dig latrines and garbage pits. When a ROK guard detail entered Compound 76 of the camp, the prisoners stoned the guards and the soldiers opened fire, killing three prisoners. More incidents followed including demonstrations within the compounds, work refusals, threats against camp personnel, and some 15 murders among groups of pro- and anti-communist Korean prisoners. In July and August 1951, the guards killed eight more prisoners.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historynet.com/war-behind-the-wire-koje-do-prison-camp.htm/4|title=War Behind The Wire: Koje-do Prison Camp|author=Allan R. Millett|date=20 January 2009|accessdate=25 August 2014}}</ref>

In September 1951, 15 prisoners were murdered by a self-appointed people's court. Three more were killed when rioting broke out on the 19th in Compound 78. Troops had to be rushed in to restore order and remove 200 prisoners who were in fear of their lives. As unrest mounted, the US 2nd Logistical Command, in charge of all POW camps, asked US [[Eighth United States Army|Eighth Army]] commander General [[James Van Fleet]] for more security personnel. PointingReferring out thatto protracted confinement, uncertainty over the future, and Communistprisoner agitationresistance against the UN "information and education program" and claiming these factors had combined to produce increasing tension among the prisoners, the chief of staff of the 2d Logistical Command also reminded Van Fleet that the caliber of the guard troops left much to be desired. The September disturbances led to a

visit by Van Fleet and a reinforcing and reorganization of the prison security forces. From the opening of the camp in January down to mid-September when Col. Maurice J. Fitzgerald assumed command, there had been eight different commanders or about one a month. As Fitzgerald later commented, "Koje-do was a graveyard of commanders." Van Fleet's recognition of the difficulties of the problems led to the activation of the 8137th Military Police Group in October. Besides three assigned battalions, four additional escort guard companies were attached to the group. In November one battalion of the US [[23rd Infantry Regiment (United States)|23rd Infantry Regiment]] was made available for duty on Koje-doGeoje and by December over 9,000 US and ROK personnel were stationed on the island. This was still some 6,000 fewer than the number requested.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|237-8237–8}}

Although the orders from Ridgway covered both Communists and anti-Communists, the latter weresubmitted co-operative in their relations with theto UN personnel and ruthless only whenused theyviolence encounteredagainst Communist sympathizers in their midst.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|239-40239–40}}

As forced screening was cast into limbo, the prospects for a relaxation of tension on Koje-do should have improved. But inIn early May, after a tour of inspection, Col. Robert T. Chaplin, [[Provost marshal]] of the [[Far East Command (United States)|Far East Command]], reported that there was a dangerous lack of control within the Communist compounds, with the prisoners refusingrefused even to bring in their own food and supplies. The possibility of new incidents that might embarrass the UN Command, especially at Panmunjom, led Ridgway to remind Van Fleet that proper control had to be maintained regardless of whether screening was conducted or not. As it happened, Van Fleet was more concerned over the fact that Colonel Chaplin had not informed Eighth Army of his impressions first than he was over the prisoner-camp situation. There was no cause for "undue anxiety" about Koje-doGeoje, he told Ridgway on 5 May. Actually, Eighth Army officers admitted freely that UN authorities could not enter the compounds, inspect sanitation, supervise medical support, or work the Communists prisoners as they desired. They exercised an external control only, in that UN security forces did prevent the prisoners from escaping. Thus, on 7 May the Communist prisoners and the UN appeared to have reached a stalemate. The former had interior control, but could not get out without violence; and the latter had exterior control, but could not get in without violence. With the cancellation of forced screening, the UN Command indicated that it was willing to accept the status quo rather than initiate another wave of bloodshed in the camps. The next move was up to the Communists.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|243}}

It did not take long for the Communist prisoners to act. As investigation later revealed, they had become familiar with the habits of General [[Francis Dodd (general)|Francis Dodd]], the camp commandant, during the spring and by the beginning of May they had readied a plan. Well aware that Dodd was anxious to lessen the tension in the camp, they also knew that he often went unarmed to the sally ports of the compounds and talked to the leaders. This system of personal contact kept Dodd in close touch with camp problems, but it exposed him to an element of risk. Only the guards carried weapons on Koje-doGeoje and there were no locks on the compounds gates, since work details were constantly passing in and out. Security personnel were not authorized to shoot save in case of grave emergency or in self-defense, and were not permitted to keep a round in the chamber of their guns. In the past the Communists had successfully kidnapped several UN soldiers and although they had later released them unharmed after Communist complaints had been heard, the practice was neither new nor unknown. Since the technique had proved profitable in previous instances, the prisoners evidently decided to capture the camp commandant. Taking advantage of his willingness to come to them, they made careful plans.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|243-4243–4}}

On the evening of 6 May, members of a Communist work detail from Compound 76 refused to enter the enclosure until they had spoken to Lt. Col. Wilbur R. Raven, commanding officer of the 94th Military Police Battalion and the compound. The prisoners told Raven that guards had beaten members of the compound and searched them for contraband. When he promised to investigate the charges, they seemed satisfied, but asked to see General Dodd on the next day to discuss matters of importance. Raven was noncommittal since he did not wish the prisoners to imagine that they could summon the commandant at will, but he promised to pass the message on to the general. Since theThe prisoners indicated that they would be willing to let themselves be listed and fingerprinted if Dodd would come and talk to them, the trap was shrewdly baited. Dodd had just been instructed to complete an accurate roster and identification of all the remaining prisoners of war on Koje-doGeoje and hoped for the chance to win a bloodless victory was too good to be missed. Colonel Raven finished his discussions with the leaders of Compound 76 shortly after 14:00 on 7 May and Dodd drove up a few minutes later. As usual they talked with the unlocked gate of the sally port between them and the Communists launchedgave a whole series of questions concerning items of food and clothing they felt they should be issuedrequired. Then, branching into the political fieldpolitics, they askedinquired about the truce negotiations. SeveralFirst, timesthey theyattempted to invitedinvite Dodd and Raven to come inside and sit down so that they could carry on the discussion in a more comfortable atmosphere. Raven turned down these suggestions bluntly since he himself had previously been seized and held. More prisoners had meanwhile gathered in the sally port and Dodd permitted them to approach and listen to the conversation. In the midst of the talk, a work detail turning in tents for salvage came through the sally port and the outer door was opened to let them pass out. It remained ajar and the prisoners drew closer to Dodd and Raven as if to finish their discussion. Suddenly they leapedleapt forward and began to drag the two officers into the compound. Raven grabbed hold of a post until the guards rushed up and used their bayonets to force the prisoners back, but Dodd was hauledsuccessfully quicklyhauled inside the compound, whisked behind a row of blankets draped along the inner barbed wire fence, and hurried to a tent that was prepared for him. The prisoners told him that the kidnapping had been planned and that the other compounds would have made an attempt to seize him if the opportunity had arisen.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|244-5244–5}}

4. Immediate recognition of the P.W. Representative Group (Commission) consisted of NKPA and CPVA PW's and close cooperation to it by your command.<br>

</blockquote><ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|250}}

The CommunistCommunists' objectivesgoal were now fully in the open, for admission by the UN Command of the validity of the first three demandswas wouldto discredit the screening process and repatriation policy backed so stronglystubbornly by the UN delegation at Panmunjom. If the UN was violating the Geneva Convention and conducting a reign of terror in the POW camps, as the Communist prisoners charged, then how much reliance could the rest of the world place in the screening figures released by the UN Command?<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|250}}

Colson had already sent a final request to Compound 76 to free Dodd, but the receipt of the four demands and of two other pieces of information gave him pause. A disturbing report from hisColson's intelligence officer indicated that the other compounds were ready to stage a mass breakout as soon as he launched his attack and, as if to substantiate this item, the villages near the compound were deserted. The prospect of a large number of casualties, on both sides, including General Dodd, decided Colson. Since the UN had not committed most of the charges levelled by the prisoners, he called Yount and simply told him that Colson could inform Dodd that the accusations were not true. Colson was willing to recognize the POW association, but had no jurisdiction over the problem of repatriation. If Yount could get authority to renounce nominal screening, Colson thought he could fashioncome to an answeragreement acceptable towith the prisoners. General Mood felt that nominal screening could be dropped and gave his approval to Yount to go ahead. Naturally, theThe Communists wanted Colson's answer in writing, and this destroyed any hope of meeting the 10:00 deadline. For some reasonbut the translator available to Colson was not particularly quick or accurate and this slowed down the negotiating process. AtColson anydid rate,not Colsoninitiate postponed taking actionviolence and sentanswered offas an answer to the prisonersfollows:

</blockquote><ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|251}}

Colson added an ultimatum that Dodd must be freed by noon and no later. With the exception of the word "more" in Item 3, Colson's reply was noncommittal and the Communists refused to accept it or release Dodd. Always opportunistic, they were determined to win more from the UN Command before they surrendered their trump card. The haggling began in the late morning and lasted until evening as the prisoners argued about the wording of Colson's answer.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|251}}

As the antagonists on Koje-doGeoje wrangled over the details, Ridgway and Van Fleet encountered increasing difficulty in finding out what was going on. When news of the four demands seeped back to UN headquarters, Ridgway had attempted to forestall Colson's reply, but had been too late. He realized the propaganda value of an admission of the prisoners' charges, but Van Fleet had assured him that Colson's answer carried no implied acknowledgment of illegal or reprehensible acts. As the afternoon drew to a close and no report of Colson's negotiations arrived in Tokyo, Ridgway became impatient. Pointing out that incalculable damage might be done to the UN cause if Colson accepted the prisoners' demands, he complained of the lack of information from Koje-doGeoje. "I have still been unable to get an accurate prompt record of action taken by your camp commander in response to these latest Communist demands. I am seriously handicapped thereby in the issuance of further instructions." Actually Van Fleet knew little more than Ridgway at this point. Colson had been so busy that even Yount was not completely abreast of all the developments.

When the noon deadline passed without incident, Dodd phoned Colson and presented the prisoners' case. He arguedexplained that there had been incidents in the past when prisoners had been killed and Colson's answer simply denied everything. MostThe ofCommunists thedemanded difficultiesan stemmedunequivocal fromadmission semantics,of Dodd admitted, but until these were cleared up, the Communists would not free himguilt. With theThe prisoner leaders sittingsat beside, him, Dodd passedand onhad theirhim andpass hison owntheir suggestions for preparing Colson's reply in an acceptable form and then offered to write in the changes that the prisoners considered mandatory. Colson agreed and informed Yount in general terms of the prisoners' objections. After a second version failedwas still unacceptable to satisfy the Communists, Colson attemptedhad to attempt to meet their demands as clearly so that there would be no further excuse foras delaypossible:

The release hour was advanced to 20:00 since so much time had been consumed in translating and discussing the changes. By the time the final version had been translated and examined by the prisoners, it was evening and the Communists endeavoured to add one last touch to what Yount called the "comic opera." They wanted to hold Dodd overnight so that they might hold a little ceremony in the morning. In recognition of his services, Dodd was to be decked with flowers and escorted to the gate. But Colson had had enough and would concede no more. He demanded that Dodd be brought out that night as agreed and the Communists decided that they could afford to give in now that they had won their main objectives. At 21:30 Dodd walked out of Compound 76 and was immediately taken to a place where he could be kept incommunicado.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|253}}

The seizure of Dodd in itself might havewas beenno relativelymeaningful unimportantvictory, it was only when the Communists skilfully used Dodd as a pawn and then backed his capture with the threat of a mass breakout that they were able to practicewin extortiontheir indemands so bold a fashionsuccessfully. Despite the fact that there were over eleven thousand armed troops supported by tanks and other weapons and despite the instructions from Ridgway and Van Fleet to employ force if Dodd was not freed, the Communists were victorious. What had begun as a military problem to be solved by military means became a political problem settled on the prisoners' terms. The Communists had seized the initiative and never relinquished it. They successfully blocked the use of force and won a formidable propagandistic victory.

Although Van Fleet tended to discount the value of the Colson letter, Clark and his superiors in Washington were quite concerned. They realized the damaging implications that the Communists would be certain to utilize. Phrases like "I can assure in the future that PW can expect humane treatment" impliedconceded that the prisoners had not received humane treatment in the past. The promise that there would be "no more forcible screening or rearming of PW in this camp . . ." conveyed an entirely erroneous impression since there never had been any rearming of prisoners and forcible screening had been cancelled. Since the press was becoming impatient for more information. Clark decided to publish a statement on the incident. He included both the prisoners' demands and Colson's reply. Dodd also met the press and issued a brief account of his capture and release. In general, the response to the affair and the letter was unfavorable and at Panmunjom, the North Korean and Chinese delegates made full use of the propaganda value of the episode to discomfortembarrass the UN representatives. At 2nd Logistical Command headquarters, Yount established a board to investigate the matter and it found Dodd and Colson "blameless". This did not satisfy Van Fleet, who felt that Dodd had not conducted himself properly nor had his advice to Colson been fitting under the circumstances. He recommended administrative action against Dodd and an administrative reprimand for Colson. Clark was even more severe; he proposed reduction in grade to colonel for both Dodd and Colson and an administrative reprimand to Yount for failing to catch several damaging phrases in Colson's statement. The Department of the Army approved Clark's action. The quick and summary punishment of the key officers involved did not solve the problem of what to do about Colson's statement or the more basic question of how to clean up the long-standing conditions in the POW camps. Although the Washington leaders did not want to "repudiate" the letter, they told Clark to deny its validity on the grounds that it was obtained under duress and Colson had not had the authority to accept the false charges contained in the Communist demands. The first count was no doubt true but the second was certainly moot. Denial was not enough for the press, and on 27 May [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army]] General [[J. Lawton Collins]] gave Clark permission to issue a concise and factual release. The Chief of Staff felt that the UN Command had always abided by the Geneva Convention and allowed the ICRC regular access to the camps. Clark's account, he went on, should stress this and emphasize that the incidents stemmed from the actions of the fanatical, die-hard Communists. In closing, the Far East commander should outline the corrective measures being taken.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|254-5254–5}}

In the wake of the Dodd incident came a series of actions. The stiffening attitude of the UN revealed itself first at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10 at PusanBusan for hospital cases. Among the patients and attached work details, 3,500 in Compounds 1, 2 and 3 had not been screened and segregated. Hoping to forestall concerted action, the camp commander, Lt. Col. John Bostic, informed the prisoners on 11 May that food and water would be available only at the new quarters prepared for them. He planned to screen and segregate the non-patients first as they moved to the new compounds and then take care of the sick. Although he had two battalions of infantry in positions around the three compounds, only Compound 3 made any attempt to negotiate conditions under which they would be screened and moved. Bostic refused to treat with the leaders of Compound 3; the other compounds simply remained indifferent to his order. After a deceptively quiet night, the prisoners became restive. Signs were painted, flags waved, demonstrations mounted, and patriotic songs sung as feelings ran high. Infantrymen of the 15th Regiment surrounded the compounds with fixed bayonets and a couple of tanks were wheeled into positions, but no attempt was made to start the screening. Despite complaints from the prisoners, they made no effort to comply with Bostic's instructions. Compound 3 set up sandbags during the night of 12 May but no further violence occurred. On the next day, loudspeakers started to hammer home the UN orders over and over again, yet the prisoners laughed at offers of hot food and cigarettes available to them in the new compounds. A few stray shots were fired on the 14th and the prisoners hurled rocks at the guards, but the deadlock continued. To break the impasse, Van Fleet permitted several [[International Committee of the Red Cross|ICRC]] representatives to interview the prisoners. Compound 1 requested the first conference with the Red Cross men and then the other compounds followed suit. The prisoners became quieter after the ICRC talks, but they were not ready to obey Bostic's orders. On 15 May Yount won Van Fleet's approval to put the emphasis on control rather than screening, with the prisoners not screened to remain unrostered until a settlement was reached at Panmunjom. Armed with this authority and with ICRC help, Bostic reached an agreement with the leaders of Compound 1 on 17 May. There was no screening and the prisoners moved without incident to their new compound.79 Hope that the other two compounds would follow the example of Compound 1 proved forlorn.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|255-6255–6}}

On 19 May, Van Fleet approved the use of force to clear the recalcitrant compounds. After a brief announcement the following morning warning the prisoners that this was their last chance to obey, infantry teams entered Compound 3 and advanced against mounting resistance. Armed with stones, flails, sharpened tent poles, steel pipes, and knives, the defiant prisoners screamed insults and challenges. The infantry maintained discipline, using tear gas and concussion grenades to break up the prisoners' opposition. Herding the prisoners into a corner, the UN troops forced them into their new compound. Only one prisoner was killed and 20 were wounded as against one US injury. The example of Compound 3 evidently was borne home to Compound 2, for on 21 May they put up no resistance as the infantrymen moved them into new quarters without casualties to either side. Whether the prisoners were screened or not became secondary after the Dodd incident. Van Fleet was most anxious to regain control over all the compounds and he had his staff examine the situation carefully in mid-May. They submitted three alternatives on 16 May: 1. Remove all prisoners from Korea; 2. Disperse the prisoners within Korea; and 3. Combine 1 and 2 by removing some prisoners and dispersing the rest. If all of the POW's were transferred out of the country, the Eighth Army commander would be free to concentrate on his primary mission and be relieved of a rear area security problem. Under the third alternative, at least some of the prisoners would be shifted and the Eighth Army responsibility lessened. Van Fleet preferred the first, but found the third more desirable than the retention of all of the prisoners in Korea. Dispersal within Korea would ensure better control, to be sure, but it would entail more logistic support and more administrative and security personnel. But Clark did not accept the movement of any of the prisoners out of Korea and he instructed Van Fleet to go ahead with his dispersal plan as quickly as possible. He was willing to send the [[187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team]] to Van Fleet to aid in the operation. Additional tank support would have to be supplied by Eighth Army if it were required.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|256-7256–7}}

Besides the reinforcement of the Koje-doGeoje forces, Van Fleet intended to construct barricades and roadblocks at strategic points until he was prepared to deconcentrate the prisoners. The new enclosures would be located on Koje-doGeoje, [[Cheju-doJeju Island]] and on the mainland and he estimated that twenty-two enclosures, each holding 4,000 prisoners and at least {{convert|0.5|mi}} apart, would be sufficient. Compounds would be limited to 500 men apiece with double fencing and concertina wire between compounds. When the new camps were finished, Van Fleet was going to try to use the prisoners' representatives to induce them to move voluntarily, but if resistance developed, as he expected it would, food and water would be withheld and the prisoners would receive these only at the new compounds. As a last resort, he would employ force. Both Clark and his superiors agreed that although the plan might incur unfavorable publicity and had to be handled carefully, the Communist control on Koje-doGeoje had to be broken. Van Fleet accepted the recommendations that ICRC assistance be utilized as much as possible and that other UN contingents be added to the forces on Koje-doGeoje. He had the [[Regiment van Heutsz|Netherlands Battalion]] already on the island and he would send a UK company, a Canadian Company and a Greek company to provide a UN flavor. As for the press, normal coverage facilities would be provided.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|257-8257–8}}

To supervise the difficult task of moving the prisoners, Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. [[Haydon L. Boatner]], assistant division commander of the US [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]], as the new commander of Koje-doGeoje. Using infantrymen as well as engineers, Boatner pushed the construction of the smaller, stronger enclosures by working his troops in two twelve-hour shifts. He also moved over 6,000 civilians away from the camp and off the island. By early June Boatner was prepared to test his plan for securing control of the Communist compounds. Despite repeated orders to remove the Communist flags that were being boldly flown in Compounds 85, 96 and 60, the prisoners ignored Boatner's commands. On 4 June, infantrymen from the 38th Regiment supported by two tanks moved quickly into Compound 85. While the tanks smashed down the flagpoles, the troops tore down signs, burnt the Communist banners, and rescued 10 bound prisoners. Half an hour later they repeated their success at Compound 96 and brought out 75 anti-Communist prisoners. The only enemy flags still aloft were in Compound 60 and the infantry did not need the tanks for this job. Using tear gas, they went in and chopped down the poles. Not a single casualty was suffered by either side during these quick strikes. Although the prisoners restored the flagpoles the following day, the experience gained in the exercise seemed helpful. Satisfied by this test run, Boatner decided to tackle the big task next.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|258-9258–9}}

On the morning of 10 June, he ordered Col. Lee Hak Koo to assemble the prisoners of Compound 76 in groups of 150 in the center of the compound and to be prepared to move them out. Instead, the prisoners brought forth their knives, spears, and tent poles and took their positions in trenches, ready to resist. Paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team wasted little time as they advanced without firing a shot. Employing concussion grenades, tear gas, bayonets and fists, they drove or dragged the prisoners out of the trenches. As a half-dozen [[M46 Patton]] tanks rolled in and trained their guns on the last 300 prisoners still fighting, resistance collapsed. Colonel Lee was captured and dragged by the seat of his pants out of the compound. The other prisoners were hustled into trucks, transported to the new compounds, fingerprinted, and given new clothing. During the 2.5 hour battle, 31 prisoners were killed, many by the Communists themselves, and 139 were wounded. One US soldier was speared to death and 14 were injured. After Compound 76 had been cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000 spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades, plus an undetermined number of clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails and hammers. These weapons had been fashioned out of scrap materials and metal-tipped tent poles by the prisoners. The aftermath proved how quickly the lesson was learned. After leaders of Compounds 78 and 77 had witnessed the fight, they swiftly agreed to move wherever Boatner wanted them to. In Compound 77 the bodies of 16 murdered men were found. The show of force was effective in eliminating the core of Communist defiance and paved the way for the relatively uneventful transfer of the other compounds on Koje-doKGeoje to their new stockades during the rest of June. With the dispersal plan successfully completed, Clark decided to remove the POW problem from Eighth Army jurisdiction.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|259-60259–60}} According to [[Bruce Cumings]] in his book, ''The Korean War'', U.S. forces used flamethrowers to retake the camp.

As part of the negotiations of the [[Korean Armistice Agreement]], [[Operation Big Switch#Operation Little Switch|Operation Little Switch]] in April and May 1953 saw the repatriation of 6670 sick and injured Chinese and North Korean POWs. Once the Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953, [[Operation Big Switch]] and Little Switch saw the repatriation of roughly 83,000 prisoners to the North, and 22,000 to the South.<ref name=":0" /> However, 76 North Korean and 12 Chinese POWs declined either option, preferring to settle in [[India]], [[Argentina]] and [[Brazil]] instead.<ref name=":0" />

<references />

*[http://www.pow.or.kr www.pow.or.kr -– Official web site]

*[http://busanhaps.com/article/geoje-islands-pow-camp Geoje Island’sIsland's POW Camp]

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