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{{short description|Prisoner of war camp}}
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[[File:Geoje-POW Camp1.JPG|thumb|300px|Geoje POW camp [[diorama]]]]
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'''Geoje-do POW camp''' ({{lang-ko|거제도 포로수용소}}) was a [[prisoner of war]] camp located on [[Geoje]] island at the southernmost part of [[Gyeongsangnam-do]], [[South Korea]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.geojeimc.or.kr/_sub03/sub03_e01.html|title=A Guide to the Geoje POW Camp Park|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722140828/http://www.geojeimc.or.kr/_sub03/sub03_e01.html|archivedate=2011-07-22}}</ref> It is considered the largest of the UNC established camps.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Park|first=Hea-Jin|title=North Korean POWs seeking last chance to return home after decades in exile|url=http://theconversation.com/north-korean-pows-seeking-last-chance-to-return-home-after-decades-in-exile-79929|access-date=2020-09-02|website=The Conversation|language=en}}</ref>▼
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{{MOS|reason=[[WP:WTW]]|date=June 2024}}
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▲'''Geoje-do POW camp''' ({{lang-ko|거제도 포로수용소/巨濟島 捕虜收容所}}, {{lang-zh|巨济岛战俘营}}) was a [[prisoner of war]] camp located on [[Geoje]] island at the southernmost part of [[Gyeongsangnam-do]], [[South Korea]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.geojeimc.or.kr/_sub03/sub03_e01.html|title=A Guide to the Geoje POW Camp Park|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722140828/http://www.geojeimc.or.kr/_sub03/sub03_e01.html|archivedate=2011-07-22}}</ref> It is considered the largest of the UNC established camps.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Park|first=Hea-Jin|title=North Korean POWs seeking last chance to return home after decades in exile|url=http://theconversation.com/north-korean-pows-seeking-last-chance-to-return-home-after-decades-in-exile-79929|access-date=2020-09-02|website=The Conversation|date=2 July 2017 |language=en}}</ref>
Geoje Camp was a [[United Nations Command]] (UN) [[Prisoner-of-war camp|POW camp]] that held North Korean and Chinese prisoners captured by UN forces during the [[Korean War]].
==History==
After the surprise [[Battle of Inchon|Inchon landings]] on 15 September 1950 and the follow-up Eighth Army [[Pusan Perimeter Offensive|breakout from the Pusan Perimeter]], the North Korean [[Korean People's Army]] (KPA) began to retreat north pursued by UN forces in the [[UN September 1950 counteroffensive]]. Large numbers of KPA were taken prisoner in the swift maneuver and sent to the rear. The number of prisoners rose from under a thousand in August 1950 to over 130,000 in November. Unfortunately, little provision had been made for so many prisoners and facilities to confine, clothe and feed them were not available. In addition, there were not enough men on hand to guard the prisoners nor were the guards assigned adequately trained for their mission. The quantity and quality of the security forces continued to plague the UN prison-camp commanders in the months that lay ahead. While the prisoners were housed near [[
As the prisoner total reached 137,000 in January 1951, the UN decided to isolate captured personnel on [[Geoje
Although there were frequent instances of unrest and occasional outbreaks of resistance during the first months of the
As the Communists struggled for control of the compounds, a
The first collective violence against camp guards occurred on 18/19 June 1951, when some North Korean officers protested having to dig latrines and garbage pits. When a ROK guard detail entered Compound 76 of the camp, the prisoners stoned the guards and the soldiers opened fire, killing three prisoners. More incidents followed including demonstrations within the compounds, work refusals, threats against camp personnel, and some 15 murders among groups of pro- and anti-communist Korean prisoners. In July and August 1951, the guards killed eight more prisoners.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.historynet.com/war-behind-the-wire-koje-do-prison-camp.htm/4|title=War Behind The Wire: Koje-do Prison Camp|author=Allan R. Millett|date=20 January 2009|accessdate=25 August 2014}}</ref>
In September 1951, 15 prisoners were murdered by a self-appointed people's court. Three more were killed when rioting broke out on the 19th in Compound 78. Troops had to be rushed in to restore order and remove 200 prisoners who were in fear of their lives. As unrest mounted, the US 2nd Logistical Command, in charge of all POW camps, asked US [[Eighth United States Army|Eighth Army]] commander General [[James Van Fleet]] for more security personnel.
visit by Van Fleet and a reinforcing and reorganization of the prison security forces. From the opening of the camp in January down to mid-September when Col. Maurice J. Fitzgerald assumed command, there had been eight different commanders or about one a month. As Fitzgerald later commented, "Koje-do was a graveyard of commanders." Van Fleet's recognition of the difficulties of the problems led to the activation of the 8137th Military Police Group in October. Besides three assigned battalions, four additional escort guard companies were attached to the group. In November one battalion of the US [[23rd Infantry Regiment (United States)|23rd Infantry Regiment]] was made available for duty on
=== Screening and indoctrination ===
During December the rival factions, Communist and anti-Communist, vied for control of the compounds with both sides meting out beatings and other punishment freely. A large-scale rock fight between compounds on 18 December was followed by riots and demonstrations. 14 deaths and 24 other casualties resulted from this flare-up. The acceleration of violence could be attributed in large part to the inauguration of the screening process in the POW camps. General Yount, commanding the 2nd Logistical Command, later told the Far East commander: "Until the inception of the screening program, American personnel had full access to compounds and were able to administer them in a satisfactory manner although never to the degree desired." In November and December over 37,000 prisoners had been screened and reclassified as civilian internees. As more prisoners indicated that they did not wish to be repatriated or evinced anti-Communist sympathies, the sensitivity of the Communist prisoners to screening intensified. Thus, when the commander of Koje-do camp decided early in January 1952 to give the civilian internees a second screening, the basic ingredients for trouble were on hand. The object of the second round of interviews by South Korean civilian teams was to correct the mistakes made in the first series and also to segregate the non-repatriates from the staunch Communist elements.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|238-9}}▼
▲During December the rival factions, Communist and anti-Communist, vied for control of the compounds with both sides meting out beatings and other punishment freely. A large-scale rock fight between compounds on 18 December was followed by riots and demonstrations. 14 deaths and 24 other casualties resulted from this flare-up. The acceleration of violence could be attributed in large part to the inauguration of the screening process in the POW camps. General Yount, commanding the 2nd Logistical Command, later told the Far East commander: "Until the inception of the screening program, American personnel had full access to compounds and were able to administer them in a satisfactory manner although never to the degree desired." In November and December over 37,000 prisoners had been screened and reclassified as civilian internees. As more prisoners indicated that they did not wish to be repatriated or evinced anti-Communist sympathies, the sensitivity of the Communist prisoners to screening intensified
By 1952 over 170,000 prisoners of war (about 85% North Korean and the rest from China) were held at the camp, however, U.N. forces lacked sufficient manpower and experience in controlling such large numbers of prisoners.▼
Another instance in which higher headquarters contributed unwittingly to the discontent of the POW camp stemmed from an information and education program instituted in 1951 to keep the prisoners occupied profitably. By far the greater portion of the education program aimed at assisting the prisoners in developing vocational and technical skills to help them after their release. The Communists readily accepted the instruction in metalworking and soon began to produce weapons of all varieties instead of sanitation utensils, stoves, and garden tools and used these arms to gain interior control in the compounds whenever they could.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|237}}
From January 1952, the prisoners were exposed to anti-communist propaganda. Syllabi included "How War Came to Korea", "Democracy and Totalitarianism" and "Facts About the United States".,<ref>Education of Prisoners of War on Koje Island, Korea; Educational Record 36 (April 1955), pp. 157–73.</ref> and English courses were also offered. For the Communists, this "orientation course" became the chief target of criticism. These lectures contrasted the "advantages of democracy" with the "fallacies of communism" and the Communists protested vehemently.
▲By 1952 over 170,000 prisoners of war (about 85% North Korean and the rest from China) were held at the camp
From February 1952, at the suggestion of [[U. Alexis Johnson]] (Deputy Secretary of State for East Asia), it was planned to check whether the prisoners were willing to return home, without making any specific promises to those who wanted to stay in the "free South". This screening began on 11 April 1952. By 19 April, over 106,000 prisoners had been interviewed by armed interrogation teams in 22 sections of the camp. The latter were usually handcuffed and beaten during the "hearing"; they were supposed to fight on the South Korean side from then on. General Yount ordered that prisoners who did not want to return home should be transferred.
===Geoje Uprising (February–June 1952)===
Despite numerous incidents all the civilian internee compounds were screened during January and early February except for the 5,600 inmates of Compound 62. Here the Communists had firm control and refused to permit the teams to enter. The compound leader stated flatly that all the members of Compound 62 desired to return to North Korea and there was no sense in wasting time in screening. Since the South Korean teams were equally determined to carry out their assignment, the 3rd Battalion, [[27th Infantry Regiment (United States)|27th Infantry Regiment]] moved in during the early hours of 18 February and took up positions in front of the compound. With bayonets fixed, the four companies passed through the gate and divided the compound into four segments. But the Communists refused to bow to the show of force. Streaming out of the barracks, they converged on the infantry with pick handles, knives, axes, flails, and tent poles. Others hurled rocks as they advanced and screamed their defiance. Between 1,000-1,500 internees pressed the attack and the soldiers were forced to resort to concussion grenades. When the grenades failed to stop the assault, the UN troops opened fire. 55 prisoners were killed immediately and 22 more died at the hospital, with over 140 other casualties as against 1 US soldier killed and 38 wounded. This was a high price for the Communists to pay, but they won their point, for the infantry withdrew and the compound was not screened.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|239}}▼
▲
The fear that the story might leak out to the Communists in a distorted version led the UN Command to release an official account placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Communist compound leaders. The [[United States Department of the Army|Department of the Army]] instructed UN commander General [[Matthew Ridgway]] to make it clear that only 1,500 of the inmates took part in the outbreak and that only civilian internees, not prisoners of war, were involved. In view of the outcry that the Communist delegates at [[Panmunjom]] were certain to make over the affair, this was an especially important point. Civilian internees could be considered an internal affair of the South Korean Government and outside the purview of the truce conference. But North Korean protests at Panmunjom were not the only results of the battle of Compound 62. On 20 February General Van Fleet appointed [[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier-General]] [[Francis Dodd (general)|Francis Dodd]] as commandant of the camp to tighten up discipline, and the following week Van Fleet received some new instructions from Tokyo:▼
▲The fear that the story might leak out to the
<blockquote>
Line 33 ⟶ 48:
</blockquote>
Although the orders from Ridgway covered both Communists and anti-Communists, the latter
The hatred between the two groups led to another bloody encounter on 13 March. As an anti-Communist detail passed a hostile compound, ardent Communists stoned the detail and its ROK guards. Without orders the guards retaliated with gunfire. Before the ROK contingent could be brought under control, 12 prisoners were killed and 26 were wounded while 1 ROK civilian and 1 US officer, who tried to stop the shooting, were injured.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|240}}
North Koreans and Chinese, on the other hand, was at first stunned and then became violently indignant, having been led to expect that a much higher percentage of repatriates would be turned up by the screening. Negotiations at Panmunjom again came to a standstill and the North Korean and Chinese renewed their attack upon the whole concept of screening. In view of the close connection between the enemy truce delegates and the POW camps, it was not surprising that the agitation of the North Korean and Chinese over the unfavorable implications of the UN screening should communicate itself quickly to the loyal Communist compounds. During the interviewing period, Van Fleet had informed Ridgway that he was segregating and removing the anti-Communist prisoners to the mainland. Although the separation would mean more administrative personnel and more equipment would be required to organize and supervise the increased number of camps, Van Fleet felt that dispersal would lessen the possibility of incidents. Segregation and dispersal, however,▼
▲April was a momentous month for the prisoners on Geoje. On 2 April the North
In addition to the general political unrest that permeated the Communist enclosures, a quite fortuitous element of discontent complicated the scene in early April. Up until this time responsibility for the provision of the grain component of the prisoners' ration had rested with the ROK. But the South Korean Government informed the Eighth Army in March that it could no longer bear the burden and Van Fleet, in turn, told the 2nd Logistical Command that it would have to secure the grain through US Army channels. Unfortunately, the UN [[United Nations Civil Assistance Corps Korea|Civil Assistance Command]] could not supply grain in the prescribed ratio of one-half rice and one-half other grains without sufficient advance time to fill the order. Instead, a one-third rice, one-third barley, and one-third wheat ration was apportioned to the prisoners in April and this occasioned an avalanche of complaints.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|242}} ▼
▲In addition to the general political unrest that permeated the Communist enclosures, a quite fortuitous element of discontent complicated the scene in early April. Up until this time responsibility for the provision of the grain component of the prisoners' ration had rested with the ROK. But the South Korean Government informed the Eighth Army in March that it could no longer bear the burden and Van Fleet, in turn, told the 2nd Logistical Command that it would have to secure the grain through US Army channels.
The 17 compounds occupied by the Communist prisoners at the end of April included 10 that had been screened and 7 that had resisted all efforts to interview them. There was little doubt in Van Fleet's mind that force would have to be used and casualties expected if the recalcitrant compounds were to be screened. As he prepared plans to use force, Van Fleet warned Ridgway on 28 April that the prisoners already screened would probably demonstrate violently when UN forces moved into the compounds still holding out. In anticipation of trouble Van Fleet moved the 3rd Battalion, [[9th Infantry Regiment (United States)|9th Infantry Regiment]] to Koje-do to reinforce the 38th Infantry Regiment and ordered the 1st Battalion, [[15th Infantry Regiment (United States)|15th Infantry Regiment]] and the ROK 20th Regiment to Pusan. Barring accident, he intended to begin screening shortly after the 1st of May.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|242}}▼
▲The 17 compounds occupied by the Communist prisoners at the end of April included 10 that had been screened and 7 that had resisted all efforts to interview them. There was little doubt in Van Fleet's mind that force would have to be used and casualties expected if the recalcitrant compounds were to be screened. As he prepared plans to use force, Van Fleet warned Ridgway on 28 April that the prisoners already screened would probably demonstrate violently when UN forces moved into the compounds still holding out. In anticipation of trouble Van Fleet moved the 3rd Battalion, [[9th Infantry Regiment (United States)|9th Infantry Regiment]] to
Confronted with almost certain violence, Ridgway decided to ask for permission to cancel forced screening:
Line 53 ⟶ 66:
This request and Ridgway's plan to list the prisoners in the unscreened compounds as desiring repatriation were approved. Although failure to interview all the inmates in these enclosures might well prevent some prisoners from choosing non-repatriation, Ridgway's superiors held that if the prisoners felt strongly enough about not returning to Communist control, they would somehow make their wishes known.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|242}}
===Capture of General Dodd (7–10 May 1952)===
It did not take long for the Communist prisoners to act. As investigation later revealed, they had become familiar with the habits of General [[Francis Dodd (general)|Francis Dodd]], the camp commandant, during the spring and by the beginning of May they had readied a plan. Well aware that Dodd was anxious to lessen the tension in the camp, they also knew that he often went unarmed to the sally ports of the compounds and talked to the leaders. This system of personal contact kept Dodd in close touch with camp problems, but it exposed him to an element of risk. Only the guards carried weapons on
On the evening of 6 May, members of a Communist work detail from Compound 76 refused to enter the enclosure until they had spoken to Lt. Col. Wilbur R. Raven, commanding officer of the 94th Military Police Battalion and the compound. The prisoners told Raven that guards had beaten members of the compound and searched them for contraband. When he promised to investigate the charges, they seemed satisfied, but asked to see General Dodd on the next day to discuss matters of importance. Raven was noncommittal since he did not wish the prisoners to imagine that they could summon the commandant at will, but he promised to pass the message on to the general.
swiftly back to General Yount and through him to Van Fleet, of the capture of Dodd. Van Fleet immediately instructed Yount not to use force to effect Dodd's release unless Eighth Army approved such action. Yount in turn sent his chief of staff, Col. William H. Craig, by air to Koje-do to assume command. Repeating Van Fleet's injunction not to use force, Yount told Craig: "We are to talk them out. Obviously if somebody makes mass break we most certainly will resist... But unless they attempt such a thing, under no circumstances use fire to get them out. Wait them out. One thing above all, approach it calmly. If we get them excited only God knows what will happen." The fear of a concerted attempt to break out of the compounds and the resultant casualties that both the UN and prisoners would probably suffer dominated this conversation and mirrored the first reaction of Dodd's superiors to the potential explosiveness of the situation. A major uprising would mean violence and unfavorable publicity that the enemy would exploit. Dodd's actions in Compound 76 complemented this desire to localize the incident. He consented to act as go-between for the prisoners and relayed their demands to the outside. A telephone was installed and upon Dodd's recommendation, representatives from all of the other compounds were brought to Compound 76 for a meeting to work out the demands that would be submitted to the UN Command. Colonel Craig attempted to use one of the senior KPA officers, Col. Lee Hak Koo, to talk inmates of Compound 76 into releasing Dodd, but Lee, as soon as he was permitted to enter the compound, remained and became the spokesman of the prisoners.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|245-6}}▼
▲With the successful completion of the first step, the Communists began carrying out the second phase. Within a few minutes of Dodd's capture, they hoisted a large sign announcing: "We capture Dodd. As long as our demand will be solved, his safety is secured. If there happen brutal act such as shooting, his life is danger." The threat was soon followed by the first note from Dodd that he was all right and asking that no troops be sent in to release him until after 17:00. Apparently General Dodd felt that he could persuade the prisoners to let him go by that time. In the meantime word had passed swiftly back to General Yount and through him to Van Fleet, of the capture of Dodd. Van Fleet immediately instructed Yount not to use force to effect Dodd's release unless Eighth Army approved such action. Yount in turn sent his chief of staff, Col. William H. Craig, by air to
As the Communist representatives met on the night of 7 May, Dodd urged that no troops be employed to get him since he did not think he would be harmed. This was a reasonable assumption, since if anything happened to Dodd, the Communists would have nothing to bargain with. In any event, Dodd's plea coincided with the wishes of Yount and Van Fleet at this point. Colonel Craig, stalling for time, agreed to sit tight. With the UN troops under general alert orders, the night passed uneasily. One fact seemed evident, the Communists had won the first round. Not only had they managed to kidnap Dodd, but they had also succeeded in using him to open negotiations. Playing upon the UN fears of a general breakout of prisoners and the concern over Dodd's life, they pressed their advantage to the hilt. As the prisoner representatives reconvened the next day, they presented Dodd with a list of their demands. The chief preoccupation of the prisoners during this early phase concerned the formation and recognition by the UN of an association of the prisoners with telephone facilities between the compounds and two vehicles for intra-compound travel. Dodd consented to most of the items of equipment that the prisoners were insisting upon even though he had no command authority to make any agreements. After the meeting concluded, the representatives wanted to return to their compounds and report to the rest of the prisoners; thus another delay ensued. General Yount refused to allow them to leave until Van Fleet overruled him late in the afternoon. By the time the representatives discussed events with their compound mates and returned to Compound 76, evening had begun. While the prisoners were carrying on their conversations, Colonel Craig sent for trained machine gun crews, grenades, and gas masks. The 3rd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment boarded [[Landing Ship, Tank|LST]] at Pusan and set out for Koje-do. [[Republic of Korea Navy]] picket boats ringed the island in case of a major escape attempt and Navy, Marine and Air Force planes remained on alert. Company B of the [[64th Armor Regiment|64th Medium Tank Battalion]] was detached from the US [[3rd Infantry Division (United States)|3rd Infantry Division]] and started to move toward Pusan.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|246-7}}▼
▲As the Communist representatives met on the night of 7 May, Dodd urged that no troops be employed to get him since he did not think he would be harmed.
From the US [[I Corps (United States)|I Corps]], Van Fleet sent Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson, chief of staff, to take charge of the camp and get Dodd out. The selection of a combat leader to resolve the crisis indicated that a military solution would now be tried. Colson had no knowledge of conditions on Koje-do until he was chosen and only a sketchy acquaintance with the issues being discussed at Panmunjom. As Colson assumed command, Van Fleet confirmed this impression that military measures would now be employed. His first instructions to Yount set forth the steps to be followed quite clearly. First official written demands were to be delivered to Compound 76 asking that Dodd be freed immediately. At the same time the prisoners would be informed that Dodd no longer was in command and could make no decisions. If they refused to let him go, Yount would set a time limit and warn the Communists that they would be held responsible for Dodd's safety when force was used. As soon as the deadline expired, Yount would enter the compound by force, release Dodd, and gain full control. Yount passed Van Fleet's orders on to Colson late on 8 May. There were other factors that had to be considered as the drama unfolded. Within the compound Dodd was treated▼
▲royally. The prisoners did all they could to provide him with small comforts and permitted medicine for his ulcers to be brought in. They applied no physical pressure whatsoever, yet they left no doubt that Dodd would be the first casualty and that they would resist violently any attempt to rescue him by force. Under the circumstances they expected Dodd to co-operate and help them reach a bloodless settlement and Dodd decided to comply.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|247}}
▲From the US [[I Corps (United States)|I Corps]], Van Fleet sent Brig. Gen. Charles F. Colson, chief of staff, to take charge of the camp and
Early on the morning of 9 May Colson sent in his first official demand for Dodd's safe deliverance and six hours later he issued a second order. When Col. Lee Hak Koo finally responded, he countered with the statement that Dodd had already admitted that he had practiced "inhuman massacre and murderous barbarity" against the prisoners. Recognizing Colson as the new camp commander, Lee asked him to join Dodd at the compound meeting. Obviously, the Communists had no intentions of letting Dodd go until they had resolved their differences with the UN Command. The refusal of the prisoners to meet Colson's order should have led to the presentation of an ultimatum with a time limit, but Colson decided to wait until the tanks arrived from the mainland before he tried force. Since the tanks would not arrive until late on the 9th, the action to bring the compound into line could not begin until the following morning. Both Yount and Maj. Gen. [[Orlando Mood]], chief of staff of the Eighth Army, agreed to this postponement. In the meantime Colson intended to put a halt to further concessions to the prisoners; his first move in this direction was to stop the POW representatives from circulating back and forth between their compounds and Compound 76. Perturbed by the stiffening attitude of Colson and the apparent preparations for action around the compound, the Communists evidently became nervous and had Dodd ask Colson whether they could hold their meeting without fear of interruption. They again promised that Dodd would be freed after the meeting if all went well. Since the UN Command was not going to make a move until 10 May anyway, the prisoners were informed that they could meet in safety.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|247-8}}▼
▲Early on the morning of 9 May Colson sent in his first official demand for Dodd's safe deliverance and six hours later he issued a second order. When
the spectacle of prisoners, still captive and surrounded by heavily armed troops, trying the kidnapped commanding officer of the POW camp on criminal counts and making him defend his record was without parallel in modern military history. While the Communists sat in judgment upon Dodd, Colson had the 38th Infantry Regiment reinforce the guards on all the compounds and had automatic weapons set up in pairs at strategic locations. He directed Lt. Col. William J. Kernan, commanding officer of the 38th, to prepare a plan for forcible entry into Compound 76, using tanks, flamethrowers, armored cars, .50-caliber multiple mounts, tear gas, riot guns, and the like, with a target date of 10:00 on 10 May. In the early afternoon, Van Fleet flew into Koje-do for a conference. He had discussed the situation with Ridgway and his appointed successor, General [[Mark W. Clark]], who had just arrived in the Far East, and they were all agreed that no press or photo coverage of the emergency would be permitted. They wanted Colson to be sure to give every opportunity to non-belligerent prisoners to surrender peaceably while he engaged in battle for control of the compound. Van Fleet added that he did not think that US troops should go into the compound, until firepower from the outside had forced obedience and driven the prisoners into small adjacent compounds that had been constructed in the meantime. If necessary he was willing to grant the prisoners' request for an association with equipment and communication facilities, but he reminded Colson that he had full authority to use all the force required to release Dodd and secure proper control and discipline. Regardless of the outcome of this affair, Van Fleet wanted dispersion of the compounds carried out. He left the timing of the Compound 76 operation in Colson's hands, but the negotiating period should end at 10:00 on 10 May.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|248-9}}▼
As the prisoners convened on the 9th, the capture of Dodd assumed a new dimension. They informed the hostage that they were going to discuss allegations of brutalities committed against their members, repatriation and screening, as well as the prisoner organization. A people's court set up by the prisoners drew up a list of nineteen counts of death and/or injury to compound inmates and had Dodd answer to each charge. Although they were generally disposed to accept his explanations and dismiss the accusations, the prisoner's trial of the commanding officer of the POW camp on criminal counts, making him defend his record, while still surrounded by heavily armed enemy troops, was without parallel in modern military history.
Dodd's trial dragged on through the afternoon as the translation process was slow and laborious. By dusk it was evident that the proceedings would not finish that night and Dodd phoned Colson asking for an extension until noon the next day. He felt that they would keep their promise to let him go as soon as the meeting finished. But Eighth Army refused to alter the 10:00 deadline and Colson passed the word back to▼
▲
▲Dodd's trial dragged on through the afternoon as the translation process was slow and laborious. By dusk it was evident that the proceedings would not finish that night and Dodd phoned Colson asking for an extension until noon the next day. He
As daylight broke, the prisoners presented their latest demands. They directed their attack against UN prisoner policy, repatriation, and screening. Although the English translation is awkward and some of the phrases difficult to understand, their demands were as follows:
<blockquote>
Line 82 ⟶ 95:
2. Immediate stopping the so-called illegal and unreasonable volunteer repatriation of NKPA and CPVA PW's.<br>
3. Immediate ceasing the forcible investigation (Screening) which thousands of PW's of NKPA and CPVA be rearmed and failed in slavery, permanently and illegally.<br>
4. Immediate recognition of the P.W. Representative Group (Commission) consisted of NKPA and CPVA PW's and close cooperation to it by your command.
This Representative Group will turn in Brig. Gen. Dodd, USA, on your hand after we receive the satisfactory declaration to resolve the above items by your command. We will wait for your warm and sincere answer.
</blockquote><ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|250}}
The
<blockquote>
Line 96 ⟶ 109:
3. Regarding your item three pertaining to forcible investigation (screening), I can inform you that after General Dodd's release, unharmed, there will be no more forcible screening of PW's in this camp, nor will any attempt be made at nominal screening.<br>
4. Reference your item four, we have no objection to the organization of a PW representative group or commission consisting of NKPA and CPVA PW, and are willing to work out the details of such an organization as soon as practicable after General Dodd's release.
</blockquote><ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|251}}
Colson added an ultimatum that Dodd must be freed by noon and no later. With the exception of the word "more" in Item 3, Colson's reply was noncommittal and the Communists refused to accept it or release Dodd
As the antagonists on
When the noon deadline passed without incident, Dodd phoned Colson and presented the prisoners' case. He <blockquote>
Line 109 ⟶ 124:
</blockquote><ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|252}}
The release hour was advanced to 20:00 since so much time had been consumed in translating and discussing the changes
The seizure of Dodd in itself
In the wake of the Dodd incident came a series of actions. The stiffening attitude of the UN revealed itself first at Prisoner of War Enclosure Number 10 at
===Breaking up the camp (19 May – June 1952)===
On 19 May, Van Fleet approved the use of force to clear the recalcitrant compounds. After a brief announcement the following morning warning the prisoners that this was their last chance to obey, infantry teams entered Compound 3 and advanced against mounting resistance. Armed with stones, flails, sharpened tent poles, steel pipes, and knives, the defiant prisoners screamed insults and challenges. The infantry maintained discipline, using tear gas and concussion grenades to break up the prisoners' opposition. Herding the prisoners into a corner, the UN troops forced them into their new compound. Only one prisoner was killed and 20 were wounded as against one US injury. The example of Compound 3 evidently was borne home to Compound 2, for on 21 May they put up no resistance as the infantrymen moved them into new quarters without casualties to either side. Whether the prisoners were screened or not became secondary after the Dodd incident. Van Fleet was most anxious to regain control over all the compounds and he had his staff examine the situation carefully in mid-May. They submitted three alternatives on 16 May: 1. Remove all prisoners from Korea; 2. Disperse the prisoners within Korea; and 3. Combine 1 and 2 by removing some prisoners and dispersing the rest. If all of the POW's were transferred out of the country, the Eighth Army commander would be free to concentrate on his primary mission and be relieved of a rear area security problem. Under the third alternative, at least some of the prisoners would be shifted and the Eighth Army responsibility lessened. Van Fleet preferred the first, but found the third more desirable than the retention of all of the prisoners in Korea. Dispersal within Korea would ensure better control, to be sure, but it would entail more logistic support and more administrative and security personnel. But Clark did not accept the movement of any of the prisoners out of Korea and he instructed Van Fleet to go ahead with his dispersal plan as quickly as possible. He was willing to send the [[187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team]] to Van Fleet to aid in the operation. Additional tank support would have to be supplied by Eighth Army if it were required.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|
Besides the reinforcement of the
To supervise the difficult task of moving the prisoners, Van Fleet appointed Brig. Gen. [[Haydon L. Boatner]], assistant division commander of the US [[2nd Infantry Division (United States)|2nd Infantry Division]], as the new commander of
On the morning of 10 June, he ordered Col. Lee Hak Koo to assemble the prisoners of Compound 76 in groups of 150 in the center of the compound and to be prepared to move them out. Instead, the prisoners brought forth their knives, spears, and tent poles and took their positions in trenches, ready to resist. Paratroopers of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team wasted little time as they advanced without firing a shot. Employing concussion grenades, tear gas, bayonets and fists, they drove or dragged the prisoners out of the trenches. As a half-dozen [[M46 Patton]] tanks rolled in and trained their guns on the last 300 prisoners still fighting, resistance collapsed. Colonel Lee was captured and dragged by the seat of his pants out of the compound. The other prisoners were hustled into trucks, transported to the new compounds, fingerprinted, and given new clothing. During the 2.5 hour battle, 31 prisoners were killed, many by the Communists themselves, and 139 were wounded. One US soldier was speared to death and 14 were injured. After Compound 76 had been cleared, a tally of weapons showed 3,000 spears, 4,500 knives, 1,000 gasoline grenades, plus an undetermined number of clubs, hatchets, barbed wire flails and hammers. These weapons had been fashioned out of scrap materials and metal-tipped tent poles by the prisoners. The aftermath proved how quickly the lesson was learned. After leaders of Compounds 78 and 77 had witnessed the fight, they swiftly agreed to move wherever Boatner wanted them to. In Compound 77 the bodies of 16 murdered men were found. The show of force was effective in eliminating the core of Communist defiance and paved the way for the relatively uneventful transfer of the other compounds on
Beginning in July 1952, the first 27,000 "civilians," in sixteen groups, were extradited to the South Korean regime. In American documents, those willing to return (to North Korea) were referred to as "diehard communists". In October 1952 around 38,000 inmates were reclassified as civilians, 7,000 of whom insisted on their return home. However, they were all handed over to the [[Syngman Rhee]] dictatorship. This happened mainly because Commander Boatner wanted clear the camp from non-soldiers. Koreans born in the south who wanted to be repatriated to the north were transferred to the camp on [[:ko:추봉도|Chubong Island]]{{efn|''Bongam Island'' ({{lang|ko|봉암도; 蜂岩島}}) and ''Chuam Island'' ({{lang|ko|추암도; 秋岩島}}) are former names of what is now called [[:ko:추봉도|Chubong Island]] ({{lang|ko|추봉도; 秋蜂島}}). The spelling "Pongam Island" is derived from the older [[McCune–Reischauer]] romanization of Korean; the name of the island is sometimes misspelled "Pong''n''am Island".}} (Pongam Island).<ref>Burchett, Wilfred; Winnington, Alan; Bunk unscreened; P. 131.</ref>
On 10 July the [[Korean Communications Zone]] was established under the Far East Command and took over responsibility for rear area activities from the Eighth Army. One of the lessons that had to be relearned during the Koje-do affair was that an army commander should not be burdened with the administration of his communications zone, since the distraction could not fail to detract from his efficiency in carrying out his primary mission—to fight the enemy.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|261}} ▼
▲On 10 July the [[Korean Communications Zone]] was established under the Far East Command and took over responsibility for rear area activities from the Eighth Army. One of the lessons that had to be relearned during the
There were other lessons that were taken on board by the US forces during this period. In most cases, after a prisoner was captured, he might attempt to escape and this was about as far as he would go. With the Communists, a new element of experience was added. The Communist prisoner's service did not end with his capture but frequently became more important. In the POW camp his responsibilities shifted from the military to politico-military duties. Easy to organize and well-disciplined, the loyal Communist prisoners required strict control or they would exploit their position for propaganda purposes. Death or injury was readily accepted if the ends were worthwhile and soft treatment merely made them more insolent and disobedient. Only force and strength were respected, for these they recognized and understood. As for the administration of the Communist POW camps, the necessity for high-quality personnel at all levels was plain. Unless the leadership and security forces were well briefed politically and alert, the Communists would miss no opportunity to cause trouble. At Koje-do the lack of information of what was going on inside the compounds pointed up another deficiency. Trained counterintelligence agents had to be planted inside to keep the camp commander advised on the plans and activities of the prisoners and to prevent surprises like the Dodd capture from happening.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|261-2}}▼
▲There were other lessons that were taken on board by the US forces during this period. In most cases, after a prisoner was captured, he might attempt to escape and this was about as far as he would go. With the Communists, a new element of experience was added. The Communist prisoner's service did not end with his capture but frequently became more important. In the POW camp his responsibilities shifted from the military to politico-military duties. Easy to organize and well-disciplined, the loyal Communist prisoners required strict control or they would exploit their position for propaganda purposes. Death or injury was readily accepted if the ends were worthwhile and soft treatment merely made them more insolent and disobedient. Only force and strength were respected, for these they recognized and understood. As for the administration of the Communist POW camps, the necessity for high-quality personnel at all levels was plain. Unless the leadership and security forces were well briefed politically and alert, the Communists would miss no opportunity to cause trouble. At
In assessing the effects of the Koje-do incidents, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they seriously weakened the international support that the UN Command had been getting on its screening program and on voluntary repatriation. In Great Britain, questions were raised in Parliament implying that the screening in April had been improperly or ineffectively carried out. Japanese press opinion reflected a growing suspicion that the US authorities had lost control of the screening process and permitted South Korean Government pressure to be exerted directly or indirectly against repatriation. As General Jenkins, Army G-3, pointed out to General Collins early in June: "The cumulative effect of sentiment such as that reflected above may tend to obscure the UNC principle of no forcible repatriation, and appear to make the armistice hinge on the questionable results of a discredited screening operation."<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|262}}▼
▲In assessing the effects of the
The presence of ICRC representatives during the clean-up activities at Pusan and Koje-do did little to enhance the reputation of the UN prisoner of war policies. Although the ICRC could offer little constructive advice on how the UN could regain control and admitted that the prisoners were committing many illegal acts, they protested vigorously against the tactics of the UN. Violence, withholding food and water even if these were available elsewhere and the use of force on hospital patients were heavily scored and the reports that the ICRC submitted to Geneva were bound to evoke an unfavorable reaction in many quarters.91 Despite the fact that focus shifted from Koje-do as the dispersal program brought the Communist prisoners under tighter controls, the cloud of doubt and suspicion that hovered over the Koje-do episode could not help but make the task of the UN delegates at Panmunjom more complex.<ref name=Hermes/>{{rp|262}}▼
▲The presence of ICRC representatives during the clean-up activities at
==Closure and redevelopment==
As part of the negotiations of the [[Korean Armistice Agreement]], [[Operation Big Switch#Operation Little Switch|Operation Little Switch]] in April and May 1953 saw the repatriation of 6670 sick and injured Chinese and North Korean POWs. Once the Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953, [[Operation Big Switch]] and Little Switch saw the repatriation of roughly 83,000 prisoners to the North, and 22,000 to the South.<ref name=":0" /> However, 76 North Korean and 12 Chinese POWs declined either option, preferring to settle in [[India]], [[Argentina]] and [[Brazil]] instead.<ref name=":0" />
Geoje Camp was closed following the signing of the Armistice Agreement. A memorial park was established on part of the old camp in 1997 it incorporates recreation of prisoner barracks and life and a display of period and more modern military hardware.
Line 147 ⟶ 163:
File:Geoje HuengNam Retreat Memorial Tower.jpg|[[Hungnam Evacuation]] Memorial Tower
</gallery>
== In popular culture ==
The Geoje POW Camp was the main setting of the South Korean film [[Swing Kids (2018 film)|Swing Kids (2018)]], a fictional story about a group of POWs who, under the leadership of a United States Officer stationed at the POW Camp, form a troupe of tap dancers.
The POW camp is a setting in the novel [[War Trash]] by Chinese author [[Ha Jin]].
==Notes==
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==References==
<references />
==External links==
*[http://www.pow.or.kr www.pow.or.kr
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110722140916/http://www.geojeimc.or.kr/sub.html?w=body_03_01&style=03&bo=03_01 A Guide to the Geoje POW Camp Park]
*[http://busanhaps.com/article/geoje-islands-pow-camp Geoje
*[https://www.flickr.com/photos/58451159@N00/sets/72157664990676439 Koje Island POW Camp, 1953: The photos of Pfc. Donald K. Grovom]
*[http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0001874 Goeje Island POW riots] (in Korean, Encyclopedia of Korean Culture)
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