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{{Synthesis |article |date=December 2023}}
[[File:Peter Singer no Fronteiras do Pensamento Porto Alegre (9616423447).jpg|thumb|320px|[[Peter Singer]] is one of the prominent philosophers of [[effective altruism]].]]
In the philosophy of [[effective altruism]], an [[altruistic]] act such as [[Charity (practice)|charitable giving]] is considered more effective, or [[cost-effective]], if it uses a set of resources to do more [[good]] per unit of resource than other options, with the goal of trying to do the most good.<ref name="EA-IEE">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Effective altruism |encyclopedia=International Encyclopedia of Ethics |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons]] |location=Hoboken, New Jersey |url=https://philarchive.org/archive/PUMEA |date=June 2020 |editor-last=LaFollette |editor-first=Hugh |pages=1–9 |doi=10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee883 |isbn=9781444367072 |oclc=829259960 |last2=MacAskill |first2=William |last1=Pummer |first1=Theron |s2cid=241220220}}</ref> Following this definition of effectiveness, researchers in [[psychology]] and related fields have identified '''psychological barriers to effective altruism''' that can cause people to choose less effective options when they engage in altruistic activities such as charitable giving.<ref name="The Science of Giving-2011">{{cite book |last1=Baron |first1=Jonathan |author-link1=Jonathan Baron |last2=Szymanska |first2=Ewa |chapter=Heuristics and Biases in Charity |date=2011 |editor1-last=Oppenheimer |editor1-first=Daniel M. |editor-link1=Daniel M. Oppenheimer |editor2-last=Olivola |editor2-first=Christopher Yves |title=The Science of Giving: Experimental Approaches to the Study of Charity |pages=215–235 |series=The Society for Judgment and Decision Making series |location=New York |publisher=Psychology Press |doi=10.4324/9780203865972-24 |isbn=9781138981430 |oclc=449889661}}</ref><ref name="Burum-2020">{{Cite journal |last1=Burum |first1=Bethany |last2=Nowak |first2=Martin A. |last3=Hoffman |first3=Moshe |date=December 2020 |title=An evolutionary explanation for ineffective altruism |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00950-4 |journal=Nature Human Behaviour |language=en |volume=4 |issue=12 |pages=1245–1257 |doi=10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4 |pmid=33046859 |s2cid=222318993 |issn=2397-3374}}</ref><ref name="Caviola-2021">{{Cite journal |last1=Caviola |first1=Lucius |last2=Schubert |first2=Stefan |last3=Greene |first3=Joshua D. |date=July 2021 |title=The Psychology of (In)Effective Altruism |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |volume=25 |issue=7 |pages=596–607 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2021.03.015 |pmid=33962844 |issn=1364-6613|doi-access=free }}</ref> These barriers can include evolutionary influences as well as motivational and epistemic obstacles.
'''Ineffective altruism''' is the practice of ineffective giving and refers to instances where efforts to do good or contribute to a cause do not produce the intended positive impact.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last1=Caviola |first1=Lucius |last2=Schubert |first2=Stefan |last3=Greene |first3=Joshua D. |date=July 2021 |title=The Psychology of (In)Effective Altruism |journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences |volume=25 |issue=7 |pages=596–607 |doi=10.1016/j.tics.2021.03.015 |pmid=33962844 |issn=1364-6613|doi-access=free }}</ref> It is a concept that has its origins in [[social psychology]],<ref name=":3" /> [[moral psychology]],<ref name=":12" /> [[philosophy]]<ref name=":7" /> and [[Charity (practice)|charitable giving]].<ref name=":13">{{Citation |title=Heuristics and Biases in Charity |date=2011-01-19 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203865972-24 |work=The Science of Giving |pages=233–254 |access-date=2023-11-23 |publisher=Psychology Press |doi=10.4324/9780203865972-24 |isbn=978-0-203-86597-2}}</ref> In general, humans are motivated to do good things in the world, whether that is through donations to charity, volunteering time for a cause, or just lending a hand to someone who needs help.<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |author-link=Charities Aid Foundation |date=2023 |title=CAF World Giving Index 2023 |url=https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-research/wgi_report_2023_final.pdf?sfvrsn=402a5447_2 |access-date=14 November 2023 |website=Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |author-link=Charities Aid Foundation |date=2022 |title=World Giving Index 2022: A global view of giving trends |url=https://www.cafonline.org/docs/default-source/about-us-research/caf_world_giving_index_2022_210922-final.pdf |access-date=10 November 2023 |website=Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)}}</ref> In 2022, approximately 4.2 billion people donated their money, time, or helped a stranger.<ref name=":4" /> Donating money to charity is especially substantial. For instance, 2% of the [[GDP of the United States]] goes to charitable organizations — a total of more than $450 billion in annual donations.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Giving USA 2020: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2019. |publisher=Giving USA Foundation |year=2020 |isbn=9780998746654}}</ref> Despite the human tendency and motivation to give and engage in [[altruistic behavior]], research has shed light on an unequal motivation to give [[Effective altruism|effectively]].<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last1=Burum |first1=Bethany |last2=Nowak |first2=Martin A. |last3=Hoffman |first3=Moshe |date=December 2020 |title=An evolutionary explanation for ineffective altruism |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-00950-4 |journal=Nature Human Behaviour |language=en |volume=4 |issue=12 |pages=1245–1257 |doi=10.1038/s41562-020-00950-4 |pmid=33046859 |s2cid=222318993 |issn=2397-3374}}</ref>▼
== Overview ==
▲
Humans are motivated to give, but often not motivated to give most effectively.<ref name="
▲Humans are motivated to give, but not motivated to give effectively.<ref name=":1" /> In the domain of business decisions, investors look for how much return they will get for each dollar they invest. However, when it comes to the domain of altruistic decision-making, this line of thinking is far less common.<ref name=":13" /> In fact, most donors seem to prioritize giving to charitable organizations that spend the least possible amount on running costs in the hopes of having more of their donation reach the destination.<ref name=":10" /><ref name=":11">{{Cite journal |last1=Caviola |first1=Lucius |last2=Faulmüller |first2=Nadira |last3=Everett |first3=Jim A. C. |last4=Savulescu |first4=Julian |last5=Kahane |first5=Guy |date=July 2014 |title=The evaluability bias in charitable giving: Saving administration costs or saving lives? |url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/1548669952 |journal=Judgment and Decision Making |language=English |volume=9 |issue=4 |pages=303–315|doi=10.1017/S1930297500006185 |s2cid=18730753 |id={{ProQuest|1548669952}} }}</ref>
== Evolutionary
[[File:Dr._Martin_Nowak.jpg|thumb|320px|[[Martin Nowak]] is a professor at [[Harvard University]] whose research contributions include the theory of evolution and cooperation.]]
While plenty of studies in the behavioral sciences have demonstrated the cognitive and emotional limitations in charitable giving, some argue that the reasons behind ineffective giving run deeper.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal |last1=Jaeger |first1=Bastian |last2=van Vugt |first2=Mark |date=April 2022 |title=Psychological barriers to effective altruism: An evolutionary perspective |url=https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.008 |journal=Current Opinion in Psychology |volume=44 |pages=130–134 |doi=10.1016/j.copsyc.2021.09.008 |pmid=34628365 |s2cid=238582556 |via=Elsevier Science Direct}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> A study by academics at [[Harvard University]] and the [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]] suggested that the human tendency to be altruistically ineffective can be explained through [[evolution|evolutionary motives]] and [[evolutionary game theory|game theory]].<ref name=":1" /> They argue that society rewards the act of giving but provides no motivation or incentive to give effectively. Past research suggests that altruistic motives are distorted by, among other things, [[parochialism]], [[Social status|status]] and [[conformity]].<ref name=":8" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Panchanathan |first1=Karthik |last2=Boyd |first2=Robert |date=November 2004 |title=Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/nature02978 |journal=Nature |language=en |volume=432 |issue=7016 |pages=499–502 |doi=10.1038/nature02978 |pmid=15565153 |bibcode=2004Natur.432..499P |s2cid=4373929 |issn=1476-4687}}</ref><ref name=":5" /> ▼
▲While plenty of studies in the behavioral sciences have demonstrated the cognitive and emotional limitations in charitable giving, some argue that the reasons behind ineffective giving run deeper.<ref name="
=== Parochialism ===
Throughout human evolutionary history, residing in small, tightly-knit groups has given rise to prosocial emotions and intentions towards kin and ingroup members, rather than universally extending to those outside the group boundaries.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Aktipis |first1=Athena |last2=Cronk |first2=Lee |last3=Alcock |first3=Joe |last4=Ayers |first4=Jessica D. |last5=Baciu |first5=Cristina |last6=Balliet |first6=Daniel |last7=Boddy |first7=Amy M. |last8=Curry |first8=Oliver Scott |last9=Krems |first9=Jaimie Arona |last10=Muñoz |first10=Andrés |last11=Sullivan |first11=Daniel |last12=Sznycer |first12=Daniel |last13=Wilkinson |first13=Gerald S. |last14=Winfrey |first14=Pamela |date=July 2018 |title=Understanding cooperation through fitness interdependence |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-018-0378-4 |journal=Nature Human Behaviour |language=en |volume=2 |issue=7 |pages=429–431 |doi=10.1038/s41562-018-0378-4 |pmid=31097813 |s2cid=49667807 |issn=2397-3374|hdl=1871.1/72e0524e-788d-4f93-90f8-a6f04369a2a7 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="
=== Status seeking ===
Humans assign value to their [[social status]] within a group for survival and reproduction.<ref name="
=== Conformity ===
Many living organisms have demonstrated [[conformity]],<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Boyd |first1=Robert |last2=Richerson |first2=Peter J. |last3=Henrich |first3=Joseph |date=2011-06-28 |title=The cultural niche: Why social learning is essential for human adaptation |journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences |language=en |volume=108 |issue= Suppl 2|pages=10918–10925 |doi=10.1073/pnas.1100290108 |issn=0027-8424 |pmc=3131818 |pmid=21690340 |bibcode=2011PNAS..10810918B |doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Muthukrishna |first1=Michael |last2=Morgan |first2=Thomas J. H. |last3=Henrich |first3=Joseph |date=2016-01-01 |title=The when and who of social learning and conformist transmission |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513815000586 |journal=Evolution and Human Behavior |volume=37 |issue=1 |pages=10–20 |doi=10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.05.004 |issn=1090-5138}}</ref> that is, the tendency to use dominant group norms (or
=== Subjective preferences ===
People often prioritize giving to charities that align with their subjectively preferred causes.<ref name="
=== Narrow moral circle ===
[[Moral circle expansion]] is the concept of increasing one's number and kind of subjects deserving of moral concern over time.<ref name="
===
[[Scope neglect]] (or ''scope insensitivity'') is the idea that people are numb to the number of victims in large, high-stake humanitarian situations.<ref>{{Cite
▲People often prioritize giving to charities that align with their subjectively preferred causes.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal |last1=Berman |first1=Jonathan Z. |last2=Barasch |first2=Alixandra |last3=Levine |first3=Emma E. |last4=Small |first4=Deborah A. |date=May 2018 |title=Impediments to Effective Altruism: The Role of Subjective Preferences in Charitable Giving |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0956797617747648 |journal=Psychological Science |language=en |volume=29 |issue=5 |pages=834–844 |doi=10.1177/0956797617747648 |pmid=29659341 |s2cid=4901791 |issn=0956-7976 |via=Association for Psychological Science}}</ref> Commonly, people believe charity to be a subjective decision which should not be motivated by numbers, but by care for the cause. This aligns with the theory of [[warm-glow giving]] originally proposed by the economist [[James Andreoni]]. According to Andreoni (1990), individuals gain satisfaction from the act of giving but are not concerned about the benefits generated by their act.<ref name=":16">{{Cite journal |last=Andreoni |first=James |date=1990 |title=Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A theory of warm-glow giving. |journal=The Economic Journal |volume=100 |issue=401 |pages=464–477|doi=10.2307/2234133 |jstor=2234133 |s2cid=6001457 }}</ref><ref name=":3" />
Donors are averse to giving to charities that devote a lot of their expenses to administration<ref name="
▲[[Moral circle expansion]] is the concept of increasing one's number and kind of subjects deserving of moral concern over time.<ref name=":14">{{Cite journal |last1=Anthis |first1=Jacy Reese |last2=Paez |first2=Eze |date=2021-06-01 |title=Moral circle expansion: A promising strategy to impact the far future |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328721000641 |journal=Futures |volume=130 |pages=102756 |doi=10.1016/j.futures.2021.102756 |issn=0016-3287|doi-access=free }}</ref> The establishment of one's moral circle depends on spatial, biological, and temporal proximity.<ref name=":14" /><ref name=":0" /> For instance, many donors in [[Western Educated Industrialized Rich Democratic|WEIRD]] countries tend to favor charities that conduct work within their respective geographical boundaries.<ref name=":13" /> In terms of biological distance, people favor donating money to help humans instead of animals, even in cases when animals can have equal cognitive and suffering capacities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Caviola |first1=Lucius |last2=Everett |first2=Jim A. C. |last3=Faber |first3=Nadira S. |date=June 2019 |title=The moral standing of animals: Towards a psychology of speciesism. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/pspp0000182 |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |language=en |volume=116 |issue=6 |pages=1011–1029 |doi=10.1037/pspp0000182 |pmid=29517258 |s2cid=3818419 |issn=1939-1315}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Caviola |first1=Lucius |last2=Kahane |first2=Guy |last3=Everett |first3=Jim A. C. |last4=Teperman |first4=Elliot |last5=Savulescu |first5=Julian |last6=Faber |first6=Nadira S. |date=May 2021 |title=Utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people? Harming animals and humans for the greater good. |url=http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/xge0000988 |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: General |language=en |volume=150 |issue=5 |pages=1008–1039 |doi=10.1037/xge0000988 |pmid=33074696 |issn=1939-2222}}</ref> The idea of temporal proximity relates to people's tendency to prefer helping current generations over future ones.<ref>{{Cite book |last=MacAskill |first=William |title=What We Owe the Future |publisher=Basic Books |year=2022 |isbn=978-1541618626 |edition=1st |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":0" />
=== Quantifiability scepticism ===
[[File:QALY graph-en.svg|thumb|320px|Demonstration of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) for two individuals. Individual A (who did not receive an intervention) has fewer QALYs than individual B (who received an intervention).]]
▲[[Scope neglect]] (or ''scope insensitivity'') is the idea that people are numb to the number of victims in large, high-stake humanitarian situations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Yudkowsky |first=Eliezer |date=13 May 2007 |title=Scope Insensitivity |url=https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2ftJ38y9SRBCBsCzy/scope-insensitivity |archive-url= |access-date=16 October 2023 |website=lesswrong.com}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite journal |last1=Dickert |first1=Stephan |last2=Västfjäll |first2=Daniel |last3=Kleber |first3=Janet |last4=Slovic |first4=Paul |date=September 2015 |title=Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy. |journal=Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition |language=en |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=248–255 |doi=10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.09.002 |issn=2211-369X|doi-access=free }}</ref> Some research has compared this [[cognitive bias]] to the economic concept of [[diminishing marginal utility]] wherein people demonstrate a decreasing non-linear concern for individuals as the number of people increases.<ref name=":2" />
Intangible outcomes (such as health interventions, charity effectiveness) are hard to quantify, and many people doubt that they can every be quantified and compared.<ref name="Caviola-2021" /> However, in disciplines such as [[health economics]], health outcomes and interventions are quantified and evaluated using metrics such as [[Quality-adjusted life year|quality-adjusted life years (QALYs)]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Banerjee |first1=Abhijit V. |title=Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty |last2=Duflo |first2=Esther |publisher=PublicAffairs |year=2011 |isbn=978-1-58648-798-0 |location=United States |language=en}}</ref> In a similar vein, [[Happiness economics|happiness economists]] have developed the concept of [[WELLBY|wellbeing-years (WELLBYs)]] which evaluates effectiveness in terms of life-years lived up to full life satisfaction.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=De Neve |first1=Jan-Emmanuel |last2=Clark |first2=Andrew E. |last3=Krekel |first3=Christian |last4=Layard |first4=Richard |last5=O’Donnell |first5=Gus |date=2020-10-05 |title=Taking a wellbeing years approach to policy choice |url=https://www.bmj.com/content/371/bmj.m3853 |journal=BMJ |language=en |volume=371 |pages=m3853 |doi=10.1136/bmj.m3853 |issn=1756-1833 |pmid=33020062|s2cid=222125497 }}</ref> Put simply, a WELLBY is given by:<math display="block">WELLBY = { L \times\Delta W }</math>Where <math>L</math> is the number of lives remaining from the region's life expectancy and <math>\Delta W</math> is the change in life satisfaction expected to result from a particular action or intervention.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Treasury |first=HM |date=2021 |title=Wellbeing Guidance for Appraisal: Supplementary Green Book Guidance |url=https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1005388/Wellbeing_guidance_for_appraisal_-_supplementary_Green_Book_guidance.pdf |access-date=11 November 2023 |website=HM Treasury}}</ref> Thus, charity cost-effectiveness analyses use a number of different measures grounded in academic research to quantify their impact, allowing direct comparisons of charities that address multiple causes.<ref name="Caviola-2020" /><ref name="Caviola-2021" />
▲=== Epistemic obstacles ===
The [[effective altruism]] movement does substantial work on identifying the world's most effective charities through charity evaluators such as [[GiveWell]], [[Giving What We Can]], and [[Animal Charity Evaluators]]. However, many people are unaware of these organizations and the charities they evaluate,<ref name="Caviola-2020" /> and are strongly driven by emotional responses when estimating the effectiveness of a charity;<ref name="Caviola-2020" /> choosing instead to prioritize those causes to which they have a personal connection.<ref name="Berman-2018" />
▲Donors are averse to giving charities that devote a lot of their expenses to administration<ref name=":17">{{Cite journal |last1=Gneezy |first1=U. |last2=Keenan |first2=E. A. |last3=Gneezy |first3=A. |date=2014-10-30 |title=Avoiding overhead aversion in charity |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1253932 |journal=Science |volume=346 |issue=6209 |pages=632–635 |doi=10.1126/science.1253932 |pmid=25359974 |bibcode=2014Sci...346..632G |s2cid=206557384 |issn=0036-8075}}</ref> or running costs.<ref name=":11" /><ref name=":15" /><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Spiteri |first=Glen William |date=March 2022 |title=Does the evaluability bias hold when giving to animal charities? |journal=Judgment and Decision Making |volume=17 |issue=2 |pages=315–330 |doi=10.1017/s1930297500009128 |issn=1930-2975|doi-access=free }}</ref> Several studies have demonstrated the ubiquitous effect of [[Uri Gneezy|overhead aversion]] which is commonly attributed to people's conflation between overhead spending and charity cost-effectiveness (or impact).<ref name=":17" /><ref name=":11" /><ref name=":15" /> Furthermore, some have argued that when donors learn that a charity uses their donation to fund running costs, donors experience a diminished feeling of warm-glow,<ref name=":16" /> which is a significant driver of donation behavior.<ref name=":17" />
== See also ==
{{Portal|Psychology|Society}}
{{columns-list|colwidth=22em|
* [[Altruism (ethics)]]
* [[Charitable organization]]
* [[Evidence-based policy]]
* [[List of cognitive biases]]
* [[Moral psychology]]
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