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{{Short description|Study of the relationship between a country's armed forces and civil society/government}}
{{Multiple issues|
{{tone|date=April 2019}}
{{Globalize|date=May 2022|2=US}}
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[[File:Shoigu in Moldova 01.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Public meeting of Moldovan President [[Igor Dodon]] (center) with the former military defence minister [[Victor Gaiciuc]] (center left) and Dodon's defence minister [[Pavel Voicu]] (far right), August 2019]]
{{Politics}}
'''Civil–military relations''' ('''Civ-Mil''' or '''CMR'''{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}) describes the relationship between [[military]] organizations and [[civil society]], military organizations and other government [[bureaucracies]], and leaders and the military.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brooks|first=Risa A.|date=2019|title=Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=379–398|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> CMR incorporates a diverse, often normative field, which moves within and across [[management]], [[social science]] and [[policy]] scales.<ref>Shields, Patricia, (2015) "Civil Military Relations" in ''Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Third edition'' Taylor and Francis DOI: 10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052814</ref> More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. "The goal of any [[State (polity)|state]] is to harness military professional power to serve vital [[national security]] interests, while guarding against the [[Abuse of power|misuse of power]] that can threaten the well-being of its people."<ref>Pion-Berlin D., Dudley D. (2020) Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field. In: Sookermany A. (eds) Handbook of Military Sciences. p. 1. Springer, Cham {{doi|10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_37-1}}</ref> Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that it is preferable to have the ultimate [[command responsibility|responsibility]] for a country's [[military strategy|strategic]] decision-making to lie in the hands of the [[civilian]] political leadership (i.e. [[civilian control of the military]]) rather than a military (a [[military dictatorship]]).
A paradox lies at the center of traditional civil-military relations theory. The military, an institution designed to protect the polity, must also be strong enough to threaten the society it serves. A military take-over or [[coup]] is an example where this balance is used to change the government. Ultimately, the military must accept that civilian authorities have the "right to be wrong".<ref>Peter D. Feaver. 2003. ''Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press</ref> In other words, they may be responsible for carrying out a policy decision they disagree with. Civilian supremacy over the military is a complicated matter. The rightness or wrongness of a policy or decision can be ambiguous. Civilian decision makers may be impervious to corrective information. The relationship between civilian authorities and military leaders must be worked out in practice.<ref>{{cite journal|last = Shields|first= Patricia|date = November–December 2006|title = Civil-Military Relations: Changing Frontiers (Review Essay)|journal =[[Public Administration Review]]|volume= 66|issue =6|pages = 924–928 |doi= 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00660.x|url = https://www.academia.edu/1189403}}</ref>
The principal problem they examine, however, is [[empirical]]: to explain how civilian control over the military is established and maintained.<ref>James Burk. 2002. "Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations." ''[http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/29/1/7 Armed Forces & Society]''. 29(1): 7–29.</ref><ref>Herspring, Dale. 2005. The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas) {{ISBN|0700613552}}</ref> In the broader sense it examines the ways society and military intersect or interact and includes topics such as the integration of [[veteran]]s into society, methods used to [[Military recruitment|recruit]] and retain service members, and the fairness and efficacy of these systems, the integration of minorities, women, and the [[LGBT]] community into the military, the behavior and consequences of [[Private military company|private contractors]], the role of culture in military organizations, voting behavior of soldiers and veterans, and the gaps in policy preferences between civilians and soldiers.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Shields
While generally not considered a separate academic area of study in and of itself, it involves scholars and practitioners from many fields and specialties.<ref name="link.springer.com">{{Citation |last=Shields
==History==
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The ramifications of the [[Cold War]], specifically the American decision to maintain a large [[standing army]] for the first time in its history, led to concerns about whether such a large military structure could be effectively maintained by a liberal democracy. [[Samuel P. Huntington]] and [[Morris Janowitz]] published the seminal books on the subject which effectively brought civil-military relations into [[academia]], particularly in [[political science]] and [[sociology]].<ref name="Samuel P. Huntington 1957">Samuel P. Huntington. 1957. ''The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations''. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.</ref><ref name="Morris Janowitz 1960">Morris Janowitz. 1960. ''The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait''. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press.</ref>
Despite the peculiarly American impetus for Huntington's and Janowitz's writing, their theoretical arguments have been used in the study of other national civil-military studies. For example, Ayesha Ray used the ideas of Huntington in her book about Indian civil-military relations.<ref>Ayesha Ray. 2013. ''The Soldier and the State in India: Nuclear Weapons, Counterinsurgency, and the Transformation of Indian Civil-Military Relations.'' London: Sage Publications.</ref> In ''The Man on Horseback'', [[Samuel E. Finer]] countered some of Huntington's arguments and
The increased incidence of military [[coups d'état]] since World War II, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, brought about a growing interest in academic and journalistic circles in studying the nature of such [[coups]]. Political upheaval in Africa led to military take-overs in [[Dahomey]], [[Togo]], [[Republic of the Congo|Congo]], and [[Uganda]], to mention just a few.<ref>Samuel Decalo. 1976. ''Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style''. New Haven: Yale University Press.</ref> Political unrest in South America, which involved military coups in [[Bolivia]] (189 military coups in its first 169 years of existence), [[Chile]], [[Argentina]], [[Brazil]], [[Paraguay]], [[Peru]], and [[Uruguay]], was largely a result of forces attempting to stem the increasing influence of left-wing and communist led uprisings.<ref>Charles F. Andrain. 1994. ''Comparative Political Systems: Policy Performance and Social Change''. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe.</ref> The 2006 military coup in [[Thailand]] engendered continued interest in this area.<ref>Mark Beeson. 2008. "Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines: Will the Thai Coup Prove Contagious?" ''[http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/3/474 Armed Forces & Society]''. 34(3): 474–490.</ref>
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By the summer of 1950, the armed forces of the United States had fewer than 1.5 million personnel on active duty, down from a high of 12 million in 1945. By the next year, however, in response to [[North Korea]]'s invasion of [[South Korea]], the size of the U.S. military was again on the rise, doubling to more than 3.2 million personnel. Reaching a high of 3.6 million in 1953, the total number of personnel on active duty in the U.S. military never again dropped below two million during the 40-plus years of the [[Cold War]]. After the fall of the [[Berlin Wall]] and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the size of the active-duty force had, by 1999, dropped to just under 1.4 million personnel. As of February 28, 2009, a total of 1,398,378 men and women remain on active duty in the U.S. armed forces.
The size of the U.S. military in the latter half of the twentieth century, unprecedented in peacetime, caused concern in some circles, primarily as to the potential effect of maintaining such a large force in a democratic society. Some predicted disaster and were concerned with the growing militarization of American society. These writers were quite sure that a distinctly military culture was inherently dangerous to a non-militaristic liberal society.{{efn|Attributed to multiple sources:<ref name="Pearl S. Buck 1949"/><ref>Fred J. Cook. 1962. ''The Warfare State''. New York: MacMillan.</ref><ref name="Irving Louis Horowitz 1963">Irving Louis Horowitz. 1963. ''The War Game''. New York: Ballantine Books.</ref><ref>Tristram Coffin. 1964. ''The Passion of the Hawks''. New York: MacMillan.</ref><ref>John Swomley. 1964. ''The Military Establishment''. Boston: Beacon Press.</ref><ref name="Judith Nies McFadden 1969">Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden (eds). 1969. ''American Militarism 1970''. New York: Viking Press.</ref><ref>M. Vincent Hayes (ed). 1973. "Is the Military Taking Over?" ''New Priorities: a Magazine for Activists''. 1(4). London: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Ltd.</ref>}} Others warned that the ascendancy of the military establishment would fundamentally change American foreign policy and would weaken the intellectual fabric of the country.<ref>C. Wright Mills. 1956. ''The Power Elite''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref><ref>C. Wright Mills. 1958. ''The Causes of World War III''. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc.</ref> However, most of the arguments were less apocalyptic and settled along two tracks. The two tracks are highlighted, respectively, by Samuel P. Huntington's ''Soldier and the State'' and Morris Janowitz's ''The Professional Soldier''.
The debate focused primarily on the nature of the relationship between the civilian and military worlds. There was widespread agreement that there were two distinct worlds and that they were fundamentally different from one another. The argument was over how best to ensure that the two could coexist without endangering [[liberal democracy]].
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In his seminal 1957 book on civil-military relations, ''[[The Soldier and the State]]'',<ref name="Samuel P. Huntington 1957"/> [[Samuel P. Huntington]] described the differences between the two worlds as a contrast between the attitudes and values held by military personnel, mostly [[Conservatism|conservative]], and those held by civilians, mostly [[Liberalism|liberal]].<ref>William T.R. Fox. 1961. "Representativeness and Efficiency: Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations" ''Political Science Quarterly'' 76(3): 354–366.</ref><ref>Peter Karsten. 1971. "ROTC, MyLai and the Volunteer Army." ''Foreign Policy'' 6 (Spring).</ref><ref name="M. Vincent Hayes 1973">M. Vincent Hayes(ed). 1973. "Is the Military Taking Over?" ''New Priorities: a Magazine for Activists''. 1(4). London: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Ltd.</ref> Each world consisted of a separate institution with its own operative rules and norms. The military's function was furthermore inherently different from that of the civilian world. Given a more conservative military world which was illiberal in many aspects, it was necessary to find a method of ensuring that the liberal civilian world would be able to maintain its dominance over the military world. Huntington's answer to this problem was "military professionalism."
Risa Brooks argues that the health of civil-military relations is best judged by whether there is a (i) preference divergence between military and political leaders, and (ii) whether there is a power imbalance. She argues that the healthiest arrangement of civil-military relations is when the preferences between military and political leaders is low, and political leaders have a dominant power advantage. She argues that the worst kind of civil-military relations is when there is high preference divergence, as well as a power balance between the military and political leaders.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Brooks|first=Risa A.|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv346qvr|title=Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment|date=2008|publisher=Princeton University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctv346qvr |jstor=j.ctv346qvr|s2cid=242040600 }}</ref>
According to Dan Slater, Lucan A. Way, Jean Lachapelle, and Adam E. Casey, variations in military supremacy in authoritarian states can be explained by the nature in which the military was established in the first place: "Where authoritarian mass parties created militaries from scratch, the armed forces have generally remained subservient. Where militaries emerged separately from authoritarian parties, they enjoyed the autonomy necessary to achieve and maintain military supremacy. The core lesson is simple: Unless an autocratic regime created the military, it will struggle to control the military."<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Slater |first1=Dan |last2=Way |first2=Lucan A. |last3=Lachapelle |first3=Jean |last4=Casey |first4=Adam E. |date=2023 |title=The Origins of Military Supremacy in Dictatorships |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/900429 |journal=Journal of Democracy |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=5–20 |doi=10.1353/jod.2023.a900429 |s2cid=259331365 |issn=1086-3214}}</ref>
===Convergence theory===
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Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence, arguing that the military, despite the extremely slow pace of change, was in fact changing even without external pressure. Convergence theory postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization of society <ref name="Irving Louis Horowitz 1963"/><ref name="Judith Nies McFadden 1969"/><ref name="M. Vincent Hayes 1973"/><ref>Gene Lyons. 1961. "The New Civil-Military Relations." ''American Political Science Review'' 55(1).</ref><ref>Harold Wool. 1968. ''The Military Specialist''. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.</ref> However, despite this convergence, Janowitz insisted that the military world would retain certain essential differences from the civilian and that it would remain recognizably military in nature.<ref>Morris Janowitz. 1973. "The Social Demography of the All-Volunteer Force." ''Annals of the American Academy of Political Science''. 406(March): 86–93.</ref>
===Institutional/occupational hypothesis===
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Concordance theory has been applied to emerging democracies, which have more immediate threat of coups.<ref>Salihu, N. (2019). Concordance civil–military relations in Ghana’s fourth republic. Armed Forces & Society. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X19841665.</ref><ref name="link.springer.com"/>
==Civil–military relations in Afghanistan==
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Their April 2013 paper <ref>Ashley Jackson and Simone Haysom; April 2013; The search for common ground, Civil–military relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13; HPG Policy Brief 51; http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7446-stablisation-civil-military-relations-afghanistan</ref> includes the following three key messages -
* Stabilisation approaches are likely to continue to present challenges to the aid
* Civil–military dialogue was markedly more effective when it was rooted in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and strategic argumentation, as with advocacy focused on reducing harm to civilians.
* Aid agencies need to invest more in capacity and training for engaging in civil–military dialogue and, together with donors, seek to generate more objective evidence on the impact of stabilisation approaches.
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* [[Aerospace Industries Association]]
==Notes==
{{notelist}}
==References==
{{reflist}}
{{Authority control}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Civil-Military Relations}}
[[Category:Civil–military relations| ]]
[[Category:Defense policy]]
[[Category:Military sociology]]
[[Category:Military–industrial complex]]
[[Category:Political science theories]]
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