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Grettoonist (talk | contribs) Compiled the seven consecutive references into one explanatory footnotes template, with a new notes section and notelist template to accompany it. Also expanded on the categories. |
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{{Politics}}
'''Civil–military relations''' ('''Civ-Mil''' or '''CMR'''{{citation needed|date=February 2023}}) describes the relationship between [[military]] organizations and [[civil society]], military organizations and other government [[bureaucracies]], and leaders and the military.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brooks|first=Risa A.|date=2019|title=Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=379–398|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> CMR incorporates a diverse, often normative field, which moves within and across [[management]], [[social science]] and [[policy]] scales.<ref>Shields, Patricia, (2015) "Civil Military Relations" in ''Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Third edition'' Taylor and Francis DOI: 10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052814</ref> More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. "The goal of any [[State (polity)|state]] is to harness military professional power to serve vital [[national security]] interests, while guarding against the [[Abuse of power|misuse of power]] that can threaten the well-being of its people."<ref>Pion-Berlin D., Dudley D. (2020) Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field. In: Sookermany A. (eds) Handbook of Military Sciences. p. 1. Springer, Cham {{doi|10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_37-1}}</ref> Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that it is preferable to have the ultimate [[command responsibility|responsibility]] for a country's [[military strategy|strategic]] decision-making to lie in the hands of the [[civilian]] political leadership (i.e. [[civilian control of the military]]) rather than a military (a [[military dictatorship]]).
A paradox lies at the center of traditional civil-military relations theory. The military, an institution designed to protect the polity, must also be strong enough to threaten the society it serves. A military take-over or [[coup]] is an example where this balance is used to change the government. Ultimately, the military must accept that civilian authorities have the "right to be wrong".<ref>Peter D. Feaver. 2003. ''Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press</ref> In other words, they may be responsible for carrying out a policy decision they disagree with. Civilian supremacy over the military is a complicated matter. The rightness or wrongness of a policy or decision can be ambiguous. Civilian decision makers may be impervious to corrective information. The relationship between civilian authorities and military leaders must be worked out in practice.<ref>{{cite journal|last = Shields|first= Patricia|date = November–December 2006|title = Civil-Military Relations: Changing Frontiers (Review Essay)|journal =[[Public Administration Review]]|volume= 66|issue =6|pages = 924–928 |doi= 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00660.x|url = https://www.academia.edu/1189403}}</ref>
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By the summer of 1950, the armed forces of the United States had fewer than 1.5 million personnel on active duty, down from a high of 12 million in 1945. By the next year, however, in response to [[North Korea]]'s invasion of [[South Korea]], the size of the U.S. military was again on the rise, doubling to more than 3.2 million personnel. Reaching a high of 3.6 million in 1953, the total number of personnel on active duty in the U.S. military never again dropped below two million during the 40-plus years of the [[Cold War]]. After the fall of the [[Berlin Wall]] and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the size of the active-duty force had, by 1999, dropped to just under 1.4 million personnel. As of February 28, 2009, a total of 1,398,378 men and women remain on active duty in the U.S. armed forces.
The size of the U.S. military in the latter half of the twentieth century, unprecedented in peacetime, caused concern in some circles, primarily as to the potential effect of maintaining such a large force in a democratic society. Some predicted disaster and were concerned with the growing militarization of American society. These writers were quite sure that a distinctly military culture was inherently dangerous to a non-militaristic liberal society.{{efn|Attributed to multiple sources:<ref name="Pearl S. Buck 1949"/><ref>Fred J. Cook. 1962. ''The Warfare State''. New York: MacMillan.</ref><ref name="Irving Louis Horowitz 1963">Irving Louis Horowitz. 1963. ''The War Game''. New York: Ballantine Books.</ref><ref>Tristram Coffin. 1964. ''The Passion of the Hawks''. New York: MacMillan.</ref><ref>John Swomley. 1964. ''The Military Establishment''. Boston: Beacon Press.</ref><ref name="Judith Nies McFadden 1969">Erwin Knoll and Judith Nies McFadden (eds). 1969. ''American Militarism 1970''. New York: Viking Press.</ref><ref>M. Vincent Hayes (ed). 1973. "Is the Military Taking Over?" ''New Priorities: a Magazine for Activists''. 1(4). London: Gordon and Breach, Science Publishers, Ltd.</ref>}} Others warned that the ascendancy of the military establishment would fundamentally change American foreign policy and would weaken the intellectual fabric of the country.<ref>C. Wright Mills. 1956. ''The Power Elite''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref><ref>C. Wright Mills. 1958. ''The Causes of World War III''. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc.</ref> However, most of the arguments were less apocalyptic and settled along two tracks. The two tracks are highlighted, respectively, by Samuel P. Huntington's ''Soldier and the State'' and Morris Janowitz's ''The Professional Soldier''.
The debate focused primarily on the nature of the relationship between the civilian and military worlds. There was widespread agreement that there were two distinct worlds and that they were fundamentally different from one another. The argument was over how best to ensure that the two could coexist without endangering [[liberal democracy]].
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* [[National Defense Industrial Association]], which [[Lobbying|lobbies]] the [[United States Congress]], advocating for the business interests of the private defense industry.
* [[Aerospace Industries Association]]
==Notes==
{{notelist}}
==References==
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Civil-Military Relations}}
[[Category:Civil–military relations| ]]
[[Category:
[[Category:Military sociology]]
[[Category:Military–industrial complex]]
[[Category:Political science theories]]
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