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=== Concrete and abstract ===
There is an influential distinction in ontology between [[abstract and concrete|concrete and abstract objects]]. Many concrete objects, like rocks, plants, and other people, are encountered in everyday life. They exist in space and time. They [[Causality|have effects]] on each other, like when a rock falls on a plant and damages it. Abstract objects, like numbers, sets, and types, have no location in space and time, and lack causal powers.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Falguera|Martínez-Vidal|Rosen|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/ lead section, § 1. Introduction]}} |3={{harvnb|Faye|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ftrmBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA89 89–91]}} |4={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=498–499}} }}</ref> The distinction between concrete objects and abstract objects is sometimes treated as the most-general division of being.<ref>{{harvnb|Lowe|2005a|pp=670–671}}</ref>
 
The existence of concrete objects is widely agreed upon but opinions about abstract objects are divided. [[Philosophical realism|Realists]] such as [[Plato]] accept the idea that abstract objects have independent existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Belfiore|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IQp5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 110]}} |2={{harvnb|Faulkner|Gregersen|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5-JhDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA298 298]}} |3={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=498–499}} }}</ref> Some realists say abstract objects have the same mode of existence as concrete objects; according to others, they exist in a different way.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2023}} |2={{harvnb|Prior|2006|pp=493, 498–499}} }}</ref> [[Anti-realism|Anti-realists]] state abstract objects do not exist, a view that is often combined with the idea that existence requires a location in space and time or the ability to causally interact.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Plebani|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pkNb_3NYyz0C&pg=PA5 5]}} }}</ref>
 
=== Possible, contingent, and necessary ===
A further distinction is between merely possible, [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]], and [[Metaphysical necessity|necessary]] existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=157–158}} |3={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49, 52]}} }}</ref> An entity has necessary existence if it must exist or could not fail to exist. This means that it is not possible to newly create or destroy necessary entities. Entities that exist but could fail to exist are contingent; merely possible entities do not exist but could exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=157–158}} | {{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Jubien|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA52 52]}} }}</ref>
 
{{multiple image |perrow=2 / 1 |total_width=300 |image1=Avicenna lithograph - cropped.png |alt1=Lithograph of Avicenna |link1=Avicenna |image2=Thomas Aquinas by Carlo Crivelli.png |alt2=Painting of Thomas Aquinas |link2=Thomas Aquinas |footer=[[Avicenna]] and [[Thomas Aquinas]] argued that God has necessary existence.}}
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=== Physical and mental ===
Entities that exist on a physical level include objects encountered in everyday life, like stones, trees, and human bodies, as well as entities discussed in [[modern physics]], like electrons and protons.<ref>{{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>{{efn|According to the [[Standard Model]] of [[particle physics]], [[elementary particles]] together with the [[four fundamental forces]] acting on them are the most basic constituents of the universe. [[String theory]] provides an alternative explanation by focusing one-dimensional [[String (physics)|strings]] and their interactions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Martin|Wells|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xVyYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4]}} | {{harvnb|Schwichtenberg|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bipBDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Chang|2024|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c2L8EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA247 247]}} }}</ref>}} Physical entities can be observed and measured; they possess mass and a location in space and time.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, §Types of Materialist Theory}} |2={{harvnb|Markosian|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lQ2xDwAAQBAJ 486–487]|loc=Physical Object}} }}</ref> Mental entities like perceptions, experiences of pleasure and pain as well as beliefs, desires, and emotions belong to the realm of the mind; they are primarily associated with conscious experiences but also include unconscious states like unconscious beliefs, desires, and memories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2006|loc=[https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 § 1. Introduction]}} | {{harvnb|Addis|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6ZEN6vByUC&pg=PA49 49–50]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5G_iBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT183 183]}} }}</ref>
 
The [[mind–body problem]] concerns the ontological status of and relation between physical and mental entities and is a frequent topic in [[metaphysics]] and [[philosophy of mind]].{{efn|Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of mental phenomena and how they are related to the physical world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mH12kYm1RKAC&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Crumley|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Yf4eAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–3]}} }}</ref>}} According to [[materialists]], only physical entities exist on the most-fundamental level. Materialists usually explain mental entities in terms of physical processes; for example, as brain states or as patterns of neural activation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} | {{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, § Types of Materialist Theory}} }}</ref> Idealism,{{efn|Some theorists use the term "ontological idealism" to distinguish it from idealistic views in epistemology.<ref>{{harvnb|Berendzen|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C0DAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17]}}</ref>}} a minority view in contemporary philosophy,<ref>{{harvnb|Guyer|Horstmann|2023|loc=§ 9. The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century}}</ref> rejects matter as ultimate and views the mind as the most basic reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Sprigge|1998|loc=Lead Section|ps=, "Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence."}}</ref> [[Dualists]] like [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) believe both physical and mental entities exist on the most-fundamental level. They state they are connected to one another in several ways but that one cannot be reduced to the other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} | {{harvnb|Calef|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Descartes’ Dualism}} }}</ref>
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[[File:Bellerophon riding Pegasus and killing the Chimera, Roman mosaic, the Rolin Museum in Autun, France, 2nd to 3rd century AD.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Mosaic depicting Pegasus|One of the topics covered by theories of the nature of existence concerns the ontological status of fictional objects like [[Pegasus]].<ref name="auto3">{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}}</ref>]]
 
Theories of the nature of existence aim to explain what it means for something to exist. A central dispute in the academic discourse about the nature of existence is whether existence is a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of individuals.<ref name="auto2">{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}}</ref> An individual is a unique entity, like [[Socrates]] or a particular apple. A property is something that is attributed to an entity, like "being human" or "being red", and usually expresses a quality or feature of that entity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orilia|Paolini Paoletti|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=683}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> The two main theories of existence are first-order and second-order theories. First-order theories understand existence as a property of individuals while second-order theories say existence is a second-order property, that is, a property of properties.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |3={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section}} |4={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref>
 
A central challenge for theories of the nature of existence is an understanding of the possibility of coherently denying the existence of something, like the statement: "Santa Claus does not exist". One difficulty is explaining how the name "Santa Claus" can be meaningful even though there is no Santa Claus.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} | {{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }}</ref>
 
=== Second-order theories ===
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A key reason against characterizing existence as a property of individuals is that existence differs from regular properties. Regular properties, such as ''being a building'' and ''being 443.2 meters tall'', express what an object is like but do not directly describe whether or not that building exists.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> According to this view, existence is more fundamental than regular properties because an object cannot have any properties if it does not exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}}</ref>
 
According to second-order theorists, [[Quantifier (logic)|quantifiers]] rather than [[Predication (philosophy)|predicates]] express existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |4={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> Predicates are expressions that apply to and classify objects, usually by attributing features to them, such as "is a butterfly" and "is happy".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Portner|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=E85VAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA141 141–143]}} | {{harvnb|Ellis|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DmLfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 39–40]}} }}</ref> Quantifiers are terms that talk about the quantity of objects that have certain properties. Existential quantifiers express that there is at least one object, like the expressions "some" and "there exists", as in "some cows eat grass" and "there exists an even prime number".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Magnus|2005|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|Uzquiano|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> In this regard, existence is closely related to counting because to assert that something exists is to assert that the corresponding concept has one or more instances.<ref name="auto"/>
 
Second-order views imply a sentence like "[[egg-laying mammals]] exist" is misleading because the word "exist" is used as a predicate in them. These views say the true logical form is better expressed in reformulations like "there exist entities that are egg-laying mammals". This way, "existence" has the role of a quantifier and "egg-laying mammals" is the predicate. Quantifier constructions can also be used to express negative existential statements; for instance, the sentence "talking tigers do not exist" can be expressed as "it is not the case that there exist talking tigers".<ref>{{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}}</ref>
 
[[File:Bertrand Russell 1949.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Bertrand Russell|upright=0.8|[[Bertrand Russell]] proposed his [[theory of descriptions]] to dissolve paradoxes surrounding negative existential statements.]]
 
Many ontologists accept that second-order theories provide a correct analysis of many types of existential sentences. It is, however, controversial whether it is correct for all cases.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref> Some problems relate to assumptions associated with everyday language about sentences like "[[Ronald McDonald]] does not exist". This type of statement is called ''negative singular existential'' and the expression ''Ronald McDonald'' is a [[singular term]] that seems to refer to an individual. It is not clear how the expression can refer to an individual if, as the sentence asserts, this individual does not exist. According to a solution philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872—1970) proposed, singular terms do not refer to individuals but are [[Theory of descriptions|descriptions of individuals]]. This theory states negative singular existentials deny an object matching the descriptions exists without referring to a non-existent individual. Following this approach, the sentence "Ronald McDonald does not exist" expresses the idea: "it is not the case there is a unique happy hamburger clown".<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} |2={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }}</ref>
 
=== First-order theories ===
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[[File:Alexius Meinong 1900.jpg|alt=Photo of Alexius Meinong|left|thumb|upright|According to [[Alexius Meinong]], there are some entities that do not exist.]]
 
According to Meinongians, sentences describing Sherlock Holmes and Zeus refer to nonexisting objects. They are true or false depending on whether these objects have the properties ascribed to them.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} |3={{harvnb|Küng|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mprnCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA208 208]}} }}</ref> For instance, the sentence "Pegasus has wings" is true because having wings is a property of Pegasus, even though Pegasus lacks the property of existing.<ref name="auto1">{{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}}</ref>
 
One key motivation of Meinongianism is to explain how negative singular existentials like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" can be true. Meinongians accept the idea that singular terms like "Ronald McDonald" refer to individuals. For them, a negative singular existential is true if the individual it refers to does not exist.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|PenelopeMackie|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} }}</ref>
 
Meinongianism has important implications for understandings of quantification. According to an influential view defended by [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], the domain of quantification is restricted to existing objects. This view implies quantifiers carry [[ontological commitments]] about what exists and what does not exist. Meinongianism differs from this view by saying the widest domain of quantification includes both existing and nonexisting objects.<ref name="auto3"/>
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A central doctrine in [[Buddhist philosophy]] is called the "[[three marks of existence]]", which are ''[[anicca|aniccā]]'' (impermanence), ''[[anattā]]'' (absence of a permanent self), and ''[[dukkha]]'' (suffering). ''Aniccā'' is the doctrine that all of existence is subject to change, meaning everything changes at some point and nothing lasts forever. ''Anattā'' expresses a similar state in relation to persons by stating that people do not have a permanent identity or a separate self. Ignorance about ''aniccā'' and ''anattā'' is seen as the main cause of ''dukkha'' by leading people to form attachments that cause suffering.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smith|Worden|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8emELTpHWSEC&pg=PA18 18]}} |2={{harvnb|Gómez|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} |3={{harvnb|Allen|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Tw2VCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 114]}} }}</ref>
 
[[File:Head of Laozi marble Tang Dynasty (618–906618-906 CE) Shaanxi Province China.jpg|thumb|upright=.7|alt=Bust of Laozi|[[Laozi]] saw [[dao]] as a fundamental principle that constitutes the root of all existence.]]
 
A central idea in many schools of [[Chinese philosophy]], like [[Laozi]]'s (6th century BCE) [[Daoism]], is that a fundamental principle known as ''[[dao]]'' is the source of all existence. The term is often translated as "the way" and is understood as a cosmic force that governs the natural order of the world. Chinese metaphysicians debated whether ''dao'' is a form of being or whether, as the source of being, it belongs to non-being.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Perkins|2019|loc=Lead Section, §3.1 Monism}} |2={{harvnb|EB staff|2017|loc=§ Periods of Development of Chinese Philosophy}} |3={{harvnb|Wang|Bao|Guan|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gSfXDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA6 6–8]}} |4={{harvnb|Blishen|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OtDcEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT7 7–8]}} }}</ref>
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* {{cite book |last1=Lucas |first1=John F. |title=Introduction to Abstract Mathematics |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield |isbn=978-0-912675-73-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jklsb5JUgoQC&pg=PA75 |language=en |date=1990 |access-date=April 8, 2024 |archive-date=April 8, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240408082658/https://books.google.com/books?id=jklsb5JUgoQC&pg=PA75 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=MacFarlane |first1=John |title=Logical Constants |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/#SynTer |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=21 November 2021 |year=2017 |archive-date=17 March 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200317180221/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/#SynTer |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=PenelopeMackie |first1=MackiePenelope |title=Existence |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/existence/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=7 August 2023 |language=en |date=1998 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810230551/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/existence/v-1 |url-status=live |issn=2161-0002 }}▼
* {{cite web |last1=MacLeod |first1=Mary C. |last2=Rubenstein |first2=Eric M. |title=Universals |url=https://iep.utm.edu/universa/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=24 March 2024 |archive-date=24 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240224193719/https://iep.utm.edu/universa/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Magee |first1=Glenn Alexander |title=The Hegel Dictionary |publisher=Continuum |isbn=978-1-84706-590-2 |date=2010 }}
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* {{cite book |last1=Pack |first1=Justin |title=Environmental Philosophy in Desperate Times |publisher=Broadview Press |isbn=978-1-77048-866-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nP18EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 |language=en |date=2022 |access-date=May 21, 2024 |archive-date=June 17, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240617060211/https://books.google.com/books?id=nP18EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Parkin |first1=Alan J. |title=Essential Cognitive Psychology |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-1-135-00511-5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cbEpAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA238 |language=en |date=2013 |edition=Classic }}
▲* {{cite web |last1=Penelope |first1=Mackie |title=Existence |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/existence/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=7 August 2023 |language=en |date=1998 |archive-date=10 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230810230551/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/existence/v-1 |url-status=live |issn=2161-0002 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Perkins |first1=Franklin |title=Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-metaphysics/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=16 August 2023 |date=2019 |archive-date=1 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201125947/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-metaphysics/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Perrett |first1=Roy W. |title=An Introduction to Indian Philosophy |date=2016 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-85356-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=q7wwCwAAQBAJ |language=en |access-date=9 June 2023 |archive-date=22 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230622154203/https://books.google.com/books?id=q7wwCwAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}
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