Energiewende: Difference between revisions

Germany phased out nuclear power in 2023 as part of the ''Energiewende'',<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/energiewende/fragen-und-antworten/kernkraft |title=Kernkraft |access-date=26 December 2020 |archive-date=30 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201130142253/https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/energiewende/fragen-und-antworten/kernkraft }}</ref> and plans to retire existing [[coal power plant]]s possibly by 2030, and latest by 2038.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/einigung-zum-kohleausstieg-1712888|title=Bund und Länder einigen sich auf Stilllegungspfad zum Kohleausstieg|website=Bundesregierung|date=16 January 2020 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-12-08 |title=What does the coalition deal mean for renewables, coal and the power market in Germany? |url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/what-does-coalition-treaty-mean-renewables-coal-and-power-market-germany |access-date=2024-07-04 |website=Clean Energy Wire |language=en}}</ref>

The key policy document outlining the ''Energiewende'' was published by the German government in September 2010, some six months before the [[Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster|Fukushima nuclear accident]].<ref name="bmwi-and-bmu-2010"/> Legislative support was passed in September 2010. On 6 June 2011, following Fukushima, the government removed the use of nuclear power as a bridging technology as part of their policy.<ref name="bmu-2011">{{cite book | title = The Federal Government's energy concept of 2010 and the transformation of the energy system of 2011 | publisher = Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU) | place = Bonn, Germany | date = October 2011 | url = http://www.germany.info/contentblob/3043402/Daten/3903429/BMUBMWi_Energy_Concept_DD.pdf | access-date = 16 June 2016 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20161006040646/http://www.germany.info/contentblob/3043402/Daten/3903429/BMUBMWi_Energy_Concept_DD.pdf | archive-date = 6 October 2016 }}</ref> The program was later described as "Germany's vendetta against nuclear" and attributed to the growing influence of ideologically anti-nuclear green movements in mainstream politics.<ref>{{Cite web|title=A Tale of Two Decarbonizations|url=https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/tale-of-two-decarbs|access-date=21 July 2020|website=The Breakthrough Institute|language=en}}</ref> In 2014, then-[[Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action|Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy]] [[Sigmar Gabriel]] lobbied Swedish company [[Vattenfall]] to continue investments in brown coal mines in Germany, explaining that "we cannot simultaneously quit nuclear energy and coal-based power generation.".<ref>{{Cite web|date=13 October 2014|title=Letter from Sigmar Gabriel to Stefan Loevfen|url=https://www.altinget.se/misc/SigmarGabriel.pdf}}</ref> A similar statement by Gabriel was recalled by [[James Hansen]] in his 2009 book "[[Storms of My Grandchildren|Storms of my grandchildren]]" — Gabriel argued that "coal use was essential because Germany was going to phase out nuclear power. Period. It was a political decision, and it was non-negotiable".<ref>{{Cite book|last=Hansen|first=James|title=Storms of my grandchildren|year=2009|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing USA |isbn=978-1608195022}}</ref>

After the 2013 federal elections, the new [[Christian Democratic Union of Germany|CDU]] (CDU) /[[Christian Social Union in Bavaria|CSU]] (CSU) and [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|SPD]] (SPD) coalition government continued the ''Energiewende'', with only minor modification of its goals in the coalition agreement. The coalition government introduced an intermediate target of a 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2035.<ref name="german-energy-blog-2013">{{cite web | title = Overview CDU/CSU and SPD present Coalition Agreement – 55% to 60% renewables by 2035 and more | date = 27 November 2013 | website = German Energy Blog | location = Germany | url = http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?page_id=14825 | access-date = 16 June 2016}}</ref> TheseThe targets were described as "ambitious".<ref name="buchan-2012">{{cite book|last=Buchan|first=David|url=https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SP-261.pdf|title=The Energiewende — Germany's gamble|date=June 2012|publisher=Oxford Institute for Energy Studies|isbn=978-1-907555-52-7|place=Oxford, UK|access-date=12 May 2016}}</ref> The Berlin-based [[Think tank|policy institute]] [[Agora Energiewende]] noted that "while the German approach is not unique worldwide, the speed and scope of the ''Energiewende'' are exceptional".<ref name="agora-2015-a">{{cite book|author=Agora Energiewende|url=http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_EW/Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende.pdf|title=Understanding the Energiewende: FAQ on the ongoing transition of the German power system|publisher=[[Agora Energiewende]]|year=2015|place=Berlin, Germany|access-date=29 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160602074457/https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_EW/Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende.pdf|archive-date=2 June 2016}}</ref> A particular characteristic of the ''Energiewende'' compared to other planned energy transitions was the expectation that the transition is driven by citizens and not large energy utilities.{{disputed inline|date=March 2019}} Germany's switch to renewablesrenewable energy was described as "democratization of the energy supply".<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Jungjohann|first1=Arne|url=https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319318905|title=Energy Democracy. Germany's Energiewende to Renewables.|last2=Morris|first2=Craig|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2016|isbn=978-3-319-31890-5}}</ref> The ''Energiewende'' also sought a greater transparency in relation to national [[energy policy]] formation.<ref name="acatech-et al-2016-b">{{cite book|url=http://www.akademienunion.de/fileadmin/redaktion/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Energy_scenarios.pdf|title=Consulting with energy scenarios: requirements for scientific policy advice|publisher=acatech — National Academy of Science and Engineering|year=2016|isbn=978-3-8047-3550-7|editor1=acatech|place=Berlin, Germany|access-date=9 November 2016|editor2=Lepoldina|editor3=Akademienunion|archive-date=9 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161109093507/http://www.akademienunion.de/fileadmin/redaktion/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Energy_scenarios.pdf}}</ref>

As of 2013, Germany was spending €1.5 billion per year on energy research to solve the technical and social issues raised by the transition,<ref name="Schiermeier-2013">{{cite news|last=Schiermeier|first=Quirin|date=10 April 2013|title=Renewable power: Germany's energy gamble: an ambitious plan to slash greenhouse-gas emissions must clear some highly technical and economic hurdles|work=Nature|url=http://www.nature.com/news/renewable-power-germany-s-energy-gamble-1.12755|access-date=1 May 2016|doi=10.1038/496156a}}</ref> which are provided by the individual federal states, universities, and the government, which provided €400 million per year.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Curry|first=Andrew|date=27 March 2019|title=Germany faces its future as a pioneer in sustainability and renewable energy|journal=Nature|language=en|volume=567|issue=7749|pages=S51–S53|doi=10.1038/d41586-019-00916-1|pmid=30918376|bibcode=2019Natur.567S..51C|doi-access=free}}</ref> The governmentGovernment's contribution was increased to €800 million in 2017.<ref name=":0" />

TheseThe targets went well beyond [[European Union]] legislation and the national policies of other European states. The policy objectives have been embraced by the German federalFederal governmentGovernment and has resulted in a huge expansion of renewablesrenewable energy, particularly wind power. Germany's share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 22.9% in 2012, surpassing the [[OECD]] average of 18% usage of renewables.<ref name="economist-2012">

Producers have been guaranteed a fixed [[feed-in tariff]] for 20 years, guaranteeing a fixed income. Energy co-operatives have been created, and efforts were made to decentralize control and profits. However, in some cases poorPoor investment designs have caused bankruptcies and low [[Return on investment|returns]], and unrealistic promises have been shown to be far from reality.<ref name="latsch-etal-2014">

OneA factor that has inhibited efficient employment of new renewable energy has been the lack of an accompanying investment in power infrastructure to bring the power to market. It is believed 8,300&nbsp;{{convert|8300|km|mi|abbr=on}} of power lines must be built or upgraded.<ref name="economist-2012" /> In 2010 legislation has been passed seeking construction and upgrade of 7'700&nbsp;{{convert|7700|km|mi|abbr=on}} of new grid lines, but only {{convert|950&nbsp;|km|mi|abbr=on}} have been built by 2019 — and in 2017, only {{convert|30&nbsp;|km|mi|abbr=on}} has been built.<ref name=":5" />

The different [[States of Germany|German States]] have varying attitudes to the construction of new power lines. Industry has had their rates frozen and so the increased costs of the ''Energiewende'' havehad been passed on to consumers, who have had rising electricity bills. Germans in 2013 had some of the highest electricity [[price]]s (including taxes) in Europe.<ref>

On 1 August 2014, a revised [[German Renewable Energy Sources Act|Renewable Energy Sources Act]] entered into force. Specific deploymentDeployment corridors stipulated the extent to which renewable energy is to be expanded in the future and the funding rates ([[feed-in tariff]]s) will no longer be fixed by the government, but will be determined by auction.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a" />

Among other things, windWind and solar power cannot be principally refinanced under the current [[marginal cost]] based market. [[Carbon price|Carbon pricing]] is also central to the ''Energiewende'', and the [[European Union Emissions Trading Scheme]] (EU ETS) needs to be reformed to create a genuine [[scarcity]] of certificates.<ref name="agora-2015-b">

The German federalFederal governmentGovernment is calling for sucha reform.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a">

}}</ref> but as German minister of economy noted, "we cannot shut down both our nuclear and coal-fired power plants".<ref>{{Cite news|last=SPIEGEL|first=Melanie Amann, Gerald Traufetter, DER|title=The Climate Activist vs. the Economics Minister: 'My Generation Has Been Fooled' – DER SPIEGEL – International|url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-climate-activist-vs-the-economics-minister-my-generation-has-been-fooled-a-1258429.html|access-date=21 July 2020|newspaper=Der Spiegel|date=19 March 2019|language=en}}</ref> Coal comprised 42% of electricity generation in 2015. If Germany is to limit its contribution to a [[Global warming|global temperature increase]] to 1.5{{nbsp}}°C above pre-industrial levels, as declared in the 2015 [[Paris Agreement]], a completeA phase-out of [[fossil fuels]] together with a shift to [[100% renewable energy]] is required by about 2040.<ref name="quaschning-2016">

The ''Energiewende'' is made up of various technical building blocks and assumptions. [[Electricity storage]], while too expensive at the beginning of the program, was hoped to become a useful technology in the future.<ref name="agora-2014">

}}</ref> As of 2019, however asa number of potential storage projects (power-to-gas, hydrogen storage and others) are still in prototype phase with losses up to 40% of the stored energy in the existing small scale installations.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Shellenberger|first=Michael|title=The Reason Renewables Can't Power Modern Civilization Is Because They Were Never Meant To|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/05/06/the-reason-renewables-cant-power-modern-civilization-is-because-they-were-never-meant-to/|access-date=21 July 2020|website=Forbes|language=en}}</ref>

}}</ref> Improved energyEnergy efficiency is one of Germany's official targets. Greater integrationIntegration with adjoining national [[electricity network]]s can offer mutual benefits. — indeed, systemsSystems with high shares of renewables can use geographical diversity to offset intermittency.<ref>

Of that theThe German federalFederal governmentGovernment spent €820{{nbsp}}million supporting projects ranging from basic research to applications.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a" /> The federal government also foresees an export role for German expertise in the area.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a" />

The social and political dimensions of the ''Energiewende'' have been subject to study. Sebastian Strunz argues that the underlying technological, political and economic structures will need to change radically — a process heHe calls "regime shift".<ref name="strunz-2014">

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Eva Schmid, Brigitte Knopf, and Anna Pechan analyseanalyze the actors and institutions that will be decisive in the ''Energiewende'' and how latency in the national electricity [[infrastructure]] may restrict progress.<ref>

On 3 December 2014, the German federalFederal governmentGovernment released its National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE) in order to improve the uptake of energy efficiency.<ref name="nape">

An official federalFederal governmentGovernment report on progress under the ''Energiewende'', updated for 2014, notes that:<ref name="bmwi-2015-b" />

Slow progress on transmission network reinforcement hashad led to a deferment of new windfarms in northern Germany.<ref name="oltermann-2016">

</ref> The German cabinet earlier approved costly underground cabling in October 2015 in a bid to dispel local resistance against above-ground pylons and to speed up the expansion process.<ref name="chambers-2015">

</ref> In November 2016, Agora Energiewende reported on the impact of the new {{nowrap|EEG (2017)}} and several other related new laws. It concludes that thisthe new legislation will bring "fundamental changes" for large sections of the energy industry, but have limited effect on the economy and on consumers.<ref name="clew-2016b">

}} This document is not an extract translated from the official plan.</ref> The goal for the energy sector is shown in the [[#table-climate-action-plan-targets|table]]. The plan states that the energy supply must be "almost completely decarbonised" by 2050, with renewablesrenewable energy as its main source. For the electricity sector, "in the long-term, electricity generation must be based almost entirely on renewable energies" and "the share of wind and solar power in total electricity production will rise significantly". Notwithstanding, during the transition, "less carbon-intensive natural gas power plants and the existing most modern coal power plants play an important role as interim technologies".<ref name="amelang-etal-2016">

The fifth monitoring report on the ''Energiewende'' for 2015 was published in December 2016. The expert commission which wrote the report warns that Germany will probably miss its 2020 climate targets and believes that this could threaten the credibility of the entire endeavour. The commission puts forward a number of measures to address the slowdown, including a flat national CO₂{{CO2}} price imposed across all sectors, a greater focus on transport, and full market exposure for renewable generation. Regarding the carbon price, the commission thinks that a reformed [[European Union Emission Trading Scheme|EU{{nbsp}}ETS]] would be better, but that achieving agreement across Europe is unlikely.<ref name="egenter-and-wehrmann-2016">{{cite news | first1 = Sven | last1 = Egenter | first2 = Benjamin | last2 = Wehrmann | title = Experts call for CO₂ price to retain Energiewende's credibility | date = 15 December 2016 | work = Clean Energy Wire (CLEW) | location = Berlin, German | url = https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/experts-call-co2-price-retain-energiewendes-credibility | access-date = 15 December 2016}}</ref><ref name="bmwi-2016b">{{cite book | title = Die Energie der Zukunft: Fünfter Monitoring-Bericht zur Energiewende: Berichtsjahr 2015 | trans-title = The energy of the future: Fifth monitoring report for the ''Energiewende'': Report year 2015 | language = de

Since 2017, it had become clear that the ''Energiewende'' was not progressing at the anticipated speed, with the countryCountry's [[Politics of global warming|climate policy]] regarded as "lackluster" and the energy transition "stalling."<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/cop25-when-it-comes-to-climate-protection-germany-still-has-a-lot-to-do/a-51621620|title=COP25: When it comes to climate protection, Germany still has a lot to do {{!}} DW {{!}} 11 December 2019|website=DW.COM|language=en-GB|access-date=12 December 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/power-levies-big-industry-concern-parties-debate-potential-coalitions/urgent-rethink-required-germanys-energy-transition-stalls|title=Urgent rethink required as Germany's energy transition stalls|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en|access-date=12 December 2019}}</ref> High [[Electricity pricing|electricity prices]], growing resistance against the use of wind turbines over their environmental and potential health impacts, and regulatory hurdles, have been identified as causes for thisthe slowdown.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ft.com/content/d8b9b0bc-04a6-11ea-a984-fbbacad9e7dd|title=Germans fall out of love with wind power|date=17 November 2019|website=Financial Times|access-date=12 December 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/german-wind-energy-stalls-amid-public-resistance-and-regulatory-hurdles/a-50280676|title=German wind energy stalls amid public resistance and regulatory hurdles {{!}} DW {{!}} 4 September 2019|website=Deutsche Welle|language=en-GB|access-date=12 December 2019}}</ref> As of 2017 Germany imported more than half of its energy.<ref>{{cite web|title=INFOGRAPHIC: Can Germany's Energiewende ensure supply security?|url=http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/infographic/infographic-can-germany-s-energiewende-ensure-supply-security/|date=21 June 2016|work=[[EurActiv]].com|access-date=1 February 2017}}</ref>

A 2018 European Commission case study report on the ''Energiewende'' noted 27% decrease in {{CO2}} emissions against the 1990 levels with a slight increase over the few preceding years and concluded achieving of the intended 40% reduction target by 2020 in unfeasible, primarily due to the "simultaneous nuclear phase-out and increased energy consumption". Also 50% increase of electricity prices was observed (compared to base 2007 prices). Germany's energy sector remains the largest single source of {{CO2}} emissions, contributing over 40%.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/mission_oriented_r_and_i_policies_case_study_report_energiewende-de.pdf|title=Mission-oriented R&I policies: In-depth case studies: Energiewende}}</ref>

In March 2019, Chancellor Merkel formed a so-called "climate cabinet" to find a consensus on new emissions reduction measures to meet 2030 targets. The result was the Climate Action Program 2030, which Berlin adopted on 9 October 2019.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.iea.org/reports/germany-2020|title=Germany 2020 – Analysis|website=IEA|date=19 February 2020 |language=en-GB|access-date=26 March 2020}}</ref> The Program contains plans for a carbon pricing system for the heating and transportation sectors, which are not covered by the EU ETS. It also includes tax- and other incentives to encourage energy-efficient building renovations, higher [[Electric vehicle|EV]] subsidies, and more public transport investments. The IEA report concludes that "[t]he package represents a clear step in the right direction towards Germany meeting its 2030 targets."<ref name=":2" /> The [[Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Employment|German Coal Commission]], composed of 28 industrial, environmental, and regional organizations, voted on the coal phase-out date. Ultimately, 27 members voted in favor of the 2038 coal phase-out date, with only one regional organization from [[Lusatia]] voting against, and [[Greenpeace]] voting in favor and later releasing a non-binding "dissenting opinion".<ref>{{Cite web|date=23 January 2019|title=German commission proposes coal exit by 2038|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/german-commission-proposes-coal-exit-2038|access-date=21 January 2022|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref>

A similar statement was voiced by SPD MP [[Udo Bullmann]] who explained that Germany has to stick with fossil fuels as it's trying to replace both coal and nuclear "at the same time", while countries that rely on nuclear power have "easier task replacing fossil fuels".<ref>{{Cite web|last=Michalopoulos|first=Sarantis|date=19 March 2021|title=German MEP: Nord Stream 2 needs a 'European' perspective|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/german-mep-nord-stream-2-needs-a-european-perspective/|access-date=19 March 2021|website=www.euractiv.com|language=en-GB}}</ref> In 2020 [[Agora Energiewende]] also declared a number of new fossil gas plants will be also required to "guarantee supply security as Germany relies more and more on intermittent renewable electricity".<ref>{{Cite web|date=22 April 2021|title=EU indecision over gas as green investment imperils supply security – German utilities|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/eu-indecision-over-gas-green-investment-imperils-supply-security-german-utilities|access-date=25 April 2021|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> In January 2019, Germany's Economy Minister [[Peter Altmaier]] he doesndidn't want to import "cheap nuclear power" from other countries to compensate for planned phase-out of coal.<ref>{{Cite news |date=28 January 2019|title=German Economy Minister – Do not want imported nuclear power to make up for coal phase-out: ZDF|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-energy-coal-idUKKCN1PM0GW|access-date=16 June 2021}}</ref> In 2021 [[European Green Party|Green]] [[Member of the European Parliament|MEP]] [[Sven Giegold]] admitted that Germany may require new fossil gas power plants in order to "stabilise the more fluctuating power supply of renewables".<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kurmayer|first=Nikolaus J.|date=1 November 2021|title=Green MEP: Germany 'may need some additional gas turbines' to stabilise renewables|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/interview/green-mep-germany-may-need-some-additional-gas-turbines-to-stabilise-renewables/|access-date=1 November 2021|website=www.euractiv.com|language=en-GB}}</ref>

The following climate goals however failed:

In 2020, a number of previously shut down [[Natural gas|fossil gas]] plants ([[Irsching Power Station|Irsching]] units 4 and 5) were restarted due to "heavy fluctuations of level of power generated from the wind and sun"<ref>{{Cite web|title=StackPath|url=https://www.uniper.energy/news/uniper-and-co-shareholder-decide-to-return-irsching-4-and-5-gas-power-plants-to-the-market/|access-date=28 May 2020|website=www.uniper.energy}}</ref> and a new [[Natural gas|fossil gas]] power plant was announced by RWE near the former [[Biblis Nuclear Power Plant|Biblis nuclear power plant]] shut down in 2017. The project is declared as part of "decarbonization plan" where renewable energy capacity is accompanied by fossil gas plants to cover for intermittency.<ref>{{Cite web|last=nicholasnhede|date=19 November 2020|title=RWE gas-fired plant to supply German nuclear decommissioning project|url=https://www.powerengineeringint.com/gas-oil-fired/rwe-gas-fired-plant-to-supply-german-nuclear-decommissioning-project/|access-date=19 November 2020|website=Power Engineering International|language=en-US}}</ref> In 2020, a new coal power plant unit, [[Datteln Power Station|Datteln]] 4, was also connected to the grid.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Proctor|first=Darrell|date=2 June 2020|title=Germany Brings Last New Coal Plant Online|url=https://www.powermag.com/germany-brings-last-new-coal-plant-online/|access-date=24 October 2021|website=POWER Magazine|language=en-US}}</ref> A new fossil gas power plant will be also opened from 2023 in [[Leipheim]], [[Bavaria]] to compensate for loss of power caused by "nuclear exit" in thisthe regionRegion.<ref>{{Cite web|date=11 February 2021|title=Bavaria gets new gas-fired power plant to ensure supply security|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/bavaria-gets-new-gas-fired-power-plant-ensure-supply-security|access-date=20 March 2021|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> In 2021, the planned decommissioning of [[Heyden Power Station|Heyden]] 4 coal power plant was cancelled and the plant remains online to compensate for shutdown of the [[Grohnde Nuclear Power Plant|Grohnde nuclear power station]].<ref>{{Cite web|date=2 June 2021|title=Supply security: Uniper coal plant needs to stay in reserve a while longer|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/supply-security-uniper-coal-plant-needs-stay-reserve-while-longer|access-date=3 June 2021|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> In 2022, another coal power plant was restarted in [[Schongau, Bavaria|Schongau]] for the same reasons.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Anonym|title=Not enough electricity for the citizens: Schongau reserve power plant in use for the first time|url=https://newsrnd.com/news/2022-02-13-not-enough-electricity-for-the-citizens--schongau-reserve-power-plant-in-use-for-the-first-time.B1fi61Q8kc.html|access-date=14 February 2022|website=newsrnd.com|language=en}}</ref>

In June 2021, professor {{Interlanguage link|André Thess|de}} from Stuttgart university published an open letter accusing [[Klaus Töpfer]] and [[Matthias Kleiner]], the authors of the 2011 Ethical Committee for Secure Energy Supply report that served as the scientific background of the "nuclear exit" decision, of disregarding the basic rules of scientific independence. The analysis promised that phase-out of nuclear energy and full transition to renewablesrenewable energy "can be completed within a decade". Thess highlighted that the authors lacked the expertise necessary to properly understand and "balance between the risk of more rapid climate change without nuclear energy and the risk of slower climate change with nuclear energy".<ref>{{Cite web|title=Unabhängige Wissenschaft?|url=https://www.igte.uni-stuttgart.de/dokumente/dokumente_es/Thess/02_Offener_Brief.html|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210601043430/https://www.igte.uni-stuttgart.de/dokumente/dokumente_es/Thess/02_Offener_Brief.html|access-date=24 October 2021|website=www.igte.uni-stuttgart.de|archive-date=1 June 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|last=Wetzel|first=Daniel|date=31 May 2021|title=Wegen Zustimmung zum Atomausstieg: Vorwürfe gegen Ethikkommission|work=DIE WELT|url=https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article231463371/Wegen-Zustimmung-zum-Atomausstieg-Vorwuerfe-gegen-Ethikkommission.html|access-date=3 June 2021}}</ref>

High average amounts of wind in 2019 and 2020 were presented in Germany as a success of therenewable renewablesenergy, but when the amount of wind was low for the first half of 2021, use of coal rose by 21% as compared to the previous years. In the first half of 2021 coal, gas, and nuclear power delivered 56% of overall electricity in Germany, with proportionally higher {{CO2}} intensity due to high inputs from coal and fossil gas.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Welle (www.dw.com)|first=Deutsche|title=Germany: Coal tops wind as primary electricity source {{!}} DW {{!}} 13 September 2021|url=https://www.dw.com/en/germany-coal-tops-wind-as-primary-electricity-source/a-59168105|access-date=16 September 2021|website=DW.COM|language=en-GB}}</ref> According to another analysis by Oekomoderne, in 2021, Germany produced nearly 260 TWh of electricity from coal in the first half of 2021, making it the single largest source of energy in that period — as it used "one billion tons" of coal.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Home|url=https://www.onebilliontons.org/|access-date=19 October 2021|website=1 Milliarde Tonnen|language=de}}</ref>

ThisThe situation once again raised questions about the future of weather-dependent electricity system that is also highly dependent on fossil sourcesenergy for stability and its contradiction with the initial objectives of decarbonization.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|last=Shellenberger|first=Michael|title=Skyrocketing Natural Gas Prices Create New Opportunity for Nuclear Energy|url=https://michaelshellenberger.substack.com/p/skyrocketing-natural-gas-prices-create|access-date=16 September 2021|website=michaelshellenberger.substack.com|date=14 September 2021}}</ref>

Projections Report published in 2021 predicted that Germany will miss its 2030 target by 16 percentage points% (49% reduction vs 65% planned) and the 2040 target by 21 percentage points% (67% vs 88% planned).<ref>{{Cite web|date=20 August 2021|title=Germany to widely miss 2030 climate target – draft govt report|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/germany-widely-miss-2030-climate-target-draft-govt-report|access-date=13 October 2021|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> Reduction of emissions in other sectors of the economy is also expected to miss the original targets.<ref>{{Cite web|date=19 October 2021|title=Government projection report confirms Germany clearly off-track from 2030 climate target|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/correction-government-projection-report-confirms-germany-clearly-track-2030-climate-target|access-date=28 October 2021|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref>

In October 2021, over 20 climate scientists and activists signed an open letter to the German governmentGovernment to reconsider the nuclear exit as it will lead to emissions of an extra 60 millions of tons of {{CO2}} each year and hinder decarbonization efforts even further.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kurmayer|first=Nikolaus J.|date=13 October 2021|title=Intellectuals urge Germany to keep nuclear plants online|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/electricity/news/german-intellectuals-urge-state-to-keep-nuclear-plants-online/|access-date=13 October 2021|website=www.euractiv.com|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=The Clean Energy Revolution: from fossil fuels to renewables + nuclear|url=https://cleanenergyrevolution.org/publications|access-date=13 October 2021|website=Clean Energy Revolution|language=en-GB}}</ref>

By end of 2021, the single largest source of electricity in Germany was coal (9.5% hard and 20.2% brown), increase of 20% compared to 2020 due to significant drop in wind (−14.5%) and solar (−5%) power output in that year. Solar power only produced 9.9% electricity, while nuclear power produced 13% even as it was going through the process of decommissioning.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Strommix 2022: Stromerzeugung in Deutschland |url=https://strom-report.de/strom/ |access-date=3 August 2022 |website=STROM-REPORT |language=de}}</ref>

In 2022, [[Agora Energiewende]] warned that Germany has missed its 2020 emission targets and is likely going to miss the 2030 targets, and increase of total emissions after 2022 is likely. Previously celebrated 2020 record low emissions were described as one-off effect of favorable weather and lower demand due to COVID-19 pandemics.<ref>{{Cite web|date=7 January 2022|title=Germany off course to 2030 climate target – think tank|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/germany-course-2030-climate-target-think-tank|access-date=15 January 2022|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> Nuclear phase-out, skyrocketing gas prices, and low wind and solar output resulting in increased reliance on coal were also attributed to the increase in emissions.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Millard|first=Rachel|date=8 January 2022|title=Germany's meltdown over nuclear power risks a costly winter|language=en-GB|work=The Telegraph|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2022/01/08/germanys-decision-abandon-nuclear-power-epic-mistake/|access-date=15 January 2022|issn=0307-1235}}</ref>

In January 2022 the new coalition government reiterated its opposition to the inclusion of [[nuclear power]] in the [[Nuclear power debate#EU Taxonomy|EU sustainable taxonomy]], but also requested that fossil gas is instead included as a "transitional" fuel and carbon intensity thresholds for gas are relaxed.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kurmayer|first=Nikolaus J.|date=24 January 2022|title=Germany takes firm pro-gas stance in green taxonomy feedback to EU|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/germany-takes-firm-pro-gas-stance-in-green-taxonomy-feedback-to-eu/|access-date=25 January 2022|website=www.euractiv.com|language=en-GB}}</ref> As the subsidies for gas were ultimately upheld, a number of new fossil gas plants plan to benefit from the subsidies, while expecting increased profits thanks to "rising wholesale electricity prices" as result of "the last nuclear power plants to be removed from the grid" at the same time.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Herne energy site: plans for one of the world's most state-of-the-art gas and steam power plants are in full swing |url=https://www.steag.com/en/news/insights/herne-energy-site |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418203939/https://www.steag.com/en/news/insights/herne-energy-site |archive-date=18 April 2021 |access-date=10 October 2022 |quote=It is also precisely at this point in time that the last nuclear power plants are to be removed from the grid, so that the Herne gas and steam power plant could benefit from rising wholesale electricity prices.}}</ref>

In 2023, Germany achieved its lowest [[greenhouse gas emissions]] since the 1950s with a 20% reduction, largely impacted by a decline in industrial production due to economic factors like the [[Russo-Ukrainian War|Ukraine war]] and high energy prices. The Berlin-based think-tank [[Agora Energiewende]] attributed approximately half of thisthe reduction to decreased coal-fired power generation, while only 15% resulted from technological improvements such as enhanced renewable energy utilization. Despite these gains, with over 50% of Germany's electricity now derived from renewablesrenewable energy, concerns persist about the industrial sector's competitiveness and sustainability, as emission levels in construction and transport have not significantly changed, putting Germany at risk of missing its EU emission targets.<ref>{{Cite web |title=German emissions fall by a fifth amid stagnant industrial output |url=https://www.ft.com/content/c9aa5a8e-cd6d-4583-b0af-131c8c448913 |access-date=2024-04-16 |website=www.ft.com}}</ref>

Following the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]], Germany announced they would re-open 10 GW of coal power to allegedly "conserve [[natural gas]]" following the recent shortage in Europe.<ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/19/world/europe/germany-russia-gas.html | title=Germany will fire up coal plants again in an effort to save natural gas | newspaper=The New York Times | date=19 June 2022 | last1=Eddy | first1=Melissa }}</ref> This led to a subsequent criticism of ''Energiewende's'' strategy, and how this impacted different countries in Europe. [[Michael Kretschmer]] (CDU) declared the ''Energiewende'' to be a failure, highlighting that renewable generation is insufficient and baseload capabilities have reached its limits. He called for nuclear power phase-out to be cancelled and remaining reactors restarted, until a new feasible strategy is created.<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 August 2022 |title=CDU-Vize Kretschmer hält Energiewende für gescheitert |language=de |work=Der Spiegel |url=https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/michael-kretschmer-sachsens-ministerpraesident-haelt-energiewende-fuer-gescheitert-und-fordert-akws-statt-kohle-zum-gas-ersatz-a-daeb7d0e-dad5-458e-adae-ec424a5fb1d1 |access-date=3 August 2022 |issn=2195-1349}}</ref>

From February 2022, there was a heated debate about pausing the nuclear phase-out and restarting still operational reactors in order to better cope with the [[2021–present global energy crisis|energy crisis]] caused by the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russian invasion of Ukraine]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=26 July 2022 |title=Germany rethinks nuclear power exit due to threat of winter energy crunch |work=Financial Times |url=https://www.ft.com/content/cc422ece-92b3-41fa-a05c-900270bfe824?sharetype=blocked |access-date=3 August 2022}}</ref> Also inIn August 2022, German counter-intelligence started an investigation into two high-ranked officials at German ministry of energy suspected of representing interests of Russia.<ref>{{Cite web |title=ZEIT ONLINE {{!}} Lesen Sie zeit.de mit Werbung oder im PUR-Abo. Sie haben die Wahl. |url=https://www.zeit.de/zustimmung?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zeit.de%2F2022%2F36%2Frussland-spionage-bmwi-robert-habeck-verfassungsschutz |access-date=1 September 2022 |website=www.zeit.de}}</ref>

In October 2022, Germany ministry of energy approved extension of RWE [[brown coal]] [[open pit mine]] in [[Lutzerath]], claiming it's "necessary for energy security".<ref>{{Cite web |date=14 October 2022 |title=Duits dorp bij Roermond verliest strijd tegen bruinkoolmijn |url=https://nos.nl/artikel/2448356-duits-dorp-bij-roermond-verliest-strijd-tegen-bruinkoolmijn |access-date=18 October 2022 |website=nos.nl |language=nl}}</ref> In October 2022, the governmentGovernment also declared the still operational nuclear power plants will not be shut down by end of 2022, but will instead operate until 15 April {{Clarify|date=May 2024}} to help cope with the electricity demand through the winter.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 October 2022 |title=Germany extends lifespan of all three nuclear power plants |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-olaf-scholz-extends-lifespan-of-all-three-nuclear-power-plants/ |access-date=18 October 2022 |website=POLITICO |language=en-US}}</ref>

In 2023, governmentthe Government declared itits plans to remove a key clause from the law that binds all ministries to reduce carbon emissions within their area of responsibility. The only binding target will be the overall 2030 emissions reduction target. The largest {{CO2}} emissions source in Germany is its electricity production, and in that sector, emissions have beenroughly growinghalved sincefrom 2020its peak in 2007 until 2023.<ref name=":7">{{Cite web |date=2022-03-28 |title=How fast is Germany cutting{{!}} itsElectricity greenhouse gas emissions? – DW – 07/10/2023Trends |url=https://wwwember-climate.dw.comorg/en/germanycountries-greenhouseand-gas-emissions-progressregions/countries/germany/a-66082833 |access-date=10 July 20232024-07-04 |website=dw.comEmber |language=en-US}}</ref> In 2020 already saw a similar decline as 2023, as electricity demand dropped massively due to COVID-19 lockdowns, leading to an annual average {{CO2}} intensity of German electricity production wasof 399364 gCO2eqgCO2/kWh and(2023: in380 2022gCO2/kWh). it<ref>{{Cite wasbook 486|last=Brinker gCO2eq|first=Lina-Sophie |url=https:/kWh/www.umweltbundesamt.de/en/publikationen/entwicklung-der-spezifischen-treibhausgas-10 Between|title=Entwicklung der spezifischen Treibhausgas-Emissionen des deutschen Strommix in den Jahren 1990 - 2023 |date=2024-06-27 |publisher=Umweltbundesamt |language=en}}</ref> In 2022, the samecut-off from Russian gas lead to a brief restarting of coal power plants, yearsmeaning the share of coal in electricity production increased from 24.1% in 2020 to 3332%.<ref>{{Cite webin |title=Live2022, 24/7before CO₂going emissionsdown ofto electricity27% consumptionin |url=http://electricitymap2023.tmrow.co/ |access-date=12<ref December 2023 |websitename=electricitymap.tmrow.co":7" |language=en}}</ref>

In 2023 Energy Economics Institute (EWI) warned that around 50 new fossil gas powered plants need to be built to "compensate for the weather-dependent production of wind and solar power" with the overall cost reaching €60 billionsbillion. but theThe budget is not secured by the governmentGovernment nor available from the electricity sales.<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 January 2024 |title=Habeck braucht Geld für Kraftwerke: Die nächsten 60 Milliarden fehlen - WELT |url=https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus249357496/Habeck-braucht-Geld-fuer-Kraftwerke-Die-naechsten-60-Milliarden-fehlen.html |access-date=15 January 2024 |website=DIE WELT |language=de}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=4 January 2024 |title=Übergang zu erneuerbaren Energien: Deutschland braucht 60 Milliarden Euro für Reservekraftwerke |url=https://www.merkur.de/wirtschaft/uebergang-zu-erneuerbaren-energien-energiewende-deutschland-braucht-60-milliarden-reservekraftwerke-zr-92757679.html |access-date=16 January 2024 |website=www.merkur.de |language=de}}</ref> To move away from coal, in February 2024, the federalFederal governmentGovernment agreed to subsidize 10 GW of [[Hydrogen economy|hydrogen-ready]] gas plants. In the first years{{Clarify|date=May 2024}}, the plants will use fossilefossil gas and are expected to be switched over to hydrogen between 2035- to 2040.<ref>{{Cite web |date= |orig-date=February 2024-02 |title=Germany outlines $17 bln plan to subsidise gas-to-hydrogen shift |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germany-agrees-subsidy-plans-hydrogen-ready-gas-power-plants-2024-02-05/ |website=Reuters}}</ref> The plants will mainly provide backup capacity in times where solar and wind power are low. As running plants this way is not economically feasible, utilities will be paid for maintaining thisthe baseload capacity.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Bundesregierung einigt sich auf Kraftwerksstrategie |url=https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/kraftwerksstrategie-regierung-100.html |access-date=2024-02-06 |website=tagesschau.de |language=de}}</ref>

In March 2024, Federal Audit Office published a report in which it assessed the policy as not meeting goals on a number of points: the planned 80% share of renewable energy requires [[Dispatchable generation|dispatchable sources]] but the assumed 10 GW in fossil gas generation is neither sufficient nor on schedule; extension of electric grid is behind the schedule by {{Convert|6000 |km|mi|abbr=on}} and 7 years; security of the supply chain is not sufficiently assessed; system costs to ensure 24/7 generation are underestimated and based on "best-case" scenarios; capacity installed in renewables is also behind the schedule by 30%, whereas demand is expected to grow by 30% as result of electrification of heating and transport.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-03-07 |title=Bericht nach § 99 BHO zur Umsetzung der Energiewende im Hinblick auf die Versorgungssicherheit, Bezahlbarkeit und Umweltverträglichkeit der Stromversorgung |url=https://www.bundesrechnungshof.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Berichte/2024/energiewende-volltext.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 |website=Bundesrechnungshof}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Court of Auditors considers power supply jeopardised - energate messenger.com |url=https://www.energate-messenger.com/news/242052/court-of-auditors-considers-power-supply-jeopardised |access-date=2024-04-03 |website=www.energate-messenger.com |language=en}}</ref>

The ''Energiewende'' has been criticized for the high costs, the early nuclear phase-out which increased carbon emissions, continuation or even increase in use of fossil fuels,<ref name="cleanenergywire.org">{{Cite web|date=26 February 2020|title=Gas-fired power generation reaches record high in Germany|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/gas-fired-power-generation-reaches-record-high-germany|access-date=29 February 2020|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> risks to power supply stability and the [[environmental damage of biomass]].<ref name=":6" />

German association of local utilities VKU said "the strategy creates significant risks to the stability of power supply in case of "'lengthy periods"' of weather unsuitable for wind and solar generation since energy storage in Germany is "'largely non-existent{{' "}}.<ref>{{Cite news|date=19 July 2019|title=Does renewables pioneer Germany risk running out of power?|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-power-supply-insight-idUSKCN1UD0GZ|access-date=29 February 2020}}</ref>

After introduction of the original [[German Renewable Energy Act|Renewable Energy Act]] in 2000, there was a focus on long term costs, while in later years this has shifted to a focus on short term costs and the "financial burden" of the ''Energiewende'' while ignoring environmental externalities of fossil fuels.<ref name="lauber-and-jacobsson-2016">{{cite journal|last1=Lauber|first1=Volkmar|last2=Jacobsson|first2=Staffan|year=2016|title=The politics and economics of constructing, contesting and restricting socio-political space for renewables – The German Renewable Energy Act|journal=Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions|volume=18|pages=147–163|doi=10.1016/j.eist.2015.06.005|bibcode=2016EIST...18..147L }}</ref> Electricity prices for household customers in Germany have been generally increasing in the last decade.{{Clarify|date=May 2024}}<ref name="bmwi-2015-b" /> The renewable energy levy to finance green power investment is added to Germans' electricity unit price. The surcharge (22.1% in 2016) pays the state-guaranteed price for renewable energy to producers and is 6.35 cents per kWh in 2016.<ref name="rueter-2015">

A comprehensive study, published in ''Energy Policy'' in 2013, reported that Germany's [[nuclear power phase-out]], to be complete by 2022, is contradictory to the goal of the climate portion of the program.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Bruninx|first1=Kenneth|last2=Madzharov|first2=Darin|last3=Delarue|first3=Erik|last4=D'haeseleer|first4=William|year=2013|title=Impact of the German nuclear phase-out on Europe's electricity generation — a comprehensive study|url=https://www.mech.kuleuven.be/en/tme/research/energy_environment/Pdf/wpen2012-1|journal=Energy Policy|volume=60|pages=251–261|doi=10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.026|bibcode=2013EnPol..60..251B |access-date=12 May 2016}}</ref>

Former German Economy and Energy Minister [[Sigmar Gabriel]] said in 2014 said "For a country like Germany with a strong industrial base, exiting nuclear and coal-fired power generation at the same time would not be possible."<ref name="severin-and-bryan-2014">{{cite news|last1=Severin|first1=Thorsten|last2=Bryan|first2=Victoria|date=12 October 2014|title=Germany says can't exit coal-fired energy at same time as nuclear|work=reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-energy-idUSL6N0S70W720141012|access-date=14 June 2016}}</ref><ref name="Letter to Swedish Prime Minister">{{cite news|last=Gabriel|first=Sigmar|author-link=Sigmar Gabriel|date=13 October 2014|title=Dear Stefan Löfven – Letter to Swedish Prime Minister from Sigmar Gabriel|work=Altinget|url=http://www.altinget.se/misc/SigmarGabriel.pdf|access-date=14 June 2016}}</ref>

As nuclear and coal power plants are being phased out, the governmentGovernment hashad begun to promote the use of fossil gas in order to bridge the gap between other [[fossil fuel]]s and low-carbon energy sources.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Stam|first=Claire|date=9 April 2019|title=Gas, a prominent guest at German energy transition event|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/gas-a-prominent-guest-at-german-energy-transition-event/|access-date=10 July 2019|website=euractiv.com|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=22 June 2015|title=Germany's dependence on imported fossil fuels|url=https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels|access-date=10 July 2019|website=Clean Energy Wire|language=en}}</ref> ThisThe move hashad been criticisedcriticized by international observers, who argue that fossil fuel gas is "essentially [[methane]], which constitutes at least one-third of global warming and is leaking into the [[Atmosphere of Earth|atmosphere]] all across the gas production and delivery chain." It is also a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon-dioxide.<ref>{{Cite web|date=19 March 2019|title=Gas wars part one: let's be honest about Germany's growing dependence on fossil gas|url=https://energytransition.org/2019/03/gas-wars-part-one-lets-be-honest-about-germanys-growing-dependence-on-fossil-gas/|access-date=10 July 2019|website=Energy Transition|language=en-US}}</ref> It is also feared that the [[European Union]], but particularly Germany, is making itself overly dependent on [[Russia]] for gas supplies via [[Nord Stream 2]], thereby undermining its [[energy security]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Welle (www.dw.com)|first=Deutsche|title=Nord Stream 2 pipeline row highlights Germany's energy dependence on Russia {{!}} DW {{!}} 4 February 2019|url=https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-pipeline-row-highlights-germanys-energy-dependence-on-russia/a-47344788|access-date=10 July 2019|website=DW.COM|language=en-GB}}</ref> In light of the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] the Nord Stream 2 project was first postponed indefinitely and ultimately cancelled. The [[Scholz cabinet]] has spent considerable efforts since February 2022 to find replacements for Russian fossil gas both in the near and the long term.

Germany's [[electrical grid|electricity transmission network]] is currently inadequately developed, therefore lacking the capability of delivering offshore wind energy produced on the Northern coast to industrial regions in the countryCountry's South. The [[transmission system operator]]s are planning to build 4000an additional kilometers{{Convert|4000|km|mi|abbr=off}} of [[Electric power transmission|transmission lines]] until 2030.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Oroschakoff|first=Kalina|date=23 March 2018|title=Germany's green energy shift is more fizzle than sizzle|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-climate-change-green-energy-shift-is-more-fizzle-than-sizzle/|access-date=10 July 2019|website=POLITICO}}</ref>

Slow reduction of {{CO2}} emissions in Germany, especially in the energy sector, hashad been contrasted with France's successful [[Low-carbon economy|decarbonization]] of its energy sector under the [[Messmer Plan#Messmer Plan|Messmer plan]] (from 1973) and the United Kingdom's carbon tax, which saw a drastic reduction of coal-powered energy from 88% in 1973 to below 1% in 2019.<ref>{{Cite web|last1=Hook|first1=Leslie|last2=Thomas|first2=Nathalie|last3=Tighe|first3=Chris|date=1 October 2019|title=How Britain ended its coal addiction|url=https://www.ft.com/content/a05d1dd4-dddd-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc|access-date=21 July 2020|website=www.ft.com|language=en-GB}}</ref><ref name=":6" />

German federal audit office report published in March 2021 highlighted the very high costs of ''Energiewende'' for the household users, where taxes and fees account for 50% of the bills, and the energy price is 43% higher than the EU average. It also noted predicted shortage of 4.5 GW between 2022 and 2025 as result of the planned shutdown of nuclear power plants.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Wacket|first=Markus|date=30 March 2021|title=Germany's energy drive criticised over expense, risks|language=en|work=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-energy-audit-idUSL8N2LS2RC|access-date=16 June 2021}}</ref>

A study found that if Germany had postponed the nuclear phase out and phased out coal first, it could have saved 1,100 lives and €3 to €8 billion in social costs per year. The study concludes that policymakers would have to overestimate the risk or cost of a nuclear accident to conclude that the benefits of the phase-out exceed its social costs.<ref>{{Cite journal |vauthors=Jarvis S, Deschenes O, Jha A|title=The Private and External Costs of Germany's Nuclear Phase-Out |journal=Journal of the European Economic Association |volume=20 |issue=3 |date=June 2022 |pages=1311–1346 |doi=10.1093/jeea/jvac007}}</ref> An open letter by a number of climate scientists published in 2021 calls against the shut-down of the remaining nuclear reactors in Germany, that would lead to 5% increase in {{CO2}} emissions from the electricity sector.<ref>{{Cite news|date=27 September 2021|title=Letter: Germany should postpone nuclear exit to help climate|work=Financial Times|url=https://www.ft.com/content/e7e08182-6749-44df-9594-23ba84ba6dd5|access-date=28 September 2021}}</ref>

The Renewable Energy Act has also had a significant impact on businesses and industries and hashad been met with criticism. A New York Times article recently reported that “German Business Is Tangled in Red Tape” on account of imposed requirements, resulting in increased costs and slowed-down growth.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Eddy |first1=Melissa |title=German Business Is Tangled in Red Tape |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/world/europe/german-business-bureaucracy.html |access-date=9 April 2024 |work=The New York Times |date=April 9, 2024}}</ref>

[[Biomass]] made up 7.0% of Germany's power generation mix in 2017.<ref>{{Cite news|date=11 January 2018|title=Germany's energy consumption in 2017|language=en-US|work=Energy Transition|url=https://energytransition.org/2018/01/german-energy-consumption-2017/|access-date=10 April 2018}}</ref> Biomass has the potential to be a [[carbon-neutral]] fuel because growing biomass absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and a portion of the carbon absorbed remains in the ground after harvest.<ref>https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41603.pdf {{Bare URL PDF|date=March 2022}}</ref> However, using biomassBiomass as a fuel produces [[air pollution]] in the form of [[carbon monoxide]], [[carbon dioxide]], [[NOx|{{NOx}}]] (nitrogen oxides), VOCs ([[volatile organic compound]]s), particulates and other pollutants, although biomass produces less sulfur dioxide than coal.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.pfpi.net/air-pollution-2|title=Air pollution from biomass energy|date=17 March 2011 }}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Eartha Jane Melzer|date=26 January 2010|title=Proposed biomass plant: Better than coal?|work=The Michigan Messenger|url=http://michiganmessenger.com/33868/proposed-biomass-plant-better-than-coal|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100205080916/http://michiganmessenger.com/33868/proposed-biomass-plant-better-than-coal|archive-date=5 February 2010}}</ref>

Between 2004 and 2011 policies lead to around {{convert|7000&nbsp;km²|sqkm|mi2|abbr=on}} new maize-fields for biomass-energy by ploughing-up of at least {{convert|2700&nbsp;km²|sqkm|mi2|abbr=on}} of permanent grassland. This released large amounts of climate active gases, [[loss of biodiversity]], and potential of groundwater recharge.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Ukhanova|first1=Mariya|last2=Schoof|first2=Nicolas|last3=Neher|first3=Lucas|last4=Luick|first4=Rainer|date=2018|title=Balancing energy transition in Germany: how will it influence permanent grassland? A Delphi-study|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331922425|journal=Grassland Science in Europe|volume=23|pages=679–671}}</ref>

There are also attempts to use [[biogas]] as partially renewable fuel with [[Green Planet Energy]] selling gas containing 10% of biogas, 1% hydrogen and 90% imported fossil gas.<ref>{{Cite web|date=11 March 2021|title=Is Germany's Greenpeace Energy at peace selling natural gas?|url=https://www.climateandcapitalmedia.com/is-germanys-greenpeace-energy-at-peace-with-selling-mostly-natural-gas/|access-date=16 September 2021|website=Climate & Capital Media|language=en}}</ref>

}}</ref>]]Estimates for 2012 suggested that almost half the renewable energy capacity in Germany was owned by citizens through energy cooperatives and private initiatives.<ref name="amelang-2016">{{cite news | first = Sören | last = Amelang | title = The reform of the Renewable Energy Act: Germany's energy transition revamp stirs controversy over speed, participation | date = 29 June 2016 | website = Clean Energy Wire (CLEW) | location = Berlin, Germany | url = https://www.cleanenergywire.org/dossiers/reform-renewable-energy-act | access-date = 2 July 2016}}</ref> More specifically, citizensCitizens accounted for nearly half of all installed biogas and solar capacity and half of the installed onshore wind capacity.<ref name="borchert-2015" /><ref name="luenburg-and-nestle-2014">{{cite book | author1 = University of Lüneburg | first2 = Uwe | last2 = Nestle | title = Marktrealität von Bürgerenergie und mögliche Auswirkungen von regulatorischen Eingriffen — Eine Studie für das Bündnis Bürgerenergie e.V. (BBEn) und dem Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. (BUND) | trans-title = Market reality of citizens energy and potential impact of regulatory intervention — A study for the Alliance for Citizens Energy (BBEn) and Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND) | language = de | date = April 2014 | url = http://www.leuphana.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschungseinrichtungen/professuren/finanzierung-finanzwirtschaft/files/Studie_Marktrealitaet_von_Buergerenergie_Leuphana_FINAL_23042014.pdf | access-date = 9 September 2016}}</ref>

The share of total final energy from renewables was 11% in 2014.<ref>

However, changesChanges in energy policy, starting with the [[German Renewable Energy Sources Act#Renewable Energy Sources Act (2014)|Renewable Energy Sources Act]] in 2014, have jeopardized the efforts of citizens to participate.<ref name="borchert-2015" /><ref name="morris-2015">{{cite web | first = Craig | last = Morris | title = Few new German energy co-ops in 2014 | date = 24 February 2015 | website = Energy Transition: The German Energiewende | location = Berlin, Germany | url = http://energytransition.de/2015/02/few-new-german-energy-coops-in-2014/ | access-date = 4 August 2016}}</ref> The share of citizen-owned renewable energy has since dropped to 42.5% as of 2016.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://energytransition.org/2018/02/share-of-german-citizen-renewable-energy-shrinking/|title=Share of German citizen renewable energy shrinking|date=7 February 2018|work=Energy Transition|access-date=26 February 2018|language=en-US}}</ref>

The Renewable Energy Sources Act provides compensation to wind turbine operators for every kilowatt-hour of electricity not produced if wind power surpasses peak grid capacity, while grid operators must splice electricity from renewable sources into the grid even in times of low or no demand for it.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://www.dw.com/en/winds-of-change-push-german-power-grid-to-brink/a-52701005|title=Winds of change push German power grid to brink {{!}} DW {{!}} 11 March 2020|website=DW.COM|language=en-GB|access-date=26 March 2020}}</ref> This can lead to a [[negative price]] of electricity, and grid operators may pass associated costs on to customers, estimated to be costing them an extra €4 billion in 2020. This has resulted in greater resistance to certain ''Energiewende'' policies, specifically wind power.<ref name=":3" />

By 2019, Germany also saws a significant increase of organized opposition against on-shore wind farms,<ref name=":5" /> especially in [[Bavaria]]<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.politico.eu/article/an-ill-wind-blows-for-the-onshore-power-industry/|title=An ill wind blows for the onshore power industry|date=20 August 2019|website=POLITICO|access-date=28 February 2020}}</ref> and [[Baden-Württemberg]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305518625|title=Against the wind: Local opposition to the German 'Energiewende'|date=2015}}</ref>

A number of computer studies confirm the feasibility of the German electricity system being 100% renewable in 2050. Some investigate the prospect of the entire energy system (all energy carriers) being fully renewable too.

In 2009 [[World Wide Fund for Nature|WWF]] (WWF) Germany published a quantitative study prepared by the [[Öko-Institut]], Prognos, and Hans-Joachim Ziesing.<ref name="wwf-germany-2009">{{cite book | author = WWF Germany | title = Blueprint Germany: a strategy for a climate safe 2050 | year = 2009 | publisher = WWF Germany | place = Berlin, Germany | url = http://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publikationen-PDF/blueprint_germany_wwf.pdf | access-date = 1 May 2016}}</ref>

}}</ref> Decarbonization pathways for Germany are illustrated by means of three ambitious scenarios with energy-related emission reductions between 1990 and 2050 varying between 80% and more than 90%. ThreeThe three strategies strongly contribute to GHG emission reduction:

* energy efficiency improvements (in all sectors but, especially in buildings)

* electrification and (in two of the scenarios also) use of renewable electricity-based synthetic fuels (especially in the transport and industry sector)

}}

</ref> The guiding question of the study is: "how can a cost-optimised transformation of the German energy system — with consideration of all [[energy carrier]]s and consumer sectors — be achieved while meeting the declared [[climate protection]] targets and ensuring a secure energy supply at all times." [[Carbon capture and storage]] (CCS) is explicitly excluded from the scenarios. A future energy scenario emitting 85% less {{CO2}} emissions than 1990 levels is compared with a reference scenario, which assumes that the German energy system operates in 2050 the same way as it does today. Under this comparison, primaryPrimary energy supply drops 42%. The total cumulative costs depend on the future prices for carbon and oil. If the penalty for {{CO2}} emissions increases to €100/tonne by 2030 and thereafter remains constant and fossil fuel prices increase annually by 2%, then the total cumulative costs of today's energy system are 8% higher than the costs required for the minus 85% scenario up to 2050. The report also notes:

{{blockquote|From the macroeconomic perspective, the transformation of Germany's energy system demands a significant shift in cash flow, moving the cash spent on energy imports today to spend it instead on new investments in systems, their operation and maintenance. In this respect a transformed energy system requires a large expenditure for local added value, a factor which also does not appear in the shown cost analysis.<ref name="henning-and-palzer-2015"/>{{rp|8}}}}

A 2015 study uses DIETER or Dispatch and Investment Evaluation Tool with Endogenous Renewables, developed by the [[German Institute for Economic Research]] (DIW), Berlin, Germany. The study examines the power storage requirements for renewables uptake ranging from 60% to 100%. Under the baseline scenario of 80% (the German government target for 2050), [[Grid energy storage|grid storage]] requirements remain moderate and other options on both the supply side and demand side offer flexibility at low cost. Nonetheless, storageStorage plays an importanta role in the provision of reserves. Storage becomes more pronounced under higher shares of renewables, but strongly depends on the costs and availability of other flexibility options, particularly on biomass availability. The model is fully described in the study report.<ref name="zerrahn-and-schill-2015">

A 2016 [[acatech]]-lead study focused on so-called "flexibility technologies" used to balance the fluctuations inherent in power generation from wind and photovoltaics.<ref name="acatech-2016">{{cite book

</ref> Set in 2050, several scenarios use [[gas turbine#Industrial gas turbines forGas-fired power generationplant|gas power plants]] to stabilise the backbone of energy system, ensuring supply security during several weeks of low wind and solar radiation. Other scenarios investigate a 100% renewable system and show these to be possible but more costly. Flexible consumption and storage control ([[energy demand management|demand-side management]]) in households and the industrial sector is the most cost-efficient means of balancing short-term power fluctuations. Long-term storage systems, based on [[power-to-X]], are only viable if carbon emissions are to be reduced by more than 80%. On the question of costs, theThe study notes:

{{blockquote|Assuming that the price of emissions allowances in 2050 will significantly surpass its current level, a power generation system boasting a high percentage of wind and photovoltaics will, as a rule, come cheaper than a system dominated by fossil fuel power plants.<ref name="acatech-2016"/>{{rp|7}}}}

</ref> In the case of Germany, totalTotal end-use energy drops from 375.8&nbsp;GW for business-as-usual to 260.9&nbsp;GW under a fully renewable transition. Load shares in 2050 would be: on-shore wind 35%, off-shore wind 17%, wave 0.08%, geothermal 0.01%, hydro-electric 0.87%, tidal 0%, residential PV 6.75%, commercial PV 6.48%, utility PV 33.8%, and [[concentrating solar power]] 0%. The study also assess avoided air pollution, eliminated global climate change costs, and net job creation. These co-benefits are substantial.