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{{short description|Battle of the Polish–Soviet War}}
{{
{{Expand Polish|topic=mil|Bitwa Warszawska|date=September 2021}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=May 2023}}
{{Infobox military conflict
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| coordinates = {{coord|52|18|N|20|49|E|region:PL-MZ_type:event_scale:50000|display=inline,title}}
| result = Polish victory
| combatant1 = {{Unbulleted list|{{flagcountry|Second Polish Republic|1919}}}}<br />{{flag|Ukrainian People's Republic}}
| combatant2 = {{Flagdeco|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Russian Soviet Socialist Republic|Russian SFSR]]
----
'''Supported by:'''{{ubl|{{flag|Byelorussian SSR|1919}}|{{flag|Ukrainian SSR|1919}}}}
| commander1 = {{ubl|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Józef Piłsudski]]|{{nowrap|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Tadeusz Jordan-Rozwadowski|T. Jordan-Rozwadowski]]}}|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Władysław Sikorski]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Józef Haller]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Edward Rydz-Śmigły]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Bolesław Roja]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Franciszek Latinik]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Leonard Skierski]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Zygmunt Zieliński (1858–1925)|Zygmunt Zieliński]]|{{flagdeco|Second Polish Republic|1919}} [[Wacław Iwaszkiewicz-Rudoszański|Wacław Iwaszkiewicz]]|{{flagdeco|Ukrainian People's Republic}} [[Symon Petliura]]}}
| commander2 = {{ubl|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Leon Trotsky]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Sergey Kamenev]]|{{nowrap|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]]}}|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Hayk Bzhishkyan]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Nikolai Sollogub]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Joseph Stalin]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Semyon Budyonny]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Alexander Ilyich Yegorov|Aleksandr Yegorov]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[August Kork]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Aleksandr Shuvayev]]|{{flagicon|Russian SFSR|1918}} [[Vladimir Lazarevich]]}}
| strength1 = 113,000–135,000<ref name="Szczep" />
14,000 [[Ukrainian People's Republic|UPR]] soldiers<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28697110.html |title=Європа повинна пам'ятати: вояки УНР у 1920 році рятували її від комунізму |newspaper=Радіо Свобода |date=August 28, 2017 |accessdate=28 August 2017 |archive-date=28 August 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170828192837/https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28697110.html |last1=Савицький |first1=Юрій }}</ref>
| strength2 = 104,000–140,000<ref name="Szczep" />
| casualties1 = {{ubl|4,500 dead|26,000 wounded|10,000 missing<ref name="Szczep" />|'''Total:''' 40,500}}
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After the Polish [[Kiev offensive (1920)|Kiev offensive]], Soviet forces launched a successful counterattack in summer 1920, forcing the [[Polish Land Forces|Polish army]] to retreat westward in disarray. The Polish forces seemed on the verge of disintegration and observers predicted a decisive Soviet victory.
The Battle of Warsaw was fought from August 12–25, 1920, as Red Army forces commanded by [[Mikhail Tukhachevsky]] approached the Polish capital of [[Warsaw]] and the nearby [[Modlin Fortress]]. On August 16, Polish forces commanded by [[
The defeat crippled the Red Army; [[Vladimir Lenin]], the [[Bolshevik]] leader, called it "an enormous defeat" for his forces.<ref>Timothy Snyder (2007), [https://books.google.com/books?id=PKrjew-H0JMC&q=timothy+snyder ''Sketches from a Secret War''], Yale University Press, p. 11</ref> In the following months, several more Polish follow-up victories secured Poland's independence and led to a [[Peace of Riga|peace treaty with Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine]] later that year, securing the Polish state's eastern frontiers until 1938.
The politician and diplomat [[Edgar Vincent, 1st Viscount D'Abernon|Edgar Vincent]] regards this event as one of the most important battles in history on his [[The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World#Derivative works|expanded list of most decisive battles]], since the Polish victory over the Soviets halted the [[Communist revolution|spread of communism]] further westwards into [[Europe]]. A Soviet victory, which would have led to the creation of a
== Prelude ==
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By the beginning of August, the Polish retreat had become more organized, as their [[logistics|supply]] lines were steadily shortened. At first, [[Józef Piłsudski]] wanted to stop the Soviets at the [[Bug River]] and the city of Brest-Litovsk, but the Soviet advance resulted in their forces breaching that line, making that plan obsolete.<ref name="Lawrynowicz" /> On the night of August 5–6, Piłsudski, staying at the [[Belweder]] Palace in Warsaw, conceived a revised plan. In the first phase, it called for Polish forces to withdraw across the Vistula River and defend the [[bridgehead]]s at Warsaw and at the [[Wieprz River]], a tributary of the Vistula southeast of Warsaw. A quarter of the available [[division (military)|divisions]] would be concentrated to the south for a strategic counteroffensive. Next, Piłsudski's plan called for the 1st and 2nd Armies of General [[Józef Haller de Hallenburg|Józef Haller's]] Central Front ({{frac|10|1|2}} divisions) to take a passive role, facing the Soviet main westward thrust and holding their [[trench|entrenched]] positions, Warsaw's last line of defence, at all costs. At the same time, the 5th Army ({{frac|5|1|2}} divisions) under General [[Władysław Sikorski]], subordinate to Haller, would defend the northern area near the [[Modlin Fortress]]; when it became feasible they were to strike from behind Warsaw, thus cutting off Soviet forces attempting to envelop Warsaw from that direction, and break through the enemy front and fall upon the rear of the Soviet Northwestern Front. Additionally, five divisions of the 5th Army were to protect Warsaw from the north. General [[Franciszek Latinik]]'s 1st Army would defend Warsaw itself, while General [[Bolesław Roja]]'s 2nd Army was to hold the Vistula River line from [[Góra Kalwaria]] to [[Dęblin]].<ref name="Szczep" /><ref name="Lawrynowicz" />
The crucial role, however, was assigned to the approximately 20,000-strong, newly formed Task Force (also translated as "Strike Group" or "Strike Army", from Polish {{lang|pl|Grupa Uderzeniowa}}), under the personal command of Piłsudski. This unit, composed of the most elite Polish units from the southern front, was to be reinforced by General [[Leonard Skierski]]'s 4th Army and General Zygmunt Zieliński's 3rd Army. After retreating from the Bug River area, those armies had not moved directly toward Warsaw but had crossed the
Although based on fairly reliable information provided by Polish intelligence and intercepted Soviet radio communications,<ref name="Ścieżyński">{{in lang|pl}} Ścieżyński, Mieczysław, Colonel of the (Polish) General Staff, {{lang|pl|Radjotelegrafja jako źrodło wiadomości o nieprzyjacielu}} [''Radiotelegraphy as a Source of Intelligence on the Enemy''], Przemyśl, Printing and Binding Establishment of (Military) Corps District No. X HQ, 1928.</ref><ref name="Wroński">{{in lang|pl}} Paweł Wroński, {{lang|pl|italic=no|[http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,53600,2855976.html "Sensacyjne odkrycie: Nie było cudu nad Wisłą"]}} [A Remarkable Discovery: There Was No Miracle at the Vistula], ''[[Gazeta Wyborcza]]''.</ref><ref name="Bury" /> the plan was called 'amateurish' by many high-ranking army officers and military experts, from Polish officers to the advisors from the [[French Military Mission to Poland]] who were quick to point out Piłsudski's lack of formal military education.
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Criticism was levied on the logistical side, as suggested concentration points were as far as {{convert|100|to|150|mi|km}} from many Polish units, most of them engaged on the front lines, and all of that a mere week before the planned date of the counterattack. All regrouping was within striking distance of the enemy; if Piłsudski and his staff mistimed when the Soviet offensive would begin, the Polish counter-attack and even the cohesion of the entire Polish front would be in chaos. Piłsudski himself admitted in his memoirs that it was a gamble; he decided to go forward with it due to politicians' defeatist stance, fear for the safety of the capital, and the prevailing feeling that if Warsaw were to fall, all would be lost. Only the desperate situation persuaded other army commanders to go along with it. They realized that under the circumstances, it was the only possible way to avoid a devastating defeat. The plan seemed so desperate and inept, that when the Soviets intercepted a copy of it, it was discarded as a poor deception attempt.<ref name="Szczep" />
The authorship of the plan is a matter of some controversy. Due to Piłsudski's political image, he was largely unpopular with the [[right wing]] of [[Polish politics]].<ref name="Szczep" /> Furthermore, Paderewski told top Allied leaders that French general [[Maxime Weygand]] had the idea; Paderewski knew better, but he was trying to use American support for a comeback in Polish politics.<ref>Biskupski 1987</ref> After the battle, many reports suggested that the plan was in fact prepared either by
Davies points out Piłsudski "was left with only one serious possibility—a counter-offensive to the right of centre, at a point where a strike-force could be assembled from both northern and southern fronts. He pondered and checked these considerations during the night of 5–6 August, ruminating alone in his study at Belweder in Warsaw. In the morning, he received Rozwadowski and together they worked out the details. Rozwadowski pointed out the value of the River Wieprz ... by the evening, Order No. 8358/3 ... was ready and issued." Gen. Weygand admitted in his memoirs that "the victory was Polish, the plan Polish, the army Polish".<ref name=Davies>{{lang|fr|"... la victoire était polonaise, le plan polonais, l'armée polonaise"}}. Davies, N. (1972), ''White Eagle, Red Star'', London: Macdonald & Co, {{ISBN|978-0-7126-0694-3}}</ref>{{rp|197–198, 222}}
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The main weakness of the Russian plan was the poorly defended southern flank, secured only by the [[Pinsk Marshes]] and the weak Mazyr (Mozyrska) Group. That unit consisted of the 57th Infantry Division, 8,000 strong, and acted as the link between the Soviet two fronts (the majority of the Russian Southwest Front was engaged in the [[battle of Lwów (1920)|Battle of Lwów]]).<ref name="Lawrynowicz" />
Davies argues that the Soviet failure was caused by its tardiness in moving forces in for a frontal attack on Warsaw. By contrast the Poles were speedy, making every day's delay a liability to the Soviets. Furthermore, there was poor coordination between the Soviet Western Command and the three armies of the Southwestern Command. In the political sphere, Davies argues, there was too much friction inside the Soviet Command.<ref>Norman Davies, "The Soviet Command and the Battle of Warsaw", ''Soviet Studies'' (1972) 23#4 pp. 573–585</ref> According to the historian Thomas Fiddick in 1973, rumors of disobedience to orders on the Soviet side by General
== Battle ==
=== First phase ===
[[File:Battle of Warsaw - Phase 1 - en.svg|thumb|left|Positions before the battle]]
While the Red Army pushed forward,<!--Please specify date--> [[Gayk Bzhishkyan]]'s Cavalry Corps, together with the 4th Army, crossed the [[Wkra]] River and advanced towards the town of
The first phase of the battle started on August 12, with a Red Army frontal assault on the [[Praga]]
The situation was saved around midnight when the 203rd [[Uhlan]] Regiment managed to break through the Red Army lines and attack a Soviet command post, which resulted in a destruction of a radio station of A. D. Shuvayev's Soviet 4th Army.<ref name="Szczep" /><ref name="milhist44" /> The latter unit had only one radio station left, fixed on one frequency which was known to the Polish intelligence. Since the Polish code-breakers did not want the Russians to find out that their codes had been broken, the remaining Soviet radio station was neutralized by having the radio station in Warsaw recite the [[Book of Genesis]] in Polish and Latin on the frequency used by the 4th Army. It thus lost contact with its [[headquarters]] and continued marching toward
At the same time, the [[Polish 1st Army]] under
During this time, Piłsudski was finishing his plans for the counter-offensive. He decided to supervise the attack, personally handing in a letter of resignation from all state functions so he could concentrate on the military situation and so that if he died, it would not paralyze the state.<ref name="Lawrynowicz" /> He succeeded in raising the morale of the troops, between August 12 and August 15, visiting units of the 4th Army concentrating near [[Puławy]], about 100 kilometres south of Warsaw.<ref name="Lawrynowicz" />
At that time, Piłsudski also commented on the dreadful state of
=== Second phase ===
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[[File:Battle of Warsaw - Phase 2.png|thumb|Second phase of the battle: Polish counterattack]]
Tukhachevsky, certain that all was going according to plan, was actually falling into Piłsudski's trap. There were only token Polish resistance in the path of the main Russian advance north and across the Vistula, on the right flank of the battle (from the perspective of the Soviet advance).<ref name="Lawrynowicz" /> At the same time, south of Warsaw, on the battle's left front, the vital link between the Northwestern and Southwestern Fronts was much more vulnerable, protected only by a small Soviet force, the Mozyr Group.<ref name="Lawrynowicz" /><ref name=milhist44 /> Further,
The Polish 5th Army counterattacked on August 14, crossing the
From that moment on, Sikorski's 5th Army pushed exhausted Soviet units away from Warsaw, in an almost [[Blitzkrieg]]-like operation. Sikorski's units were given the support of almost all of the small number of mechanized units—[[tank]]s and [[Armored car (military)|armoured cars]]—that the Polish army had, as well as that of the two Polish [[armoured train]]s. It was able to advance rapidly at the speed of 30 kilometres a day, disrupting the Soviet "enveloping" northern manoeuvre.<ref name="Szczep" />
=== Third phase ===
On August 16, the Polish Assault Group commanded by Piłsudski began its march north from the
On August 18, Tukhachevsky, in his headquarters in [[Minsk]], some {{convert|300|mi|km}} east of Warsaw, realized the extent of his defeat, quickly issuing the orders for the Red Army to retreat and regroup. He wanted to straighten the front line to improve his logistics, regain the initiative and push the Poles back again, but the situation had progressed beyond salvaging. His orders either arrived too late or failed to arrive at all. Soviet General
The Soviet armies in the centre of the front fell into chaos. Some divisions continued to fight their way toward Warsaw, while others retreated, lost their cohesion and panicked.<ref name="Cisek" /> Tukhachevsky lost contact with most of his forces, and the Soviet plans were thrown into disorder. Only the 15th Army remained an organized force; it tried to obey Tukhachevsky's orders, shielding the withdrawal of the westernmost extended 4th Army. However, it was defeated twice on August 19 and 20 and joined the general rout of the Red Army's North-Western Front. Tukhachevsky had no choice but to order a full
== Aftermath ==
Although Poland managed to achieve victory and push back the Russians, Piłsudski's plan to outmanoeuvre and surround the Red Army did not succeed completely. On July 4, four Soviet armies of the North-Western Front began to advance on Warsaw. After initial successes, by the end of August, three of them—the 4th, 15th and 16th Armies, as well as the bulk of
Red Army losses were about 15,000 dead, 500 missing, 10,000 wounded and 65,000 captured, compared to Polish losses of approximately 4,500 killed, 22,000 wounded and 10,000 missing. Between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet troops managed to reach the borders of Germany. After crossing into East Prussian territory, they were briefly interned, then allowed to leave with their arms and equipment. Poland captured about 231 pieces of artillery and 1,023 [[machine gun]]s.<ref name="Lawrynowicz" />
The southern arm of the Red Army's forces had been routed and no longer posed a threat to the Poles. Semyon Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army, besieging
Tukhachevsky succeeded eventually in reorganizing his eastward-retreating forces, but not in regaining the initiative. In September, he established a new defensive line near
Bolshevik propaganda before the Battle of Warsaw had described the fall of Poland's capital as imminent, and its anticipated fall was to be a signal for the start of large-scale [[communist revolution]]s in Poland, Germany, and other European countries, economically devastated by the [[World War I|First World War]]. Due to the Polish victory, however, the Soviet attempts to overthrow the government of Lithuania (planned for August) had to be cancelled.<ref>{{cite book |title=Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920 |language=lt |trans-title=Lithuanian Army in the Freedom Struggles 1918–1920 |last=Lesčius |first=Vytautas |year=2004 |publisher=[[General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania]] |location=Vilnius |isbn=978-9955-423-23-2 |page=296 |url=http://www.lka.lt/EasyAdmin/sys/files/LIETUVOS_KARIUOMENE_1.pdf |access-date=2011-03-05 |archive-date=2011-07-18 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110718201622/http://www.lka.lt/EasyAdmin/sys/files/LIETUVOS_KARIUOMENE_1.pdf |url-status=dead }}</ref> The Soviet defeat was therefore considered a setback for Soviet leaders supportive of that plan (particularly Vladimir Lenin).
A [[National Democracy (Poland)|National Democrat]] Sejm deputy, [[Stanisław Stroński]], coined the phrase, "Miracle on the Vistula" ([[Polish language|Polish]]: {{lang|pl|Cud nad Wisłą}}), to underline his disapproval of Piłsudski's earlier "Ukrainian adventure".<ref name="Głos">{{cite journal|last=Frątczak|first=Sławomir Z.|language=pl|url=http://www.glos.com.pl/Archiwum_nowe/Rok+2005/032/strona/Cud.html|journal=[[Głos (1991)|Głos]]|issue=32/2005|year=2005|title=Cud nad Wisłą|access-date=June 18, 2006|url-status = dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070708173639/http://www.glos.com.pl/Archiwum_nowe/Rok%202005/032/strona/Cud.html|archive-date=July 8, 2007}}</ref> In response, Poland's Prime Minister Wincenty Witos commented, "Whatever you want to write and say – whoever you want to dress in laurels and merits – this ''is'' 1920's 'Miracle on the Vistula'."<ref name="Szczep" /> Diaries from many participants of the battle attribute the outcome to the Blessed Virgin Mary (citing multiple reasons, including widespread national prayer beforehand and subsequent reports of her appearance on the battlefield). The date of the turn of the battle, August 15, is the feast of the [[Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary]] which is an important date in the Catholic year.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Suski |first1=Paul |title=The Miracle on the Vistula – Rediscovered |url=https://www.catholicjournal.us/2020/07/30/the-miracle-on-the-vistula-rediscovered/ |website=Catholic Journal: Reflections on Faith and Culture |access-date=14 August 2020}}</ref>
=== Breaking of Russian ciphers ===
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[[Category:Conflicts in 1920|Warsaw 1920]]
[[Category:Military history of Warsaw|Warsaw 1920]]
[[Category:
[[Category:August 1920 events]]
[[Category:Battles involving the Ukrainian People's Republic]]
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