OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine: Difference between revisions

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Adding short description: "Civilian observer mission"
 
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{{Short description|Civilian observer mission}}
{{Infobox organization
| name = OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
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[[File:OSCE SMM monitoring the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine (16730531022).jpg|thumb|OSCE SMM monitoring the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine in 2015]]
The '''OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine''' was an international civilian observer mission of the [[Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]] (OSCE) mandated to contribute to reducing tensions and to help foster peace in [[Ukraine]]. The mission was deployed in March 2014, following the Russian [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]] and the outbreak of open [[War in Donbas (2014–2022)|conflict in eastern Ukraine]].<ref>{{cite web |title=OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - The Facts |url=https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879 |website=OSCE |publisher=Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |access-date=6 October 2020 |archive-date=9 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201009032530/https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=von Twickel |first1=Nikolaus |title=Zwischen den Fronten: Was die OSZE Beobachter in der Ukraine leisten können, und was nicht |trans-title=Between the Fronts: What OSCE Observers Can and Cannot Do in Ukraine |journal=Internationale Politik |date=2017 |volume=2 |issue=15 |pages=48–53}}</ref> Following the [[2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine]], theThe mission discontinued its operationsended on 31 March 2022.<ref>{{cite, webfollowing |the url=https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed[[Russian |invasion title=OSCE Special Monitoring Mission toof Ukraine (Closed) }}</ref>]].
 
==Background==
{{Main article|Euromaidan}}
[[File:OSCE SMM monitoring the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine (16524364807).jpg|thumb|OSCE SMM monitoring the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine]]
In late 2013 [[Euromaidan|protests]] began in [[Kyiv]] as a response to the decision of the then-President of Ukraine, [[Viktor Yanukovych]], to abandon the planned [[Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Zelinska |first1=Oksana |title=Ukrainian protesters flood Kiev after president pulls out of EU deal |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia |access-date=6 October 2020 |work=The Guardian |archive-date=11 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201111234142/http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/24/ukraine-protesters-yanukovych-aborts-eu-deal-russia |url-status=live }}</ref> After months of protests, the government [[2014Revolution Ukrainianof revolutionDignity|fell]] in early 2014 and [[2014 pro-Russian unrest in Ukraine|unrest]] spread to other regions in Ukraine, in particular the Russian-speaking eastern and southern regions.
 
On 1 March 2014, Inin response to the developing crisis, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, [[Didier Burkhalter]], proposed establishing ana diplomatic contact group and an international observer mission during an address to the [[United Nations Human Rights Council]] in order to support Ukraine in facilitating a diplomatic solution to the crisis.<ref>{{cite news |title=OSZE-Vorsitzender Burkhalter schlägt Ukraine-Kontaktgruppe vor |trans-title=OSCE Chairman Burkhalter proposes Ukraine Contact Group |url=https://www.blick.ch/schweiz/vereinte-nationen-ukraine-osze-vorsitzender-burkhalter-schlaegt-ukraine-kontaktgruppe-vor-id2699528.html |access-date=19 December 2020 |publisher=Blick |date=24 February 2014}}{{Dead link|date=September 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last1=Bradley |first1=Simon |title=Swiss push OSCE 'contact group' to defuse crisis |url=https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ukrainian-security_swiss-push-osce--contact-group--to-defuse-crisis/38079850 |access-date=19 December 2020 |publisher=swissinfo |date=3 March 2014 |archive-date=16 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201116154157/https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/ukrainian-security_swiss-push-osce--contact-group--to-defuse-crisis/38079850 |url-status=live }}</ref>
 
==Mandate and structure==
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Following this, the mandated maximum strength of the mission was extended to 1000 on March 12, 2015.<ref>{{cite web |title=DECISION No. 1162 EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THE OSCE SPECIAL MONITORING MISSION TO UKRAINE |url=https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/b/144996.pdf |website=OSCE |publisher=OSCE Permanent Council |access-date=21 January 2021 |archive-date=17 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210117142145/https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/3/b/144996.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
 
Since then the conflict hashad stabilized but ceasefire violations still regularly occuroccurred and arewere reported by the SMM.
 
In 2017 one monitor was killed and two more wounded when their vehicle struck a landmine.<ref>{{cite web |title=OSCE SMM car damaged in anti-tank mine blast in Donbas, casualties reported |url=https://www.unian.info/war/1889801-osce-smm-car-damaged-in-anti-tank-mine-blast-in-donbas-casualties-reported.html |website=UNIAN information agency |publisher=UNIAN information agency |access-date=15 December 2020 |archive-date=26 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210226162221/https://www.unian.info/war/1889801-osce-smm-car-damaged-in-anti-tank-mine-blast-in-donbas-casualties-reported.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Subsequently, SMM patrolling was limited to asphalt and concrete roads. SMM monitoring effectiveness suffers from the presence of mines, unexploded ordinances and the low rate at which they are cleared, and from shelling by artillery and threatening behavior of armed personnel. This hinders SMM's ability to monitor the implementation of Minsk Protocol effectively because it restricts their access to areas and presents big risks to the security of SMM's civilian monitors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Haug|first=Hilde|date=2016-09-09|title=The Minsk Agreements and the osce Special Monitoring Mission|url=https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/27/3-4/article-p342_342.xml|journal=Security and Human Rights|volume=27|issue=3–4|pages=342–357|doi=10.1163/18750230-02703004|s2cid=168698517 |issn=1874-7337|access-date=2021-03-19|archive-date=2021-01-22|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210122204713/https://brill.com/view/journals/shrs/27/3-4/article-p342_342.xml|url-status=live}}</ref>
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On 24 February 2022, following the [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russian invasion of Ukraine]], Secretary General [[Helga Schmid]] announced the temporary evacuation of SMM staff, with a view to resuming work as soon as circumstances on the ground permit.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Statement of the Secretary General on the temporary evacuation of OSCE staff from Ukraine |url=https://www.osce.org/secretary-general/512953 |access-date=2022-03-09 |website=www.osce.org |language=en}}</ref>
 
On 31 March 2022 consensus for the extension of the Mission's mandate was not reached, due to Russian opposition.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General expressed regret that no consensus reached on extension of mandate of Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine |url=https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/514958 |access-date=2022-03-31 |website=www.osce.org |language=en}}</ref> The mission subsequently discontinued its operations on the same day.<ref name=":1">{{cite web |title=OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (Closed) |url=https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed}}</ref>
 
On 19 September 2022, Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have sentenced two former OSCE staff members to 13 years in prison on charges of treason. The OSCE regional authority body, consisting of Ukrainian and Russian representatives, protested the sentencing and urged "their immediate and unconditional release.” The arrests came after the OSCE invoked the [[Moscow Mechanism]], condemning Russia's human rights violations.<ref>[https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/19/russian-separatists-in-luhansk-convict-ex-osce-staff-of-treason "Russian separatists in Luhansk convict ex-OSCE staff of treason"] aljazeera.com. Retrieved 20 Sept 2022.</ref>
 
The mission discontinued its operations on 31 March 2022 following the [[2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine]].<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed | title=OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (Closed) }}</ref>
 
On 19 September 2022, Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine have sentenced two former OSCE staff members to 13 years in prison on charges of treason. The OSCE regional authority body, consisting of Ukrainian and Russian representatives, protested the sentencing and urged "their immediate and unconditional release". The arrests came after the OSCE invoked the [[Moscow Mechanism]], condemning Russia's human rights violations.<ref>[{{Cite web |title=Russian separatists in Luhansk convict ex-OSCE staff of treason |url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/19/russian-separatists-in-luhansk-convict-ex-osce-staff-of-treason "Russian separatists in Luhansk convict ex|access-OSCE staff of treason"]date=2022-09-20 |website=aljazeera.com. Retrieved 20 Sept 2022.|language=en}}</ref>
==Monitoring restrictions==
OSCE monitoring frequently faces access restrictions and signal jamming of the monitoring UAVs. In 2021 OSCE reported that 62.5% long-range UAV flights "encountered [[Radio jamming|GPS signal interference]]" with jamming so strong, it occasionally prevented UAV from even taking off.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Spot Report 6/2021: SMM long-range UAV unable to take off due to dual GPS signal interference|url=https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/483008|access-date=15 April 2021|website=www.osce.org|language=en|archive-date=15 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210415165127/https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/483008|url-status=live}}</ref> OSCE has on numerous occasions reported presence of Russian [[electronic warfare]] equipment in the separatist-controlled areas<ref>{{Cite web|title=Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 16 August 2015|url=https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826|access-date=16 April 2021|website=www.osce.org|language=en|archive-date=9 June 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609145358/https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 15 June 2016|url=https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/247216|access-date=16 April 2021|website=www.osce.org|language=en|archive-date=16 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210416061600/https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/247216|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/448393|access-date=16 April 2021|website=www.osce.org|title=OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) Daily Report 60/2020 issued on 12 March 2020|date=12 March 2020|archive-date=16 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210416061558/https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/448393?download=true|url-status=live}}</ref> including specifically anti-UAV [[Repellent-1]] systems.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 August 2018|url=https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/390236|access-date=16 April 2021|website=www.osce.org|language=en|archive-date=15 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220215170539/https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/390236|url-status=live}}</ref> On 30 April 2021 OSCE further reported two members of armed formations approaching the monitor team as it prepared to launch an UAV and threatening it will be shot down if launched.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Daily Report 99/2021|url=https://www.osce.org/files/2021-04-30%20Daily%20Report.pdf|url-status=live|website=OSCE|access-date=2021-05-07|archive-date=2021-05-02|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210502112207/https://www.osce.org/files/2021-04-30%20Daily%20Report.pdf}}</ref>
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==References==
{{reflist}}
 
==Further reading==
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book |year=2021 |author=OSCE |title=A Peaceful presence. The First Five Years of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine |url=https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/6/491220_0.pdf| publisher=OSCE|location=Vienna}}
{{refend}}
 
==External links==