Operation Roundup (1942): Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
No edit summary
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit
No edit summary
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile web edit
Line 3:
 
==History==
The plan, for an invasion in the spring of 1943, drawn up by [[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower]], reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.<ref name = "este">Carlo d'Este, ''Decision in Normandy'', Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.</ref> Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the [[Battle of the Somme]] (where, on the [[first day on the Somme|first day of the battle]], the [[British Army]] lost almost 60,000 men) and the [[Battle of Passchendaele]] in the [[World War I|First World War]], they preferred to avoid a direct assault on a powerful enemy. [[Winston Churchill]], the [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|British Prime Minister]], preferred a strategy of attacking [[Wehrmacht|German forces]] in the Mediterranean instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly"), while other [[British Armed Forces|British military]] leaders hoped to defer an invasion until the Germans had been worn down by fighting on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] against the [[Red Army|Russian Army]].<ref name="morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', ISBN 0-316-58311-1, pp 7-17</ref> Churchill's plan would allow relatively inexperienced [[United States Armed Forces|American forces]] to gain experience in a less risky [[Theater (warfare)|theatre of war]] while gradually building up overwhelming force before engaging Germany head on.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiNp_GU4vXLAhUBWxQKHd9CDkQQ6AEIPTAG#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=1317864719|page=54-55|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55&&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwicw4jk4PXLAhVBlhQKHepMDJUQ6AEINzAF#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref>
 
Given shortages of merchant shipping, [[landing craft]], and other resources, the Roundup plan was considered to be unrealistic; it called for a force consisting of 48 [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] [[Division (military)|divisions]] and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad [[beachhead]]s between the [[France|French]] ports of [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] and [[Le Havre]].<ref name="morison"/> By comparison, the eventual [[Normandy landings]], which occurred over a year later in June 1944, featured only 39 Allied divisions.
 
After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall|George C. Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], suggested instead to [[President of the United States|U.S. President]] [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] that the United States abandon the [[Europe first|Germany-first strategy]] and take the offensive in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]]. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=0385353065|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&lpg=PP1&pg=SA6-PA69-IA6#v=onepage&q&f=false|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the [[Second Claridge Conference]] in late July 1942 to carry out [[Operation Torch]], the Allied invasion of French North Africa.<ref>{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwip0Jbc4vXLAhXIuBoKHXC4DYgQ6AEIQzAH#v=onepage&q&f=false}}</ref> Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch and preparations for Roundup were given lower priority due to the uncertainties of Allied strategy.<ref name = "este"/> The British were as reluctant to fully abandon Roundup as they had been to support it but in November 1942 Eisenhower, now a [[Lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name="morison"/>