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==Clausewitz's theory==
[[File:Clausewitz-Vom-Kriege-9061.tif|thumb|350px|An operational map for [[Napoleon]]'s military expedition to Italy, 1796. Map from Clausewitz: ''Vom Kriege'', 1857.]]
=== Definition of war ===
Clausewitz argued that war theory cannot be a strict operational advice for generals.<ref>G.H.L. LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare" ''History Today'' (Aug 1951), Vol. 1 Issue 8, pp 24-32.</ref> Instead, he wanted to highlight general principles that would result from the study of history and logical thinking. He contended that military campaigns could be planned only to a very small degree because incalculable influences or events, so-called ''friction'', would quickly make any too-detailed planning in advance obsolete. Military leaders must be capable to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information since in his opinion "three quarters of the things on which action is built in war" are concealed and distorted by the ''[[fog of war]]''.<ref name="Savkin1974">{{Cite book |last=Vasiliĭ Efimovich Savkin |url=https://books.google.com/?id=RONcU8KpOT4C&pg=PA23 |title=The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics: (a Soviet View) |publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office |year=1974 |pages=23–}}</ref>
In his 1812 ''Bekenntnisschrift'' ("Notes of Confession"), he presents a more existential interpretation of war by envisioning war as the highest form of self-assertion by a people. That corresponded in every respect with the spirit of the time when the French Revolution and the conflicts that arose from it had caused the evolution of conscript armies and guerrillas. The people's armies supported the idea that war is an existential struggle.<ref name="Cobb1987">{{Cite book |last=Richard Cobb |url=https://books.google.com/?id=T5Uu9YPlqVMC |title=Les armées révolutionnaires |publisher=Yale University Press |year=1987 |isbn=978-0-300-02728-0}}</ref><ref name="Hagemann2015">{{Cite book |last=Karen Hagemann |url=https://books.google.com/?id=oQm0BgAAQBAJ&pg=PA132 |title=Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon: History, Culture, and Memory |date=30 March 2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-19397-6 |pages=132–}}</ref>
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=== Purpose, goal and means ===
Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along the line of the categories ''Purpose'', ''Goal'' and ''Means''. He reasoned that the ''Purpose'' of war is one's will to be enforced, which is determined by politics. The ''Goal'' of the conflict is therefore to defeat the opponent in order to exact the ''Purpose''. The ''Goal'' is pursued with the help of a strategy, that might be brought about by various ''Means'' such as by the defeat or the elimination of opposing armed forces or by non-military ''Means'' (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve as ''Means'' to achieve the set goal.<ref>LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare" </ref>
One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes summarizes that idea: "War is a mere continuation of politics by other means."<ref name="Clausewitz2010" />
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