Benito Mussolini: Difference between revisions

During this time he studied the ideas of the philosopher [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], the [[Sociology|sociologist]] [[Vilfredo Pareto]], and the [[Syndicalism|syndicalist]] [[Georges Sorel]]. Mussolini also later credited the [[Christian socialist]] [[Charles Péguy]] and the [[syndicalist]] [[Hubert Lagardelle]] as some of his influences.<ref name=autogenerated1>''Mediterranean Fascism'' by Charles F. Delzel p. 96</ref> Sorel's emphasis on the need for overthrowing decadent [[liberal democracy]] and capitalism by the use of violence, [[direct action]], the [[general strike]] and the use of [[Machiavelli|neo-Machiavellian]] appeals to emotion, impressed Mussolini deeply.<ref name="Mediterranean3" />

The ideological basis for fascism came from a number of sources. Mussolini utilized works of [[Plato]], [[Georges Sorel]], [[Nietzsche]], and the economic ideas of [[Vilfredo Pareto]], to develop fascism. Mussolini admired Plato's ''[[The Republic (Plato)|The Republic]]'', which he often read for inspiration.{{sfn|Moseley|2004|p=39}} ''The Republic'' expounded a number of ideas that fascism promoted, such as rule by an elite promoting the state as the ultimate end, opposition to democracy, protecting the class system and promoting class collaboration, rejection of egalitarianism, promoting the militarization of a nation by creating a class of warriors, demanding that citizens perform civic duties in the interest of the state, and utilizing state intervention in education to promote the development of warriors and future rulers of the state.<ref>Sharma, Urmila. ''Western Political Thought''. Atlantic Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd, 1998. p. 66.</ref> Plato was an idealist, focused on achieving justice and morality, while Mussolini and fascism were realist, focused on achieving political goals.<ref>Sharma, Urmila. ''Western Political Thought.'' Atlantic Publishers and Distributors (P) Ltd, 1998. pp. 66–67.</ref>

The idea behind Mussolini's foreign policy was that of ''[[spazio vitale]]'' (vital space), a concept in Fascism that was analogous to ''[[Lebensraum]]'' in German National Socialism.{{sfn|Kallis|2002|pp=48–51}} The concept of ''spazio vitale'' was first announced in 1919, when the entire [[Mediterranean]], especially so-called [[Julian March]], was redefined to make it appear a unified region that had belonged to Italy from the times of the [[Italia (Roman province)|ancient Roman province of Italia]],<ref name="Newman1943">{{cite book|author=Bernard Newman|title=The New Europe|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gTA34DxHx4AC&pg=PA307|year=1943|publisher=Books for Libraries Press|isbn=978-0-8369-2963-8|pages=307–|access-date=13 August 2015|archive-date=25 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151025120942/https://books.google.com/books?id=gTA34DxHx4AC&pg=PA307|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="JonesÖstberg2007">{{cite book|author1=Harriet Jones|author2=Kjell Östberg|author3=Nico Randeraad|title=Contemporary historyHistory on trialTrial: Europe since 1989 and the roleRole of the expertExpert historianHistorian|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4h1nAAAAMAAJ|year=2007|publisher=Manchester University Press|isbn=978-0-7190-7417-2|page=155|access-date=13 August 2015|archive-date=27 September 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150927055130/https://books.google.com/books?id=4h1nAAAAMAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref> and was claimed as Italy's exclusive sphere of influence. The right to colonize the neighboring [[Slovene minority in Italy (1920–1947)|Slovene ethnic areas]] and the Mediterranean, being inhabited by what were alleged to be less developed peoples, was justified on the grounds that Italy was allegedly suffering from overpopulation.{{sfn|Kallis|2002|pp=50–51}}

German-American historian [[Konrad Jarausch]] has argued that Mussolini was responsible for an integrated suite of political innovations that made fascism a powerful force in Europe. First, he went beyond the vague promise of future national renewal, and proved the movement could actually seize power and operate a comprehensive government in a major country along fascist lines. Second, the movement claimed to represent the entire national community, not a fragment such as the working class or the aristocracy. He made a significant effort to include the previously alienated Catholic element. He defined public roles for the main sectors of the business community rather than allowing it to operate backstage. Third, he developed a cult of one-man leadership that focused media attention and national debate on his own personality. As a former journalist, Mussolini proved highly adept at exploiting all forms of mass media, including such new forms as motion pictures and radio. Fourth, he created a mass membership party, with free programs for young men, young women, and various other groups who could therefore be more readily mobilized and monitored. He shut down all alternative political formations and parties (but this step was not an innovation by any means). Like all dictators he made liberal use of the threat of extrajudicial violence, as well as actual violence by his Blackshirts, to frighten his opposition.<ref>Konrad Jarausch, ''Out of Ashes: A newNew historyHistory of Europe in the 20th centuryCentury'' (2015) pp. 179–80</ref>

Mussolini's foremost priority was the subjugation of the minds of the Italian people through the use of [[Propaganda of Fascist Italy|propaganda]]. The regime promoted a lavish [[Propaganda of Fascist Italy#Personality cult|cult of personality]] centered on the figure of Mussolini. He pretended to incarnate the new fascist [[Übermensch]], promoting an aesthetic of exasperated [[Machismo]] that attributed to him quasi-divine capacities.<ref>{{cite book|last=Falasca-Zamponi|first=Simonetta|title=Fascist spectacle Spectacle: theThe aestheticsAesthetics of powerPower in Mussolini's Italy|year=2000|publisher=University of California Press|location=Berkeley|isbn=978-0-520-22677-7|page=67|edition=1st pbk.}}</ref> At various times after 1922, Mussolini personally took over the ministries of the interior, foreign affairs, colonies, corporations, defense, and public works. Sometimes he held as many as seven departments simultaneously, as well as the premiership. He was also head of the all-powerful Fascist Party and the armed local fascist militia, the [[Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale|MVSN]] or "Blackshirts", who terrorized incipient resistance in the cities and provinces. He would later form the [[OVRA]], an institutionalized [[secret police]] that carried official state support. In this way he succeeded in keeping power in his own hands and preventing the emergence of any rival.

In foreign policy, Mussolini was pragmatic and opportunistic. At the center of his vision lay the dream to forge a new [[Roman Empire]] in Africa and the [[Balkans]], vindicating the so-called "[[mutilated victory]]" of 1918 imposed by the "plutodemocracies" (Britain and France) that betrayed the [[Treaty of London (1915)|Treaty of London]] and usurped the supposed "natural right" of Italy to achieve supremacy in the Mediterranean basin.<ref>{{cite book|last=Burgwyn|first=H. James|title=Mussolini warlord Warlord: failedFailed dreamsDreams of empireEmpire, 1940–1943|year=2012|publisher=Enigma Books|location=New York|isbn=978-1-936274-29-1|page=7}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Townley|first=Edward|title=Mussolini and Italy|year=2002|publisher=Heinemann Educational|location=Oxford|isbn=978-0-435-32725-5|page=173}}</ref> However, in the 1920s, given Germany's weakness, post-war reconstruction problems and the [[World War I reparations|question of reparations]], the situation of Europe was too unfavorable to advocate an openly revisionist approach to the [[Treaty of Versailles]]. In the 1920s, Italy's foreign policy was based on the traditional idea of Italy maintaining "equidistant" stance from all the major powers in order to exercise "determinant weight", which by whatever power Italy chose to align with would decisively change the balance of power in Europe, and the price of such an alignment would be support for Italian ambitions in Europe and Africa.<ref>Kallis, Aristotle ''Fascist Ideology'', London: Routledge, 2000 pp. 129 & 141</ref> In the meantime, since for Mussolini demography was destiny, he carried out relentless natalist policies designed to increase the birthrate; for example, in 1924 making advocating or giving information about contraception a criminal offense, and in 1926 ordering every Italian woman to double the number of children that they were willing to bear.<ref>Strang, Bruce ''On the Fiery March'', New York: Praeger, 2003 p. 27.</ref> For Mussolini, Italy's current population of 40&nbsp;million was insufficient to fight a major war, and he needed to increase the population to at least 60&nbsp;million Italians before he would be ready for war.<ref>Strang, Bruce ''On the Fiery March'', New York: Praeger, 2003 p. 26.</ref>

As World War II began, Ciano and [[E. F. L. Wood, 1st Earl of Halifax|Viscount Halifax]] were holding secret phone conversations. The British wanted Italy on their side against Germany as it had been in World War I.<ref name="knox"/> French government opinion was more geared towards action against Italy, as they were eager to attack Italy in Libya. In September 1939, France swung to the opposite extreme, offering to discuss issues with Italy, but as the French were unwilling to discuss [[Corsica]], Nice and [[Savoy]], Mussolini did not answer.<ref name="knox"/> Mussolini's Under-Secretary for War Production, [[Carlo Favagrossa]], had estimated that Italy could not be prepared for major military operations until 1942 due to its relatively weak industrial sector compared to western Europe.<ref>Walker, Ian W. (2003). ''Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa''. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. {{ISBN|1-86126-646-4}}. p.19</ref> In late November 1939, Adolf Hitler declared: "So long as the Duce lives, one can rest assured that Italy will seize every opportunity to achieve its imperialistic aims."<ref name="knox" />

Mussolini first learned of [[Operation Barbarossa]] after the invasion of the [[Soviet Union]] had begun on 22 June 1941, and was not asked by Hitler to involve himself.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|p=276}} Mussolini took the initiative in ordering an Italian Army Corps to head to the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]], where he hoped that Italy might score an easy victory to restore the Fascist regime's luster, which had been damaged by defeats in Greece and North Africa.{{citation needed|date=November 2018}} On 25 June 1941, he inspected the first units at Verona, which served as his launching pad to Russia.<ref>Marino, James I. (5 December 2016). [https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/italians-on-the-eastern-front-from-barbarossa-to-stalingrad/ "Italians on the Eastern Front: From Barbarossa to Stalingrad"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180920010353/http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/wwii/italians-on-the-eastern-front-from-barbarossa-to-stalingrad/ |date=20 September 2018 }}. Warfare History Network. Retrieved 17 November 2018.</ref> Mussolini told the Council of Ministers of 5 July that his only worry was that Germany might defeat the Soviet Union before the Italians arrived.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|pp=276–77}} At a meeting with Hitler in August, Mussolini offered and Hitler accepted the commitment of further Italian troops to fight the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|p=277}} The heavy losses suffered by the Italians on the Eastern Front, where service was extremely unpopular owing to the widespread view that this was not Italy's fight, did much to damage Mussolini's prestige with the Italian people.{{sfn|Weinberg|2005|p=277}} After the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], he [[Italian declaration of war on the United States|declared war on the United States]] on 11 December 1941.<ref>MacGregor Knox. ''Mussolini unleashedUnleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War''. Edition of 1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. 122–27.</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/11/newsid_3532000/3532401.stm | work=BBC News | title=1941: Germany and Italy declare war on US | date=11 December 1941 | access-date=10 November 2013 | archive-date=5 December 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191205102107/http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/11/newsid_3532000/3532401.stm | url-status=live }}</ref> A piece of evidence regarding Mussolini's response to the attack on Pearl Harbor comes from the diary of his Foreign Minister Ciano:

Although Mussolini was aware that Italy, whose resources were reduced by the campaigns of the 1930s, was not ready for a long war, he opted to remain in the conflict to not abandon the occupied territories and the fascist imperial ambitions.<ref name="MacGregor Knox 1999. pp. 122–23">MacGregor Knox. ''Mussolini unleashedUnleashed, 1939–1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War''. Edition of 1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pp. 122–23.</ref>

After being kicked and spat upon, the bodies were hung upside down from the roof of an [[Esso]] gas station.<ref>{{cite video | year =1945 | title =Video: Beaten Nazis Sign Historic Surrender, 1945/05/14 (1945) | url =https://archive.org/details/1945-05-14_Beaten_Nazis_Sign_Historic_Surrender | publisher =[[Universal Newsreel]] | access-date =20 February 2012}}</ref> The bodies were then stoned from below by civilians. This was done both to discourage any Fascists from continuing the fight, and as an act of revenge for the hanging of many partisans in the same place by Axis authorities. The corpse of the deposed leader was subject to ridicule and abuse. Fascist loyalist [[Achille Starace]] was captured and sentenced to death and then taken to the Piazzale Loreto and shown the body of Mussolini. Starace, who once said of Mussolini "He is a god,"<ref>Quoted in "''Mussolini: A New Life"'', p. 276 by Nicholas Burgess Farrell. 2004</ref> saluted what was left of his leader just before he was shot. The body of Starace was subsequently hung up next to that of Mussolini.

In the early 1920s, Mussolini stated that Fascism would never raise a "[[Jewish Question]]" and in an article he wrote he stated "Italy knows no antisemitism and we believe that it will never know it," and then elaborated, "let us hope that Italian Jews will continue to be sensible enough so as not to give rise to antisemitism in the only country where it has never existed."<ref>Zimmerman, p. 62</ref> In 1932, Mussolini during a conversation with [[Emil Ludwig]] described antisemitism as a "German vice" and stated that "There was 'no Jewish Question' in Italy and could not be one in a country with a healthy system of government."<ref>Christopher Hibbert, ''Benito Mussolini'' (1975), p. 99</ref> On several occasions, Mussolini spoke positively about Jews and the [[Zionist movement]],<ref name="Zimmerman, p. 160">Zimmerman, p. 160</ref> although Fascism remained suspicious of Zionism after the Fascist Party gained power.<ref>Zimmerman, pp. 26–27</ref> In 1934, Mussolini supported the establishment of the [[Betar Naval Academy]] in [[Civitavecchia]] to train Zionist cadets under the direction of [[Ze'ev Jabotinsky]], arguing that a Jewish state would be in Italy's interest.<ref name="Kaplan, 2005, p. 154">Kaplan, 2005, p. 154.</ref>

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