Price's Missouri Expedition: Difference between revisions

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In his paper [http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA428656&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf Assessing Compound Warfare During Price's Raid], written as a thesis for the [[U.S. Army Command and General Staff College]], Major Dale E. Davis postulates that Price's Missouri Expedition failed primarily due to his inability to properly employ the principles of "compound warfare". This requires an inferior power to effectively use regular and irregular forces in concert (such as was done by the [[North Vietnamese]] and [[Viet Cong]] against the French and Americans during the [[Vietnam War]]) to defeat a superior army. He also blamed Price's slow rate of movement during his campaign, and the close proximity of Confederate irregulars to his regular force, for this outcome.<ref>Davis, pp. 85-86.</ref>
 
Major Davis observes that by wasting valuable time, ammunition and men in relativelyfairly meaningless assaults on Fort Davidson, Glasgow, [[Capture of Sedalia|Sedalia]] and Boonville, Price offered Union General Rosecrans time he might not otherwise have had to organize an effective response. Furthermore, he says, Price's insistence on guarding an ever-expanding wagon train of looted military supplies and other items ultimately became "an albatross to [his] withdrawal".<ref>Davis, pg. 55.</ref> Price, wrote Davis, ''ought'' to have used Confederate bushwhackers to harass Federal formations, forcing the Unionists to disperse large numbers of troops to pursue them over wide ranges of territory. This in turn would have reduced the number of effectives available to fight against Price's main force. Instead, Price kept many guerrillas close to his army and even incorporated some into his ranks, thus largely negating the value of their mobility and small, independent formations. This in turn allowed the Federal generals to ultimately concentrate a force large enough to trap and defeat Price at [[Battle of Westport|Westport]], effectively ending his campaign and crushing one of the last hopes for the Confederacy in the Civil War.<ref>Davis, pg. 87.</ref>
 
==References==