Operation Roundup (1942): Difference between revisions

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==History==
Overseen by [[Brigadier generalGeneral (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the plan was developed in early 1942 and reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.<ref name = "este">Carlo d'Este, ''Decision in Normandy'', Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.</ref>
 
Given shortagesShortages of merchant shipping, [[landing craft]], and other resources, caused the Roundup plan wasfor consideredRoundup to be considered as unrealistic;. itIt called for a force consisting of 48 Allied [[Divisiondivision (military)|divisions]] and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad [[beachhead]]s between the French ports of [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] and [[Le Havre]].{{Efn|By comparison, the eventual Normandy landings, which occurred over a year later in June 1944, and the subsequent campaign, featured only 39 Allied divisions.|name=|group=nb}}<ref name="morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', {{ISBN|0-316-58311-1}}, pp 7-17</ref> Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the First World War's [[Battle of the Somme]] (where, on the [[first day on the Somme|first day of the battle]], the British Army had suffered almost 60,000 casualties) and [[Battle of Passchendaele]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why D-Day Was So Important to Allied Victory |url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-d-day-was-so-important-to-allied-victory|access-date=2020-11-28 |website=Imperial War Museums |language=en}}</ref>
 
[[Winston Churchill]], the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, preferred a strategy of attacking the [[Wehrmacht]], the German forces, in the [[Mediterranean Sea]] instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly").<ref name="morison" /> Churchill's plan would allow relatively -inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky [[theater (warfare)|theatre of war]] while they gradually built up overwhelmingto forcebe overwhelming before they engaged Germany head on.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|page=54–55}}</ref>
 
After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], suggested instead to U.S. President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] thatfor the United States to abandon the [[Europe first|Germany-first strategy]] and take the offensive in the [[Pacific War]]. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA402|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0385353069|pages=402|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the Second Claridge Conference in late July 1942 to carry out [[Operation Torch]], the Allied invasion of French North Africa.<ref>{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135}}</ref> TorchThat was a compromise by allowing the U.S. to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale whileand to meetingmeet the British objective of securing victory in North Africa.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Willmott|first=H.P.|url=https://archive.org/details/june194400will|title=June, 1944|publisher=Blandford Press|year=1984|isbn=0-7137-1446-8|location=Poole, Dorset}}</ref> Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch with preparations for Roundup given lower priority because of the uncertainties of Allied strategy.<ref name="este" />
 
In November 1942, Eisenhower, now a [[lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name="morison" /> Briefings concerning the plan brought Eisenhower’s organizational and diplomatic skills to the attention of senior civil and military leaders in the United States and Europe, launching his meteoric rise to [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in Europe.
 
Operation Roundup included [[Operation Sledgehammer]] and the later variant, Operation Roundhammer. British [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant General]] [[Frederick E. Morgan]] incorporated aspects of the plan into the earliest version of the plan that became [[Operation Overlord]].