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===Retrospective assessment===
In his 2004 paper [https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA428656.pdf Assessing Compound Warfare During Price's Raid], written as a thesis for the [[U.S. Army Command and General Staff College]], Major Dale E. Davis postulates that Price's Missouri Expedition failed primarily due to his inability to properly employ the principles of "compound warfare." This requires an inferior power to effectively use regular and irregular forces in concert (as was done by the [[North Vietnamese]] and [[Viet Cong]] against the French and Americans during the [[Vietnam War]]) to defeat a superior army. He also blames Price's slow rate of movement during his campaign, and the close proximity of Confederate irregulars to his regular force, for this outcome.<ref>Davis, pp. 85-86.</ref>
Major Davis observes that by wasting valuable time, ammunition and men in fairly meaningless assaults on Fort Davidson, Glasgow, [[Capture of Sedalia|Sedalia]] and Boonville, Price gave Union General Rosecrans time to organize an effective response he might not otherwise have had. Furthermore, he says, Price's insistence on guarding an ever-growing wagon train of looted military supplies and other items ultimately became "an albatross to [his] withdrawal."<ref>Davis, pg. 55.</ref> Price, wrote Davis, ''ought'' to have used Confederate bushwhackers to harass Federal formations, forcing his Union foe to send large numbers of troops out to pursue them over wide ranges of territory. This would have reduced the number of effectives available to fight against Price's main force. Instead, Price kept many guerrillas close to his army and even incorporated some into his ranks, which sharply reduced the value of their mobility and small, independent formations. This allowed the Federal generals to concentrate a force large enough to trap and defeat Price at [[Battle of Westport|Westport]], which ended his campaign, forced him to retreat, and crushed one of the Confederacy's last hopes in the Civil War.<ref>Davis, pg. 87.</ref>
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