Anglo-Egyptian War: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
infobox
Tags: Mobile edit Mobile app edit Android app edit
Line 40:
A.G. Hopkins rejected Robinson and Gallagher's argument, citing original documents to claim that there was no perceived danger to the Suez Canal from the ‘Urabi movement, and that ‘Urabi and his forces were not chaotic "anarchists", but rather maintained law and order.<ref name=hopkins />{{rp|373–374}} He alternatively argues that British Prime Minister [[William Ewart Gladstone|William Gladstone]]'s cabinet was motivated by protecting the interests of British bondholders with investments in Egypt as well as by pursuit of domestic political popularity. Hopkins cites the British investments in Egypt that grew massively leading into the 1880s, partially as a result of the Khedive's debt from construction of the Suez Canal, as well as the close links that existed between the British government and the economic sector.<ref name=hopkins />{{rp|379–380}} He writes that Britain's economic interests occurred simultaneously with a desire within one element of the ruling Liberal Party for a militant foreign policy in order to gain the domestic political popularity that enabled it to compete with the Conservative Party.<ref name=hopkins />{{rp|382}} Hopkins cites a letter from [[Edward Malet]], the British consul general in Egypt at the time, to a member of the [[Second Gladstone ministry|Gladstone Cabinet]] offering his congratulations on the invasion: "You have fought the battle of all Christendom and history will acknowledge it. May I also venture to say that it has given the Liberal Party a new lease of popularity and power."<ref name=hopkins>{{cite journal|last1=Hopkins|first1=A. G.|title=The Victorians and Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882|journal=The Journal of African History|date=July 1986|volume=27|issue=2|pages=363–391|jstor=181140|doi=10.1017/S0021853700036719|s2cid=162732269 }}</ref>{{rp|385}}
 
[[John Semple Galbraith|John Galbraith]] and [[Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot]] make a similar argument to Hopkins, though their argument focuses on how individuals within the British government bureaucracy used their positions to make the invasion appear as a more favourable option. First, they describe a plot by [[Edward Malet]] in which he portrayed the Egyptian government as unstable to his superiors in the cabinet.<ref name=galbraith>{{cite journal|last=Galbraith|first=John S.|author2=al-Sayyid-Marsot, Afaf Lutfi|title=The British Occupation of Egypt: Another View|journal=International Journal of Middle East Studies|date=November 1978|volume=9|issue=4|doi=10.1017/S0020743800030658|jstor=162074|pages=471–488|s2cid=162397342 }}</ref>{{rp|477}} On Galbraith and al-Sayyid-Marsot's reading, Malet naïvely expected he could convince the British to intimidate Egypt with a show of force without considering a full invasion or occupation as a possibility.<ref name=galbraith />{{rp|477–478}} They also dwell on Admiral [[Beauchamp Seymour]], who, they claim, hastened the start of the bombardment by exaggerating the danger posed to his ships by ‘Urabi's forces in his telegrams back to the British government.<ref name=galbraith />{{rp|485}}
 
==Course of the war==