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Fredendall was assigned to command the [[II Corps (United States)|U.S. II Corps]] in its [[Tunisia Campaign|advance into Tunisia]] against [[Wehrmacht|German forces]]. (He thus became the second-oldest of the 34 generals to serve as a U.S. Army corps commander in World War II, after [[Innis P. Swift]], commander of the [[I Corps (United States)|I Corps]] in the [[Pacific War|Pacific]].) II Corps served under the [[First Army (United Kingdom)|British First Army]], whose commander, [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant General]] [[Kenneth Anderson (British Army officer)|Kenneth Anderson]], considered Fredendall incompetent well before the loss at Kasserine. Fredendall was given to speaking and issuing orders using his own slang, such as calling [[infantry]] units "walking boys" and [[artillery]] "popguns." Instead of using the standard military map grid-based location designators, he made up confusing codes such as "the place that begins with C." This practice was unheard-of for a general and distinguished graduate of the Command and General Staff School, who had been taught to always use standardized language and procedures to ensure clarity when transmitting orders under the stress of combat. Fredendall's informality often led to confusion among his subordinates, and precious time was lost attempting to discern his meaning.<ref>Carr, Vincent M., ''The Battle of Kasserine Pass: An Examination of Allied Operational Failings'', Air Command And Staff College, Maxwell AFB, (April 2003), pp. 18–21.</ref>
During the advance into Tunisia, Fredendall used an [[Military engineer|engineer]] [[Company (military unit)|company]] of the [[19th Engineer Regiment]] to build a large, dug-in [[corps]] headquarters [[bunker]] {{convert|70|mi}} behind the front in a place called Speedy Valley (nine miles southeast of [[Tébessa]]). Blasted and drilled out of solid rock, the bunker (actually two U-shaped complexes running {{convert|160|ft}} into the hillside) took three weeks to construct.<ref>Andrews, Peter, ''A Place to be Lousy In'', ''[[American Heritage Magazine]]'' (December 1991), Volume 42, Issue 8, pp. 100–109.</ref> An anti-aircraft battalion was emplaced to protect the headquarters. Fredendall also ordered a bulletproof [[Cadillac]] similar to Eisenhower's, and regularly phoned Oran to find out why it was not being delivered faster. Then-[[Brigadier general (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Omar Bradley]] called the headquarters "an embarrassment to every American soldier," and General Eisenhower, the [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in North Africa, after viewing the elaborate structure, reminded his senior commanders that even generals must assume personal risk in combat.<ref>[[Stephen E. Ambrose|Ambrose, Stephen E.]], ''D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II'', Simon and Schuster (1994), {{ISBN|0-671-67334-3}}, {{ISBN|978-0-671-67334-5}}, p. 361: After observing Fredendall's huge underground HQ bunker
During the [[Battle of Kasserine Pass]], Eisenhower sent Major General [[Ernest N. Harmon]] to report on the fighting, to assist Fredendall and the other Allied commanders, and to determine whether Fredendall or his [[1st Armored Division (United States)|1st Armored Division]] commander, Major General [[Orlando Ward]], should be replaced.<ref>Carr, p. 28.</ref> Harmon noted that Fredendall and his superior, Anderson, rarely saw each other, and failed to properly coordinate and integrate forces under their command. Fredendall was barely on speaking terms with Ward, whom he had deliberately left out of operational meetings after Ward had repeatedly protested the separation of his command into weaker 'penny packet' forces distributed across various sectors of the front.<ref name="ossad"/><ref>Carr, p. 30.</ref>
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