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Risa Brooks argues that the health of civil-military relations is best judged by whether there is a (i) preference divergence between military and political leaders, and (ii) whether there is a power imbalance. She argues that the healthiest arrangement of civil-military relations is when the preferences between military and political leaders is low, and political leaders have a dominant power advantage. She argues that the worst kind of civil-military relations is when there is high preference divergence, as well as a power balance between the military and political leaders.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Brooks|first=Risa A.|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv346qvr|title=Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment|date=2008|publisher=Princeton University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctv346qvr |jstor=j.ctv346qvr|s2cid=242040600 }}</ref>
According to Dan Slater, Lucan A. Way, Jean Lachapelle, and Adam E. Casey, variations in military supremacy in authoritarian states can be explained by the nature in which the military was established in the first place: "Where authoritarian mass parties created militaries from scratch, the armed forces have generally remained subservient. Where militaries emerged separately from authoritarian parties, they enjoyed the autonomy necessary to achieve and maintain military supremacy. The core lesson is simple: Unless an autocratic regime created the military, it will struggle to control the military."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Slater |first=Dan |last2=Way |first2=Lucan A. |last3=Lachapelle |first3=Jean |last4=Casey |first4=Adam E. |date=2023 |title=The Origins of Military Supremacy in Dictatorships |url=https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/900429 |journal=Journal of Democracy |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=5–20 |doi=10.1353/jod.2023.a900429 |issn=1086-3214}}</ref>
===Convergence theory===
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