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Tom.Reding (talk | contribs) m +{{Authority control}} (5 IDs from Wikidata), WP:GenFixes on, typo(s) fixed: ’s → 's |
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{{Short description|Study of the relationship between a country's armed forces and civil society/government}}
{{Multiple issues|
{{tone|date=April 2019}}
{{Globalize|date=May 2022|2=US}}
}}
[[File:Shoigu in Moldova 01.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Public meeting of Moldovan President [[Igor Dodon]] (center) with the former military defence minister [[Victor Gaiciuc]] (center left) and Dodon's defence minister [[Pavel Voicu]] (far right), August 2019]]
{{Politics
'''Civil–military relations''' ('''Civ-Mil''' or '''CMR'''{{
A paradox lies at the center of traditional civil-military relations theory. The military, an institution designed to protect the polity, must also be strong enough to threaten the society it serves. A military take-over or [[coup]] is an example where this balance is used to change the government. Ultimately, the military must accept that civilian authorities have the "right to be wrong".<ref>Peter D. Feaver. 2003. ''Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press</ref> In other words, they may be responsible for carrying out a policy decision they disagree with. Civilian supremacy over the military is a complicated matter. The rightness or wrongness of a policy or decision can be ambiguous. Civilian decision makers may be impervious to corrective information. The relationship between civilian authorities and military leaders must be worked out in practice.<ref>{{cite journal|last = Shields|first= Patricia|date = November–December 2006|title = Civil-Military Relations: Changing Frontiers (Review Essay)|journal =[[Public Administration Review]]|volume= 66|issue =6|pages = 924–928 |doi= 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00660.x|url = https://www.academia.edu/1189403}}</ref>
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Their April 2013 paper <ref>Ashley Jackson and Simone Haysom; April 2013; The search for common ground, Civil–military relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13; HPG Policy Brief 51; http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7446-stablisation-civil-military-relations-afghanistan</ref> includes the following three key messages -
* Stabilisation approaches are likely to continue to present challenges to the aid
* Civil–military dialogue was markedly more effective when it was rooted in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and strategic argumentation, as with advocacy focused on reducing harm to civilians.
* Aid agencies need to invest more in capacity and training for engaging in civil–military dialogue and, together with donors, seek to generate more objective evidence on the impact of stabilisation approaches.
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*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110214150347/http://civmilblog.com/ CivMilBlog]
*[http://coupproof.blogspot.com/ Coup Proof]
{{Authority control}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Civil-Military Relations}}
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