Civil–military relations: Difference between revisions

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Removed the section as it only reflected personal opinions and uncited claims at best.
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{{Short description|Study of the relationship between a country's armed forces and civil society/government}}
{{Multiple issues|
{{tone|date=April 2019}}
{{Globalize|date=May 2022|2=US}}
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[[File:Shoigu in Moldova 01.jpg|thumb|upright=1.2|Public meeting of Moldovan President [[Igor Dodon]] (center) with the former military defence minister [[Victor Gaiciuc]] (center left) and Dodon's defence minister [[Pavel Voicu]] (far right), August 2019]]
{{Politics}}{{Globalize|date=May 2022|2=US}}
 
'''Civil–military relations''' ('''Civ-Mil''' or '''CMR'''{{cncitation needed|date=February 2023}}) describes the relationship between [[military]] organizations and [[civil society]], military organizations and other government [[bureaucracies]], and leaders and the military.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Brooks|first=Risa A.|date=2019|title=Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=22|issue=1|pages=379–398|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-060518-025407|issn=1094-2939|doi-access=free}}</ref> CMR incorporates a diverse, often normative field, which moves within and across [[management]], [[social science]] and [[policy]] scales.<ref>Shields, Patricia, (2015) "Civil Military Relations" in ''Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Third edition'' Taylor and Francis DOI: 10.1081/E-EPAP3-120052814</ref> More narrowly, it describes the relationship between the civil authority of a given society and its military authority. "The goal of any [[State (polity)|state]] is to harness military professional power to serve vital [[national security]] interests, while guarding against the [[Abuse of power|misuse of power]] that can threaten the well-being of its people."<ref>Pion-Berlin D., Dudley D. (2020) Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field. In: Sookermany A. (eds) Handbook of Military Sciences. p. 1. Springer, Cham {{doi|10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_37-1}}</ref> Studies of civil-military relations often rest on a normative assumption that it is preferable to have the ultimate [[command responsibility|responsibility]] for a country's [[military strategy|strategic]] decision-making to lie in the hands of the [[civilian]] political leadership (i.e. [[civilian control of the military]]) rather than a military (a [[military dictatorship]]).
 
A paradox lies at the center of traditional civil-military relations theory. The military, an institution designed to protect the polity, must also be strong enough to threaten the society it serves. A military take-over or [[coup]] is an example where this balance is used to change the government. Ultimately, the military must accept that civilian authorities have the "right to be wrong".<ref>Peter D. Feaver. 2003. ''Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations''. Cambridge: Harvard University Press</ref> In other words, they may be responsible for carrying out a policy decision they disagree with. Civilian supremacy over the military is a complicated matter. The rightness or wrongness of a policy or decision can be ambiguous. Civilian decision makers may be impervious to corrective information. The relationship between civilian authorities and military leaders must be worked out in practice.<ref>{{cite journal|last = Shields|first= Patricia|date = November–December 2006|title = Civil-Military Relations: Changing Frontiers (Review Essay)|journal =[[Public Administration Review]]|volume= 66|issue =6|pages = 924–928 |doi= 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2006.00660.x|url = https://www.academia.edu/1189403}}</ref>
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Their April 2013 paper <ref>Ashley Jackson and Simone Haysom; April 2013; The search for common ground, Civil–military relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13; HPG Policy Brief 51; http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/7446-stablisation-civil-military-relations-afghanistan</ref> includes the following three key messages -
 
* Stabilisation approaches are likely to continue to present challenges to the aid community’scommunity's ability to act according to humanitarian principles in conflict-affected, fragile and post conflict environments. Experiences in Afghanistan highlight significant tension, if not conflict, between stabilisation and internationally recognised guidelines and principles governing civil–military interaction.
* Civil–military dialogue was markedly more effective when it was rooted in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and strategic argumentation, as with advocacy focused on reducing harm to civilians.
* Aid agencies need to invest more in capacity and training for engaging in civil–military dialogue and, together with donors, seek to generate more objective evidence on the impact of stabilisation approaches.
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*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110214150347/http://civmilblog.com/ CivMilBlog]
*[http://coupproof.blogspot.com/ Coup Proof]
 
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