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The popularity of the term dates from [[Andrew J. R. Mack]]'s 1975 article "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" in ''[[World Politics]]'', in which "asymmetric" referred simply to a significant disparity in power between opposing actors in a conflict. "Power," in this sense, is broadly understood to mean material power, such as a large army, sophisticated weapons, an advanced economy, and so on. Mack's analysis was largely ignored in its day, but the end of the [[Cold War]] sparked renewed interest among academics. By the late 1990s, a new research building off Mack's works was beginning to mature; after 2004, the [[U.S. military]] began once again to prioritize responding to challenges presented by asymmetric warfare.<ref>{{cite journal|first=James A.|last=Russell|year=2004|title=Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power|journal=Naval War College Review|volume=57|issue=19|url=https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2085&context=nwc-review}}</ref>
Since 2004, the discussion of asymmetric warfare has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military officials to use the term in different ways, as well as by its close association with [[guerrilla warfare]], [[insurgency]], [[terrorism]], [[counterinsurgency]], and [[counterterrorism]].
Academic authors tend to focus on explaining two puzzles in asymmetric conflict. First, if "power" determines victory, there must be reasons why weaker actors decide to fight more powerful actors. Key explanations include:
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==Use of terrain==
Terrain that limits mobility, such as forests and mountains, can be used as a [[force multiplier]] by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger one, especially one operating far from its [[Military logistics|logistical base]]. Such terrain is called ''difficult terrain''. [[Urban warfare|Urban]] areas, though generally having good transport access, provide innumerable ready-made defensible positions with simple escape routes and can also become rough terrain if prolonged combat fills the streets with rubble
{{blockquote|The contour of the land is an aid to the army, sizing up opponents to determine victory and assessing dangers and distance. "Those who do battle without knowing these will lose."|[[Sun Tzu]]|''[[The Art of War]]''}}
{{blockquote|The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.|[[Mao Zedong]]
An early example of terrain advantage is the [[Battle of Thermopylae]], 480 BC, where the narrow terrain of a defile was used to funnel the Persian forces, who were numerically superior, to a point where they could not use their size as an advantage.
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==Examples==
===American Revolutionary War===
From its initiation, the [[American Revolutionary War]] was, necessarily, a showcase for asymmetric techniques. In the 1920s,
Another feature of the long march from Concord was the urban warfare technique of using buildings along the route as additional cover for [[sniper]]s. When revolutionary forces forced their way into [[Norfolk, Virginia]] and used waterfront buildings as cover for shots at British vessels out in the river, the response of destruction of those buildings was ingeniously used to the advantage of the rebels, who encouraged the spread of fire throughout the largely [[Loyalist (American Revolution)|Loyalist]] town and spread propaganda blaming it on the British. Shortly afterwards, they destroyed the remaining houses because they might provide cover for British soldiers.<ref>{{cite web|first=Louis L. Jr.|last=Guy|url=http://www.norfolkhistorical.org/insights/2001_spring/nightmare.html|title=Norfolk's Worst Nightmare|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180629224630/http://www.norfolkhistorical.org/insights/2001_spring/nightmare.html|archive-date=2018-06-29|website=Norfolk Historical Society|date=Spring 2001|access-date=2008-01-03}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|first=H.J.|last=Eckenrode|url=http://www.newrivernotes.com/va/varev3.htm|title=The Revolution in Virginia (chap. III: The Struggle for Norfolk)|location=Boston MA|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=1916|website=newrivernotes.com|access-date=2008-01-03}}</ref><ref>Virginia Auditor of Public Accounts: records of Commissioners to examine claims in Norfolk, 1777–1836. (Library of Virginia archives, ref. APA 235)</ref>
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[[File:Philippine Revolutionary Army Rifles.jpg|thumb|Remnants of rifles used by [[Philippine Revolutionary Army|Filipino soldiers]] during [[Philippine–American War|the War]] on display at Clark [[Museum]]]]
The goal, or end-state, sought by the [[First Philippine Republic]] was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the ''ilustrado'' (intellectual) [[oligarchy]].<ref name=Deady2005p57>{{Harvnb|Deady|2005|p=57}}</ref> Local chieftains, landowners, and businessmen were the ''[[principalía|principales]]'' who controlled local politics. The war was strongest when ''illustrados'', ''principales'', and peasants were unified in opposition to annexation.<ref name=Deady2005p57 /> The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerrilla forces, had interests different from their ''illustrado'' leaders and the ''principales'' of their villages.<ref name=Deady2005p57 /> Coupled with the ethnic and geographic fragmentation, unity was a daunting task. The challenge for [[Emilio Aguinaldo|Aguinaldo]] and his generals was to sustain unified Filipino public opposition; this was the revolutionaries' strategic [[Center of gravity (military)|centre of gravity]].<ref name=Deady2005p57/> The Filipino operational center of gravity was the ability to sustain its force of 100,000 irregulars in the field.<ref name=Deady2005p58>{{Harvnb|Deady|2005|p=58}}</ref> The Filipino General [[Francisco Macabulos]] described the Filipinos' war aim as "not to vanquish the U.S. Army but to inflict on them constant losses." They initially sought to use conventional tactics and an increasing toll of U.S. casualties to contribute to McKinley's defeat in the 1900 presidential election.<ref name=Deady2005p58 /> Their hope was that as president the avowedly [[Anti-imperialism|anti-imperialist]] future [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of state]] [[William Jennings Bryan]] would withdraw from the Philippines.<ref name=Deady2005p58/> They pursued this short-term goal with [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla tactics]] better suited to a protracted struggle.<ref name=Deady2005p58/> While targeting [[William McKinley|McKinley]] motivated the revolutionaries in the short term, his victory demoralized them and convinced many undecided Filipinos that the United States would not depart precipitously.<ref name=Deady2005p58/> For most of 1899, the revolutionary leadership had viewed guerrilla warfare strategically only as a tactical option of final recourse, not as a means of operation which better suited their disadvantaged situation. On 13 November 1899, [[Emilio Aguinaldo]] decreed that guerrilla war would henceforth be the strategy. This made the American occupation of the Philippine archipelago more difficult over the next few years. In fact, during just the first four months of the guerrilla war, the Americans had nearly 500 casualties. The Philippine Revolutionary Army began staging bloody ambushes and raids, such as the guerrilla victories at [[Battle of Paye|Paye]], Catubig, [[Battle of Makahambus Hill|Makahambus]], [[Battle of Pulang Lupa|Pulang Lupa]], [[Battle of Balangiga|Balangiga]] and [[Battle of Mabitac|Mabitac]]. At first, it seemed like the Filipinos would fight the Americans to a stalemate and force them to withdraw. President McKinley even considered this at the beginning of the phase. The shift to guerrilla warfare drove the U.S. Army to adopt counterinsurgency tactics.
===20th century===
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{{see also|Proxy war}}
In Southeast Asia, specifically Vietnam, the [[Viet Minh]], [[Viet Cong|NLF]] and other insurgencies engaged in asymmetrical guerrilla warfare with [[French Fourth Republic|France]]. The war between the [[Afghan mujahideen|Mujahideen]] and the [[Soviet Armed Forces]] during the [[Soviet–Afghan War]] of 1979 to 1989, though claimed as a source of the term "asymmetric warfare,"<ref>Chris Bray, ''The Media and GI Joe'', in ''Reason'' (Feb 2002)</ref> occurred years after Mack wrote of "asymmetric conflict." (Note that the term "asymmetric warfare" became well-known in the West only in the 1990s.<ref>Oxford English Dictionary</ref>) The aid given by the [[Operation Cyclone|U.S.]] to the Mujahideen during the war was only covert at the tactical level; the [[Reagan Administration]] told the world that it was helping the "freedom-loving people of Afghanistan." Many countries, including the U.S., participated in this proxy war against the USSR during the [[Cold War]].
▲The war between the [[Afghan mujahideen|Mujahideen]] and the [[Soviet Armed Forces]] during the [[Soviet–Afghan War]] of 1979 to 1989, though claimed as a source of the term "asymmetric warfare,"<ref>Chris Bray, ''The Media and GI Joe'', in ''Reason'' (Feb 2002)</ref> occurred years after Mack wrote of "asymmetric conflict." (Note that the term "asymmetric warfare" became well-known in the West only in the 1990s.<ref>Oxford English Dictionary</ref>) The aid given by the [[Operation Cyclone|U.S.]] to the Mujahideen during the war was only covert at the tactical level; the [[Reagan Administration]] told the world that it was helping the "freedom-loving people of Afghanistan." Many countries, including the U.S., participated in this proxy war against the USSR during the [[Cold War]]. It{{clarify|date=April 2020}} was considered{{by whom|date=April 2020}} cost-effective and politically successful,<ref>{{cite book|first=Michael|last=Scheuer|author-link=Michael Scheuer|title=[[Imperial Hubris|Imperial Hubris - Why the West is Losing the War on Terrorism]]|location=Washington, D.C.|publisher=Brassey's|year=2004|isbn=978-1-57488-849-2|chapter=2}}</ref> as it caused a drain on the resources and manpower of the USSR and turned out to be a contributing factor to the [[Dissolution of the Soviet Union|collapse of that polity]] in 1991.{{citation needed|date=July 2010}}
===Post-Cold War===
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====Ukraine====
{{main|Russo-Ukrainian War}}
The [[2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine]] has resulted in a classical asymmetrical warfare scenario. Russia's superior military might, including its [[Russia and weapons of mass destruction#Nuclear arsenal of Russia|vast nuclear arsenal]] and seemingly superior armored forces have not helped Russia surmount fierce opposition from the [[Armed Forces of Ukraine]], which has inflicted severe blows against the [[Russian Armed Forces]] by relying on technologically advanced weaponry supplied by the outside Ukraine supporting parties.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Kessler |first1=Andy |title=Ukraine's Asymmetric War: Moscow has more firepower, but Kyiv is using digital technology better. |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-asymmetric-war-technology-starlink-mariupol-theater-collapse-russia-explosives-internet-drones-weapons-11648400672 |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=27 March 2022
==Semi-symmetric warfare==
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