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{{Refimprove|article|date=August 2019}}
'''Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives''' (ISDA, also known as Smith-[[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|IIA]] or '''Weak independence of irrelevant alternatives''') is a [[voting system criterion]] defined such that its satisfaction by a voting system occurs when the selection of the winner is independent of candidates who are not within the [[Smith set]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Four-Condorcet-Hare-Hybrid-Methods-for-Elections-Green-Armytage/49dba225741582cae5aabec6f1b5ff722f6fedf1|title=Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections|last=|first=|date=|website=|s2cid=15220771
A simple way to describe it is that if a voting system is ISDA, then whenever you can partition the candidates into group ''A'' and group ''B'' such that each candidate in group ''A'' is preferred over each candidate in group ''B'', you can eliminate all candidates of group ''B'' without changing the outcome of the election.
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