Bolívar's campaign to liberate New Granada: Difference between revisions

On May 25, BolivarBolívar set out with his Venezuelan troops from the town of Mantecal in the [[Apure]] region of Venezuela westwards towards [[Tame, Arauca|Tame]] in New Granada (modern day Colombia) where he met up with the army General Santander had formed to combine their forces and then set off for the Andes. During the march from Venezuela to New Granada a considerable number of horses and pack mules were lost to the flooded Llanos where they drowned. On June 4 they crossed the [[Arauca River]] and reached Tame on June 12. Once there BolivarBolívar began the organization of the combined army of 2,500 men with him as commander-in-chief and General [[Carlos Soublette]] as his [[Chief of staff]]. The army was organized into 2 Divisions, a Vanguard Division in the front of the army under the command of Brigadier General Francisco de Paula Santander, and a Rearguard Division, with the bulk of the army under the command of Brigadier General [[José Antonio Anzoátegui]]. Within this Rearguard Division was the British Legion under the command of Colonel [[James Rooke (British Legion officer)|James Rooke]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moreno de Angel |first=Pilar |title=Santander |orig-date=1989 |publisher=Crítica Colombia |year=2019 |isbn=9789584276926 |edition=1st |location=Bogotá |pages=400 |language=es}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Gutiérrez Ardila |first=Daniel |title=1819: Campaña de la Nueva Granada |publisher=Universidad Externado de Colombia |year=2019 |isbn=978-958-790-122-1 |edition=1st |location=Bogotá |pages=61}}</ref> While at Tame, Bolivar and Santander conducted a war meeting in order to discuss which route the army would take to cross the Cordillera Oriental. While Bolivar had originally intended to take the route through [[La Salina, Casanare|La Salina]] pass, Santander disagreed with this and suggested taking the route through the Paramo de Pisba with Boilvar eventually agreeing with this recommendation.<ref>Riaño, Camilo. ''La Campaña Libertadora de 1819'', 116-119.</ref> The pass through the Paramo de Pisba was the shortest and the least defended route, however it was also the most difficult and treacherous but with the greatest chance of surprising Spanish forces as it was deemed impassable by Barreiro especially during the rain season.<ref>Albi de la Cuesta, Julio (2019) p.384</ref> With the forces that he and Santander had recruited in the [[Apure River|Apure]] and [[Meta River]] regions now combined, set off on June 17, 1819.<ref>Lynch, John. ''Bolívar, A Life'', 124–127.</ref><ref>Masur, Gerhard. ''Simon Bolivar'', 261–264.</ref><ref>Madariaga, Salvador de. ''Bolívar'', 339–343.</ref>

In order to reach the pass, the Patriot Army marched towards Morcote where the foothills of the Andes began and then to Paya where they climbed to the last town, called [[Pisba]], before crossing the Paramo, where they reached the town of [[Socha]] on the other side of the Cordillera. The army's march usually began around 5 am as the early morning weather was much easier on the troops.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} The Vanguard division eventually reached Morcote on 26 June and on 27 June they marched towards Paya. The rearguard was usually a day's march behind the vanguard.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} ItThe Vanguard force reached Morcote on the morning of 27 June.

On 27 June, as the Patriot Vanguard approached the town of Paya, they spotted the presence of a Spanish Garrison guarding the town. This Spanish garrison of 2 companies which numbered around 300 men was under the command of Sergeant Major Juan Figueroa y Ladron. They were guarding the town because it was along the road that led to the main mountain pass at [[Labranzagrande]]. Santander then ordered the troops of the ''Cazadores'' Battalion to attack the Spanish force in order to clear the way for the rest of the army. The battle was short, as Figueroa ordered his troops to withdraw towards Labranzagrande when he realized that he was facing a much larger force. HeDuring alsothe retreat he ordered his men to cut the bridge towards that town, thinking that it was the intended route for the Patriot Army.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} That same day 27 July, he wrote a letter to Colonel Barreiro, informing him of the battle.

Since June 1819, the Spanish had received intelligence that Bolívar was possibly on the move.<ref>Gutierrez Ardila, Daniel (2019) p. 59</ref> However, the Spanish doubted that Bolívar's army could make the trip during the rainy season.<ref>Moreno de Angel, Pilar (1989) p. 414</ref> Barreiro who had been garrisoned in Tunja since May was informed about the reunion of BolivarBolívar and Santander in Tame on July 25 and their intentions of penetrating central New Granada, the same day he informed Viceroy Juan de SamanoSámano of the situation. He then considered several paths through which Bolívar could cross the mountains: La Salina, Paya (Pisba), Pueblo Viejo, Medina, Miraflores, [[Tenza|Tenza valley]] and [[Cáqueza]]. He discarded the first four, considering them too difficult and costly in human lives, especially in the winter season. He also ruled out penetration through Cáqueza, because it was located too far to the south. He assumed that Bolívar would choose the one in the Tenza Valley as the most appropriate and sent a number of force there to guard the pass.<ref>Friede Alter, Juan (1969) p. 34</ref>

Barreiro's soon found himself in a difficult situation: he did not dare to cross the mountain range and attack Bolívar, because he feared opening any other passage for him on a front that extended almost 250 kilometers. Furthermore, he did not see the possibility of maintaining his troops on the other side of the mountains, practically cut off from Tunja and the capital. He therefore chose to wait, while alarming and contradictory reports arrivedbegan to arrive such as one that informed that Bolívar was going to meet [[José Antonio Páez|Páez]] in [[Piedecuesta|Píedecuesta]]. He tried to gather, as far as the security of the Kingdom allowed, several detachments of his army, who had been stationed at widely dispersed points.<ref>Friede Alter, Juan (1969) p. 35</ref> Finally, on July 5 he received news that 500 cattle were led from Paya to Pisba and on the 6th, that the enemy army had moved towards the moor towards Pisba and [[Socotá]]., Whenconfirming Bolivarthat the Patriots had taken the route through the Páramo de Pisba. When Bolívar arrived in [[Socha]] on July 6 his army was in a weaknenedweakened state and at its most vulnerable, however Barreiro preferred to stay garrisoned andin Tunja in order to concentrate his forces that had been dispersed throughout the region in Tunja at the timeprovince. Viceroy SamanoSámano grew frustrated with this approach and decided to relieve Barreiro of his command and replace him with Colonel Sebastian de la Calzada, who was commander of the 400 strong European Aragon Battalion which guarded Santa Fe, as commander of the III Division dispatching him to Tunja at once.<ref>Albi de la Cuesta, Julio (2019) p.386 </ref> Barreiro however refused to obey this order as it would "Stain his honor as a military officer" and also told the Viceroy that only General Pablo Morillo had the authority to relieve him of his command, as a result he ordered de la Calzada to return to Santa Fe.<ref>Friede Alter, Juan (1969) p.99-100. Carta de Barreiro a Samano 8 de Julio 1819 Tunja [Letter from Barreiro to Samano 8 July 1819, Tunja]</ref>

During this time BolivarBolívar remained near Socha as he began to rebuild his weakened army, this was aided with the support of the local people of the Tunja Province (nowmodern Boyacaday: [[Boyacá Department]]) who sewed uniforms, provided men for the army, as well as horses to replace the losses suffered during the crossing of the Paramo.<ref>Riaño, Camilo. ''La Campaña Libertadora de 1819'', 167-168</ref> The support of the local people for the Patriot Army had been noted by the Royalist officials, with Barreiro complaining about this in his communications with Viceroy Samano. While the bulk of the army rested for 4 days in Socha, BolivarBolívar dispatchedordered Santander's Vanguard force to take control of the nearby towns of [[Corrales, Boyacá|Corrales]] and [[Gámeza|Gameza]], GamezaGámeza in partiicularparticular was important strategically as there was a bridge there that crosses the Gameza river which was swollen during this time of year. On July 7 this vanguard force engaged in small skirmishes with patrolling Royalist squads dispatched from Sogamoso by the local Spanish commander Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Gonzalez. As reports of the Patriot troops taking nearby towns reached Gonzalez he decided to fall back from Sogamoso toward Tunja.

As a result of these circumstances Barreiro advanced along the banks of the Chicamocha River where set up his HQ in a place known as MolinosTopaga de TopagaMills, once there he sent reinforcements in order to support his forces near Corrales as well as sending reinforcements to Gameza.<ref>Riaño, Camilo. ''La Campaña Libertadora de 1819'', 182</ref> These reinforcements pushed back the Patriot advances, with the Patriot Cavalry being chased down by Spanish forces past the town of Corrales where they were forced to throw themselves into the river in order to escape the Spanish with 20 men dead and 5 captured in the process while Patriot infantry was almost entirely wiped out. With this Barreiro achieved a partial victory of which he informed the Viceroy about in his letter. After the battle a large group of Patriot prisoners were tied up in a group and executed by bayonet on the orders of Barreiro to conserve ammuniton.<ref>Gutierrez Ardilia, Daniel (2019) p.68</ref>

Barreiro considering that the Numancia battalion could be cut off from retreating along the river, ordered its unit commander, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Tolrá, to withdraw his battalion to the left bank, that is, behind the bridge, taking into account the direction of the river. Bolivar saw this movement, and ordered the Cazadores Battalion as well as a company from each of the Rifles, Barcelona and Bravos of Páez battalions to charge the royalists.<ref>Riaño, Camilo. ''La Campaña Libertadora de 1819'', 189</ref> This led both the patriots and royalists, to take defensive positions on both sides of the river with both attempting to cross each others sides various times to no avail, the battle lasted between 5 and 8 hours with neither able to cross both armies withdrew to their previous positions. As a result of the battle the Patriots suffered 180 casaulties with Santander himself being lightly wounded as well as Colonel Antonio Arriendo being mortally wounded and dying a few days later leading his second in command [[Joaquín París Ricaurte|Joaquin Paris]] being promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and being given command of the Cazadores Battalion. <ref>Moreno de Angel, Pilar (1989) p. 421-422</ref><ref>Riaño, Camilo. ''La Campaña Libertadora de 1819'', 191</ref>The Royalists suffered 74 casaulties, during the encounter both sides expended a large amount of ammuntion during the battle with the Spanish having expended 35,000 Paper cartridges (39 shots per soldierssoldier) which madeforced Barreiro request more ammuntion from the Viceroy.<ref>Gutierrez Ardila, Daniel. p. 69</ref><ref>Riaño, Camilo. ''La Campaña Libertadora de 1819'', 192</ref>

After the results of the Battle of Gameza, Bolivar changed his strategy disregarding his initial plan for a frontal assault on Sogamoso and instead opting for a flanking manuevour through Cerinza Valley. This movement caused Barreiro to fall back towards the town of [[Paipa]] where he hoped to intercept him. By 22 July the British Legion had finally crossed Páramo de Pisba and rejoined the army, the Patriot army now numbered around 2,400 men. Bolivar now at full strength, still aimed to reach the capital Santa Fe through the main Camino Real, however he would need to cross the swollen [[Chicamocha River]] in order to do this. On 23 July the Patriot army began building rafts to ford the river, these would be completed by late 24 July. On the early hours of July 25 the Patriot Army attempted to cross the Chicamocha River near an area called Puente de Balsa, this crossing would be complicated by the collapse of some of the rafts delayingwhich delayed the army significantly. SpiesThis delay was noticed by royalist spies in the vicinity who informed Barreiro of this, Barreiro camped in Paipa now knew Bolivar intended to take the road from Salitre and Paipa. The Royalist Army was able to muster 1,800 men as troops from the surrounding areas finally rejoined the bulk of the army. Barreiro moved quickly to place his troops on favorable ground on top of Picacho and Cangrejo hills in an area near Vargas Swamp that served as a chokepoint between the Salitre to Paipa road arriving there at 11am. The Patriot Army arrived at 12pm and immediately did battle with the Royalist Army.

The [[Battle of Vargas Swamp]] lasted 5 hours as the Patriot Army tried repeatedly to dislodge the Spanish from their positions on Picacho Hill and Cangrejo Hill. Time and time again the Royalists were able to hold off and push back the Patriots. Around 5pm the Patriots began to fall back in disarray, Barreiro committed his reserve infantry and cavalry for a frontal assault in tandem with a flanking maneuver in order to encircle the patriots to finish them off. Bolivar in an act of desperation committed his reserve cavalry under the command of Colonel Juan José Rondón who led an uphill charge with 14 lancers that managed to penetrate the Spanish line on Cangrejo Hill. Rondón's charge caught the Spanish off guard as the Hussars of Ferdinand VII had dismounted to support the infantry. Rondón's charge was followed by an infantry attack by Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Infante that finally dislodged the Spanish forces off of Cangrejo Hill. At the same time Santander's Vanguard force along with the British Legion under Rooke force, led a renewed bayonet charge up Picacho Hill which dislodged the Spanish forces there as well, however Rooke would be mortally wounded as a result of the charge dying a few days later. While the Royalists had been pushed back, their forces were mostly intact and were able to avoid further destruction thanks to a tropical rainstorm that covered their withdrawal towards Paipa. The Patriot army also withdrew to the Chicamocha River. This uphill battle for Bolivar was a close victory, however it was ultimately indecisive as neither side decimatedwas able to decimate the other. Both armies suffered heavy loses as a result, with Barreiro suffering around 400-500 dead and Bolivar 300 dead as well numerous wounded. This would be the bloodiest battle of the campaign.

After the Battle of Vargas Swamp, the losses suffered by Bolivar's army had been left the army nonoperational, asto aremedy resultthis he decreed [[Martial law|martial law]] in the area on 28 July and conscripted all men from the ages 14 to 60 to rebuild his force,. heThe Patriot Army rested them until 4 August, when he ordered a return to Venezuela. However, during the night, he redirected his forces towards Tunja, and took the city by mid-day of 5 August 1819. Due to Bolivar's flash conquest, Barreiro was obliged to mobilize his troops to defend the capital, Santafé, from Bolivar.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} The Royalist men took the fastest route to Bogota (which led through the Boyacá Bridge), but were unable to pass, as Bolivar intercepted them in the early morning of 7 August. Bolivar's republican troops were composed of approximately 2,850 men, which successfully divided and defeated the 2,670 royalist soldiers in a battle that lasted two hours.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} The battle resulted in the death of 66 republicans, 250 royalists, as well as the capture of approximately 1,600 of the remaining royal troops.{{Citation needed|date=March 2024}} At the [[Battle of Boyacá]] on 7 August 1819, the bulk of the royalist army surrendered to Bolívar.