Energiewende: Difference between revisions

Content deleted Content added
m Copyedit (minor)
Clean up/copyedit
Line 62:
=== Initial phase 2013–2016 ===
[[File:Energy transition scenario in Germany.png|thumb|Energy transition scenario in Germany from 2012]]
After the 2013 federal elections, the new [[Christian Democratic Union of Germany]] (CDU) /[[Christian Social Union in Bavaria]] (CSU) and [[Social Democratic Party of Germany]] (SPD) coalition government continued the ''Energiewende'', with minor modification of its goals in the coalition agreement. The coalition government introduced an intermediate target of a 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2035.<ref name="german-energy-blog-2013">{{cite web | title = Overview CDU/CSU and SPD present Coalition Agreement – 55% to 60% renewables by 2035 and more | date = 27 November 2013 | website = German Energy Blog | location = Germany | url = http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?page_id=14825 | access-date = 16 June 2016}}</ref> TheseThe targets were described as "ambitious".<ref name="buchan-2012">{{cite book|last=Buchan|first=David|url=https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SP-261.pdf|title=The Energiewende — Germany's gamble|date=June 2012|publisher=Oxford Institute for Energy Studies|isbn=978-1-907555-52-7|place=Oxford, UK|access-date=12 May 2016}}</ref> The Berlin-based [[Think tank|policy institute]] [[Agora Energiewende]] noted that "while the German approach is not unique worldwide, the speed and scope of the ''Energiewende'' are exceptional".<ref name="agora-2015-a">{{cite book|author=Agora Energiewende|url=http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_EW/Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende.pdf|title=Understanding the Energiewende: FAQ on the ongoing transition of the German power system|publisher=[[Agora Energiewende]]|year=2015|place=Berlin, Germany|access-date=29 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160602074457/https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_EW/Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende.pdf|archive-date=2 June 2016}}</ref> A particular characteristic of the ''Energiewende'' compared to other planned energy transitions was the expectation that the transition is driven by citizens and not large energy utilities.{{disputed inline|date=March 2019}} Germany's switch to renewablesrenewable energy was described as "democratization of the energy supply".<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Jungjohann|first1=Arne|url=https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319318905|title=Energy Democracy. Germany's Energiewende to Renewables.|last2=Morris|first2=Craig|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2016|isbn=978-3-319-31890-5}}</ref> The ''Energiewende'' also sought a greater transparency in relation to national [[energy policy]] formation.<ref name="acatech-et al-2016-b">{{cite book|url=http://www.akademienunion.de/fileadmin/redaktion/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Energy_scenarios.pdf|title=Consulting with energy scenarios: requirements for scientific policy advice|publisher=acatech — National Academy of Science and Engineering|year=2016|isbn=978-3-8047-3550-7|editor1=acatech|place=Berlin, Germany|access-date=9 November 2016|editor2=Lepoldina|editor3=Akademienunion|archive-date=9 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161109093507/http://www.akademienunion.de/fileadmin/redaktion/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Energy_scenarios.pdf}}</ref>
 
As of 2013, Germany was spending €1.5 billion per year on energy research to solve the technical and social issues raised by the transition,<ref name="Schiermeier-2013">{{cite news|last=Schiermeier|first=Quirin|date=10 April 2013|title=Renewable power: Germany's energy gamble: an ambitious plan to slash greenhouse-gas emissions must clear some highly technical and economic hurdles|work=Nature|url=http://www.nature.com/news/renewable-power-germany-s-energy-gamble-1.12755|access-date=1 May 2016|doi=10.1038/496156a}}</ref> which are provided by the individual federal states, universities, and the government, which provided €400 million per year.<ref name=":0">{{Cite journal|last=Curry|first=Andrew|date=27 March 2019|title=Germany faces its future as a pioneer in sustainability and renewable energy|journal=Nature|language=en|volume=567|issue=7749|pages=S51–S53|doi=10.1038/d41586-019-00916-1|pmid=30918376|bibcode=2019Natur.567S..51C|doi-access=free}}</ref> The governmentGovernment's contribution was increased to €800 million in 2017.<ref name=":0" />
 
Important aspects included ({{as of|2016|November|lc=yes}}):
Line 126:
}}</ref>
 
TheseThe targets went well beyond [[European Union]] legislation and the national policies of other European states. The policy objectives have been embraced by the German federalFederal governmentGovernment and has resulted in a huge expansion of renewablesrenewable energy, particularly wind power. Germany's share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 22.9% in 2012, surpassing the [[OECD]] average of 18% usage of renewables.<ref name="economist-2012">
{{cite news
| title = Germany's energy transformation Energiewende
Line 134:
| access-date = 14 June 2016
}}</ref>
Producers have been guaranteed a fixed [[feed-in tariff]] for 20 years, guaranteeing a fixed income. Energy co-operatives have been created, and efforts were made to decentralize control and profits. However, in some cases poorPoor investment designs have caused bankruptcies and low [[Return on investment|returns]], and unrealistic promises have been shown to be far from reality.<ref name="latsch-etal-2014">
{{cite news
| first1 = Gunther | last1 = Latsch
Line 150:
Nuclear power plants were closed, and the existing nine plants were scheduled to close earlier than planned, in 2022.
 
OneA factor that has inhibited efficient employment of new renewable energy has been the lack of an accompanying investment in power infrastructure to bring the power to market. It is believed 8,300&nbsp;{{convert|8300|km|mi|abbr=on}} of power lines must be built or upgraded.<ref name="economist-2012" /> In 2010 legislation has been passed seeking construction and upgrade of 7'700&nbsp;{{convert|7700|km|mi|abbr=on}} of new grid lines, but only {{convert|950&nbsp;|km|mi|abbr=on}} have been built by 2019 — and in 2017, only {{convert|30&nbsp;|km|mi|abbr=on}} has been built.<ref name=":5" />
 
The different [[States of Germany|German States]] have varying attitudes to the construction of new power lines. Industry has had their rates frozen and so the increased costs of the ''Energiewende'' havehad been passed on to consumers, who have had rising electricity bills. Germans in 2013 had some of the highest electricity [[price]]s (including taxes) in Europe.<ref>
{{cite news
| title = Troubled turn: Germany's national energy project is becoming a cause for disunion
Line 161:
}}</ref> In comparison, its neighbours (Poland, Sweden, Denmark and nuclear-reliant France) have some of the lowest [[cost]]s (excluding taxes) in the EU.<ref name="esIndu">[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Electricity_price_statistics#Electricity_prices_for_industrial_consumers Electricity prices for industrial consumers] ''[[Eurostat]]'', October 2015</ref><ref>[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/4/4f/Half-yearly_electricity_and_gas_prices_%28EUR%29.png Electricity prices (table)] ''[[Eurostat]]'', October 2016</ref>
 
On 1 August 2014, a revised [[German Renewable Energy Sources Act|Renewable Energy Sources Act]] entered into force. Specific deploymentDeployment corridors stipulated the extent to which renewable energy is to be expanded in the future and the funding rates ([[feed-in tariff]]s) will no longer be fixed by the government, but will be determined by auction.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a" />
 
Market redesign was perceived as a key part of the ''Energiewende''. The German [[electricity market]] needed to be reworked to suit.<ref name="agora-2013">
Line 173:
| access-date = 29 April 2016
}}</ref>
Among other things, windWind and solar power cannot be principally refinanced under the current [[marginal cost]] based market. [[Carbon price|Carbon pricing]] is also central to the ''Energiewende'', and the [[European Union Emissions Trading Scheme]] (EU ETS) needs to be reformed to create a genuine [[scarcity]] of certificates.<ref name="agora-2015-b">
{{cite book
| author = Agora Energiewende
Line 183:
| access-date = 29 April 2016
}}</ref>
The German federalFederal governmentGovernment is calling for sucha reform.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a">
{{cite book
| title = Making a success of the energy transition: on the road to a secure, clean and affordable energy supply
Line 203:
| url = http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Kohlekonsens/Agora_Kohlekonsens_KF_EN_WEB.pdf
| access-date = 29 April 2016
}}</ref> but as German minister of economy noted, "we cannot shut down both our nuclear and coal-fired power plants".<ref>{{Cite news|last=SPIEGEL|first=Melanie Amann, Gerald Traufetter, DER|title=The Climate Activist vs. the Economics Minister: 'My Generation Has Been Fooled' – DER SPIEGEL – International|url=https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-climate-activist-vs-the-economics-minister-my-generation-has-been-fooled-a-1258429.html|access-date=21 July 2020|newspaper=Der Spiegel|date=19 March 2019|language=en}}</ref> Coal comprised 42% of electricity generation in 2015. If Germany is to limit its contribution to a [[Global warming|global temperature increase]] to 1.5{{nbsp}}°C above pre-industrial levels, as declared in the 2015 [[Paris Agreement]], a completeA phase-out of [[fossil fuels]] together with a shift to [[100% renewable energy]] is required by about 2040.<ref name="quaschning-2016">
{{cite book
| first = Volker | last = Quaschning
Line 217:
}}</ref>
 
The ''Energiewende'' is made up of various technical building blocks and assumptions. [[Electricity storage]], while too expensive at the beginning of the program, was hoped to become a useful technology in the future.<ref name="agora-2014">
{{cite book
| author = Agora Energiewende
Line 240:
| url = https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/108856/1/820492299.pdf
| access-date = 9 June 2016
}}</ref> As of 2019, however asa number of potential storage projects (power-to-gas, hydrogen storage and others) are still in prototype phase with losses up to 40% of the stored energy in the existing small scale installations.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Shellenberger|first=Michael|title=The Reason Renewables Can't Power Modern Civilization Is Because They Were Never Meant To|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/05/06/the-reason-renewables-cant-power-modern-civilization-is-because-they-were-never-meant-to/|access-date=21 July 2020|website=Forbes|language=en}}</ref>
 
[[Efficient energy use|Energy efficiency]] plays a key but under-recognised role.<ref>{{cite book
Line 252:
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160602080036/https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2012/positive-effekte-energieeffizienz/Agora_ECF_RAP_System_Benefit_Study_short_version_web.pdf
| archive-date = 2 June 2016
}}</ref> Improved energyEnergy efficiency is one of Germany's official targets. Greater integrationIntegration with adjoining national [[electricity network]]s can offer mutual benefits. — indeed, systemsSystems with high shares of renewables can use geographical diversity to offset intermittency.<ref>
{{cite book
| author = Agora Energiewende
Line 273:
| doi = 10.1038/496156a
}}</ref>
Of that theThe German federalFederal governmentGovernment spent €820{{nbsp}}million supporting projects ranging from basic research to applications.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a" /> The federal government also foresees an export role for German expertise in the area.<ref name="bmwi-2015-a" />
 
The social and political dimensions of the ''Energiewende'' have been subject to study. Sebastian Strunz argues that the underlying technological, political and economic structures will need to change radically — a process heHe calls "regime shift".<ref name="strunz-2014">
{{cite journal
| last = Strunz | first = Sebastian
Line 289:
| hdl-access = free
}}</ref>
Eva Schmid, Brigitte Knopf, and Anna Pechan analyseanalyze the actors and institutions that will be decisive in the ''Energiewende'' and how latency in the national electricity [[infrastructure]] may restrict progress.<ref>
{{cite book
| last1 = Schmid | first1 = Eva
Line 300:
}}</ref>
 
On 3 December 2014, the German federalFederal governmentGovernment released its National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE) in order to improve the uptake of energy efficiency.<ref name="nape">
{{cite web
| title = National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE): making more out of energy
Line 317:
The areas covered are the energy efficiency of buildings, energy conservation for companies, consumer energy efficiency, and transport energy efficiency. German industry is expected to make a sizeable contribution.
 
An official federalFederal governmentGovernment report on progress under the ''Energiewende'', updated for 2014, notes that:<ref name="bmwi-2015-b" />
* energy consumption fell by 4.7% in 2014 (from 2013) and at {{val|13132}}{{nbsp}}petajoules reached its lowest level since 1990
* renewable generation is the number-one source of electricity