1948 and After: Difference between revisions

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Here Morris examines the evolving attitudes to "the Arab problem" as it appeared in the two dominant parties, [[Mapam]] and [[Mapai]] in 1948. Of the minor parties only the Revisionists spoke with a clear voice. (p.&nbsp;51:) On 13 May [[Lehi (group)|LHI]] declared: <blockquote>A strong attack on the centres of the Arab population will intensify the movement of refugees and all the roads in the direction of Transjordan and the neighbouring countries will be filled with panic-stricken masses and [this] will hamper the [enemy's] military movement, as happened during the collapse of France [in World War II] ... A great opportunity has been given us.... The whole of this land is ours....</blockquote>
 
====(p. 53:): Mapai====
Morris examines the "paper trail" on the "Arab question", and writes that the most striking thing about [[Mapai]] is that the party—according to the "paper trail"—hardly ever discussed it.
 
The first to break the silence was [[Golda Meir]], who, after a visit to the deserted Arab quarters of [[Haifa]] argued on 11 May that the party now had to determine Israeli behaviour towards the Arabs that remained. Her calls for a full-scale party debate on the issue was not heeded. Morris writes (p. 55): "It was as if a large stone had been thrown into a pool—but had caused no ripple at all."
The only full-scale Mapai party debate in 1948 took place 24 July. Some quotes from that debate:
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(p. 59–61): [[Aharon Cohen]], leader of the Mapam's Arab department wrote a memorandum called: "Our Arab Policy in the Midst of the War", 10 May. In his notes for the memorandum, penned 6 May 1948, he wrote: "a deliberate eviction [of the Arabs] is taking place.... Others may rejoice—I, as a socialist, am ashamed and afraid.... To win the war and lose the peace ... the state [of Israel], when it arises, will live on its sword." In the memorandum, he wrote: "... out of certain political goals and not only out of military necessity' the Arabs were driven out. "In practice, a ... "transfer" of the Arabs out of the area of the Jewish state was being carried out', and this would eventually redound against the [[Yishuv]], both militarily (by increasing pan-Arab anger) and politically.
(p.&nbsp;66): Cohen had charged that "it had depended on us whether the Arabs stayed or fled ... [They had fled] and this was [the implementation of] Ben-Gurion's line in which our comrades are [also] active"" <br />
(p.&nbsp;64): Ya'acov Hazan, a [[Kibbutz Artzi]] leader specifically denounced the way the Haganah had treated the Arabs who had stayed put. In [[Abu Shusha]], a village near his home kibbutz, the Haganah had completely bulldozed the village, instead of distinguishing between houses belonging to friends and houses belonging to foes of the Yishuv. He spoke of Haganah "killing, robbery, rape. I don't think our army should be like any army." <br />
(p. 65): Mapam co-leader Ya'ari, 14 June: "In truth, thousands [of Palestinians] did flee, but not always of their own will. There were shameful episodes.... There was no necessity for all the villages to be emptied..." "
 
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===Yosef Weitz and the Transfer Committees, 1948–1949===
This article was first published in [[Middle Eastern Studies]] in 1986. <br />
 
[[Yosef Weitz]] was the director of [[Jewish National Fund]]'s Land Department, who from the 1930s was responsible for land acquisition (mostly from Arabs) for the [[Yishuv]]. He was instrumental in establishing the "Transfer Committees".
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