Modularity of mind: Difference between revisions

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# Fixed neural architecture.
 
[[Zenon Pylyshyn|Pylyshyn]] (1999) has argued that while these properties tend to occur with modules, one—information encapsulation—stands out as being the real signature of a module; that is the encapsulation of the processes inside the module from both cognitive influence and from cognitive access.<ref>Pylyshyn, Z.W. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(3), 341-423. [http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/bbs1999_reprint.pdf Full text] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511184911/http://ruccs.rutgers.edu/ftp/pub/papers/bbs1999_reprint.pdf |date=2008-05-11 }}</ref> One example is that conscious awareness of the [[Müller-Lyer illusion]] being an illusion does not correct visual processing.<ref name=FP2007/>
 
==Evolutionary psychology and massive modularity==