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the campaigns in central and eastern Europe, directed by
Napoleon no longer one amongst many French generals,
nor even a simple ''primus inter pares'', but "Emperor"“Emperor” in
the fullest sense between the years 1804 and 1814. Napoleon's
short Spanish Campaign of 1809 is dealt with under [[../Peninsular War|{{SC|Peninsular War}}]] (this article covering the campaigns in Spain, Portugal and
Line 158:
valley of the Danube is clearly indicated in his reply (November
27th, 1803) to a Prussian proposal for the neutralization of the
South German states. In this he says, "It“It is on the road from
Strassburg to Vienna that the French must force peace on
Austria, and it is this road which you wish us to renounce."”
When, therefore, on the 25th of August 1805, he learnt definitely
that Villeneuve (see ''[[#Naval Operations|Naval operations]]'' below) had failed in his
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Bamberg. The left column was composed of the V. (Lannes)
[[File:EB1911-19-0220-a-Napoleonic Campaigns, Jena Campaign.jpg|left|thumb|400px]]
at Hemmendorf, with the VII. (Augereau) extending south to
the Main at Burgebrach.
 
Napoleon's object being surprise, all the cavalry except a
few vedettes were kept back behind the leading infantry columns
and these latter were ordered to advance, on the signal being
given, in "masses“masses of manœuvre,"” so as to crush at once any
outpost resistance which was calculated upon the time required
for the deployment of ordinary marching columns. This order
has never since found an imitator, but deserves attentive study
as a masterpiece (see H. Bonnal, ''Manœuvre d'Iéna'').
 
To meet the impending blow the Prussians had been extended
To meet the impending blow the Prussians had been extended in a cordon along the great road leading from Mainz to Dresden, Blücher was at Erfurt, Rüchel at Gotha, Hohenlohe at Weimar, Saxons in Dresden, with outposts along the frontier. An offensive move into Franconia was under discussion, and for this purpose the Prussian staff had commenced a lateral concentration about Weimar, Jena and Naumburg when the storm burst upon them. The emperor gathered little from the confused reports of their purposeless manœuvres, but, secure in the midst of his "battalion square" of 200,000 men, he remained quite indifferent, well knowing that an advance straight on Berlin must force his enemy to concentrate and fight, and as they would bring at most 127,000 men on to the battlefield the result could hardly be doubtful. On the 9th of October the cloud burst. Out of the forests which clothe the northern slopes of the Thuringer Wald the French streamed forth, easily overpowering the resistance of the Prussian outposts on the upper Saale,<ref>At the action of Saalfeld on the 10th, the young and gallant Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia was killed.</ref> and once the open country was reached the cavalry under Murat trotted to the front, closely followed by Bernadottes corps as "general advance guard." The result of the cavalry scouting was however unsatisfactory. On the night of the 10th,
in a cordon along the great road leading from Mainz to Dresden,
Blücher was at Erfurt, Rüchel at Gotha, Hohenlohe at Weimar,
Saxons in Dresden, with outposts along the frontier. An
offensive move into Franconia was under discussion, and for
this purpose the Prussian staff had commenced a lateral concentration
about Weimar, Jena and Naumburg when the storm
burst upon them. The emperor gathered little from the confused
reports of their purposeless manœuvres, but, secure in the midst
of his “battalion square” of 200,000 men, he remained quite
indifferent, well knowing that an advance straight on Berlin
must force his enemy to concentrate and fight, and as they
would bring at most 127,000 men on to the battlefield the
result could hardly be doubtful. On the 9th of October the cloud
burst. Out of the forests which clothe the northern slopes of
the Thuringer Wald the French streamed forth, easily overpowering
the resistance of the Prussian outposts on the upper
Saale,<ref>At the action of Saalfeld on the 10th, the young and gallant Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia was killed.</ref> and once the open country was reached the cavalry
under Murat trotted to the front, closely followed by Bernadotte's
corps as “general advance guard.” The result of the cavalry
scouting was however unsatisfactory. On the night of the 10th,
<!--column 2-->
the emperor was still unaware of the position of his principal
foe, and Murat with Bernadotte behind him was directed on
Gera for the 11th, the remainder of the army con tinuing continuing
along the roads previously assigned to
them.
 
In the meanwhile, however, the Saxons had been
Leipzig moving from Naumburg through Gera on Jena,
Hohenlohe was near Weimar, and all the other
divisions of the army had closed in a march n
eastwards, the idea of an offensive to the south 1 ward southward
which Napoleon had himself attributed to
them having already disappeared.
 
Reaching Gera at 9 {{sc|a.m.}} Murat reported the Altenburgo
movement of the Saxons on the previous day,
but omitted to send a strong detachment in
pursuit. The traces of the Saxons were lost, and .,era
Napoleon, little satisfied with his cavalry, author ized authorized
Lasalle to offer up to 6000 frs. reward for
information of the Prussian point of concentration.
At 1 {{sc|a.m.}} of the 12th Napoleon issued his orders.
Murat and Bernadotte via Zeitz to Naumburg;
Davout (III. corps and a dragoon division) also to
Naumburg; Lannes to Jena, Augereau following;
Soult to Gera.
 
{{section|Prussian Movements}}15. ''Prussian Movements.''—In the meantime
the Prussians were effecting their concentration.
Rüchel, who with 15,000 men had been sent into
the mountains as an advanced guard for the projected
offensive, was recalled to Weimar, which
he reached on the 13th. The main body were
between Weimar and Apolda during the 12th, and
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been concentrated against Lannes and Augereau
the afternoon of the 13th, whilst Soult could only
have intervened very late in the day, and Davout and Bernadotte
were still too distant to reach the battlefield before the
14th. All the French corps, moreover, were so exhausted by
their rapid marches over bad roads that the emperor actually
Line 602 ⟶ 652:
Davout, Bernadotte, Lannes and Murat.
 
The Prussian headquarters, however, spent the 12th and 13th
The Prussian headquarters, however, spent the 12th and 13th in idle discussion, whilst the troop commanders exerted themselves to obtain some alleviation for the suffering of their starving men. The defeats undergone by their outpost detachment had profoundly affected the nerves of the troops, and on the afternoon. of the 11th, on the false alarm of a French approach, a panic broke out in the streets of Jena, and it took all the energy of Hohenlohe and his staff to restore order. On the morning of the 12th the Saxon commanding officers approached Hohenlohe with a statement of the famishing condition of their men, and threatened to withdraw them again to Saxony. Hohenlohe pointed out that the Prussians were equally badly off, but promised to do his best to help his allies. Urgent messages were sent off to the Commissary von Goethe (the poet), at Weimar for permission to requisition food and firewood. These requests, however, remained unanswered, and the Prussians and Saxons spent the night before the battle shivering in their miserable bivouacs.
in idle discussion, whilst the troop commanders exerted themselves
to obtain some alleviation for the suffering of their
starving men. The defeats undergone by their outpost detachment
had profoundly affected the nerves of the troops, and
on the afternoon. of the 11th, on the false alarm of a French
approach, a panic broke out in the streets of Jena, and it took
all the energy of Hohenlohe and his staff to restore order. On
the morning of the 12th the Saxon commanding officers
approached Hohenlohe with a statement of the famishing
condition of their men, and threatened to withdraw them
again to Saxony. Hohenlohe pointed out that the Prussians
were equally badly off, but promised to do his best to help
his allies. Urgent messages were sent off to the Commissary
von Goethe (the poet), at Weimar for permission to requisition
food and firewood. These requests, however, remained
unanswered, and the Prussians and Saxons spent the night
before the battle shivering in their miserable bivouacs.
 
{{section|The 13th of October}}16. ''The 13th of October.''—During the early morning of the 13th
the reports brought to Napoleon at Gera partially cleared up
the situation, though the real truth was very different from
what he supposed. However, it was evident that the bulk of
the Prussians lay to his left, and instructions were at once
despatched to Davout to turn westward from Naumburg towards Ksen
Kösen and to bring Bernadotte with him if the two were still
together. The letter, however, ended with the words "but“but I
hope he is already on his way to Dornburg."” Now Bernadotte
{{page break|221|left}}
had neglected to keep the emperor informed as to his whereabouts. He was still with Davout, but, concluding that he had missed an order directing him to Dornburg, he thought to conceal his error by assuming the receipt of the order evidently alluded to in the last words, and as a result he marched towards Dornburg, and his whole corps was lost to the emperor at the crisis of the next days battle.
 
On the road from Gera to Jena Napoleon was met by intelligence from Lannes announcing his occupation of Jena and the discovery of Prussian troops to the northward. Knowing the emperors methods, he wisely restrained the ardour of his subordinates and asked for instructions whether to attack or wait. The emperor rode forward rapidly, reached Jena about 3 {{sc|p.m.}}, and with Lannes proceeded to the Landgrafenberg to reconnoitre. From this point his view was, however, restricted to the immediate foreground, and he only saw the camps of Hohenlohes left wing. At this moment the Prussians were actually on parade and ready to move off to attack, but just then the "evil“evil genius"genius” of the Prussian army, von Massenbach, an officer of the Headquarter Staff, rode up and claiming to speak with the authority of the king and commander-in-chief, induced Hohenlohe to order his troops back to camp. Of all this Napoleon saw nothing, but from all reports he came to the conclusion that the whole Prussian army was actually in front of him, and at once issued orders for his whole army to concentrate towards Jena, marching all night if need be. Six hours earlier his conclusion would have been correct, but early that morning the Prussian headquarters, alarmed for the safaty of their line of retreat on Berlin by the presence of the French in Naumburg, decided to leave Hohenlohe and Rüchel to act as rear-guard, and with the main body to commence their retreat towards the river Unstrutt and the Eckhardtsberge where Massenbach had previously reconnoitred an ideal battlefield. This belief in. positions was the cardinal principle of Prussian strategy in these days. The troops had accordingly commenced their march on the morning of the I3th, and now at 3 {{sc|p.m.}} were settling down into bivouac; they were still but a short march from the decisive field.
 
{{section|Battle of Jena}}17. ''Battle of Jena.''—On the French side, Lannes' men were working their hardest, under Napoleon's personal supervision, to make a practicable road up to the Landgrafenberg, and all night long the remaining corps struggled through darkness towards the rendezvous. By daybreak on the 14th, the anniversary of Elchingen, upwards of 60,000 men stood densely
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{{section|Campaigns in Poland and East Prussia}}20. ''Campaigns in Poland and East Prussia.''—Hitherto the French had been operating in a rich country, untouched for half a century past by the ravages of war, but as the necessity for a campaign against the Russians confronted the emperor, he realized that his whole supply and transport service must be put on a different footing. After the wants of the cavalry and artillery had been provided for, there remained but little material for transport work. Exhaustive orders to organize the necessary trains were duly issued, but the emperor seems to have had no conception of the difficulties the tracks—there were no metalled roads—of Poland were about to present to him. Moreover, it was one thing to issue orders, but quite another to ensure that they were obeyed, for they entailed a complete transformation in the mental attitude of the French soldier towards all that he had been taught to consider his duties in the field. Experience only can teach the art of packing wagons and the care of draught animals, and throughout the campaign the small ponies of Poland and East Prussia broke down by thousands from over loading and unskilful packing.
 
{{section|The Russian Army}}21. ''The Russian Army'' formed the most complete contrast to the French that it is possible to imagine. Though clad, armed and organized in European fashion, the soldiers retained in a marked degree the traditions of their Mongolian forerunners, their transport wagons were in type the survival of ages of experience, and their care for their animals equally the result of hereditary habit. The intelligence of the men and regimental officers was very low, but on the other hand service was practically for life, and the regiment the only home the great majority bad ever known. Hence obedience was instinctive and initiative almost undreamt of. Moreover, they were essentially a war-trained army, for even in peace time their long marches to and fro within the empire had most thoroughly inured them to hardship and privation. Napoleon might have remembered his own saying, "La“La misre est l'école du bon soldat."” In cavalry they were weak, for the Russian does not take kindly to equitation and the horses were not equal to the accepted European standard of weight, while the Cossack was only formidable to stragglers and wounded. Their artillery was numerous and for the most part of heavy calibre—18- and 24-pounders were commonbut—the strength of the army lay in its infantry, with its incomparable tenacity in defence and its blind confidence in the bayonet in attack. The traditions of Suvarov and his victories in Italy (see [[../French Revolutionary Wars|{{SC|French Revolutionary Wars}}]]) were still fresh, but there was no longer a Suvarov to lead them.
 
{{section|Advance to the Vistula}}22. ''Advance to the Vistula.''—Napoleon had from the first been aware of the secret alliance between Prussia and Russia, sworn by their respective sovereigns over the grave of Frederick the Great, and this knowledge had been his principal reason for precipitating hostilities with the former. He remained, however, in complete ignorance of the degree of preparation attained on the Russian side, and since the seizure of Warsaw together with the control of the resources of Poland in men and material its occupation would afford, was the chief factor in his calculation, he turned at once to the eastward as soon as all further organized resistance in Prussia was ended by the surrender of Prenzlau and Ltibeck. Scarcely leaving his troops time to restore their worn-out footgear, or for the cavalry to replace their jaded horses from captured Prussian resources, he set Davout in motion towards Warsaw on the 2nd of November, and the remainder of the army followed in successive echelons as rapidly as they could be despatched.
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Unfortunately, Ney with his VI. corps about Gilgenberg had received the most poverty-stricken district in the whole region, and to secure some alleviation for the sufferings of his men he incautiously extended his cantonments till they came in contact with the Russian outposts. Apparently seeing in this movement a recommencement of hostilities, Bennigsen concentrated his troops towards his right and commenced an advance westwards towards Danzig, which w~s still in Prussian hands. Before his advance both Ney and Bernadotte (the latter, between Ney and the Baltic, covering the siege of Danzig) were compelled to fall back. It then became necessary to disturb the repose of the whole army to counter the enemy's intentions. The latter by this movement, however, uncovered his own communication with Russia, and the emperor was quick to seize his opportunity. He received the information on the 28th of January. His orders were at once issued and complied with with such celerity that by the 3 ist he stood prepared to advance with the corps of Soult, Ney, Davout and Augereau, the Guard and the reserve cavalry (8o,oco men on a front of 60 m.) from Myszienec through Wollenberg to Gilgenberg; whilst Lannes on his right towards Ostrolenka and Lefebvre (X.) at Thorn covered his outer flanks.
 
Bernadotte, however, was missing, and this time through no fault of his own. His orders and the despatch conveying Napoleon's instructions fell into the hands of the Cossacks, and just in time Bennigsen's eyes were opened. Rapidly renouncing his previous intentions, he issued orders to concentrate on Allenstein; but this point was chosen too far in advance and he was anticipated by Murat and Soult at that place on the 2nd of February. He then determined to unite his forces at Joukendorf, but again he was too late. Soult and Murat attacked his rearguard on the 3rd, and learning from his Cossacks that the French corps were being directed so as to swing round and enclose him, he withdrew by a night march and ultimately succeeded in getting his whole army, with the exception of von Lestocq's Prussians, together in the strong position along the Alle, the centre of which is marked by Preussisch-Eylau. The opportunity for this concentration he owed to the time gained for him by his rearguard at Joukendorf, for this had stood just long enough to induce the French columns to swing in to surround him, and the next day was thus lost to the emperor as his corps had to extend again to their manceuvring intervals. The truth is that the days were too short and the roads too bad for Napoleon to carry out the full purpose his "general“general advanced guard"guard” was intended to fulfil. It was designed to hold the enemy in position by the vigour of its attack, thus neutralizing his independent will power and compelling him to expend his reserves in the effort to rescue the troops engaged. But in forests and snowdrifts the French made such slow progress that no sufficient deployment could be made until darkness put a stop to the fighting. Thus, when late on the 7th of February 1807 Murat and Soult overtook the enemy near [[../Eylau|Eylau]] (''q.v.'') the fighting was severe but not prolonged. This time, however, Bennigsen, with over 60,000 men in position and 15,000 Prussians expected to arrive next morning, had no desire to avoid a battle, and deployed for action, his front protected by great batteries of guns, many of them of heavy calibre, numbering some 200 in all.
 
During the night Augereau and the Guards had arrived, and Ney and Davout were expected on either flank in the forenoon. This time the emperor was determined his enemy should not escape him, and about 8 {{sc|a.m.}}, ordered Soult and Augereau on the left and right respectively to assail the enemy, Murat and the Guards remaining in the centre as reserve. Napoleon's own forces thus became the "general“general advanced guard"guard” for Ney and Davout, who were to close in on either side and deliver the decisive stroke. But here too the weather and the state of the roads operated adversely, for Ney came up too late, while Davout, in the full tide of his victorious advance, was checked by the arrival of Lestocq, whose corps Ney had failed to intercept,
{{page break|224|left}}
and the attack of Augereaus corps (VII.), made in a blinding snowstorm, failed with the appalling loss of over 40% killed and wounded. Augereau himself was severely wounded, and the remnant of his corps was subsequently distributed amongst the other corps. Bcnnigsen, however, drew off on Neys arrival, and the French were too much exhausted to pursue him. Again the emperor had to admit that his troops could do no more, and bowing to necessity, he distributed them into winter quarters, where, however, the enterprise of the Cossacks, who were no strangers to snow and to forests, left the outposts but little repose.
Line 662 ⟶ 737:
A protracted period of rest followed, during which the emperor exerted himself unremittingly to re-equip, reinforce and supply his troops. Hitherto he had been based on the entrenched camp of Warsaw, but he had already taken steps to organize a new line of supply and retreat via Thorn, and this was now completed. At the same time Lefebvre was ordered to press the siege of Danzig with all vigour, and on the 5th of May, after a most gallant resistance, Kalckreuth, who redeemed here his failure of Auerstädt, surrendered. English assistance came too late. By the beginning of June the French had more than made good their losses and 210,000 men were available for field service.
 
{{section|Heilsberg and Friedland}}25. ''Heilsberg and Friedland.''—Meanwhile Bennigsen had prepared for a fresh undertaking, and leaving Lestocq with 20,000 Prussians and Russians to contain Bernadotte, who lay between Braunsberg and Spandau on the Passarge, he moved southwards on the 2nd, and on the 3rd and 4th of June he fell upon Ney, driving him back towards Guttstadt, whilst with the bulk of his force he moved towards Heilsberg, where he threw up an entrenched position. It was not till the 5th that Napoleon received tidings of his advance, and for the moment these were so vague that he contented himself by warning the remainder of his forces to be prepared to move on the 6th. Next day, however, all doubts were set at rest, and as the Russians advanced south of Heilsberg, he decided to wheel his whole force to the right, pivoting on the III. corps, and cut Bennigsen off from Königsberg and the sea. On the 8th the VI., III., VIII. and Guard corps, together with a new cavalry reserve corps under Lannes, in all 147,000, stood ready for the operation, and with Murat and Soult as "general“general advanced guard"guard” the whole moved forward, driving the Russian outposts before them. Bernadotte, who was to have attacked Lestocq, again failed to receive his orders and took no part in the following operations.
 
Murat attacked the Russians, who had halted in their entrenched position, on the 11th and drove in their outposts, but did not discover the entrenchments. Meanwhile Soult had followed with his infantry in dose support, and the emperor himself arriving, ordered him to attack at once. Now the Russians uncovered their entrenchments, and in the absence of artillery preparation Soult's leading troops received most severe punishment. Fresh troops arriving were sent in to his support, but these also proved insufficient, and darkness alone put an end to the struggle, which cost the French 12,000 killed and wounded.
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{{section|Austrian Offensive}}28. ''Austrian Offensive.''—The position of assembly was excellently chosen, but unfortunately the Austrians took the initiative. On the 9th of April their main body of six corps crossed the Inn between Braunau and Passau, and simultaneously two additional corps moved from Pilsen in Bohemia on Regensburg. At this moment Davout was entering Regensburg with his leading troops, the remainder stifi some marches in rear, and it was evident that the whole concentration could no longer be carried out before the Austrians would be in a position to intervene. Berthier received the news while still on his way to the front, and quite failed to grasp the situation. Reaching Donauwrth at 8 {{sc|p.m.}} on the 13th of April, he ordered Payout and Oudinot to remain at Regensburg, whilst Lefebvre and Wrede (Bavarians) who had fallen back before the Austrians were directed to reoccupy Landshut. This was in direct contradiction with the instructions Napoleon had given him on the 28th of March in view of this very emergency. Davout obeyed, but remonstrated. On the 16th Berthier went on to Augsburg, where he learnt that Lefebvre's advanced troops had been driven out of Landshut, thus opening a great gap seventy-six miles wide between the two wings of the French army. Meanwhile Napoleon, who had left Paris at 4 {{sc|a.m.}} on the i3th of April, was hastening towards the front, but remained still in ignorance of Berthiers doings until on the 16th at Stuttgart he received a letter from the Marshal dated the I3th, which threw him into co~isternation. In reply he immediately wrote:
"You“You do not inform me what has rendered necessary such an extraordinary measure which weakens and divides my troops"—and—"Itroops”—and—“I cannot quite grasp the meaning of your letter yet, I should have preferred to see my army concentrated between Ingolstadt and Augsburg, the Bavarians in the first line, with the duke of Danzig in his old position, until we know what the enemy is going to do. Everything would be excellent if the duke of Auerstädt had been at Ingolstadt and the duke of Rivoli with the Wurtternbergers and Oudinots corps at Augsburg, ... so that just the opposite of what should have been done has been done"done” (C. N. to Berthier, Ludwigsburg, 16th April).
 
{{section|Napoleon takes command}}29. ''Napoleon takes command.''—Having despatched this severe reprimand he hastened on to Donauwdrth, where he arrived at 4 {{sc|a.m.}} on the 17th, hoping to find Berthier, but the latter was at Augsburg. Nevertheless, at 10 {{sc|a.m.}} he ordered Payout and Oudinot to withdraw at once to Ingolstadt; and Lefebvre and Wrede on the right to SunDort the movement. About noon
<!--column 2-->
Berthier returned and after hearing his explanation Massena received orders to move from Augsburg towards Ingolstadt. "To“To-morrow will be a day of preparation spent in drawing closer together, and I expect to be able by Wednesday to mancnuvre against the enemy's columns acca~din to circumstances."”
 
Meanwhile the Austrians had approached so near that by a single days march it would have been possible to fall upon and crush by superior numbers either wing of the French army, but though the Austrian light cavalry successfully covered the operations of the following troops they had not yet risen to a conception of their reconnoitring mission, and the archduke, in ignorance of his opportunity and possessed, moreover, with the preconceived idea of uniting at Regensburg with the two corps coming from Bohemia, moved the bulk of his forces in that direction, leaving only a covering body against Davout altogether insufficient to retain him. Davout, however, had left a garrison of 1800 men in Regensburg, who delayed the junction of the Austrian wings until the 20th inst., and on the same day the emperor, having now reunited his whole right wing and centre, overwhelmed the covering detachments facing him in a long series of disconnected engagements lasting forty-eight hours, and the archduke now found himself in danger of being forced back into the-Danube. But with the Bohemian reinforcements he had stifi four corps in hand, and Napoleon, whose inteffigence service in the difficult and intersected country had lamentably failed him, had weakened his army by detaching a portion of his force in pursuit of the beaten right wing, and against the archdukes communications.
Line 700 ⟶ 775:
fruitless assaults. Thus covered by his rearguard Hiller gained space and time to pass his troops over to the north bank of the Danube and remove all boats on the river. This left the direct road to Vienna open, and Napoleon, hoping to find peace in the enemy's capital, pushed the whole of his army down the right bank, and with Murat's cavalry entered the city on the 12th of May, after somewhat severe resistance lasting three days. Meanwhile the archduke and Hiller, both now unmolested, effected their junction in the vicinity of Wagram, picketing the whole line of the Danube with their outposts and collecting all the boats.
 
{{section|Aspern and Wagram}}32. ''Aspern and Wagram.''—The reconnaissance of the river was at once taken in hand by the French upon their arrival in Vienna, and a point opposite the island of Lobau selected for the crossing. Thanks to the Austrian precautions it took four days to collect the necessary material to span the main branch of the river, here some 2000 yds. across, and though Napoleon personally spurred on all to activity nearly four days more were required for its construction. It was not till the night of the 19th of May that orders for the passage were finally issued, and during the night the troops commenced to occupy the island of Lobau. Surprise, of course, was out of the question, but the Austrians did not attempt to dispute the passage, their object being to allow as many French as they felt they could deal with to pass over and then to fall on them. Thus on the 21st of May the [[../Aspern-Essling, Battle of|battle of Aspern]] (''q.v.'') or Essling began. It ended on the night of the 22nd with the complete defeat of Napoleon, the first ever inflicted upon him. The French retreated into the island of Lobau. By nightfall upwards of 100,000 men, encumbered with at least 20,000 wounded, were crowded together on the little island scarcely a mile square, short of provisions and entirely destitute of course of all hospital accessories. The question then arose whether the retreat was to be continued across the main stream or not, and for the second time in his career Napoleon assembled his generals to take their opinion. They counselled retreat, but having heard them all he replied, in substance: "If“If we leave here at all we may as well retire to Strassburg, for unless the enemy is held by the threat of further operations he will be free to strike at our communications and has a shorter distance to go. We must remain here and renew operations as soon as possible."”
 
Immediate orders were despatched to summon every available body of troops to concentrate for the decisive stroke. Practically the lines of communication along the Danube were denuded of combatants, even Bernadotte being called up from Passau, and the viceroy of Italy, who driving the archduke Johann before him (action of Raab) had brought up 56,000 men through Tirol, was disposed towards Pressburg within easy call. The arsenal of Vienna was ransacked for guns, stores and appliances, and preparations in the island pushed on as fast as possible. By the end of June 200,000 troops were stationed within call, and on the 4th July the French began to cross over to the left bank of the Danube. The events which followed are described under WAGRAM. The great battle at this place, fought on the 5th and 6th of July, ended in the retirement of the Austrians. The only other event which occurred before peace was made was an unimportant action at Znaym on the 11th of July.
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The emperors first great ''coup'' thus failed. Jerome was replaced by Davout, and the army resumed its march, this time in the hope of surrounding and overwhelming Barclay, whilst Davout dealt with Bagration. The want of mobility, particularly in the cavalry, now began to tell against the French. With horses only just recovering from an epidemic, they proved quite unequal to the task of catching the Cossacks, who swarmed round them in every direction, never accepting an engagement but compelling a constant watchfulness for which nothing in their previous experience had sufficiently prepared the French.
 
Before their advance, however, the Russian armies steadily retired, Barclay from Vilna via Drissa to Vitebsk, Bagration from Wolkowysk to Mohilev. Again arrangments were made for a Napoleonic battle; behind Murat's cavalry came the "general“general advanced guard"guard” to attack and hold the enemy, whilst the main body and Davout were held available to swing in on his rear. Napoleon, however, failed to allow for the psychology
{{page break|227|left}}
of his opponents, who, utterly indifferent to the sacrifice of life, refused to be drawn into engagements to support an advance or to extricate a rearguard, and steadily withdrew from every position when the French gained touch with them.
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junction of Bagration and Barclay was now assured in the vicinity of Smolensk. Towards this place the French advance was now resumed, and the Russian generals at the head of a united force of 130,000 men marched forwara to meet them. Here, however, the inefficiency of the Russian staff actually saved them from the disaster which must certainly have overtaken them had they realized their intention of fighting the French. The Russians marched in two columns, which lost touch of one another, and as it was quite impossible for either to engage the French singlehanded, they both retired again towards Smolensk, where with an advanced guard in the town itself—which possessed an oldfashioned brick ''enceinte'' not to be breached by field artillery alone the—two columns reunited and deployed for action behind the unfordable Dnieper.
 
Murat and Ney as "general“general advanced guard"guard” attacked the town in the morning of the 16th of August, and whilst they fought the main body was swung round to attack the Russian left and rear. The whole of the 17th was required to complete the movement, and as soon as its purpose was sufficiently revealed to the Russians the latter determined to retreat under cover of night. Their manœuvre was carried out with complete success,
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and then began a series of rearguard actions and nocturnal retreats which completely accomplished their purpose of wearing down the French army. The Russian government, however, failed to see the matter in its true light, and Marshal Kutusov was sent to the front to assume the chief command. His intention was to occupy a strong position and fight one general action for the possession of Moscow, and to this end he selected the line of the Kalatscha where the stream intersects the great Moscow road.
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But the Russians and the soldiers were resolved to continue the campaign, and working in collusion they put pressure on the not unwilling representatives of the civil power to facilitate the supply and equipment of such troops as were still in the field; they could not refuse food and shelter to their starving countrymen or their loyal allies, and thus by degrees the French garrisons scattered about the country either found themselves surrounded or were compelled to retire to avoid that fate. Thus it happened that the viceroy of Italy felt himself compelled to depart from the positive injunctions of the emperor to hold on at all costs to his advanced position at Posen, where about 14,000 men bad gradually rallied around him, and to withdraw step by step to Magdeburg, where he met reinforcements and commanded the whole course of the lower Elbe.
 
{{section|Napoleon's Preparations}}43. ''Napoleon's Preparations.''—Meanwhile the emperor in Paris had been organizing a fresh army for the reconquest of Prussia. Thanks to his having compelled his allies to fight his battles for him, he had not as yet drawn very heavily on the fighting resources of France, the actual percentage of men taken by the conscriptions during the years since 1806 being actually lower than that in force in continental armies of to-day. He had also created in 1811–1812 a new National Guard, organized in "cohorts"“cohorts” to distinguish it from the regular army, and for borne defence ''only'', and these by a skilful appeal to their patriotism and judicious pressure applied through the prefects, became a useful reservoir of half-trained men for new battalions of the active army. Levies were also made with rigorous severity in the states of the Rhine Confederation, and even Italy was called on for fresh sacrifices. In this manner by the end of March upwards of 200,000 men were moving towards the Elbe,<ref>Napoleon always gave them 300,000, but this number was never attained.</ref> and in the first fortnight of April they were duly concentrated in the angle formed by the Elbe and Saale, threatening on the one hand Berlin, on the other Dresden and the east.
 
{{section|Spring Campaign of 1813}}44. ''Spring Campaign of 1813.''—The allies, aware of the gradual strengthening of their enemy's forces but themselves as yet unable to put more than 200,000 in the field, had left a small corps of observation opposite Magdeburg and along the Elbe to give timely notice of an advance towards Berlin; and with the bulk of their forces had taken up a position about Dresden, whence they had determined to march down the course of the Elbe and roll up the French from right to left. Both armies were very indifferently supplied with information, as both were without any reliable regular cavalry capable of piercing the screen of outposts with which each endeavoured to conceal his disposition, and Napoleon, operating in a most unfriendly country, suffered more in this respect than his adversaries.
 
On the 25th of April Napoleon reached Erfurt and assumed the chief command. On this day his troops stood in the following positions. Eugene, with Lauriston's, Macdonald's and Regnier's corps, on the lower Saale, Ney in front of Weimar, holding the defile of Kösen; the Guard at Erfurt, Marmont at Gotha, Bertrand at Saalfeld, and Oudinot at Coburg, and during the next few days the whole were set in motion towards Merseburg and Leipzig, in the now stereotyped Napoleonic order, a strong advanced guard of all arms leading, the remainderabout twothirds of the wholefollowing as "masse“masse de mancnuvre,"” this time, owing to the cover afforded by the Elbe on the left, to the right rear of the advanced guard.
 
Meanwhile the Russians and Prussians had concentrated all available men and were moving on an almost parallel line, but somewhat to the south of the direction taken by the French. On the 1st of May Napoleon and the advanced guard entered Ltzen. Wittgenstein, who now commanded the allies in place of Kutusov, hearing of his approach, had decided to attack
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the two minds the greater the uncertainty which must prevail on the side of the abler commander.
 
It was in 1806 that an improved solution was first devised. The "general“general advanced guard"guard” of all arms now followed immediately behind the cavalry screen and held the enemy in position, while the remainder of the army followed at a days march in a bataillon carre ready to manœuvre in any required direction. The full reach of this discovery seems as yet scarcely to have impressed itself upon the emperor with complete conviction, for in the s~cceeding campaign in Poland we find that he twice departed from this format Pultusk and Heilsberg and each time his enemy succeeded in escaping him. At Friedland, however, his success was complete, and henceforth the method recurs on practically every battlefield. When it fails it is because its inventor himself hesitates to push his own conception to its full development (Eckmuhl 1809, Borodino 1812). Yet it would seem that this invention of Napoleon's was intuitive rather than reasoned; he never communicated it in its entirety to his marshals, and seems to have been only capable of exercising it either when in full possession of his health or under the excitement of action. Thus we find him after the battle of Dresden itself a splendid example of its efficacysuddenly reverting to the terminology of the school in which he had been brought up, which he himself had d,estroyed, only to revive again in the next few days and handle his forces strategically with all his accustomed brilliancy.
 
In 1814 and in 1815 in the presence of the enemy he again rises supremely to each occasion, only to lapse in the intervals even below the level of his old opponents; and that this was not the consequence of temporary depression naturally resulting from the accumulated load of his misfortunes, is sufficiently shown by the downright puerility of the arguments by which he seeks to justify his own successes in the St Helena memoirs, which one may search in vain for any indication that Napoleon was himself aware of the magnitude of his own discovery. One is forced to the conclusion that there existed in Napoleon's brain. a dual capacityone the normal and reasoning one, developing only the ideas and conceptions of his contemporaries, the other intuitive, and capable only of work under abnormal pressure. At such moments of crisis it almost excelled human comprehension; the mind seems to have gathered to itself and summed up the balance of all human passions arranged for and against him, anti to have calculated with unerring exactitude the consequences of each decision.
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