1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Napoleonic Campaigns: Difference between revisions
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officer on the spot to protect the French treasure chests, which at
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that moment lay actually in the path of the Austrians. The
young archduke with some cavalry escaped. {{section|Mack surrounded}}9. ''Mack surrounded.''—The defeat at Elchingen on the 14th of
October sealed the fate of the Austrians, though Mack was still
determined to endure a siege. As the French columns coming
up from the south and west gradually surrounded him, he drew
in his troops under shelter of the fortress and its improvised
entrenched camp, and on the 15th he found himself completely
surrounded. On the 16th the French field-guns fired into the
town, and Mack realized that his troops were no longer under
sufficient control to endure a siege. When, therefore, next
morning, negotiations were opened by the French, Mack, still
feeling certain that the Russians were at hand, agreed to an
armistice and undertook to lay down his arms if within the next
twenty-one days no relief should arrive. To this Napoleon
consented, but hardly had the agreement been signed than he
succeeded in introducing a number of individual French soldiers
into the fortress, who began rioting with the Austrian soldiery.
Then, sending in armed parties to restore order and protect the
inhabitants, he caused the guards at the gates to be overpowered,
and Mack was thus forced into an unconditional surrender.
On the 22nd of October, the day after Trafalgar, the remnant
of the Austrian army, 23,000 strong, laid down its arms. About 5000 men under Jellachich had escaped to Tirol, 2000 cuirassiers with Prince Ferdinand to Eger in Bohemia, and about 10,000 men under Werneck, had surrendered at Heidenheim. The losses in battle having been insignificant, there remain some 30,000 to account for—most of whom probably escaped individually by the help of the inhabitants, who were bitterly hostile to the French. {{section|Napoleon's Advance to Vienna}}10. ''Napoleon's Advance to Vienna.''—Napoleon now hastened
to rejoin the group of corps he had left under Bernadotte in observation towards the Russians, for the latter were nearer at hand than even Mack had assumed. But hearing of his misfortune they retreated before Napoleon's advance along the right bank of the Danube to Krems, where they crossed the river and withdrew to an entrenched camp near OImUtz to pick up fresh Austrian reinforcements. The severe actions of Durrenstein (near Krems) on the 11th, and of Hollabrunn on the 16th of November, in which Napoleon's marshals learned the tenacity of their new opponents, and the surprise of the Vienna bridge
(November 14) by the French, were the chief incidents of
this period in the campaign.
{{section|Campaign of Austerlitz}}11. ''Campaign of Austerlitz.''—Napoleon continued down the
right bank to Vienna, where he was compelled by the condition {{EB1911 Shoulder Heading|''Austerlitz''}}
of his troops to call a halt to refit his army.
After this was done he continued his movement to
Brünn. Thither he succeeded in bringing only 55,000 men.
He was again forced to give his army rest and shelter, under
cover of Murat's cavalry. The allies now confronted him with
upwards of 86,000 men, including 16,000 cavalry. About the
20th of November this force commenced its advance, and
Napoleon concentrated in such a manner that within three days
he could bring over 80,000 French troops into action around
Brünn, besides 17,000 or more Bavarians under Wrede. On
the 28th Murat was driven in by the allied columns. That night
orders were despatched for a concentration on Brünn in expectation
of a collision on the following day; but hearing that the
whole allied force was moving towards him he decided to concentrate
south-east of Brünn, covering his front by cavalry on
the Pratzen heights. Meanwhile he had also prepared a fresh
line of retreat towards Bohemia, and, certain now of having
his men in hand for the coming battle, he quietly awaited
events.
The allies were aware of his position, and still adhering to the
old [[../Austerlitz|{{SC|Austerlitz}}]]). As soon as their strategic purpose of cutting him off from Vienna became apparent, the emperor moved his troops into position, and in the afternoon issued his famous proclamation to his troops, pointing out the enemy's mistakes and his plan for defeating them. At the same time he issued his orders for his first great battle as a supreme commander. The battle of <!--column 2-->
with the thorough and decisive defeat of the allies. {{section|Jena 1806}}12. ''Jena, 1806.''—Around the Prussian army, and particularly
{{section|Jena 1806}}12. ''Jena, 1806.''—Around the Prussian army, and particularly the cavalry, the prestige of Frederick the Greats glory still lingered; but the younger generation had little{{EB1911 Shoulder Heading|Jena Campaign.}} experience of actual warfare, and the higher commanders were quite unable to grasp the changes in tactics and in the conduct of operations which had grown out of the necessities of the French Revolution. The individual officers of the executive staff were the most highly trained in Europe, but there was no great leader to co-ordinate their energies. The total number of men assigned to the field army was 110,000 Prussians and Saxons. They were organized in corps, but their leaders were corps commanders only in name, for none were allowed any latitude for individual initiative. Ill-judged economies had undermined the whole efficiency of the Prussian army. Two-thirds of the infantry and one-half of the cavalry were allowed furlough for from ten to eleven months in the year. The men were unprovided with greatcoats. Most of the muskets had actually seen service in the Seven Years War, and their barrels had worn so thin with constant polishing that the use of full charges at target practice had been forbidden. Above all, the army had drifted entirely out of touch with the civil population. The latter, ground down by feudal tradition and law, and at the same time permeated by the political doctrines of the late 18th century, believed that war concerned the governments only, and formed no part of the business of the "honest citizen." In this idea they were supported by the law itself, which protected the civilian against the soldier, and forbade even in war-time the requisitioning of horses, provisions and transport, without payment. Up to the night of the battle of Jena itself, the Prussian troops lay starving in the midst of plenty, whilst the French everywhere took what they wanted. This alone was a sufficient cause for all the misfortunes which followed.▼
the cavalry, the prestige of Frederick the Greats glory still
lingered; but the younger generation had little{{EB1911 Shoulder Heading|Jena Campaign.}}
experience of actual warfare, and the higher commanders
were quite unable to grasp the changes in tactics and in
the conduct of operations which had grown out
of the necessities of the French Revolution. The individual
officers of the executive staff were the most highly trained in
▲
{{section|Outbreak of the War}}13. ''Outbreak of the War.''—During the campaign of Austerlitz Prussia, furious at the violation of her territory of Anspach, had mobilized, and had sent Haugwitz as ambassador to Napoleon's headquarters. He arrived on the 30th of November, and Napoleon, pleading business, put off his official reception till after the battle of Austerlitz. Of course the ultimatum was never presented, as may be imagined; Haugwitz returned and the king of Prussia demobilized at once. But Napoleon, well knowing the man he had to deal with, had determined to force a quarrel upon Prussia at the earliest convenient opportunity. His troops therefore, when withdrawn from Austria, were cantoned in south Germany in such a way that, whilst suspicion was not aroused in minds unacquainted with Napoleonic methods, they could be concentrated by a few marches behind the Thuringian forest and the upper waters of the Main. Here the Grand Army was left to itself to recuperate and assimilate its recruits, and it is characteristic of the man and his methods that he did not trouble his corps commanders with a single order during the whole of the spring and summer.
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