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of the necessities of the French Revolution. The individual
officers of the executive staff were the most highly trained in
Europe, but there was no great leader to co-ordinate their
Europe, but there was no great leader to co-ordinate their energies. The total number of men assigned to the field army was 110,000 Prussians and Saxons. They were organized in corps, but their leaders were corps commanders only in name, for none were allowed any latitude for individual initiative. Ill-judged economies had undermined the whole efficiency of the Prussian army. Two-thirds of the infantry and one-half of the cavalry were allowed furlough for from ten to eleven months in the year. The men were unprovided with greatcoats. Most of the muskets had actually seen service in the Seven Years War, and their barrels had worn so thin with constant polishing that the use of full charges at target practice had been forbidden. Above all, the army had drifted entirely out of touch with the civil population. The latter, ground down by feudal tradition and law, and at the same time permeated by the political doctrines of the late 18th century, believed that war concerned the governments only, and formed no part of the business of the "honest citizen." In this idea they were supported by the law itself, which protected the civilian against the soldier, and forbade even in war-time the requisitioning of horses, provisions and transport, without payment. Up to the night of the battle of Jena itself, the Prussian troops lay starving in the midst of plenty, whilst the French everywhere took what they wanted. This alone was a sufficient cause for all the misfortunes which followed.
energies. The total number of men assigned to the field army
was 110,000 Prussians and Saxons. They were organized in
corps, but their leaders were corps commanders only in name,
for none were allowed any latitude for individual initiative.
Ill-judged economies had undermined the whole efficiency of
the Prussian army. Two-thirds of the infantry and one-half of
the cavalry were allowed furlough for from ten to eleven months
in the year. The men were unprovided with greatcoats. Most
of the muskets had actually seen service in the Seven Years War,
and their barrels had worn so thin with constant polishing that
the use of full charges at target practice had been forbidden.
Above all, the army had drifted entirely out of touch with the
civil population. The latter, ground down by feudal tradition and
law, and at the same time permeated by the political doctrines
of the late 18th century, believed that war concerned the governments
only, and formed no part of the business of the “honest
citizen.” In this idea they were supported by the law itself,
which protected the civilian against the soldier, and forbade
even in war-time the requisitioning of horses, provisions and
transport, without payment. Up to the night of the battle of
Jena itself, the Prussian troops lay starving in the midst of plenty,
whilst the French everywhere took what they wanted. This
alone was a sufficient cause for all the misfortunes which followed.
 
{{section|Outbreak of the War}}13. ''Outbreak of the War.''—During the campaign of Austerlitz
{{section|Outbreak of the War}}13. ''Outbreak of the War.''—During the campaign of Austerlitz Prussia, furious at the violation of her territory of Anspach, had mobilized, and had sent Haugwitz as ambassador to Napoleon's headquarters. He arrived on the 30th of November, and Napoleon, pleading business, put off his official reception till after the battle of Austerlitz. Of course the ultimatum was never presented, as may be imagined; Haugwitz returned and the king of Prussia demobilized at once. But Napoleon, well knowing the man he had to deal with, had determined to force a quarrel upon Prussia at the earliest convenient opportunity. His troops therefore, when withdrawn from Austria, were cantoned in south Germany in such a way that, whilst suspicion was not aroused in minds unacquainted with Napoleonic methods, they could be concentrated by a few marches behind the Thuringian forest and the upper waters of the Main. Here the Grand Army was left to itself to recuperate and assimilate its recruits, and it is characteristic of the man and his methods that he did not trouble his corps commanders with a single order during the whole of the spring and summer.
Prussia, furious at the violation of her territory of Anspach,
had mobilized, and had sent Haugwitz as ambassador to
Napoleon's headquarters. He arrived on the 30th of November,
and Napoleon, pleading business, put off his official reception
till after the battle of Austerlitz. Of course the ultimatum was
never presented, as may be imagined; Haugwitz returned and
the king of Prussia demobilized at once. But Napoleon, well
knowing the man he had to deal with, had determined to force
a quarrel upon Prussia at the earliest convenient opportunity.
His troops therefore, when withdrawn from Austria, were cantoned
in south Germany in such a way that, whilst suspicion
was not aroused in minds unacquainted with Napoleonic methods,
they could be concentrated by a few marches behind the
Thuringian forest and the upper waters of the Main. Here the
Grand Army was left to itself to recuperate and assimilate its
recruits, and it is characteristic of the man and his methods
that he did not trouble his corps commanders with a single
order during the whole of the spring and summer.
 
As the diplomatic crisis approached, spies were sent into
Prussia, and simultaneously with the orders for preliminary concentration
the marshals received private instructions, the pith
of which cannot be better expressed than in the following two
quotations from Napoleon's correspondence:—
{{quote|"Mon“Mon intention est de concentrer toutes mes forces sur lextrmitl'extérmité de ma droite en laissant tout lespacel'espace entre Icle Rhin et Bamberg entibremententrèment dgarnidégarni, de maniremanière aà avoir prsprès de 200,000 hommes runisréunis sur un mmemême champ de bataille; mes premierespremièrs marches menacent Icle cmurcœur de Iala monarchicmonarchie prussienne''prussienne” (No. 10,920).}}
 
{{quote|"Avec“Avec cette immense suprioritsupériorité de forces runisréunis sur un espace si troitétroit, vous sentez que je suis dans la volontvolonté de ne rico hasarder et dattaquerd'attaquer lennemil'ennemi partout ofioù il voudra tenir. Vous pensez bien que ccce serait une belle affaire que de se porter stir cetcecette place (Dresden) en ''un bataillon carré de 200,000 hommes''"” (Soult, No. 10,941).}}
 
{{section|Advance of the Grande Armeé}}14. ''Advance of the Grande Armeé.''—On the 7th of October
the ''Grande A rmeArmée'' lay in three parallel columns along the roads
leading over the mountains to Hof, Schleiz and Kronach;
on the right lay the IV. corps (Soult) about Bayreuth; with his
cavalry in rear, and behind these the VI. corps (Ney) at Pegnitz;
in the centre, BernadottesBernadotte's I. corps from Nordhalben, with the
{{page break|220|left}}
III. corps (Davout) Lichtenfels; Guard and headquarters,
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