Operation Roundup (1942): Difference between revisions
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==History== |
==History== |
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Overseen by [[Brigadier General (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the plan was developed in early 1942 and reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.<ref name = "este">Carlo d'Este, ''Decision in Normandy'', Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.</ref> |
Overseen by [[Brigadier General (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], the plan was developed in early 1942 and reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.<ref name = "este">Carlo d'Este, ''Decision in Normandy'', Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.</ref> |
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Shortages of merchant shipping, [[landing craft]], and other resources caused the plan for Roundup to be considered as unrealistic. It called for a force consisting of 48 Allied [[division (military)|divisions]] and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad [[beachhead]]s between the French ports of [[Boulogne-sur-Mer|Boulogne]] and [[Le Havre]].{{Efn|By comparison, the eventual Normandy landings, which occurred over a year later in June 1944, and the subsequent campaign, featured only 39 Allied divisions.|name=|group=nb}}<ref name="morison">[[Samuel Eliot Morison]], ''The Invasion of France and Germany'', {{ISBN|0-316-58311-1}}, pp 7-17</ref> Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the First World War's [[Battle of the Somme]] (where, on the [[first day on the Somme|first day of the battle]], the British Army had suffered almost 60,000 casualties) and [[Battle of Passchendaele]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why D-Day Was So Important to Allied Victory |url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-d-day-was-so-important-to-allied-victory|access-date=2020-11-28 |website=Imperial War Museums |language=en}}</ref> |
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[[Winston Churchill]], the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, preferred a strategy of attacking the [[Wehrmacht]], the German forces, in the [[Mediterranean Sea]] instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly").<ref name="morison" /> Churchill's plan would allow relatively |
[[Winston Churchill]], the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, preferred a strategy of attacking the [[Wehrmacht]], the German forces, in the [[Mediterranean Sea]] instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly").<ref name="morison" /> Churchill's plan would allow relatively-inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky [[theater (warfare)|theatre of war]] while they gradually built up to be overwhelming before they engaged Germany head on.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|pages=54–55}}</ref> |
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After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], suggested instead to U.S. President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] |
After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, [[General (United States)|General]] [[George Marshall]], the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], suggested instead to U.S. President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] for the United States to abandon the [[Europe first|Germany-first strategy]] and take the offensive in the [[Pacific War]]. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA402|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0385353069|pages=402|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the Second Claridge Conference in late July 1942 to carry out [[Operation Torch]], the Allied invasion of French North Africa.<ref>{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135}}</ref> That was a compromise by allowing the U.S. to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale and to meet the British objective of securing victory in North Africa.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Willmott|first=H.P.|url=https://archive.org/details/june194400will|title=June, 1944|publisher=Blandford Press|year=1984|isbn=0-7137-1446-8|location=Poole, Dorset}}</ref> Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch with preparations for Roundup given lower priority because of the uncertainties of Allied strategy.<ref name="este" /> |
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In November 1942 Eisenhower, now a [[lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name="morison" /> Briefings concerning the plan brought Eisenhower’s organizational and diplomatic skills to the attention of senior civil and military leaders in the United States and Europe, launching his meteoric rise to [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in Europe. |
In November 1942, Eisenhower, now a [[lieutenant general (United States)|lieutenant general]], told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.<ref name="morison" /> Briefings concerning the plan brought Eisenhower’s organizational and diplomatic skills to the attention of senior civil and military leaders in the United States and Europe, launching his meteoric rise to [[Supreme Allied Commander]] in Europe. |
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Operation Roundup included [[Operation Sledgehammer]] and the later variant, Operation Roundhammer. British [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant General]] [[Frederick E. Morgan]] incorporated aspects of the plan into the earliest version of the plan that became [[Operation Overlord]]. |
Operation Roundup included [[Operation Sledgehammer]] and the later variant, Operation Roundhammer. British [[Lieutenant-general (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant General]] [[Frederick E. Morgan]] incorporated aspects of the plan into the earliest version of the plan that became [[Operation Overlord]]. |
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== See also == |
== See also == |
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* [[Diplomatic history of World War II]] |
* [[Diplomatic history of World War II]] |
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* [[List of Allied World War II conferences]] |
* [[List of Allied World War II conferences]] |
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* [[Operation Bolero]] |
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== Notes == |
== Notes == |
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Latest revision as of 17:15, 15 April 2024
Operation Roundup was the codename for a plan to invade Northern France in the spring of 1943 prepared by Allied forces during World War II.
History[edit]
Overseen by Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the plan was developed in early 1942 and reflected American enthusiasm for an early entry into Europe.[1]
Shortages of merchant shipping, landing craft, and other resources caused the plan for Roundup to be considered as unrealistic. It called for a force consisting of 48 Allied divisions and 5,800 aircraft, with a landing on broad beachheads between the French ports of Boulogne and Le Havre.[a][2] Senior British commanders and politicians were reluctant to commit themselves to the invasion plan; mindful of the painful losses during the First World War's Battle of the Somme (where, on the first day of the battle, the British Army had suffered almost 60,000 casualties) and Battle of Passchendaele.[3]
Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, preferred a strategy of attacking the Wehrmacht, the German forces, in the Mediterranean Sea instead (which he referred to as the "soft underbelly").[2] Churchill's plan would allow relatively-inexperienced American forces to gain experience in a less risky theatre of war while they gradually built up to be overwhelming before they engaged Germany head on.[4][5]
After Churchill pressed for a landing in French North Africa in 1942, General George Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, suggested instead to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt for the United States to abandon the Germany-first strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific War. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal, saying it would do nothing to help the Soviet Union.[6] Instead, with Roosevelt's support and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, the decision was made at the Second Claridge Conference in late July 1942 to carry out Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of French North Africa.[7] That was a compromise by allowing the U.S. to engage in the fight against Nazi Germany on a limited scale and to meet the British objective of securing victory in North Africa.[8] Most of the troops and supplies accumulated for Roundup were used to implement Torch with preparations for Roundup given lower priority because of the uncertainties of Allied strategy.[1]
In November 1942, Eisenhower, now a lieutenant general, told Churchill that no major operation on the Continent could be carried out before 1944.[2] Briefings concerning the plan brought Eisenhower’s organizational and diplomatic skills to the attention of senior civil and military leaders in the United States and Europe, launching his meteoric rise to Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
Operation Roundup included Operation Sledgehammer and the later variant, Operation Roundhammer. British Lieutenant General Frederick E. Morgan incorporated aspects of the plan into the earliest version of the plan that became Operation Overlord.
See also[edit]
Notes[edit]
- ^ By comparison, the eventual Normandy landings, which occurred over a year later in June 1944, and the subsequent campaign, featured only 39 Allied divisions.
References[edit]
- ^ a b Carlo d'Este, Decision in Normandy, Penguin, 2004, pp. 24-35.
- ^ a b c Samuel Eliot Morison, The Invasion of France and Germany, ISBN 0-316-58311-1, pp 7-17
- ^ "Why D-Day Was So Important to Allied Victory". Imperial War Museums. Retrieved 28 November 2020.
- ^ Husen, editor, David T. Zabecki; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van (1999). World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia. Garland Pub. p. 1270. ISBN 9780824070298.
{{cite book}}:|first1=has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Mackenzie, S.P. (2014). The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition. Routledge. pp. 54–55. ISBN 978-1317864714.
- ^ Ward, Geoffrey C.; Burns, Ken (2014). "The Common Cause: 1939-1944". The Roosevelts: An Intimate History. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. p. 402. ISBN 978-0385353069.
- ^ Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis. 2013. p. 135. ISBN 9781135071028.
- ^ Willmott, H.P. (1984). June, 1944. Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press. ISBN 0-7137-1446-8.