Talk:Platonic realism

• In the article, the text is: "...what does it mean to say that this particular apple is a copy of the form of applehood? Does it mean the apple is the same shape as the form? Probably not; the form, after all, is not supposed to have a shape because it is not spatial. What would it mean to say that apple participates in applehood? Is that like membership in a club, somehow? It is not clear."
  • I'm trying to relate Forms to sets. Would it be correct to say that an apple is one of the set of apples, and that the Form of apples is the same as the set of apples? Or would it be more correct to say that the Form of apples is the set of criteria that determine whether an object properly belongs to the set? Alan Nicoll 19:07, Feb 4, 2005 (UTC)

It's difficult to answer your question, because it depends on the meaning of the word "set". If with the "set of X" we mean some factual aggregate of material objects, this is certainly not the interpretation of "Form" by the Platonic Realist himself. But some would say it's the only rational content that could be given to an otherwise inane concept. The Platonist, and certainly the modern one, would surely agree more with your second description, that it's a set of criteria. But he would warn against the mistake to again see such a set of criteria as some factual aggregate of actual ideas in the minds of actual people (which despicable heresy goes under the name of mentalism) or of actual social rules in an actual society (sociologism,conventionalism). The set of criteria should in his view be seen as an abstraction; indeed an abstraction that is more fundamental to the concept of set than the respective aggregates of material objects - and so he would say that the Form of an apple is indeed the set of apples: in abstracto.

--MWAK 11:06, 18 Apr 2005 (UTC) (who happens to be one of the few Platonic Realists presently immanent in this timeline group and thus is singularly qualified to answer questions about the true nature of Platonic doctrine ;o)

It depends on what you mean by "criteria", but Platonic Forms cannot be sets of objects, by my lights. That is because sets are extensional entities - two sets are identical if and only if they have the same members. But if, for all pairs of non-synonymous predicates (or properties), there are two corresponding Forms, we have two Forms even when the predicates are extensionally equivalent (true of the same things). But we cannot have two Forms for two extensionally equivalent sets, because extensionally equivalent sets are the same set, and (I think) there is at most one Form per object (or property). (Iolasov 14:59, 23 March 2007 (UTC))

Aristotelian realism

It would be nice if the same author wrote an article on Aristotelian realism to contrast with the Platonic variety, esp. as there are already articles on conceptualism and nominalism. The possibility of realism about the abstract without a commitment to Platonism is an intringuing one.

That would be very nice indeed as that writer is Larry Sanger, a professional philosopher and cofounder of Wikipedia! :o) But the subject is extraordinarily controversial and complicated. Part of the problem is that Aristotle's public works have been all but lost — we today "only" have the Corpus and there are many uncertainties about authorship and date of creation. But even more problematic is that Aristotle developed his thoughts in opposition to Platonic Realism: so to judge his thought we have to understand the nature of Plato's as well.

--MWAK 20:48, 25 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Here is the basic form defined. A driveway is the subject and all kinds appear as generalized driveways. This abstract driveway is then the subject and to cause the set than.

"And to cause the set than" denotes Plato's form. A twice thought for the abstract. And the abstract abstraction is the level of difficulty. To abstract all that is, correctly, identifies a form of natural existence. Just like left and right as an existent relation, Plato's form denotes a subject abstraction and clearly becomes a class of inference.

I can write all day on this subject if there is any interest.

A subject of forms therefore denotes a relation of the abstraction to the particular set. A sly thought is the degree of confusion over the meaning of his form. A kind of inference appears!

Articles on Platonism

Note that this article more or less competes with Platonic idealism, and that there is a whole raft of articles on Platonism, which perhaps ought to be consolidated into fewer. A Platonism template might also be useful. --HK 14:42, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

This is what I said at Talk:Platonic idealism:

1. Although Platonic Realism is indeed sometimes called Platonic Idealism, the concepts are not congruent. Many would deny that Plato's idealism entailed a realist stance. And Platonic Realism is a more general philosophical position, while "Platonic Idealism" is typically reserved for the views of Plato himself. It's therefore best to keep two articles.
2. Some repetition is inevitable and often a lot of repetition is quite functional.
3. If there are any perceived contradictions, try to solve them. But be wary. Sometimes they are merely perceived :o).
4. A Platonism template would be very nice of course.
5. Wikipedia should be in a permanent state of improvement. Try to fight the understandable but ultimately disastrous tendency to "consolidate". Or was it a euphemism for "merge"?

What you say here at least answers my question :o). I'd like to add that Platonism is a very interesting and complicated subject, that can be treated from many subtly different aspects. A "raft of articles" wouldn't be amiss.--MWAK 16:04, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Plato is bullshit

I dont expect to be able to put this in the main article, so it is here for your consideration. He is one of the first thinkers and does not deserve more than anecdotal consideration, his ideas are hilarious to a modern man. Granted we must treat him with respect, but dont let that trick you into thinking that he has any meaningfull thing to say in the 21st century. 88.15.59.243 23:17, 17 October 2006 (UTC)

(It is this comment that is hilarious)thomas —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.140.183.1 (talk) 05:04, 30 July 2009 (UTC)

And you would be the epitomal "21 century-Man", I suppose? ;o) Any evaluation of Plato of course depends on your philosophical opinion. These opinions today vary wildly. I've often noticed that people changed their views on him after actually reading his work, instead of relying on largely anecdotal renderings of it... And there is always the troubling possibility that you only consider some ideas to be hilarious as a defensive reaction, because you despair of being able to understand them. --MWAK 08:46, 18 October 2006 (UTC)

Oh, Plato was a smart guy in his time and for all times, and the article have evolved enough to vaguely reflect this, even though some improvements in formulations can still be made. For C++ programmers Plato was obviously perfectly right: no object orientation without abstract classes, instantiations and inheritance. ... said: Rursus (bork²) 20:50, 26 June 2009 (UTC)

Analogies to Computer Science/Object oriented Programming

The language for much of the article talks about 'instantiations', inherence, forms, etc... Sounds very much like inheritance/etc... from computer science. Perhaps this is deliberate, perhaps written by a comp. sci. person, perhaps it's totally my perception. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 128.100.71.61 (talk) 13:51, 20 March 2007 (UTC).

The jargon used is very much standard and rather a bit older than computer science. So if there is indeed a causal connection, philosophy is the origin :o). --MWAK 14:50, 20 March 2007 (UTC)

Platonic Idealism and Articles on Universals

In the first paragraph, until now, it said, "Confusingly, this stance is also called Platonic idealism," phrased thusly to draw attention to the apparent contrast between correlating Platonic idealism and realism. Although MWAK says the concepts are not congruent, many would deny that Plato had a realist stance, and defines the difference between Platonic realism and idealism, I would make the additional argument that platonic universals are ideas that can be real, and that Plato would say the ideal realm is the real one. For example, justice is an idea until, like peace, it is enforced. --ZLRS 10:24, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

The major source of a possible confusion of course lies in the fact that in standard philosophical jargon, idealism and realism are seen as different stances. Certainly the Platonic "idealism" is quite different from the German Idealism of the 18th and 19th century. So that is a cogent reason to make the reader aware of this problem.

I personally would agree that Plato considered the ideal world the real one. However, this does not mean Platonic Realism unproblematically coincides with Platonic Idealism. It depends on your interpretation of Plato's thought. So the best way, I feel, to solve this woulkd be to state that a certain interpretation is the cause of using "Platonic Idealism"for "Platonic Realism".

A last point is that among the examples you gave of Platonic Ideas, Peace is not one Plato is emphasizing the transcendental nature of. Can't we just stick with Truth, Beauty and the Good? :o) —Preceding unsigned comment added by MWAK (talk • contribs) 16:39, 25 November 2007 (UTC)

Question concerning last paragraph

"...The response reconciles Platonism with empiricism by contending that an abstract (and thus not real) object is real and knowable by its instantiation. Since the critic has, after all, naturally understood the abstract, the response suggests merely to abandon prejudice and accept it."

With regard to the last paragraph, either I am misreading it or not fully understanding it. If Platonism holds forms to be archetypal and non spatio-temporal then how is it that an instantiation could give knowledge of its form other than by sparking some process akin to remembering as Plato describes?

You might view an apple and generalize from there to multiple apples all sharing similarities, but that seems to lack the notion that there is some ideal form of applehood that all apples make reference to. A generalization might make an abstraction out of apple but it does so by containing less information than any specific instance of an apple. Whereas, I thought, in Platonism it isn't that the form contains less information but rather is perfect, and all instantiations are flawed copies.75.163.233.26 (talk) 07:32, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

They could be "flawed" copies by having too much "information". Now "apple" is a very problematic concept in this respect. Let us first consider the (slightly less problematic) concept "circle"; it could be argued (though, to complicate matters, Plato himself would probably have disagreed :o) that all material circles are imperfect by deviating, however small, from the ideal. But it would take a much longer — indeed arguably infinite — mathematical formula to describe them.

To return to apples, the problem is that the early Plato clearly confused the concept of the ideal as the abstract, with the concept of the ideal as the optimal form within a set of related forms. Later in life he began to realise this, as is obvious from the Parmenides. The doctrine of Platonic Realism in the philosophical tradition is about the first concept. But many more popular books emphasize the second — perhaps because readers favour perfect apples over abstract ones ;o).--MWAK (talk) 12:22, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Changed a paragraph in the section Forms. The example given was of a perfect circle only an atom thick. It said that it would not be perfect because it would still be a series of lines but I regard atoms as closer to points in my mind so I found the example confusing. I changed it to something I thought was more intuitive. Achannel (talk) 06:58, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Plato and Spirituality

The whole confusion about Plato's doctrine can be traced to the refusal of contemporary (agnostic/materialistic) philosophers to consider something that was truth for the ancients sages: the reality of the spirit; the immortality of the human's soul, who is reincarnated in successive lives; and that this soul has an evolutionary path to go which is what gives purpose to existence. This is evident and clear in the dialogues of Plato. 190.140.1.141 (talk) 00:15, 3 October 2011 (UTC)

Well, it's true that Plato believed in the immortality of the human soul and reincarnation (BTW only a minority of the "ancient sages" agreed with him, unless such an agreement is a condition for being sage ;o) but there is no direct connection with Platonic Realism. I'm afraid that if you try to grasp the concept of Form by vaguely considering it a "piece of spirit" you have missed the point entirely. You would then still treat it as if it were some concrete object — be it of a spiritual nature — and the point is that it is an abstract object. Neither dualism nor monistic idealism are directly implied by Platonic Realism and historically both dualist and idealist philosophers have indeed tended to reject Platonic Realism.--MWAK (talk) 06:03, 3 October 2011 (UTC)

Proposed merge to Platonic idealism

• Proposed. "Platonic realism" and "Platonic idealism" are synonymous. "Platonic realism" is just realism about ideas. "Platonic idealism" is realism about ideas. Which synonym you pick is just based on whether you put the emphasis on the 'realism' or the 'idea' part of the sentence. Since one can be a 'realist' about almost anything, whereas being a 'thing-ist' tends to presuppose that you're a realist about that specific thing, 'idealist' is the more specific / explanatory term. -Silence (talk) 01:58, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

• Opposed: Not idealism, however I'd take it that "Platonic idealism" is meant somewhat pleonastically. On the other hand, Platonic realism clearly implies something more radical (as seen from an anachronistic standpoint of idealism v realism).—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 01:41, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

• What is the difference between Platonic idealism and Platonic realism? In the modern context of idealism vs. realism, obviously 'Platonic realism' is (or both terms are) inaccurate, since Plato can't be both a realist and an anti-realist, but both articles are trying to describe the same view, espoused by the same person. To look at the name "Platonic realism" anachronistically is to look at it inaccurately; if the title suggests such an anachronistic significance, then that is a further reason to support the merge.
• You call 'Platonic idealism' redundant (a strange claim, albeit understandable for people already well-versed in Plato's views -- i.e., people who don't much need these articles), but what it is is unambiguously relevant and accurate; 'Platonic realism' is a much thornier term, since in point of Fact Plato is a nominalist about 'universals' (common natures) in the traditional classical and Medieval sense. -Silence (talk) 01:58, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

• Opposed: You seem to forget that "Platonic Realism" is a general philosophical stance, and thus not simply identical to Plato's point of view about the subject. So it is not true that "both articles are trying to describe the same view, espoused by the same person". It is extraordinarily difficult to determine what Plato's views were and there is little consensus about it. E.g. your claim that Plato is a nominalist about universals, is likely only to be acceptable if one is a nominalist oneself — not to a realist about abstracta. Most modern Platonic Realists are not realists about "ideas" but about abstract objects. Arguably there is no important modern stance called "Platonic Idealism", so that article is better suited to treat Plato's writings as such.

• In general it is problematic to merge articles about philosophical terms because this presupposes a professional consensus about what objects they refer to. Such a consensus is however, exceedingly rare. Your statement "what it is is unambiguously relevant and accurate" strikes me as wildly optimistic!--MWAK (talk) 09:45, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

• That's all well and good; if an argument can be given that the terms genuinely and consistently refer to distinct objects, I'll gladly drop the merge proposal. But just arguing 'They're philosophy names, so they can't be merged!' is, obviously, not Wikipedia practice or policy. :) Here is my challenge to you: 1. Cite a single sentence in Platonic realism that does not directly concern Platonic idealism or the Theory of Forms. 2. Cite reputable non-Wikipedia sources that establish that 'Platonic Realism' isn't the theory of Forms, and/or that Platonic Realism isn't Platonic idealism. This should be extraordinarily easy to do if, as you say, the terms are so difficult to correlate. 3. Explain why the first two sentences of Platonic realism define Platonic realism as Platonic idealism, and vice versa. "As universals were considered by Plato to be ideal forms, this stance is confusingly also called Platonic idealism." This has all the makings of a POV fork; one group of editors found the name "idealism" confusing, the other found the name "realism" unexplanatory, and here we are today. 4. Provide evidence that Platonic Idealism or the Theory of Forms aren't "general philosophical stances," and that Platonic Realism is a "general philosophical stance", so that this criterion can be used to distinguish one or more of the pages. If you can't substantiate the claim that only one or two of these three pages is a 'general philosophical stance,' your argument can't get off the ground.
• "your claim that Plato is a nominalist about universals, is likely only to be acceptable if one is a nominalist oneself — not to a realist about abstracta." - Er, no. I'm (usually) a realist about universals. I just recognize that from a classical and Medieval perspective, a 'universal' is generally defined as 'one thing inhering as a whole in many.' Platonic Ideas aren't multiply inhering; they are particulars transcending time and space, and their relation to property-instantiations is causal and extrinsic rather than constitutive and intrinsic. Regardless, I'm not proposing that we move the article to Platonic nominalism; I'm just pointing out that calling him a realist is confusing and at least a little contentious (Paul Spade disputes it, as does Donald Brownstein in Aspects of the problem of universals), whereas no one has ever disputed that he has a theory of Ideas/Forms. Using the somewhat more self-explanatory, transparent title resolves the problems. (Also, no one is disputing that Plato is a realist about abstracta. You can be a realist about abstracta without being a realist about universals, and you can certainly be a realist about universals without affirming abstracta. Platonic realism is specifically 'realism about ideas qua universals.') -Silence (talk) 16:48, 25 November 2011 (UTC)