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{{distinguish|Komala Kurdistan's Organization of the Communist Party of Iran|Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan}}
{{POV|date=July 2010}}
{{POV-check|date=July 2010}}
{{pp-protect|small=yes}}
{{Coord|35.4069|N|45.4657|E|display=title}}

{{Infobox political party
{{Infobox political party
| name = Komala
| party_name = Komalah
| logo = The Official Logo Of Komala.png
| name_native = كؤمــــةلَة<br> Komele
| colorcode = Red
| logo_size = 100px
| caption = [[Red star]] combined with the Soviet-style typography of Komala in Farsi script<ref name="Detsch">{{citation|last1=Detsch|first1=Jack|title=Kurdish rebels join anti-Iran lobbying fray|url=https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/kurdish-rebels-anti-iran-lobbying.html|date=2 October 2018|work=Al-Monitor|access-date=30 March 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181002234856/https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/10/kurdish-rebels-anti-iran-lobbying.html|archive-date=2 October 2018}}</ref>
| party_logo = [[Image:Komalah.jpg]]
| colorcode = Red
| leader =
| abbreviation = KPIK
| foundation = 1967
| leader = Abdullah Mohtadi<ref name="MERIA">{{cite journal|author=Rodi Hevian|title=THE MAIN KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY: A RESEARCH GUIDE|url=http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/08/the-main-kurdish-political-parties-in-iran-iraq-syria-and-turkey-a-research-guide/|date=Summer 2013|volume=17|journal=[[Middle East Review of International Affairs]]|number=2|publisher=Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs|location=Herzliya, Israel|access-date=2018-05-22|archive-date=2017-03-28|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170328125252/http://www.rubincenter.org/2013/08/the-main-kurdish-political-parties-in-iran-iraq-syria-and-turkey-a-research-guide/|url-status=dead}}</ref>
| ideology = [[Kurdish nationalism]], [[social democracy]], [[democratic socialism]]
| foundation = 2000
| international = [[Alliance of Democrats]]
| split = [[Komalah (CPI)]] (2000)
| colors = Red
| merged =
| headquarters = [[Kurdistan]]
| ideology = [[Social democracy]]<br/>[[Kurds in Iran|Kurdish minority]] interests
| website = [http://www.komalah.org Komalah]
| headquarters = [[Sulaymaniyah]], [[Kurdistan Region]]
| international = [[Socialist International]] (observer)<br/>[[Progressive Alliance]]<br/>[[Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization|UNPO]]
| website = [http://www.komalainternational.org/ Komala]
| country = Iran
| country2 = Iraq
| founder =
| position = [[Centre-left politics|Centre-left]] to [[Left-wing politics|left-wing]]
| national = [[Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran]]
| colors = {{color box|#E70A0A}} Red
| flag = Flag of Komala.svg
| membership = <1,000 (estimate)<ref name="Milburn"/>
| membership_year = 2017
}}
}}


The '''Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan''' ({{lang-ku|{{lang|fa|كۆمه‌ڵه‌ی شۆڕشگێڕی زه‌حمه‌تكێشانی كوردستانی ئێران}}|Komełey Şorrişgêrrî Zehmetkêşanî Kurdistanî Êran|lit=Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan}}), commonly shortened to '''Komalah''' ({{lang-ku|Komełe}}; {{lang-fa|کومله}}), is a [[social-democratic]]<ref>[https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/sem/en/data/internationales/herkunftslaender/asien-nahost/irq/IRQ-ber-factfindingmission-e.pdf.download.pdf/IRQ-ber-factfindingmission-e.pdf Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) Pages 81 and 82]</ref><ref>[https://www.trouw.nl/nieuws/dansend-verzet~b7d102c1/ Trouw]</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.trouw.nl/gs-bcaeb60d|title=Dromen aan de grens|first=Judit|last=Neurink|date=January 25, 2009|website=Trouw}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.bbc.com/persian/world/2010/06/100617_l15_ptv_hard_talk_mohtadi|title=عبدالله مهتدی: از تغيير قانون اساسی بدون خشونت و خونريزی دفاع می کنيم|date=June 17, 2010|website=BBC News فارسی}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://komalainternational.org/2018/03/05/komalas-beliefs|title=Komala's Beliefs|website=komalainternational.org}}</ref> [[ethnic party]] of [[Kurds in Iran]]. Formerly with [[Marxist-Leninist]] and [[communist]] ties,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kazemzadeh|first=Masoud|date=2009|title=U.S.–Iran Confrontation in the Post-NIE World: An Analysis of Alternative Policy Options|journal=Comparative Strategy|volume=28|issue=1|pages=14–27|doi=10.1080/01495930802679736|s2cid=154745287|issn=1521-0448}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Azeez|first=Govand Khalid|date=2019|title=The "Kurd" between capitalist-statist nationalism and class conflict|journal=Critique|volume=47|issue=3|pages=411–432|doi=10.1080/03017605.2019.1644724|s2cid=201367012|issn=1748-8605}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Akbarzadeh|first1=Shahram|last2=Shahab Ahmed|first2=Zahid|last3=Laoutides|first3=Costas|last4=Gourlay|first4=William|date=2019|title=The Kurds in Iran: balancing national and ethnic identity in a securitised environment|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=47|issue=3|pages=1145–1162|doi=10.1080/01436597.2019.1592671|s2cid=159392674|issn=1360-2241}}</ref> the Komalah is a well established party with a history of more than five decades. The Komala party's headquarters are presently in the [[Kurdistan Region]] of [[Iraq]]. They have an armed wing that has a history of leading the Kurdish resistance. The Komalah was advocated for anti-imperialism and Kurdish [[self-determination]].<ref name="MERIA"/>
'''Komalah''' ('''Komele''' in [[Kurdish language|Kurdish]]) is a [[Kurdish people|Kurdish]] political party in [[East Kurdistan]]. The word ''Komele'' in [[Kurdish Language|Kurdish]] is derived from ''Komel'' (Society) and means "association" [http://www.dicts.info/di1.php?k1=1&k2=214&w=komele].


The group is classified as a [[terrorist organization]] by Iran and Japan. Since 2018, it is a registered [[Lobbying in the United States|lobby in the United States]].
==Political background==
In 1967, '''Komalah''' was founded and struggled against the government and policies of [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]] for 12 years until 1979. In 1983 '''Komalah''' formed a political organization with other [[Iran]]ian Marxist and [[socialist]] groups called the [[Communist Party of Iran]].<ref>[http://www.komalah.org/english/html_files/background.htm Background] Komalah Official Website</ref>


Komala has been engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Iranian government, notably during the [[1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran|1979 Kurdish rebellion]] and the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. It was also [[KDPI–Komala conflict|involved in armed conflict]] against the [[Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan]] (KDPI) during the 1980s and early 1990s.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State|author=Hussein Tahiri|year=2007|publisher=Mazda Publications|volume=8|series=Bibliotheca Iranica: Kurdish studies series|isbn=9781568591933|page=144}}</ref> After a long time ceasefire, in 2017 the organization declared to have resumed [[Western Iran clashes (2016–present)|armed conflict with Iran]].<ref name="Milburn"/>
==Political program==
'''Komalah''' considers itself a Marxist organisation. Its aim is the establishment of a new kind of society, a new kind of social system based on freedom, equality and social justice, in other words a system of socialism guided by this principle: from each according to ability, to each according to need.


== History ==
In its view, the struggle for socialism requires workers acting together on a mass scale. At the same time, it recognises that collective action does not come from nothing. Instead, each and every small struggle provides workers with experiences and the confidence in their own ability and strength. Towards this end, workers organise themselves in trade or professional organisations (such as trade unions etc) and their political parties.
It is not known when exactly the organization began its activity.<ref>{{citation|first=Ali|last=Ezzatyar|title=The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan: Ethnic and Religious Implications in the Greater Middle East|date=2016|publisher=Springer|isbn=9781137563248|page=35}}</ref> According to the account of Abdullah Mohtadi, he co-founded the group on 27 October 1969 at a secret initiation meeting together with six other Kurdish students in [[Tehran]].<ref>{{citation|first=Ali|last=Ezzatyar|title=The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan: Ethnic and Religious Implications in the Greater Middle East|date=2016|publisher=Springer|isbn=9781137563248|page=104}}</ref> This is disputed by Hussein Moradbegi and Iraj Farzad, two co-founders who state that the group was officially born on 26 January 1979. [[Abbas Vali]] argues the latter view is correct, as the 1969-established organization had no specific ethnic identity and had no position on Kurdistan, and Kurdish members of the former –[[Foad Mostafa Soltani]], Mohammad Hossein Karimi, Abdollah Mohtadi, Tayeb Abbas Ruh Illahi, Mohsen Rahimi, [[Ibrahim Alizade]], Sa’ed Vatandoust, Hussein Moradbagi, Omar Ilkhanizadeh and Iraj Farzad– created an offshoot.<ref>{{citation|first=Abbas|last=Vali|title=The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran|date=2020|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-3-030-16069-2|doi=10.1007/978-3-030-16069-2|pages=165–166|s2cid=198843257 }}</ref>


The organization initially operated underground, and went into public after the [[Iranian Revolution]] in 1979.<ref name="Kreyenbroek and Sperl"/> Shortly afterwards, they boycotted [[March 1979 Iranian Islamic Republic referendum|March 1979 referendum]], as well as the next [[December 1979 Iranian constitutional referendum|referendum of December 1979]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Romano|first=David|title=The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity|series=Cambridge Middle East studies|volume=22|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2006|page=236|isbn=978-0-521-85041-4|oclc=61425259}}</ref> [[Ladislav Bittman]] wrote in ''[[The KGB and Soviet Disinformation]]'' that Komala was part of [[KGB]]'s network in Iran, and was founded under financial and ideological influence of [[Soviet Union]].<ref>{{citation|first=Ladislav|last=Bittman|title=The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View|url=https://archive.org/details/TheKGBAndSovietDisinformationLadislavBittman|publisher=Pergamon-Brassey's|year=1983|isbn=9780080315720|page=111}}</ref> [[Edgar O'Ballance]] states that Komala received "help" from the Soviet KGB.<ref>{{citation|first=Edgar|last=O'Ballance|journal=Military Review: The Professional Journal of the United States Army|title=The Kurdish Factor in the Gulf War|volume=61|number=6|date=June 1981|page=16}}</ref>
In [[Iranian Kurdistan]], '''Komalah''' is trying to create the conditions favourable for bringing about radical changes in people's lives, and to end the national oppression of the [[Kurds]]. For this purpose, it has developed a special programme which asks for self-determination rights for the people of [[Iranian Kurdistan]]. This right means that the people of [[Iranian Kurdistan]] can, secede and establish their own independent state. Hence, '''Komalah''' aims to be able to create such conditions in [[Kurdistan]] which would enable them to conduct a free referendum in a democratic fashion, and to make their final decision to either separate from or remain within the framework of [[Iran]].


In 1981, Komala refused to join the [[National Council of Resistance of Iran]] (NCRI).<ref>{{cite book|first1=Charles|last1=Hobday|first2=Roger|last2=East|editor-first=David Scott|editor-last=Bell|title=Communist and Marxist parties of the world|page=245|publisher=Longman|year=1990|isbn=9780582060388}}</ref>
If the decision of the [[Kurdish people]] were to remain within the framework of [[Iran]], it would seek changes such as the creation of equality of all nationalities in [[Iran]], an end to all the practices and official laws which discriminate between the various [[Iran]]ian nationalities, and alongside it the reversal of the imposition of the present official language on the peoples, an end to the bureaucratic intervention by the central government in people’s everyday lives, and the possibility of creating and setting up a system of democratic power internally.


In September 1983, the group underwent organizational changes and patterned itself as an orthodox communist party, eventually joining [[Communist Party of Iran]], as its [[Komalah (CPI)|Kurdish wing]].<ref name="NE"/> In 2000, the faction led by Abdullah Mohtadi split from the latter and styled itself as the "original" Komala.<ref>{{citation|last1=Romano|first1=David|last2=Gurses|first2=Mehmet|title=Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria|date=2014|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1-137-40999-7|page=75|edition=1st|doi=10.1057/9781137409997_4}}</ref>
While '''Komalah''' has been, and continues to be, actively involved in the struggle to remove the national oppression from the [[Kurdish people]], it is also opening other avenues of struggle in [[Kurdistan]]. This is why '''Komalah''' raise questions such as the day-to-day quest of workers for economic improvements; of women against oppression and the political and social inequalities they are suffering; of poor farmers against the bourgeois landowners. They also include efforts of shaping civil society through building mass institutions such as trade unions, youth and women’s organisations; and the expression of popular will through people’s councils in the towns and in liberated areas whenever possible and no matter how transient they may be. It also means pressing for unqualified political freedoms and the basic rights of working people, not only in opposition to the central government, but also against anyone and any local force which violate these rights; and it means struggling against religious superstitions and backward morality.


During [[Presidency of George W. Bush|George W. Bush administration]], the group's leader met American officials in 2005 and 2006 amidst approval of [[Iran Freedom and Support Act]] budget. While it is unclear which groups have been funded through the program, Mohtadi welcomed an aid in 2008 and stated "If you’re a political movement that is part of an opposition, you need help from abroad... We're not ashamed to admit it."<ref>{{citation|first=Borzou|last=Daragahi|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-apr-15-fg-proxy15-story.html|title=Iran says U.S. aids rebels at its borders|date=15 April 2008|access-date=11 May 2020|work=The Los Angeles Times}}</ref> In 2006, the party set up its Sweden-based satellite television named Rojhelat TV. Turkish [[NTV (Turkish TV channel)|NTV]] reported that the channel has been established with financial assistance from the United States.<ref>{{citation|title=USA said aiding Iranian-Kurdish ROJHELAT TV in Sweden - Turkish report|date=4 January 2006|work=BBC Monitoring European|location=London}}, {{ProQuest|459397420}}</ref>
==Tactic and Political Struggle==


On grounds that politburo acts non-democratic, the faction led by Omar Ilkhanizade split in October 2007, founding [[Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan|the faction of reform]].<ref name="Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield">{{citation|first1=Hashem|last1=Ahmadzadeh|first2=Gareth|last2=Stansfield|title=The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran|journal=Middle East Journal|volume=64|number=1|date=2010|pages=11–27|doi=10.3751/64.1.11|jstor=20622980|hdl=10871/9414|s2cid=143462899|hdl-access=free}}</ref> On 29 April 2008, another faction led by Abdulla Konaposhi accused Mohtadi of "non-democratic management", and expressing dissatifcation to a policy of a cooperation with [[Monarchism in Iran|monarchists]] including [[Reza Pahlavi, Crown Prince of Iran|Reza Pahlavi]], split from the group to establish [[Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan–Reunification Faction|the reunification faction]].<ref name="Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield"/> Both factions have since reunited with the party.<ref>{{cite web|author1=Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan Secretariat|title=Announcement on the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan – Reunification Faction rejoining|url=http://www.brwska.org/content-168.html?fbclid=IwAR1bxWBJ-T_nI9c8TtD6P--qXkN9774g5j0A2SY_TSc_oku5qPuZ6QfMEbk|website=Brwska.org|access-date=4 June 2023|date=27 October 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author1=Komala Media Center|title=Declaration of the merger of the two sides of Komala|url=https://www.komala.com/?p=16308|website=Komala.com|access-date=4 June 2023|language=fa|date=27 November 2022}}</ref>
The three main areas '''Komalah''' is involved in are as follows:


On 21 Juny 2023, the alliance between the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and [[Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan]] collapsed.<ref name="II">{{cite news |title=Infighting Between Iranian Kurdish Groups Leaves At Least Two Dead |url=https://www.iranintl.com/en/202306227400 |access-date=23 June 2023 |agency=Iran International}}</ref> Following the collapse, the two clashed, and as a result of the infighting, two were killed and three were wounded.<ref name="II"/> The clashes took place in Zargawez in Iraq's [[Kurdistan Region]].<ref name="II"/> Norway-based Kurdish human rights NGO [[Hengaw]] offered readiness to mediate between the two.<ref name="II"/>
*1. The development of the party’s clandestine organisation, and activities in the cities and villages of Kurdistan.
*2. The development of people’s everyday struggle for reforms, building on their achievements both small and great, and establishing large trade and professional organisations wherever people live and work.
*3. The military struggle in Kurdistan against the Islamic regime’s aggression.


== Ideology ==
With regard to the first area of work, a group called the ‘clandestine organisation centre’, known by the name ‘TAKISH’, was set up. Its members in the cities and villages of Iran’s Kurdistan are contacted either by written correspondence or verbally, by calling them out from Iran and discussing matters with them in person (eg in Iraqi Kurdistan, or Europe).
The group is ideologically [[Marxist–Leninist]], therefore it saw itself [[revolutionary]] and transcending ethnic boundaries, unlike rival [[Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan]].<ref name="NE">{{cite book|last=Entessar|first=Nader|title=Kurdish Politics in the Middle East|publisher=Lexington Books|location=Lanham|pages=49–50|year=2010|isbn=9780739140390|oclc=430736528}}</ref> It was predominantly [[Maoist]] during first decade of its activity<ref name="NE"/> and adopted it as a mobilization strategy to recruit from peasantry and lower urban class.<ref>{{cite book|last=Romano|first=David|title=The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity|series=Cambridge Middle East studies, 22.|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2006|page=233|isbn=978-0-521-85041-4|oclc=61425259}}</ref> [[Michael Gunter]] says that inspired by [[Chinese Communist Revolution]], they became Maoists and viewed [[Kurdish nationalism]] as [[Parochialism|parochial]].<ref>{{cite book|last1=Gunter|first1=Michael M.|title=The A to Z of the Kurds|date=2009|page=102|publisher=Scarecrow Press|isbn=9780810863347}}</ref>


However at its first congress held in 1979, the ideology was renounced due to being "inappropriate to Kurdish conditions in Iran".<ref name="NE"/> In 1981, the group initiated [[Self-criticism (Marxism–Leninism)|self-criticism]] of its past and concluded that what it needs is "strong links with the [[proletariat]]".<ref name="Kreyenbroek and Sperl">{{cite book|editor-last1=Kreyenbroek|editor-first1=Philip G.|editor-last2=Sperl|editor-first2=Stefan|title=The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview|publisher=Routledge|page=143|year=2005|isbn=9781134907663}}</ref>
The second part of '''Komalah''''s work, is mainly carried out through the publication of magazines and special broadsheets which are frequently issued. They also have a daily radio broadcast lasting three and a half hours, on three short wave channels. '''Peshang''' is '''Komalah''''s monthly political magazine written in the [[Kurdish language]], as is '''Peshang''', a literary magazine.


In 2000, when the party claimed reestablishment, it criticized some reports to the 8th congress of the CPI in 1995 for not being correct from the Marxist viewpoint and giving more privileges to the [[Bourgeois nationalism|bourgeois nationalist]] groups. Sabah Mofidi described the party's position on political spectrum in 2016 as "[[Far-left politics|radical left]]", adding that "in the line of the created changes in the practical thought of Marxism and indeed the indigenous Marxism accommodated with the place-time conditions of various societies, it has become more [[Realpolitik|pragmatic]] and taken steps to realism".<ref>{{citation|first=Sabah|last=Mofidi|title=The Left Movement and National Question: From Romanticism to Realism (With a Focus on Komala Organization)|journal=Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies|volume=3|number=1|pages=20–48|date=June 2016|location=Istanbul|publisher=Yildiz Technical University|doi=10.29333/ejecs/48|issn=2149-1291|doi-access=free}}</ref>
With regard to the third area of there work, '''Komalah''' has set up a military group called '''KOMALAH’S PESHMERGA FORCE'''. Its purpose is to organise the military defence of the people of [[Kurdistan]], and it has carried out this task in [[Iranian Kurdistan]] for the past 16 years. Given the regime’s militarisation of the whole [[Iranian Kurdistan]] in the recent period, the Force’s military actions are carried out through small guerrilla groups who live secretly inside [[Kurdistan]].
Komalah maintains two camps in [[Iraqi Kurdistan]], in the [[Silemani]] province, which contain some of the departments central to '''Komalah'''’s activities, such as the Executive Committee, the Clandestine Organisation Centre, Radio Broadcasting, Printing, the Health Centre, and the Military Training Centre.


It is currently a member of the [[Progressive Alliance]]<ref>{{Cite web|title=Parties & Organisations|url=https://progressive-alliance.info/network/parties-and-organisations/|access-date=2020-10-09|website=Progressive Alliance|language=en-US}}</ref> which was formed in 2013 as an international association of social democratic and socialist parties.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Agenda (en)|url=http://progressive-alliance.info/network/agenda/|access-date=2020-10-09|website=Progressive Alliance|language=en-US}}</ref>
It also takes care of a group of [[Iran]]ian political refugees living in the regions of [[Silemani]], Qlaladiza, Rania, Arbat, Kifri and Kalar.


== Armed activities ==
One fact needs highlighting. During the years following the first [[Gulf War]] (1988), because of changes in the region’s political conditions, '''Komalah''' was forced to prepare for later events and to increase its ability to manoeuvre and the humanitarian aspect of its work. Thus, it sent out around 2000 members and supporters, well known political refugees and their families who lived in [[Iraqi Kurdistan]], with the co-operation of the UN or independent of it, who subsequently settled in different countries around the world.
[[File:Kurdish Komala Peshmerga (11569031325).jpg|thumb|Komala Peshmerga in 2013]]
{{see also|1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran|Iran–Iraq War|KDPI–Komala conflict|Western Iran clashes (2016–present)}}
Following [[Iran–Iraq War]], the group were stationed inside [[Iraq]]i soil and were supported by [[Saddam Hussein]] and his [[Ba'athist Iraq|Ba'athist regime]],<ref>{{cite book|first1=Seyed Mohammad|last1=Lolaki|isbn=978-981-15-0478-5|doi=10.1007/978-981-15-0478-5|year=2020|title=Diverging Approaches of Political Islamic Thought in Iran since the 1960s|publisher=Springer|page=211|s2cid=211315936 }}</ref> who was willing to leverage insurgent groups against Tehran.<ref name="Deterring Terrorism"/> Saddam gave the group money, logistical support and arms.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=van Bruinessen|first=Martin|date=1986|title=The Kurds between Iran and Iraq|journal=MERIP Middle East Report|issue=141|pages=14–27|doi=10.2307/3011925|issn=0888-0328|jstor=3011925}}</ref> After 1991, they found more secure sanctuaries under ''de facto'' autonomous [[Kurdistan Region]].<ref name="Deterring Terrorism">{{cite book|editor-first1=Andreas|editor-last1=Wenger|editor-first2=Alex|editor-last2=Wilner|isbn=9780804783477|year=2012|chapter=Deterring Kurdish Insurgent Attacks|title=Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice|publisher=Stanford University Press|pages=231–232}}</ref>


Headquarters of the group is currently located in an installation in Zergwez, about a 20-minute drive southeast of [[Sulaymaniya]].<ref name="ACCORD">{{citation|title=Report on Joint Finnish-Swiss Fact-Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area, May 10-22, 2011|date=1 February 2012|url=https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1170945/90_1329398573_2012-02-01-iraq-report-on-joint-finnish-swiss-fact-finding-mission.pdf|work=Finnish Immigration Service, Federal Office for Migration (Switzerland)|id=1170945|via=Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)}}</ref> A European mission reported in 2012 that the camp has strict security measures at the entry gate.<ref name="ACCORD"/> Their previous camp was located in the vicinity of [[Halabja]], near [[Iran–Iraq border]], but after they suffered from attacks by [[Iranian Armed Forces]], they moved to the current place.<ref name="ACCORD"/>
==Organizing Elements and Komalah's Formation Chart==
'''Komalah''''s conference is held every two years. Until now, there have been eleven conferences, the last one having been held in July 2003, when a central committee of 21 members was elected.


James Martin of ''[[The Jerusalem Post]]'' who visited the camp in 2007, wrote that Komala guerillas were equipped with [[AK-47]]s and [[RPG-7|RPG]]s, and are also trained in using anti-aircraft guns.<ref>{{citation|first=James|last=Martin|title=Lunch with Komala|url=https://www.jpost.com/features/lunch-with-komala|work=The Jerusalem Post|date=23 August 2007|access-date=15 April 2020}}</ref>
The [[Central Committee]] holds meetings every three months. These meetings always elect an Executive Committee to conduct the work between the meetings. '''Komalah''' has an official spokesperson who is at the same time the first secretary of '''Komalah'''. Currently, this spokesperson is [[Ebrahim Alizadeh]].


A report published by [[Combating Terrorism Center]] in 2017, estimated that the group has less than 1,000 members.<ref name="Milburn"/>
==See also==
*[[PJAK]]
*[[PDKI]]
*[[PKK]]


== Designation as a terrorist organization ==
==External links==
{{Campaignbox Kurdish separatism in Iran}}
*[http://www.komalah.org Komalah's Official site]
Iran<ref name="Milburn">{{citation|first=Franc|last=Milburn|title=Iranian Kurdish Militias: Terrorist-Insurgents, Ethno Freedom Fighters, or Knights on the Regional Chessboard?|url=http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/41930fa0-6afa-42f3-837b-e343778df613/pdf|publisher=Combating Terrorism Center|via=Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich|date=May 2017|volume=10|issue=5|journal=CTC Sentinel|pages=1–2}}</ref> and Japan have listed Komala as a [[terrorist organization]].<ref name="JPN">{{cite web |url=http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/ITH/organizations/ME_N-africa/komala.html |script-title=ja:コマラ|publisher=[[Ministry of Justice (Japan)|Ministry of Justice of Japan]] |language=ja |title=Komaleh，Kumele|access-date=20 April 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190309091042/http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/ITH/organizations/ME_N-africa/komala.html|archive-date=9 March 2019|url-status=dead }}</ref>

== Lobbying activities ==
In September 2018, the group opened an office in [[Washington D.C.]], and formally registered as a [[Lobbying in the United States|lobby organization in the United States]], while it was reported to hold meetings with Congressmen from both parties since at least 2015.<ref name="Detsch"/> According to filed reports, Komala spent $7,500 in 2018 and in the next year, penned a $4,000 per month contract with the firm AF International, along with another worth $40,000 with Cogent Law Group.<ref>{{citation|editor-first=Julian|editor-last=Pecquet|url=https://lobbying.al-monitor.com/pulse/iran|title=Annual Overview 2019: Iran opposition buoyed by Trump's 'maximum pressure' campaign|work=Al-Monitor Lobbying Tracker|date=11 September 2019|access-date=30 March 2020}}</ref> One-fourth of latter included working on an [[op-ed]], advise to establish a charitable foundation in the U.S., and "develop" Wikipedia page.<ref>{{citation|first=Aaron|last=Schaffer|url=https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/komala-iranian-kurds-hire-lobbyist-executive-branch-meet-trump.html|title=Iranian Kurdish rebels hire law firm to lobby Trump administration|work=Al-Monitor|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200206153842/https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/02/komala-iranian-kurds-hire-lobbyist-executive-branch-meet-trump.html|archive-date=6 February 2020|date=5 February 2020|access-date=20 April 2020}}</ref>

==See also==
{{Komala offshoots}}


==References==
==References==
{{Reflist}}
{{Reflist}}
{{Iranian exiled parties}}


[[Category:Iranian Kurdish organisations]]
[[Category:2000 establishments in Iraqi Kurdistan]]
[[Category:Political organizations in Iran]]
[[Category:Banned Kurdish parties]]
[[Category:Communist parties in Iran]]
[[Category:Banned political parties in Iran]]
[[Category:Socialism in Kurdistan]]

[[Category:Social democratic parties in Iran]]
[[ar:كومله]]
[[Category:Social democratic parties in Iraq]]
[[de:Komalah]]
[[Category:Social democratic parties in Kurdistan]]
[[eo:Komala]]
[[Category:Kurdish political parties in Iran]]
[[fa:کومله]]
[[Category:Kurdish political parties in Iraq]]
[[fr:Komala]]
[[Category:Left-wing militant groups in Iran]]
[[ku:Komele]]
[[Category:Lobbying organizations based in Washington, D.C.]]
[[ckb:کۆمەڵە]]
[[Category:Militant opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran]]
[[Category:Organisations designated as terrorist by Iran]]
[[Category:Organisations designated as terrorist by Japan]]
[[Category:Political parties established in 2000]]
[[Category:Political parties in Kurdistan Region]]
[[Category:Political parties of the Iranian Revolution]]

Latest revision as of 13:17, 2 November 2023

Not to be confused with Komala Kurdistan's Organization of the Communist Party of Iran or Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan.

35°24′25″N 45°27′57″E / 35.4069°N 45.4657°E / 35.4069; 45.4657

Komala
AbbreviationKPIK
LeaderAbdullah Mohtadi[2]
Gegründet2000
Split fromKomalah (CPI) (2000)
HauptsitzSulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region
Membership (2017)<1,000 (estimate)[3]
IdeologySocial democracy
Kurdish minority interests
Political positionCentre-left to left-wing
National affiliationCongress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran
International affiliationSocialist International (observer)
Progressive Alliance
UNPO
Colors  Red
Party flag
Website
Komala

The Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: كۆمه‌ڵه‌ی شۆڕشگێڕی زه‌حمه‌تكێشانی كوردستانی ئێران, romanized: Komełey Şorrişgêrrî Zehmetkêşanî Kurdistanî Êran, lit. 'Society of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan'), commonly shortened to Komalah (Kurdish: Komełe; Persian: کومله), is a social-democratic[4][5][6][7][8] ethnic party of Kurds in Iran. Formerly with Marxist-Leninist and communist ties,[9][10][11] the Komalah is a well established party with a history of more than five decades. The Komala party's headquarters are presently in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. They have an armed wing that has a history of leading the Kurdish resistance. The Komalah was advocated for anti-imperialism and Kurdish self-determination.[2]

The group is classified as a terrorist organization by Iran and Japan. Since 2018, it is a registered lobby in the United States.

Komala has been engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Iranian government, notably during the 1979 Kurdish rebellion and the Iran–Iraq War. It was also involved in armed conflict against the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) during the 1980s and early 1990s.[12] After a long time ceasefire, in 2017 the organization declared to have resumed armed conflict with Iran.[3]

History

It is not known when exactly the organization began its activity.[13] According to the account of Abdullah Mohtadi, he co-founded the group on 27 October 1969 at a secret initiation meeting together with six other Kurdish students in Tehran.[14] This is disputed by Hussein Moradbegi and Iraj Farzad, two co-founders who state that the group was officially born on 26 January 1979. Abbas Vali argues the latter view is correct, as the 1969-established organization had no specific ethnic identity and had no position on Kurdistan, and Kurdish members of the former –Foad Mostafa Soltani, Mohammad Hossein Karimi, Abdollah Mohtadi, Tayeb Abbas Ruh Illahi, Mohsen Rahimi, Ibrahim Alizade, Sa’ed Vatandoust, Hussein Moradbagi, Omar Ilkhanizadeh and Iraj Farzad– created an offshoot.[15]

The organization initially operated underground, and went into public after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.[16] Shortly afterwards, they boycotted March 1979 referendum, as well as the next referendum of December 1979.[17] Ladislav Bittman wrote in The KGB and Soviet Disinformation that Komala was part of KGB's network in Iran, and was founded under financial and ideological influence of Soviet Union.[18] Edgar O'Ballance states that Komala received "help" from the Soviet KGB.[19]

In 1981, Komala refused to join the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).[20]

In September 1983, the group underwent organizational changes and patterned itself as an orthodox communist party, eventually joining Communist Party of Iran, as its Kurdish wing.[21] In 2000, the faction led by Abdullah Mohtadi split from the latter and styled itself as the "original" Komala.[22]

During George W. Bush administration, the group's leader met American officials in 2005 and 2006 amidst approval of Iran Freedom and Support Act budget. While it is unclear which groups have been funded through the program, Mohtadi welcomed an aid in 2008 and stated "If you’re a political movement that is part of an opposition, you need help from abroad... We're not ashamed to admit it."[23] In 2006, the party set up its Sweden-based satellite television named Rojhelat TV. Turkish NTV reported that the channel has been established with financial assistance from the United States.[24]

On grounds that politburo acts non-democratic, the faction led by Omar Ilkhanizade split in October 2007, founding the faction of reform.[25] On 29 April 2008, another faction led by Abdulla Konaposhi accused Mohtadi of "non-democratic management", and expressing dissatifcation to a policy of a cooperation with monarchists including Reza Pahlavi, split from the group to establish the reunification faction.[25] Both factions have since reunited with the party.[26][27]

On 21 Juny 2023, the alliance between the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan and Komala of the Toilers of Kurdistan collapsed.[28] Following the collapse, the two clashed, and as a result of the infighting, two were killed and three were wounded.[28] The clashes took place in Zargawez in Iraq's Kurdistan Region.[28] Norway-based Kurdish human rights NGO Hengaw offered readiness to mediate between the two.[28]

Ideology

The group is ideologically Marxist–Leninist, therefore it saw itself revolutionary and transcending ethnic boundaries, unlike rival Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan.[21] It was predominantly Maoist during first decade of its activity[21] and adopted it as a mobilization strategy to recruit from peasantry and lower urban class.[29] Michael Gunter says that inspired by Chinese Communist Revolution, they became Maoists and viewed Kurdish nationalism as parochial.[30]

However at its first congress held in 1979, the ideology was renounced due to being "inappropriate to Kurdish conditions in Iran".[21] In 1981, the group initiated self-criticism of its past and concluded that what it needs is "strong links with the proletariat".[16]

In 2000, when the party claimed reestablishment, it criticized some reports to the 8th congress of the CPI in 1995 for not being correct from the Marxist viewpoint and giving more privileges to the bourgeois nationalist groups. Sabah Mofidi described the party's position on political spectrum in 2016 as "radical left", adding that "in the line of the created changes in the practical thought of Marxism and indeed the indigenous Marxism accommodated with the place-time conditions of various societies, it has become more pragmatic and taken steps to realism".[31]

It is currently a member of the Progressive Alliance[32] which was formed in 2013 as an international association of social democratic and socialist parties.[33]

Armed activities

Komala Peshmerga in 2013
See also: 1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran, Iran–Iraq War, KDPI–Komala conflict, and Western Iran clashes (2016–present)

Following Iran–Iraq War, the group were stationed inside Iraqi soil and were supported by Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist regime,[34] who was willing to leverage insurgent groups against Tehran.[35] Saddam gave the group money, logistical support and arms.[36] After 1991, they found more secure sanctuaries under de facto autonomous Kurdistan Region.[35]

Headquarters of the group is currently located in an installation in Zergwez, about a 20-minute drive southeast of Sulaymaniya.[37] A European mission reported in 2012 that the camp has strict security measures at the entry gate.[37] Their previous camp was located in the vicinity of Halabja, near Iran–Iraq border, but after they suffered from attacks by Iranian Armed Forces, they moved to the current place.[37]

James Martin of The Jerusalem Post who visited the camp in 2007, wrote that Komala guerillas were equipped with AK-47s and RPGs, and are also trained in using anti-aircraft guns.[38]

A report published by Combating Terrorism Center in 2017, estimated that the group has less than 1,000 members.[3]

Designation as a terrorist organization

Iran[3] and Japan have listed Komala as a terrorist organization.[39]

Lobbying activities

In September 2018, the group opened an office in Washington D.C., and formally registered as a lobby organization in the United States, while it was reported to hold meetings with Congressmen from both parties since at least 2015.[1] According to filed reports, Komala spent $7,500 in 2018 and in the next year, penned a $4,000 per month contract with the firm AF International, along with another worth $40,000 with Cogent Law Group.[40] One-fourth of latter included working on an op-ed, advise to establish a charitable foundation in the U.S., and "develop" Wikipedia page.[41]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b Detsch, Jack (2 October 2018), "Kurdish rebels join anti-Iran lobbying fray", Al-Monitor, archived from the original on 2 October 2018, retrieved 30 March 2020
  2. ^ a b Rodi Hevian (Summer 2013). "THE MAIN KURDISH POLITICAL PARTIES IN IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, AND TURKEY: A RESEARCH GUIDE". Middle East Review of International Affairs. 17 (2). Herzliya, Israel: Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs. Archived from the original on 2017-03-28. Retrieved 2018-05-22.
  3. ^ a b c d Milburn, Franc (May 2017), "Iranian Kurdish Militias: Terrorist-Insurgents, Ethno Freedom Fighters, or Knights on the Regional Chessboard?", CTC Sentinel, 10 (5), Combating Terrorism Center: 1–2 – via Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich
  4. ^ Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) Pages 81 and 82
  5. ^ Trouw
  6. ^ Neurink, Judit (January 25, 2009). "Dromen aan de grens". Trouw.
  7. ^ "عبدالله مهتدی: از تغيير قانون اساسی بدون خشونت و خونريزی دفاع می کنيم". BBC News فارسی. June 17, 2010.
  8. ^ "Komala's Beliefs". komalainternational.org.
  9. ^ Kazemzadeh, Masoud (2009). "U.S.–Iran Confrontation in the Post-NIE World: An Analysis of Alternative Policy Options". Comparative Strategy. 28 (1): 14–27. doi:10.1080/01495930802679736. ISSN 1521-0448. S2CID 154745287.
  10. ^ Azeez, Govand Khalid (2019). "The "Kurd" between capitalist-statist nationalism and class conflict". Critique. 47 (3): 411–432. doi:10.1080/03017605.2019.1644724. ISSN 1748-8605. S2CID 201367012.
  11. ^ Akbarzadeh, Shahram; Shahab Ahmed, Zahid; Laoutides, Costas; Gourlay, William (2019). "The Kurds in Iran: balancing national and ethnic identity in a securitised environment". Third World Quarterly. 47 (3): 1145–1162. doi:10.1080/01436597.2019.1592671. ISSN 1360-2241. S2CID 159392674.
  12. ^ Hussein Tahiri (2007). The Structure of Kurdish Society and the Struggle for a Kurdish State. Bibliotheca Iranica: Kurdish studies series. Vol. 8. Mazda Publications. p. 144. ISBN 9781568591933.
  13. ^ Ezzatyar, Ali (2016), The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan: Ethnic and Religious Implications in the Greater Middle East, Springer, p. 35, ISBN 9781137563248
  14. ^ Ezzatyar, Ali (2016), The Last Mufti of Iranian Kurdistan: Ethnic and Religious Implications in the Greater Middle East, Springer, p. 104, ISBN 9781137563248
  15. ^ Vali, Abbas (2020), The Forgotten Years of Kurdish Nationalism in Iran, Springer, pp. 165–166, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-16069-2, ISBN 978-3-030-16069-2, S2CID 198843257
  16. ^ a b Kreyenbroek, Philip G.; Sperl, Stefan, eds. (2005). The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview. Routledge. p. 143. ISBN 9781134907663.
  17. ^ Romano, David (2006). The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity. Cambridge Middle East studies. Vol. 22. Cambridge University Press. p. 236. ISBN 978-0-521-85041-4. OCLC 61425259.
  18. ^ Bittman, Ladislav (1983), The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider's View, Pergamon-Brassey's, p. 111, ISBN 9780080315720
  19. ^ O'Ballance, Edgar (June 1981), "The Kurdish Factor in the Gulf War", Military Review: The Professional Journal of the United States Army, 61 (6): 16
  20. ^ Hobday, Charles; East, Roger (1990). Bell, David Scott (ed.). Communist and Marxist parties of the world. Longman. p. 245. ISBN 9780582060388.
  21. ^ a b c d Entessar, Nader (2010). Kurdish Politics in the Middle East. Lanham: Lexington Books. pp. 49–50. ISBN 9780739140390. OCLC 430736528.
  22. ^ Romano, David; Gurses, Mehmet (2014), Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (1st ed.), Springer, p. 75, doi:10.1057/9781137409997_4, ISBN 978-1-137-40999-7
  23. ^ Daragahi, Borzou (15 April 2008), "Iran says U.S. aids rebels at its borders", The Los Angeles Times, retrieved 11 May 2020
  24. ^ "USA said aiding Iranian-Kurdish ROJHELAT TV in Sweden - Turkish report", BBC Monitoring European, London, 4 January 2006, ProQuest 459397420
  25. ^ a b Ahmadzadeh, Hashem; Stansfield, Gareth (2010), "The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran", Middle East Journal, 64 (1): 11–27, doi:10.3751/64.1.11, hdl:10871/9414, JSTOR 20622980, S2CID 143462899
  26. ^ Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan Secretariat (27 October 2020). "Announcement on the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan – Reunification Faction rejoining". Brwska.org. Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  27. ^ Komala Media Center (27 November 2022). "Declaration of the merger of the two sides of Komala". Komala.com (in Persian). Retrieved 4 June 2023.
  28. ^ a b c d "Infighting Between Iranian Kurdish Groups Leaves At Least Two Dead". Iran International. Retrieved 23 June 2023.
  29. ^ Romano, David (2006). The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity. Cambridge Middle East studies, 22. Cambridge University Press. p. 233. ISBN 978-0-521-85041-4. OCLC 61425259.
  30. ^ Gunter, Michael M. (2009). The A to Z of the Kurds. Scarecrow Press. p. 102. ISBN 9780810863347.
  31. ^ Mofidi, Sabah (June 2016), "The Left Movement and National Question: From Romanticism to Realism (With a Focus on Komala Organization)", Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies, 3 (1), Istanbul: Yildiz Technical University: 20–48, doi:10.29333/ejecs/48, ISSN 2149-1291
  32. ^ "Parties & Organisations". Progressive Alliance. Retrieved 2020-10-09.
  33. ^ "Agenda (en)". Progressive Alliance. Retrieved 2020-10-09.
  34. ^ Lolaki, Seyed Mohammad (2020). Diverging Approaches of Political Islamic Thought in Iran since the 1960s. Springer. p. 211. doi:10.1007/978-981-15-0478-5. ISBN 978-981-15-0478-5. S2CID 211315936.
  35. ^ a b Wenger, Andreas; Wilner, Alex, eds. (2012). "Deterring Kurdish Insurgent Attacks". Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice. Stanford University Press. pp. 231–232. ISBN 9780804783477.
  36. ^ van Bruinessen, Martin (1986). "The Kurds between Iran and Iraq". MERIP Middle East Report (141): 14–27. doi:10.2307/3011925. ISSN 0888-0328. JSTOR 3011925.
  37. ^ a b c "Report on Joint Finnish-Swiss Fact-Finding Mission to Amman and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Area, May 10-22, 2011" (PDF), Finnish Immigration Service, Federal Office for Migration (Switzerland), 1 February 2012, 1170945 – via Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD)
  38. ^ Martin, James (23 August 2007), "Lunch with Komala", The Jerusalem Post, retrieved 15 April 2020
  39. ^ "Komaleh，Kumele" コマラ (in Japanese). Ministry of Justice of Japan. Archived from the original on 9 March 2019. Retrieved 20 April 2020.
  40. ^ Pecquet, Julian, ed. (11 September 2019), "Annual Overview 2019: Iran opposition buoyed by Trump's 'maximum pressure' campaign", Al-Monitor Lobbying Tracker, retrieved 30 March 2020
  41. ^ Schaffer, Aaron (5 February 2020), "Iranian Kurdish rebels hire law firm to lobby Trump administration", Al-Monitor, archived from the original on 6 February 2020, retrieved 20 April 2020
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