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In 2003, during the [[Iraq War]], Peshmerga played a key role in the mission to capture [[Saddam Hussein]].<ref>{{cite web |first=Manish |last=Rai |title=Kurdish Peshmerga Can Be a Game-changer in Iraq And Syria |url=http://www.khaama.com/kurdish-peshmerga-can-be-a-game-changer-in-iraq-and-syria-6802 |work=[[Khaama Press]] |date=6 October 2014 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Operation Red Dawn's eight-month hunt |url=http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336860245.html |work=[[The Sydney Morning Herald]] |date=15 December 2003 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref> In 2004, they captured key [[al-Qaeda]] figure [[Hassan Ghul]], who revealed the identity of [[Osama bin Laden]]'s messenger, which eventually led to [[Death of Osama bin Laden#Operation Neptune Spear|Operation Neptune Spear]] and the [[death of Osama bin Laden]].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://theweek.com/article/index/243389/how-the-cia-really-caught-bin-ladens-trail#axzz34IzUbxqb |last=Ambinder |first=Marc |title=How the CIA really caught Bin Laden's trail |newspaper=[[The Week]] |date=29 April 2013 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |first=Arom |last=Roston |title=Cloak and Drone: The Strange Saga of an Al Qaeda Triple Agent |url=http://www.vocativ.com/usa/nat-sec/cloak-drone-strange-saga-al-qaeda-triple-agent/ |work=[[Vocativ]] |date=9 January 2014 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref>Valentine, Peshmerga: Those who Face Death, 2018, chapter five.</ref>
In 2003, during the [[Iraq War]], Peshmerga played a key role in the mission to capture [[Saddam Hussein]].<ref>{{cite web |first=Manish |last=Rai |title=Kurdish Peshmerga Can Be a Game-changer in Iraq And Syria |url=http://www.khaama.com/kurdish-peshmerga-can-be-a-game-changer-in-iraq-and-syria-6802 |work=[[Khaama Press]] |date=6 October 2014 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Operation Red Dawn's eight-month hunt |url=http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/12/15/1071336860245.html |work=[[The Sydney Morning Herald]] |date=15 December 2003 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref> In 2004, they captured key [[al-Qaeda]] figure [[Hassan Ghul]], who revealed the identity of [[Osama bin Laden]]'s messenger, which eventually led to [[Death of Osama bin Laden#Operation Neptune Spear|Operation Neptune Spear]] and the [[death of Osama bin Laden]].<ref>{{cite news |url=http://theweek.com/article/index/243389/how-the-cia-really-caught-bin-ladens-trail#axzz34IzUbxqb |last=Ambinder |first=Marc |title=How the CIA really caught Bin Laden's trail |newspaper=[[The Week]] |date=29 April 2013 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |first=Arom |last=Roston |title=Cloak and Drone: The Strange Saga of an Al Qaeda Triple Agent |url=http://www.vocativ.com/usa/nat-sec/cloak-drone-strange-saga-al-qaeda-triple-agent/ |work=[[Vocativ]] |date=9 January 2014 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref>Valentine, Peshmerga: Those who Face Death, 2018, chapter five.</ref>

Historically the Peshmerga existed only as guerrilla organizations, but under the self-declared [[Republic of Mahabad]] (1946–1947), the Peshmerga led by [[Mustafa Barzani]] became the official army of the republic.<ref name="first mahabad source">{{cite web |first=Mufid |last=Abdulla |title=Mahabad – the first independent Kurdish republic |url=http://kurdistantribune.com/2011/mahabad-first-independent-kurdish-republic/ |work=The Kurdistan Tribune |date=12 June 2011 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref><ref name="ma barzani" /> After the fall of the republic and the execution of head of state [[Qazi Muhammad]], Peshmerga forces reemerged as guerrilla organizations that would go on to fight the [[Iran]]ian and [[Iraq]]i governments for the remainder of the century.<ref>{{cite book |first=Susan |last=Meiselas |title=Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History |edition=2nd |publisher=[[University of Chicago Press]] |date=2008 |isbn=978-0-226-51928-9}}</ref>

In Iraq, most of these Peshmerga were led by [[Mustafa Barzani]] of the [[Kurdistan Democratic Party]].<ref name="ma barzani">{{cite web |title=President |url=http://www.krgspain.org/government/profiles/english-president/ |work=[[Kurdistan Regional Government]] Representation in Spain |date=2015 |access-date=14 February 2015}}</ref> In 1975 the Peshmerga were defeated in the [[Second Iraqi–Kurdish War]]. [[Jalal Talabani]], a leading member of the KDP, left the same year to revitalize the resistance and founded the [[Patriotic Union of Kurdistan]]. This event created the baseline for the political discontent between the KDP and PUK that to this day divides Peshmerga forces and much of Kurdish society in Kurdistan.

After Mustafa Barzani's death in 1979, his son [[Masoud Barzani]] took his position.<ref name="ma barzani" /> As tension increased between KDP and PUK, most Peshmerga fought to keep a region under their own party's control while also fighting off Iraqi Army incursions. Following the [[Iran–Iraq War|First Persian Gulf War]], Iraqi Kurdistan saw the [[Kurdish Civil War]] between the two major parties, the KDP and the PUK, and Peshmerga forces were used to fight each other.<ref>S. R. Valentine, Peshmerga: Those Who Face Death, KDP, 2018, chapter six.</ref> The civil war officially ended in September 1998 when Barzani and Talabani signed the Washington Agreement establishing a formal peace treaty.<ref>{{cite web |first=Frman |last=Abdulrahman |title=Never-ending mystery: what really happened to Kurdish civil war missing |url=http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3000 |work=niqash |date=23 February 2012 |access-date=22 February 2015}}</ref> In the agreement, the parties agreed to share revenue and power, deny the use of northern Iraq to the [[Kurdistan Workers' Party]] (PKK), and not allow Iraqi troops into the Kurdish regions. By then, around 5,000 had been killed on both sides, and many more had been evicted for being on the wrong side.<ref>{{cite web |first=Charles |last=McDermid |title=New force emerges in Kirkuk |url=http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LB20Ak02.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100222221442/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/LB20Ak02.html |url-status=unfit |archive-date=22 February 2010 |work=[[Asia Times Online]] |date=20 February 2010 |access-date=22 February 2015}}</ref> In the years after, tension remained high, but both parties moved towards each other, and in 2003 they both took part in the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|overthrowing of the Baathist regime]] as part of the [[Iraq War]]. Unlike other militia forces, the Peshmerga were never prohibited by Iraqi law.<ref name=WhoPeshmerga>[https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28738975 Profile: Who are the Peshmerga?] BBC News. Retrieved 19 December 2014.</ref>In 2014, the Peshmerga withdrew from the Nineveh Plains which was said by the locals as being a contributing factor of the quick ISIS victory in the invasion, and the widespread massacre of Yazidis, who were rendered defenseless.<ref>{{cite web|last=van den Toorn|first=Christine|date=August 17, 2014|title=How the U.S.-Favored Kurds Abandoned the Yazidis when ISIS Attacked|url=https://auis.edu.krd/iris/staff-publications/how-us-favored-kurds-abandoned-yazidis-when-isis-attacked|access-date=June 27, 2020|website=Institute of Regional & International Studies}}</ref>


==Structure==
==Structure==

Revision as of 21:08, 20 August 2021

Iraqi Armed Forces
القوات المسلحة العراقية
Emblem of the Armed Forces
Founded6 January 1921
Current form2003
Service branches
HeadquartersBaghdad
Leadership
Supreme Commander Barham Salih
General Commander Mustafa Al-Kadhimi
Minister of Defence Juma Inad
Personnel
Military age18[1]
Conscription9 months
Reaching military
age annually
661,224[2]
Active personnel538,000[2]
Expenditure
Budget$17.6 Billion (2020)[3]
Percent of GDP5.8%(2020)[3]
Industry
Foreign suppliers United States
 United Kingdom
 Russia
 Australia
 South Korea
 European Union
 Ukraine
 China
 Iran
Annual imports$2,948 million (2020)
Annual exports$2,390 million (2020)
Related articles
History
RanksMilitary ranks of Iraq

The Iraqi Armed Forces (Arabic: القوات المسلحة العراقية) are the military forces of The Republic of Iraq. Iraq armed forces consist of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. The armed forces of Iraq have a long and very active history. They were initially formed in the early 1920s. Six military coup d'états were mounted by the Army between 1936 and 1941. The armed forces first saw combat in the Anglo-Iraqi War of 1941. They fought against Israel in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, in the 1967 Six-Day War, and in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Two wars with the Kurds were fought from 1961 to 1970 and in 1974 and 1975. A much larger conflict was the Iran–Iraq War, initiated by the Iraqis in 1980, which continued until 1988. Thereafter Iraq began the invasion of Kuwait, which led to the Persian Gulf War of 1991, which led in turn to confrontations over the Iraqi no-fly zones during the 1990s, and finally the Iraq War of 2003. Two strong categories for Iraq have been logistics and combat engineering. Iraqi soldiers have also usually fought hard in difficult situations.[4]

The armed forces are administered by the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which toppled the Saddam Hussein regime, the Iraqi Armed Forces have been rebuilt with substantial assistance from the United States Armed Forces. Since the implementation of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement on January 1, 2009, the Iraqi Armed Forces and the forces of the Iraqi interior ministry are responsible for providing security and upholding law and order throughout Iraq.

The Iraqi Army, in particular, is one of the most trusted national institutions of Iraq. The Iraqi Armed Forces deficiencies have been identified in enabling functions, such as, e.g., logistics and military intelligence. In high-end conventional operations, Iraqi capabilities are currently limited by lack of artillery and air power.

Role

Article 9 of the Constitution of Iraq establishes the legal basis of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Much of the wording of Article 9 draws upon Article 27 of the 2004 Transitional Administrative Law.

File:Armed members of the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service in position during a deployment in Baghdad. (AFP).jpg
Armed members of the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service in position during a deployment in Baghdad.
Iraqi T-72 tank fires.

Part A, First Section, Article 9 states that 'The Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and representation without discrimination or exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority.'[5] Parts B and C prohibit the formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces and prohibit armed forces personnel from standing for political office or campaigning for political candidates. Part C expressively notes that military personnel are allowed to vote in elections. Part E expressively states the Iraqi Government's commitment to the respect and implementation of Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, nonproduction, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Second Section says that military service shall be regulated by law.

Iraq's legislation on defence dates from the Coalition Provisional Authority period of 2003–2004. CPA Order 22 established the New Iraqi Army on August 18, 2003, and CPA Order 67 renamed the New Iraqi Army the Iraqi Armed Forces on March 21, 2004.[6] In the process, the New Iraqi Army was expanded to include an Army, Air Force, Coastal Defense Force, reserve forces, and other elements.

Iraq does not appear to have publicly issued a national defence review or white paper. Much of defence policy since 2003 has been set by the United States. For example, one mission objective for Multi-National Force-Iraq was an "Iraq that has a security force that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists". To do this, the U.S. aimed to train and equip Iraq's security forces and gradually transition security responsibilities to them. In 2010 there are at least three major defence tasks. They are the suppression of the insurgency, the resolution of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces' status in relation to the Iraqi Armed Forces themselves, and longer-term, the growth of the armed forces so that they can defend Iraq from external threats.

History

Iraqi Security Force fire a howitzer at known Islamic State of Iraq and Syria locations near the Iraqi-Syrian border during Operation Roundup, June 5, 2018

The armed forces of Iraq as a modern country began to be formed by the British after they assumed mandated control over Iraq after 1917. During the March 1921 Cairo conference, it was agreed that an Iraqi Army would be created along British lines, with training and equipment provided by the UK.[7] King Faisal wanted an army of 15,000–20,000 men. The army actually grew from 3,500 in 1922 to 7,000 in 1927 and then to 11,500 in 1932.[8] The army became a modernising influence in the country. In 1931, the Iraqi Air Force was founded with a small number of pilots. Six Army coups took place, with one in 1936 being led by Bakr Sidqi and the last being the Rashid Ali coup of 1941.[9] Following the persecution of the Assyrians, which culminated in the Simele massacre of 1932, a conscription law was introduced, which strengthened the Iraqi Army at the expense of the tribal sheiks. In 1938–1939, Iraqi Army forces were concentrated near the Kuwaiti border, as the military portion of a policy by then-King Ghazni to encourage its union with Iraq.[10] British forces later defeated the Iraqis in the short Anglo-Iraqi War of May 1941, during the Second World War. The Iraqi Air Force used British aircraft until the 14 July Revolution in 1958, where the new Iraqi government began increased diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union. The Iraqi Air Force used both Soviet and British aircraft throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In 1961, Iraqi forces were again amassed along the Kuwaiti border, and Iraqi again threatened to invade. A quick British deployment of troops, aircraft, and naval vessels, called Operation Vantage, deterred any move though. Iraqi forces fought in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, a first war against the Kurds from 1961 to 1970, and then in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Iraqi participation in the Six-Day War was limited, principally owing to the slow reaction of the Iraqi 3rd Armoured Division, which had been stationed in eastern Jordan.[11] The 3rd Armoured Division did not organise itself and reach the front line before the Jordanians ceased operations. Therefore, Iraqi participation was limited to a Tu-16 bomber raid on Israel, which did not locate its targets, and a return Israeli air raid on the H-3 airbase, which was around 435 kilometers from Bagdad in western Iraq, near the H-3 oil pumping station. The Israelis reportedly destroyed 21 Iraqi aircraft for the loss of three of their own.

After the first Kurdish war ended with a Peshmerga victory, the Iraqi military began to implement a number of changes.[12] They concluded that Soviet equipment and methods did not meet their needs and that many western weapons were superior to their Soviet counterparts. Also the Soviet Union was trying to influence Iraqi policy by holding up arms deliveries. Despite the large amount of Soviet equipment that Iraq continued to receive (shown by the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Iraq 1973–1990), Iraq sought Western military equipment. Purchases from France included 64 Mirage F1 fighter-attack aircraft in 1976 and 200 AMX-30 tanks in 1977. That same year, Iraq ordered ten frigates and corvettes from Italy and in 1978 it purchased 200 Cascavel APCs from Brazil. While Iraqi generals supported a complete changeover to Western equipment, Western countries were reluctant to sell large amounts of weaponry to Iraq. Western weapons were more expensive than Soviet ones, and they took longer to train personnel on, so there was a reluctance to make a complete equipment reversal. However, more weapons were bought from various non-communist countries, supplementing their largely Soviet arsenal, and a reliance on Soviet doctrine reduced. In most cases, the Iraqis went back to British doctrine, while in others, they melded British and Soviet doctrine. Iraq's logistics capability was also improved, with the purchase of 2,000 heavy equipment transporters.

Iraqi participation in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 took the part of a 60,000 strong Iraqi Army expeditionary force which operated on the Syrian front. However, the force did not perform very well, and the Iraqi Air Force did not do well either, losing 26 of the 101 fighter aircraft sent to Syria without shooting down any Israeli aircraft.[13]

The Kurds started the second Kurdish war of 1974–75, but the war ended in a Kurdish defeat after the Iranian–Iraqi Algiers agreement cut off Iranian support to the Kurds. From 1973 to 1980, Saddam largely relieved the armed forces of internal security functions by creating new paramilitary forces, such as the Iraqi Popular Army. He also guaranteed the military's loyalty to the regime by promoting loyal officers and purging questionable ones. However, this had the effect of filling the senior officer ranks with incompetents.[14]

Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

Iraqi commanders discussing strategy on the battlefront (1986)
Iranian soldiers captured at Khorramshahr during the Iran-Iraq War

The Iran–Iraq War[a] (Persian: جنگ ایران و عراق; Arabic: الحرب الإيرانية العراقية) was a protracted armed conflict that began on 22 September 1980 with a full-scale invasion of Iran by neighbouring Iraq. The war lasted for almost eight years, and ended in an effective stalemate on 20 August 1988, when Iran accepted Resolution 598 of the United Nations Security Council. Iraq's primary rationale for the invasion was to cripple Iran and prevent Ruhollah Khomeini from exporting the 1979 Iranian Revolution movement to Shia-majority Iraq and internally exploit religious tensions that would threaten the Sunni-dominated Ba'athist leadership. Iraq had also wished to replace Iran as the dominant state in the Persian Gulf, which, prior to the Iranian Revolution, was not seen as an achievable objective by the Iraqi leadership due to pre-revolutionary Iran's colossal economic and military power as well as its close alliances with the United States, a superpower, and Israel, a major player in the Middle East. The war followed a long-running history of bilateral border disputes between the two states, as a result of which Iraq had planned to annex Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan Province[dubiousdiscuss] and the eastern bank of the Shatt al-Arab (known in Iran as the Arvand Rud).

While the Iraqi leadership had hoped to take advantage of Iran's post-revolutionary chaos and expected a decisive victory in the face of a severely weakened Iran, the Iraqi military only made progress for three months, and by December 1980, the Iraqi invasion of Iran had stalled. As fierce fighting broke out between the two sides, the Iranian military began to gain momentum against the Iraqis and regained virtually all of its lost territory by June 1982. After pushing Iraqi forces back to the pre-war border lines, Iran invaded Iraq and went on the offensive for the next five years[15] until the latter took back the initiative in mid-1988 and launched a series of major counter-offensives that ultimately led to the conclusion of the war in a stalemate.[16][17] There were a number of proxy forces operating for both countries—most notably the People's Mujahedin of Iran, which had sided with Iraq, and the Iraqi Kurdish militias of the KDP and PUK, which had sided with Iran. The United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, France, and most Arab countries provided an abundance of financial, political and logistical support for Iraq. While Iran was comparatively isolated to a large degree, it also received various forms of support, with its most notable sources of aid being Syria, Libya, China, North Korea, Israel, the Eastern bloc and Pakistan.

The eight years of war-exhaustion, economic devastation, decreased morale, military stalemate, inaction by the international community towards the use of weapons of mass destruction by Iraqi forces on Iranian civilians as well as increasing U.S.–Iran military tensions all culminated in Iran's acceptance of a ceasefire brokered by the United Nations.

The conflict has been compared to World War I in terms of the tactics used, including large-scale trench warfare with barbed wire stretched across fortified defensive lines, manned machine gun posts, bayonet charges, Iranian human wave attacks, extensive use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and deliberate attacks on civilian targets. A notable feature of the war was the state-sanctioned glorification of martyrdom to Iranian children, which had been developed in the years before the revolution. The discourses on martyrdom formulated in the Iranian Shia Islamic context led to the tactics of "human wave attacks" and thus had a lasting impact on the dynamics of the war.[18]

In total, around 500,000 Iraqi and Iranian soldiers combined had died over the course of the war, in addition to an estimated 100,000 civilians. The end of the war resulted in neither reparations by either side to the other nor any border changes.

Persian Gulf War

An Iraqi Mil Mi-24 on display at the military museum of Kirkuk in Iraq
An Iraqi Type 69 main battle tank sits on the side on the road into Kuwait City during the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm.

Saddam Hussein had also poured massive resources into regime protection agencies, like the Republican Guard (Iraq), that later took on a battlefield role. Losses during the Persian Gulf War from the United States-led coalition resulted in the reduction of Iraq's ground forces to 23 divisions and the air force to less than 300 aircraft.[19] The Iraqi Popular Army was also disbanded. Military and economic sanctions prevented Iraq from rebuilding its military power. What rebuilding was done was concentrated on the Republican Guard and the new Special Republican Guard, created after the war ended. Iraq maintained a standing military of about 375,000 troops. Among the components of the military was the Directorate of General Military Intelligence.

Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq had a growing domestic arms producing industry that produced everything from rifle bullets to ballistic missiles, advanced naval mines, Lion of Babylon (tank), remote-piloted "drone" aircraft, sophisticated cluster-bomb, infrared and television-guided bombs and laser-guided missiles. At that time, Iraq was believed to be way ahead of its then rival Iran's arms producing industry.[20] Also under Saddam Hussein, the Project Babylon was launched. It was a project to build a series of "superguns". Notable ballistic missiles of Iraq produced under president Saddam Hussein included Al Hussein (missile) and Al-Samoud 2. Other notable weapons of Iraq produced under Saddam Hussein included Tabuk Sniper Rifle, Al-Fao (self-propelled artillery system), GC-45 howitzer (the GHN-45 variant used by some Iraqi artillery units had a longer range than any coalition cannon systems. This initially caused considerable worry on the part of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf War), and LUGM-145 (naval moored contact mine). There was an Iraqi biological weapons program (not to be confused with Iraqi chemical weapons program) under Saddam Hussein until the end of 1991 Gulf War. By the time Iraqis were testing biological warheads (containing anthrax and botulinum toxin) in Iraq's deserts, the 1980 to 1988 Iran–Iraq war had come to an end.[21] In December 1990 the Iraqis had filled 100 R-400 bombs with botulinum toxin, 50 with anthrax, and 16 with aflatoxin. In addition, 13 Al Hussein missile warheads were filled with botulinum toxin, 10 with anthrax, and 2 with aflatoxin. These weapons were deployed in January 1991 to four locations for use against Coalition forces only as "weapons of last resort" in case the Coalition stormed the gates of Baghdad. Since this never happened in 1991, Saddam found their use unnecessary. The Iraqis destroyed their biological arsenal after the 1991 war. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Britain published in September 2002 a review of Iraq's military capability, and concluded that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained.[22]

Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who created Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program that had successfully enriched uranium to weapons grade before the 1991 Gulf War, stated in an op-ed in The New York Times that although Iraqi scientists possessed the knowledge to restart the nuclear program, by 2002 the idea had become "a vague dream from another era."[23] Iraqi scientists under Saddam Hussein, for example Nassir al-Hindawi, Rihab al-Taha and Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, among many others, were considered among the most nationalistic and best weapons designers in the world.

During the 1990s, the Iraqi Armed Forces were involved in suppressing the 1991 uprisings in Iraq, which led to refugees fleeing north in 1991. The U.S. launched Operation Provide Comfort with allied aid to provide assistance to these refugees. This involved some confrontations with the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi no-fly zones were established partially due to these operations. Operation Southern Watch dominated Iraqi airspace in the southern part of Iraq while Operation Northern Watch did the same in the north. As a result of Iraqi actions, cruise missile strikes on Iraq were launched in June 1993. Kuwait was then threatened with Republican Guard divisions in October 1994, which resulted in a major U.S. protective deployment designated Operation Vigilant Warrior.[24] Operation Vigilant Sentinel was a later 1995–2007 operation of the same nature. More cruise missile strikes on Iraq were launched in 1996. Iraq was bombed again in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. As U.S. preparations for an attack on Iraq gathered pace in 2002, Operation Southern Focus was launched, further damaging Iraqi air defences in the southern part of the country.

U.S. invasion of Iraq (2003)

In the 1980s and 1990s, Iraq built and used an arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, some of which have been alleged to come from the United States and its allies.[25] These weapons were ordered destroyed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. After a protracted and problematic weapons inspection process, the majority of these type of weapons were considered to be destroyed and their facilities sealed under UN weapons inspections. A new round of weapons inspections was performed in early 2003 by United Nations weapons inspectors led by Hans Blix, which searched Iraqi sites again, but found no new weapons or weapons programs. However, the Bush Administration decided that Saddam Hussein's regime must be removed, and it gave an ultimatum to that effect.

Saddam's government did not respond to the ultimatum in the way that the Bush Administration wanted them to, and therefore, on March 19, 2003, the Coalition Forces of the United Kingdom and United States, with Australian, and Polish assistance began to invade Iraq. In the process, Saddam's military was defeated and dispersed. In the south, V Corps (United States), I Marine Expeditionary Force, and numerous divisions of the British Army, defeated the Iraqi 3rd Corps, the Republican Guard, and much of the Fedayeen Saddam. In the north, Task Force Viking, a special operations led task force, defeated the Iraqi 1st and 5th Corps and attached other Republican Guard elements. Significant battles included the Battle of Nasiriyah and the Battle of Baghdad. The British Army controlled the southern regions of Iraq and maintained a peace-keeping presence in the country until their withdrawal on 30 April 2009. The United States controlled Northern and Central Iraq. After the invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority was established to administer the Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–present.

Security Forces

ISOF soldiers with M4A1 carbines, March 2020.
Iraq Special Operation Forces (ISOF)


File:Iraqi Forces in Training2014.jpg
Iraqi Soldiers during exercise in Babylon

The Iraqi military was formally disbanded and the Iraqi Military of Defense was dissolved shortly after the invasion, by Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 of May 23, 2003.

On June 25, 2003, the Vinnell Corporation was awarded a contract to train the first nine battalions, or 9,000 recruits, of a 44,000 person-strong "New Iraqi Army." The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team under Major General Paul Eaton was responsible for managing the process.

On September 3, 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 28 established the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as a temporary security and emergency service agency for Iraq to complement operations conducted by Coalition military forces in Iraq.

In April 2004, an Iraqi battalion refused to fight insurgents in Fallujah. Soon afterwards, the U.S. military structure in Iraq was reorganised. Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) was created under General George W. Casey, Jr.. For the new Iraqi armed forces, the most important move was the creation of Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) as a subordinate command to MNF-I, under Major General David Petraeus.[26] MNSTC-I was given the task of building up the new Iraqi Armed Forces, as well as the Ministry of Interior (Iraq) (MOI) and other security forces. A new force generation plan authorized an end-strength of ten Iraqi army divisions.

On 22 April 2004, under Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 73 all personnel, facilities, and equipment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps were transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence as a component of the Iraqi Armed Forces.

After the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority on June 28, 2004, the Coalition stayed in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government and under a UN Mandate to help the fledgling government develop its security forces and fight an insurgency. For periods immediately after the invasion, U.S. Army forces had seen the fighting as conventional 'fighting in built up areas (FIBUA),' rather than as an insurgency. After a review of the Iraq War military strategy in the end of 2004, General Casey directed the Coalition forces to shift their focus from fighting insurgents to training Iraqis.[27] This was to be the strategy until 2006. The aim was a small Coalition footprint and a rapid handover of security responsibilities to the newly generated Iraqi security forces. Developing host-nation security forces became a cornerstone of the 2006 United States counter-insurgency doctrine.[28] However, after national elections in December 2005, the Iraqi insurgency shifted focus from a resistance against the occupation towards a sectarian conflict. Accelerated by the Golden mosque bombing in February 2006, the levels of sectarian violence rose dramatically and the security situation deteriorated. In Baghdad, a cycle of sectarian violence accelerated in which Al-Qaeda-affiliated Sunni insurgents carried out suicide-bombings in Shia districts and Shia militias retaliated with killings in Sunni districts.[29] It became evident that the Iraqi Armed Forces and the various MOI forces were incapable of putting a lid on the sectarian violence and protecting the population, and the MNF-I had to adjust plans again for a security transition. Even though Iraqi forces had received initial training and been equipped, they had not developed the capabilities needed to plan, conduct and sustain effective counter-insurgency operations. There were also challenges at the ministerial level, within the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense, and these ministries could not sustain their forces in terms of logistics, intelligence, communications and procurement.[30] A by-product of the Iraq War troop surge of 2007 was that it provided the Iraqi security forces time for training and leadership development, as well as more Coalition partnering with Iraqi units. The commander of the Iraqi Assistance Group, Dana Pittard said June 2007 that the lesson learned was that Coalition forces should not draw down too quickly and that the transitioning of security responsibilities would take time.[31]

In July 2006, a milestone was achieved when the first Iraqi province transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control. Al Muthanna Governorate was the first province to meet this status.[32] Twelve further governorates were transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control from September 2006 to October 2008.

The Iraqi Army (IA) launched its first solely planned and executed high-profile division-level operation March 25, 2008 in the Battle of Basra (2008). The IA received Coalition support only in air support, logistics and via embedded advisors. A British infantry brigade stationed at Basra International Airport was ready in a tactical overwatch role, but it did not intervene.

On January 1, 2009, the Provincial Iraqi Control process was superseded by the U.S.-Iraqi Security Agreement (see also U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement), which transferred all provinces' security responsibilities to the Iraqi government. Five provinces were transferred at once as a result.

File:Popular Mobilizations Soldiers.jpg
Iraqi fighters of Popular Mobilization (The League of the Righteous) stand guard outside their headquarters on Jan 18, 2020 in the southern city of Basra.


The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) (Arabic: الحشد الشعبي al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī), also known as the People's Mobilization Committee (PMC) and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU),[33] is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organization composed of approximately 40 forces that are mostly Shia Muslim groups, but also include Sunni Muslim, Christian, and Yazidi groups.[34][35] The Popular Mobilization Units as a group was formed in 2014 and have fought in nearly every major battle against ISIL.[36] It has been called the new Iraqi Republican Guard after it was fully reorganized in early 2018 by its then–Commander in Chief Haider al-Abadi, Prime Minister of Iraq from 2014 to 2018, who issued "regulations to adapt the situation of the Popular Mobilization fighters".[37] Some of its component militias are considered terrorist groups by some states, while others have been accused of sectarian violence.[38][39][40]

While the factions have their own flags,[38] a yellow or white flag with the phrase "Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi" is also used by PMF[41] along with the Iraqi flag.[42][43][44]

With regard to the official native name, the Arabic word الشعبي (ash-Shaʿbī) translates as "people's" or "popular", as referred to the people; the Arabic word الحشد (al-Ḥashd) translates as "mobilization", as in the group of people mobilized rather than the process of mobilization. In other contexts, al-hashd may translate as other terms such as "crowd", "horde", "throng", "gathering" .

The People's Mobilization Forces (PMF) were formed by the Iraqi government on 15 June 2014 after top Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani's non-sectarian[35] fatwa on "Sufficiency Jihad" on 13 June.[45] The fatwa called for defending Iraqi cities, particularly Baghdad, and to participate in the counter-offensive against ISIL, following the Fall of Mosul on 10 June 2014.[45][46] The forces brought together a number of Shia militias, most of which receive direct support from Iran, along with a small number of Sunni tribesmen by uniting existing militias under the "People's Mobilization Committee" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior in June 2014.[47] The forces would fall under the umbrella of the state's security services and within the legal frameworks and practices of the Ministry of Interior. On 19 December 2016, Iraqi President Fuad Masum approved a law passed by parliament in November that incorporated PMU in the country's armed forces. The pro-Assad website Al-Madsar News reports that, with this incorporation, the PMU are now subject to the supreme commander of the national armed forces and will no longer be affiliated to any political or social group.[48][better source needed] However, many of these irregulars have continued to operate independently of the Iraqi state.[49]

On 21 March 2017, the PMU announced the launch of a special forces course, in order to create a Special Forces Division. The training program covered a variety of missions with direction from the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.[50][better source needed] On December 11, 2017, the PMU began to be entirely consolidated under the Iraqi Armed Forces, following a call by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to integrate.[36] However, as late as May 2018, this integration had yet to take place, and PMF members remained without the same wages and privileges as soldiers in the regular Iraqi Armed Forces.[51]

According to some sources, the Popular Mobilization Forces have made a fundamental difference on the battlefield, as they have undermined the superiority of ISIL at the level of guerrilla warfare, as well as at the level of the psychological operations.[52]

Peshmerga

File:Special Soldier of Iraqi Peshmerga In Syria.jpg
An Iraqi Peshmerga soldier during the confrontation of ISIS in Aleppo, Syria

The Peshmerga (Kurdish: پێشمەرگه, romanized: Pêşmerge, lit.'those who face the death'),[53] are the military forces of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Since the Iraqi Army is forbidden by Iraqi law to enter the Kurdistan Region,[54][55] the Peshmerga, along with their security subsidiaries, are responsible for the security of Kurdistan Region.[56][57][58][59] These subsidiaries include Asayish (intelligence agency), Parastin u Zanyarî (assisting intelligence agency) and the Zeravani (Gendarmerie). The Peshmerga predates Iraq, starting out as a strictly tribal pseudo-military border guard under the Ottomans and Safavids and later changing to a well-trained, disciplined guerrilla force in the 19th century.[60]

Formally, the Peshmerga are under the command of the Kurdistan Regional Government's Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. In reality, the Peshmerga force itself is largely divided and controlled separately by the two regional political parties: Democratic Party of Kurdistan and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Unifying and integrating the Peshmerga has been on the public agenda since 1992, but the forces remain divided due to factionalism which has proved to be a major stumbling block.[61]

In 2003, during the Iraq War, Peshmerga played a key role in the mission to capture Saddam Hussein.[62][63] In 2004, they captured key al-Qaeda figure Hassan Ghul, who revealed the identity of Osama bin Laden's messenger, which eventually led to Operation Neptune Spear and the death of Osama bin Laden.[64][65][66]

Historically the Peshmerga existed only as guerrilla organizations, but under the self-declared Republic of Mahabad (1946–1947), the Peshmerga led by Mustafa Barzani became the official army of the republic.[67][68] After the fall of the republic and the execution of head of state Qazi Muhammad, Peshmerga forces reemerged as guerrilla organizations that would go on to fight the Iranian and Iraqi governments for the remainder of the century.[69]

In Iraq, most of these Peshmerga were led by Mustafa Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.[68] In 1975 the Peshmerga were defeated in the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War. Jalal Talabani, a leading member of the KDP, left the same year to revitalize the resistance and founded the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. This event created the baseline for the political discontent between the KDP and PUK that to this day divides Peshmerga forces and much of Kurdish society in Kurdistan.

After Mustafa Barzani's death in 1979, his son Masoud Barzani took his position.[68] As tension increased between KDP and PUK, most Peshmerga fought to keep a region under their own party's control while also fighting off Iraqi Army incursions. Following the First Persian Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan saw the Kurdish Civil War between the two major parties, the KDP and the PUK, and Peshmerga forces were used to fight each other.[70] The civil war officially ended in September 1998 when Barzani and Talabani signed the Washington Agreement establishing a formal peace treaty.[71] In the agreement, the parties agreed to share revenue and power, deny the use of northern Iraq to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and not allow Iraqi troops into the Kurdish regions. By then, around 5,000 had been killed on both sides, and many more had been evicted for being on the wrong side.[72] In the years after, tension remained high, but both parties moved towards each other, and in 2003 they both took part in the overthrowing of the Baathist regime as part of the Iraq War. Unlike other militia forces, the Peshmerga were never prohibited by Iraqi law.[73]In 2014, the Peshmerga withdrew from the Nineveh Plains which was said by the locals as being a contributing factor of the quick ISIS victory in the invasion, and the widespread massacre of Yazidis, who were rendered defenseless.[74]

Structure

Iraqi security forces are composed of forces serving under the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD), as well as the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Bureau, reporting directly to the Prime Minister of Iraq, which oversees the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. MOD forces include the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Air Force and the Iraqi Navy. The MOD also runs a Joint Staff College, training army, navy, and air force officers, with support from the NATO Training Mission - Iraq. The college was established at Ar Rustamiyah on September 27, 2005.[75] The center runs Junior Staff and Senior Staff Officer Courses designed for first lieutenants to majors.

The Peshmerga, since September 2009 the 'Armed Forces of the Kurdistan Region,' are a separate armed force loyal to the Kurdistan Regional Government. The force is quite sizable. USF-I public affairs officers indicated that the KDP and PUK both have around 100,000 peshmerga (totalling 200,000) as of January 2010. The two divisions are included in this figure; the regional government and the central government disagree as to whether they are under Baghdad's authority and to what extent.[76]

Iraqi military intelligence has been rebuilt since the army was dissolved in 2003. However it has suffered from political interference. In mid 2009 Prime Minister al-Maliki reportedly dismissed Major General Jamal Suleiman, the director of military intelligence, and took on the job himself. The Prime minister had reportedly dismissed the director of Iraqi national intelligence at the same time.[77]

Iraqi Army

Modified T-55 tank of the 5th Mechanized Division which saw action in the Battle of Khafji

The Iraqi Army, officially the Iraqi Ground Forces (Arabic: القوات البرية العراقية), is the ground force component of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was known as the Royal Iraqi Army up until the coup of July 1958.

The Iraqi Army in its modern form was first created by the United Kingdom during the inter-war period of de facto British control of Mandatory Iraq. Following the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces in 2003, the Iraqi Army was rebuilt along U.S. lines with enormous amounts of U.S. military assistance at every level. Because of the Iraqi insurgency that began shortly after the invasion, the Iraqi Army was later designed to initially be a counter-insurgency force.[78][79] With the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2010, Iraqi forces have assumed full responsibility for their own security.[80] A New York Times article suggested that, between 2004 and 2014, the U.S. had provided the Iraqi Army with $25 billion in training and equipment in addition to an even larger sum from the Iraqi treasury.[81]

The Army extensively collaborated with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces during anti-ISIL operations.

The Iraqi Army is an objective counter-insurgency force that has been developed by the government of Iraq from 2003 to 2009 in co-operation with the Multi-National Force – Iraq, with the majority of the assistance coming from the United States. The force generation plan as of November 2009 includes 14 divisions, each consisting of 4 brigades.[82]

The Iraqi Army is described as the most important element of the counter-insurgency fight.[83] The tactic is to provide security and other services on a local level by using infantrymen on dismounted patrols. As insurgents lose passive or active support from the local population, they will easily be defeated, it is believed.

Light infantry brigades are equipped with small arms, machine guns, RPGs, body armor and light armored vehicles. Mechanized infantry brigades are equipped with T-54/55 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles.[83] The Hungarian Armed Forces have donated 77 Soviet-made T-72 tanks from their own arsenal. The tanks have been refurbished by Hungarian specialists and were delivered in fully battle-ready condition in 2004. Training of personnel was also provided to the newly forming Iraqi Army. Iraq will be receiving 280 M1A1M tanks from 2010 and 2013.

From its creation in 1922 to 2003, the army suffered from a number of serious difficulties, junior tactical leadership among them. "Iraqi forces consistently had problems because of a dearth of technical skills and a limited exposure to machinery."[84] However it also had significant strengths, particularly in two areas: logistics and combat engineering. Two impressive logistical accomplishments of the army included the ability to sustain an armoured corps in Syria during the Yom Kippur War/1973 Arab–Israeli War and their ability to move formations of corps size from one end of the country to another in days during the Iran–Iraq War.[84] Since 2003, creation of combat forces has been the priority, and logistical support was initially supplied in one way or another by the coalition. As of mid 2008, logistical problems included a maintenance crisis and ongoing supply problems.[85] Logistical capabilities have been developing, however, and the build-up of a nationwide logistical structure, with the Taji National Depot at its centre, is now well under way.

Iraqi Air Force

A C-130 Hercules of the Iraqi Air Force
Iraqi F-16D landing at Tucson International

The Iraqi Air Force (IQAF or IrAF) (Arabic: القوات الجوية العراقية, Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Iraqiya) is the aerial warfare service branch of the Iraqi Armed Forces, responsible for the policing of international borders and surveillance of national assets. The IQAF also acts as a support force for the Iraqi Navy and the Iraqi Army, and it allows Iraq to rapidly deploy its developing Army.

The Iraqi Air Force was founded in 1931, during the period of British control in Iraq after their defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War, with only a few pilots. Aside from a brief period during the Second World War, the Iraqi Air Force operated mostly British aircraft until the 14 July Revolution in 1958, when the new Iraqi government began increased diplomatic relationships with the Soviet Union. The air force used both Soviet and British aircraft throughout the 1950s and 1960s. When Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979, the air force grew quickly when Iraq ordered more Soviet and French aircraft. The air force's peak came after the long Iran–Iraq War, which ended in 1988, when it consisted of 1029 aircraft of all types (of which 550 were combat aircraft),[86] becoming the largest air force in the region. Its downfall came during the Gulf War (1990–91) and continued while coalition forces enforced no-fly zones. The remains of Iraq's air force were destroyed during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

After the invasion, the IQAF was rebuilt, receiving most of its training and aircraft from the United States. In 2007, Iraq asked Iran to return some of the scores of Iraqi fighter planes that flew there to escape destruction during the Gulf War in 1991.[87] As of 2014, Iran was receptive to the demands and was working on refurbishing an unspecified number of jets.[88][89]

The Royal Iraqi Air Force (RIrAF) considered its founding day as 22 April 1931, when the first pilots flew in from training in the United Kingdom.[90] Before the creation of the new air force, the RAF Iraq Command was in charge of all British Armed Forces elements in Iraq in the 1920s and early 1930s.[91] The RIrAF was based at the airport in the Washash neighborhood of Baghdad, and consisted of five pilots, aeronautics students trained at the RAF College Cranwell, and 32 aircraft mechanics.[90] The original five pilots were Natiq Mohammed Khalil al-Tay, Mohammed Ali Jawad, Hafdhi Aziz, Akrem Mushtaq, and Musa Ali.[90] During the early years of the Royal Iraqi Air Force, it mainly received aircraft from the United Kingdom as well as Breda Ba.65 attack planes and SM-79 bombers from Italy.[91]

In the years following Iraqi independence, the Air Force was still dependent on the Royal Air Force. The Iraqi government allocated the majority of its military expenditure to the Iraqi Army and by 1936 the Royal Iraqi Air Force had only 37 pilots and 55 aircraft. The following year, the Air Force showed some growth, increasing its number of pilots to 127.[92]

Iraqi Navy

Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) Patrol.

The Iraqi Navy (Arabic: القوات البحرية العراقية) is one of the components of the military of Iraq. Its primary responsibilities are the protection of Iraq's coastline and offshore assets. Initially called the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force, its official name was changed on 12 January 2005.[93]

As of February 2011, the navy had approximately 5,000 sailors and marines which form an Operational headquarters, five afloat squadrons, and two marine battalions.[94]

Headed by Rear Admiral Muhammad Jawad, the navy had plans to build six Al Uboor-class patrol boats in Baghdad, with the first of the boats to enter service in September 2005. This project however, was ultimately canceled. Additionally, two Assad-class corvettes built for Iraq in the 1980s by Italy were originally planned to be delivered sometime around 2006–2007. The ships however, were found to be in a worse state than originally believed, forcing the Iraqi navy to reconsider the deal and instead buy 4, newer, smaller modified-Diciotti class vessels. The 5 British corvettes and 1 Soviet patrol boat operated by the Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi Navy were destroyed in the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, respectively.

The Iraqi Navy is designed for coastal water protection; preventing the smuggling of people, oil and weapons; and to protect the country's oil platforms. As a result, it mainly needs patrol boats. These may be backed up by fast attack craft. The patrol boats need to have the ability to launch rigid-inflatable boats (RIBs) for boarding ships and also possibly be able to accommodate a helicopter which would increase their patrol capability. The Iraqi Navy is building a second Marine battalion.[95] In 2016 the Iraqi Navy awarded money to a ship maintenance company to sustain its current fleet of ships.

The Iraqi Navy was formed in 1937 as a small four-ship force headquartered in Basra. Between 1937 and 1958, it was primarily a riverine force. Following the 14 July Revolution of 1958, the Iraqi Navy began to expand. Operationally based in the port of Umm Qasr, the Arabic Gulf Academy for Sea Studies was established in Basra, which offered a bachelor's degree in war and engineering naval studies. By 1988, the Navy grew to a force of 5,000, but played a relatively small role during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War. Much of the Navy was destroyed during Operation Pearl.

Between 1977 and 1987, the Iraqi Navy received eight Template:Sclass-s, armed with Styx anti-ship missiles, from the Soviet Union. It also purchased four Template:Sclass-s and six Template:Sclass-s from Italy, although these were never delivered because of international sanctions following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.[96]

The Iraqi Navy was almost completely destroyed by the Royal Navy during the Gulf War of 1991. The force had 19 ships sunk and 6 vessels damaged. In total, more than 100 Iraqi ships were destroyed. The Navy was not rebuilt and played little part in the Iraq War (2003). One exception was two mine warfare vessels captured by US Navy and Coast Guard units during the assault on Al Faw; The tug Jumariya, towing a well camouflaged minelaying barge, and the tug Al Raya, which had been outfitted as a minelayer itself.[97] Of the units that remained by late 2002, most were in a poor state of repair and the crews were in a poor state of readiness. Whatever units that remained after 1991 were used primarily for safeguarding Saddam's palaces on the Tigris river.[98]

Challenges for the armed forces

Poor levels of internal security have stifled attempts to build any national banking or credit systems. In lieu of such organizations, Iraqi units operate at any given time with an estimated 10–20% absenteeism rate due to soldiers temporarily leaving their units to deliver their pay back to their families.[99] This can be especially grueling if the unit is on deployment outside of their home province as the absenteeism time is naturally increased.

In addition, all military hospitals under the Saddam regime were looted and abandoned during the 2003 invasion of Iraq; thus as of April 2007 the Army had no military hospitals.[100] There is only one military prosthetics facility in the country and virtually no mental health or burn treatment services. Wounded Iraqi soldiers are expected to receive treatment either at civilian hospitals or if possible, at Coalition medical facilities.[100] Corruption practices spurred partly by over-taxation at these civilian hospitals significantly drive up costs to the soldier. Due to overwhelming red tape within the Iraqi military compensation system, it is commonplace for the soldier to end up bearing the financial brunt of medical expenses.[100]

Purchases from U.S. Industry

U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) to Iraq during fiscal year 2020 included:

  • AeroVironment unmanned aircraft systems, maintenance, and training[101]
  • BAE Systems Inc. MK90 grain[102]
  • Chemring cartridge actuated devices/propellant actuated devices, which can be used in ejection seats[103]
  • General Dynamics vehicle logistics support and training in Taji, Iraq[104]
  • Lockheed Martin long range radar systems[105]
  • Lockheed Martin Integrated Air Defense System sustainment[106]
  • Navistar Defense transport trucks, recovery vehicles, and spare parts[107]
  • Northrop Grumman ATK contractor logistic support for Iraq's Textron Cessna 208 and Cessna 172 fleet[108]
  • Rapiscan Systems contractor logistics support for M60 mobile scanning vehicle systems[109]
  • Scientia Global digital mobile radio equipment and training[110]
  • Spartan Air Academy contractor logistics support for T-6A aircraft at Balad Air Base[111]
  • and M16A4 rifles from Colt and FN America LLC.[112]

Defense industry under Saddam Hussein

Under Saddam Hussein's presidency, Iraq had constructed state-of-the-art production facilities for the rocket propellant at Hillah, south of Baghdad, and assembled the missiles at Falluja, west of the Iraqi capital. At the time, Iraq was believed to be way ahead of its then rival Iran's arms producing industry. The Iraqis were producing a ground-to-ground missile with a 400-mile range known as the Husayn, a variant of the Soviet Scud rocket. They lobbed dozens of these terrifying missiles into Tehran in the late stages of their war with Iran during the so-called "War of the Cities." In addition, the Iraqis were believed to have the best stocks of rocket artillery in the Third World. They were producing a rocket with a 35-mile range modeled on the Brazilian Astros 2, a copy of the Soviet Frog 7, and their own 55-mile-range Liath rocket that was reportedly capable of carrying a chemical warhead. The Iraqis were also building a 30-mile-range surface-to-surface rocket known as the Ababil, which was designed to carry a sophisticated cluster-bomb warhead. Other Iraqi munitions projects included Lion of Babylon (tank), infrared and television-guided bombs and laser-guided missiles. Baghdad was working on advanced naval mines and remote-piloted "drone" aircraft for battlefield surveillance. They had also developed indigenous radar planes similar to the U.S. airborne warning and control system (AWACS) surveillance aircraft. Iraq also had embarked upon an undertaking known as Project 395, a $400-million program to produce solid-fuel surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.[20] Also under Saddam Hussein, the Project Babylon was launched. It was a project with unknown objectives commissioned by the then Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to build a series of "superguns". Notable ballistic missiles of Iraq produced under president Saddam Hussein included Al Hussein (missile) and Al-Samoud 2. Other notable weapons of Iraq produced under Saddam Hussein included Tabuk Sniper Rifle, Al-Fao (self-propelled artillery system), GC-45 howitzer (the GHN-45 variant used by some Iraqi artillery units had a longer range than any coalition cannon systems. This initially caused considerable worry on the part of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf War), and LUGM-145 (naval moored contact mine). There was an Iraqi biological weapons program (not to be confused with Iraqi chemical weapons program) under Saddam Hussein until the end of 1991 Gulf War. By the time Iraqis were testing biological warheads (containing anthrax and botulinum toxin) in Iraq's deserts, the 1980 to 1988 Iran–Iraq war had come to an end.[21] In December 1990 the Iraqis had filled 100 R-400 bombs with botulinum toxin, 50 with anthrax, and 16 with aflatoxin. In addition, 13 Al Hussein missile warheads were filled with botulinum toxin, 10 with anthrax, and 2 with aflatoxin. These weapons were deployed in January 1991 to four locations for use against Coalition forces only as "weapons of last resort" in case the Coalition stormed the gates of Baghdad. Since this never happened in 1991, Saddam found their use unnecessary. The Iraqis destroyed their biological arsenal after the 1991 war. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Britain published in September 2002 a review of Iraq's military capability, and concluded that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months if fissile material from foreign sources were obtained.[22] Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who created Saddam's nuclear centrifuge program that had successfully enriched uranium to weapons grade before the 1991 Gulf War, stated in an op-ed in The New York Times that although Iraqi scientists possessed the knowledge to restart the nuclear program, by 2002 the idea had become "a vague dream from another era."[23]

Iraqi scientists under Saddam Hussein included Nassir al-Hindawi, Rihab al-Taha and Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash as weapons designers.

International military cooperation

From 2003 to 2010, the United States Armed Forces took the major role in assuring Iraq's exterior defense. The U.S. command responsible was initially Combined Joint Task Force 7, then Multi-National Force – Iraq, and is now United States Forces – Iraq. USF-I was established on January 1, 2010, and withdrew on December 31, 2011. Residual assistance efforts are now managed by the Office of Security Cooperation, Iraq, headed by Lieutenant General Robert L. Caslen.[113] OSC-Iraq was established on October 1, 2011.[114]

In 2010, U.S. Army Major General Tony Cucolo mentioned Operation Bright Star as an example of a possible joint training exercise component of a future U.S.–Iraq military-to-military relationship.[115]

While Iran has been accused of involvement in the Iraqi insurgency, the Iranian government also publicly offered help to build up the Iraqi armed forces. Then-Iraqi Defence Minister Saadoun al-Dulaimi met with his Iranian colleague Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani in Tehran in 2005, and the Iranians pledged to give assistance.[116]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ The war is known in the Arab world and a few other regions as the First Gulf War (Arabic: حرب الخليج الأولى), whereas Western sources use that name to refer to the conflict between the American-led coalition and Iraq in 1991.

References

  1. ^ "CIA – The World Factbook – Iraq". Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 25 June 2016.
  2. ^ a b IISS (2020). The Military Balance 2020. Routledge. p. 353. ISBN 978-0367466398.
  3. ^ a b Tian, Nan; Fleurant, Aude; Kuimova, Alexandra; Wezeman, Pieter D.; Wezeman, Siemon T. (27 April 2020). "Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2020" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 17 December 2020.
  4. ^ Pollack 2002, pp. 264-66. Pollack notes that two strong categories for Iraq have been logistics and combat engineering. Iraqi soldiers have also usually fought hard in difficult situations.
  5. ^ There is no single authoritative translation of the Constitution. These translations are drawn from the translation by the United Nations, accessible at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi_constitution.pdf, page 5 of 43.
  6. ^ Order 22: Creation of a New Iraqi Army and Order 67: Ministry of Defense, accessed 26 March 2010
  7. ^ Al-Marashi, Ibrahim; Salama, Sammy (2008). Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History. London and New York: Routledge. p. 215. ISBN 978-0-415-40078-7.
  8. ^ Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, 1990, p.170
  9. ^ Library of Congress Country Studies: Iraq, 'Iraq as an independent monarchy,' 1988, accessed March 2010
  10. ^ Darwish, Adel; Alexander, Gregory (1991). Unholy Babylon: The Secret History of Saddam's War. London: Victor Gollancz. p. 13. ISBN 978-0-7881-5108-8.
  11. ^ This section is drawn from Pollack 2002, p.167
  12. ^ This section is drawn from Pollack, 2002, p.177–178
  13. ^ Pollack, 2002, p.175, citing Dupuy, Elusive Victory, 532–534, Herzog, Arab–Israeli Wars, 303–04, Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished, 317–18, and Tzvi Ofer, The Iraqi Army in the Yom Kippur War, transl. Hatzav, Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 1986, p.128–65. Pollack notes that the various accounts of Iraqi operations on the Golan Heights are highly contradictory. He relies on Ofer, 1986, which is an Israeli General Staff critique of the official Iraqi General Staff analysis of the battle.
  14. ^ Pollack 2002, 182–183
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Bibliography

Further reading

  • Jane's Pointer, 'Iraq changes command structure,' 1993
  • Michael Eisenstadt, 'The Iraqi Armed Forces Two Years On,' Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1993, p. 121–127
  • Hemphill, Paul (1979) `The Formation of the Iraqi Army, 1921–33', in Abbas Kelidar (ed.) The Integration of Modern Iraq, pp. 88–110. London: Croom Helm.
  • Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–91, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln/London, 2002
  • Andrew Rathmell, 'Iraq's Military: Waiting for Change,' Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No.2, February 1995, p. 76–80
  • Al-Marashi, Ibrahim; Salama, Sammy (2008). Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-40078-7. (one callmark UA853.I72 ALM)
  • Sean Boyle, 'In wake of Desert Fox, Saddam moves to tighten his grip,' Jane's ChemBio Web/Geopolitical Resources (also Jane's Intelligence Review), 2 February 1999.

PMO, Iraqi. "رئيس مجلس الوزراء @MAKadhimi يؤكد أنّ تطوير المؤسسات الأمنية واصلاحها هي من أولويات المنهاج الوزاري الذي ينصّ على تعزيز أداء الأجهزة الأمنية المختلفة وتحقيق التكامل المطلوب بينها، والعمل بمبدأ أنَّ كلَّ القوات العسكرية والأمنية في خدمة الشعب وتطلعاته ووحدته وأمنه ... Pic.twitter.com/TYAN3Au34v." Twitter, Twitter, 28 May 2020, twitter.com/IraqiPMO/status/1265950977829601282.