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Revision as of 04:55, 1 September 2022

The flag of Russia.
The coat of arms of the Russian Empire.

Russian nationalism is a form of nationalism that promotes Russian cultural identity and unity. Russian nationalism first rose to prominence in the early 19th century, and became closely related to pan-Slavism, from its origin during the Russian Empire, to its repression during early Bolshevik rule, and revival in the Soviet Union after that.

History

Imperial Russian nationalism

The Millennium of Russia monument built in 1862 that celebrated one-thousand years of Russian history.

The Russian motto "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality" was coined by Count Sergey Uvarov and adopted by Emperor Nicholas I as official ideology.[1] Three components of Uvarov's triad were:

The Slavophile movement became popular in 19th-century Russia. Slavophiles opposed influences of Western Europe in Russia and were determined to protect Russian culture and traditions. Aleksey Khomyakov, Ivan Kireyevsky, and Konstantin Aksakov are credited with co-founding the movement.[improper synthesis?]

Russian World War I era poster calling to buy war bonds.

A notable folk revival in Russian art was loosely related to Slavophilia.[3] Many works concerning Russian history, mythology and fairy tales appeared. Operas by Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, Mikhail Glinka and Alexander Borodin; paintings by Viktor Vasnetsov, Ivan Bilibin and Ilya Repin; and poems by Nikolay Nekrasov, Aleksey Konstantinovich Tolstoy, among others, are considered[by whom?] masterpieces of Russian romantic nationalism.

White Russian anti-Soviet poster, c. 1932

Pan-Slavism, an ideal of unity of all Slavic Orthodox Christian nations, gained popularity in the mid- to late 19th century. Among its major ideologists were Nikolay Danilevsky. Pan-Slavism was fueled by and was the fuel for Russia's numerous wars against the Ottoman Empire with the goal of liberating Orthodox nations, such as Bulgarians, Romanians, Serbs and Greeks, from Muslim rule. The final goal was Constantinople; the Russian Empire still considered itself the "Third Rome" and saw its duty as succeeding the "Second Rome", conquered by the Ottoman Empire.[4] Pan-Slavism also played a key role in Russia's entry into World War I, since the 1914 war against Serbia by Austria-Hungary triggered Russia's response.[citation needed]

Early 20th century ultra-nationalism

In the beginning of 20th century, new nationalist and rightist organizations and parties emerged in Russia, such as the Russian Assembly, the Union of the Russian People, the Union of Archangel Michael ("Black Hundreds") and others.

Nationalism during the Soviet epoch

The Bolshevik revolutionaries who seized power in 1917 were nominally "antinationalists" and "antipatriots", the newborn Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic under Vladimir Lenin proclaimed internationalism as its official ideology using the Russian language—which was also the language of their party and government.[5][failed verification] Since Russian patriotism served as a legitimizing prop of old order, Bolshevik leaders were anxious to suppress its manifestations and ensure its eventual extinction. They officially discouraged Russian nationalism and remnants of Imperial patriotism, such as the wearing of military awards received before the Civil War. Some of their followers disagreed; in non-Russian territories, Bolshevik power was often regarded as renewed Russian imperialism during 1919 to 1921. In 1922, the Soviet Union was formed with its members combined, but Russia was the largest and most populous member. After 1923 following Lenin's ideas, a policy of korenizatsiya, which provided government support for non-Russian culture and languages within the non-Russian republics, was adopted.[6] However, this policy was not strictly enforced due to domination of Russians in Soviet Union.[7][8][page needed][9]: 24 This domination had been formally criticized in the tsarist empire by Lenin and others as Great Russian chauvinism. Thomas Winderl wrote "The USSR became in a certain sense more a prison-house of nations than the old Empire had ever been. [...] The Russian-dominated center established an inequitable relationship with the ethnic groups it voluntarily helped to construct."[10] Various scholars focused on the nationalist features that already existed during the Leninist period.[10]: 43: 48[11][9]: 24

Stalin reversed much of his predecessor's previous internationalist policies, signing off on orders for exiling multiple distinct ethnic-linguistic groups brandished as "traitors", including the Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Kalmyks, Koreans, and Meskhetian Turks, who were collectively deported to Siberia or Central Asia, where they were legally designated "special settlers", meaning that they were officially second-class citizens with few rights and were confined within a small perimeter.[12][13] Russian historian Andrei Savin stated that Stalin's policy shifted away from internationalism towards National Bolshevism.[14] Historian Jon K. Chang wrote that the Soviet deportations of Koreans (and other diaspora, deported peoples such as Germans, Finns, Greeks and many others) illustrated that Russian nationalism, and essentialized views of race, that is, primordialism were carried over in whole from the Tsarist era. These Soviet tropes and biases produced and converted the Koreans (and the Chinese) into a decidedly, un-Marxist Soviet "yellow peril". The racism lie in the fact that others (Slavs, some Jews, Armenians and others) could be seen or judged by a class line or individually while the Koreans could not.[13]: 32–33  Norman M. Naimark believed that the Stalinist "nationalities deportations" were forms of national-cultural genocide. The deportations at the very least changed the cultures, way of life and world views of the deported peoples as the majority were sent to Soviet Central Asia and Siberia.[15]

The creation of an international communist state under control of the workers was perceived by some as accomplishment of Russian nationalistic dreams.[16] Poet Pavel Kogan described his feelings of the Soviet patriotism just before World War II:[17]

I am a patriot. I love Russian air and Russian soil.
But we will reach the Ganges River,
and we will die in fights,
to make our Motherland shine
from Japan to England

According to Nikolai Berdyaev:

The Russian people did not achieve their ancient dream of Moscow, the Third Rome. The ecclesiastical schism of the 17th century revealed that the Muscovite tsardom is not the Third Rome... The messianic idea of the Russian people assumed either an apocalyptic form or a revolutionary; and then there occurred an amazing event in the destiny of the Russian people. Instead of the Third Rome in Russia, the Third International was achieved, and many of the features of the Third Rome pass over to the Third International. The Third International is also a holy empire, and it also is founded on an orthodox faith. The Third International is not international, but a Russian national idea.[18]

In 1944, the Soviet Union abandoned its communist anthem The Internationale and adopted a new national anthem conveying a Russian-centered national pride in its first stanza, "An unbreakable union of free republics, Great Russia has sealed forever."[19][20]

Although Khrushchev had risen up during Stalinism, his speech On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences and de-Stalinization signified a retreat from official anti-Semitism and Great Russian Chauvinism. Most, though not all nationalities deported by Stalin were allowed to return during Khrushchev, and the Soviet Union to a degree, returned to a policy of cultivating local national developments.[9]: 46 Alexander Shelepin, a Communist Party hardliner and KGB chairman, called for a return to Stalinism and policies more in line with Russian cultural nationalism, as did conservative writers like Sergey Vikulov. The Komsomol leadership also hosted several prominent nationalists such as Sergei Pavlovich Pavlov, an ally of Shelepin, while the Molodaya Gvardiya published numerous neo-Stalinist and nationalist works.[9]: 52–53 

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union

The first "State flag" of the Russian Empire (1858–1896) is used by some Russian nationalists and monarchists.
A march of about 7,000 people waving Tsarist flags, chanting anti-immigrant slogans and carrying a big banner that reads "Let's return Russia to the Russians" (Вернём Россию русским) in Moscow, 4 November 2011.

Many nationalist movements, both radical and moderate, have arisen after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. One of the oldest and most popular is Vladimir Zhirinovsky's right-wing populist LDPR, which had been a member of the State Duma since its creation in 1993. Rodina was a popular moderate left-wing nationalist party under Dmitry Rogozin, which eventually abandoned its nationalist ideology and merged with the larger socialist party A Just Russia.[citation needed]

One of the more radical, ultranationalist movements was Russian National Unity, a far-right group that organised paramilitary brigades of its younger members before it was banned in 1999.[21][22] Before its breakup in late 2000 the Russian National Unity was estimated to have had approximately 20,000 to 25,000 members.[23] Others include BORN (Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists) which was involved in the murder of Stanislav Markelov,[24] the neo-monarchist Pamyat, the Union of Orthodox Banner-Bearers, and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration, which revived the slogan "Russia for Russians." These parties organised an annual rally called the Russian March.[citation needed]

Extremist nationalism

Extremist nationalism in Russia refers to many far-right and a few far-left ultra-nationalist movements and organizations. Of note, the term nationalism in Russia often refers to extremist nationalism. However, it is often mixed up with "fascism" in Russia. While this terminology does not exactly match the formal definitions of fascism, the common denominator is chauvinism. In all other respects the positions vary over a wide spectrum. Some movements hold a political position that the state must be an instrument of nationalism (such as the National Bolshevik Party, headed by Eduard Limonov), while others (for example, Russian National Unity) promote vigilante tactics against the perceived "enemies of Russia" without going into politics.

Historically, the first prototype of such groups started with the Black Hundreds in Imperial Russia. More recent antisemitic, supremacist and neo-fascist organizations include Pamyat, Russian National Socialist Party and others.

In 1997, the Moscow Anti-Fascist Center estimated there were 40 (nationalist) extremist groups operating in Russia.[25] The same source reported 35 extremist newspapers, the largest among these being Zavtra. In spite of repression by governmental authorities, a far-right extremist movement has established itself in Russia.[26]

Contemporary nationalism

The Kremlin conducted a campaign against radical nationalists in 2010s, resulting in many currently jailed, according to a Russian political scientist and a senior visiting fellow at the George Washington University Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Maria Lipman.[27]

Sociologist Marcel Van Herpen wrote that United Russia increasingly relied on Russian nationalism for support following the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine.[28] Nationalist political party Rodina cultivated ties with Eurosceptic, far-right and far-left political movements, supporting them financially and inviting them to Eurasian conferences in Crimea and Saint Petersburg.[29]

However, Kremlin scaled nationalism down out of fears that prominent figures such as Igor Girkin began to act independently, following a brief period of stirring activism in 2014 and 2015 that resulted in Russian men volunteering to fight in Donbas, said Lipman. According to her, the Kremlin aim is to prevent emotions that "might get out of control and motivate people to act independently".[27]

Academics Robert Horvath and Anton Shekhovtsov described how Kremlin uses far-right groups in Russia and abroad to promote Russian nationalist or anti-western views. According to Horvath, Kremlin cultivated neo-Nazis who reject democratic institutions while restricting mainstream nationalists who may support free elections.[30][31] (See also Putinism § Links to far-right.)

In November 2018, Vladimir Putin described himself as "the most effective nationalist", explaining that Russia is a multiethic and multireligious state and preserving it as such serves interests of the ethnic Russians. He remarked that Russian ethnicity didn't exist at some point and was formed from multiple Slavic tribes.[32]

According to Michael Hirsh, a senior correspondent at Foreign Policy:

Graham and other Russia experts said it is a mistake to view Putin merely as an angry former KGB apparatchik upset at the fall of the Soviet Union and NATO’s encroachment after the Cold War, as he is often portrayed by Western commentators. Putin, himself, made this clear in his Feb. 21 speech, when he disavowed the Soviet legacy, inveighing against the mistakes made by former leaders Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin to grant Ukraine even partial autonomy. ... Putin is rather a messianic Russian nationalist and Eurasianist whose constant invocation of history going back to Kievan Rus, however specious, is the best explanation for his view that Ukraine must be part of Russia’s sphere of influence, experts say. In his essay last July, Putin even suggested that the formation of a separate, democratic Ukrainian nation “is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us.”[33]

Russian nationalism and ethnic minorities

The issue in regard to Russian nationalism's relationship with its ethnic minorities has been under subject of study since the rapid expansion of Russia from 16th century onward.[34] Since in English there is no word to differ the meaning of "Russian", it is either regarded in Russian as an ethnic people ("Русский" – ethnic Russian) and as inhabitants of Russia ("Россиянин" – Russian citizen).[35]

Russian conquest of Muslim Kazan have been a significant part of understanding Russia's first step from a nearly homogenous nation into a multi-ethnic society.[36][37] Over years, Russia, from the basis of conquest it gained in Kazan, managed to conquer Siberia, Manchuria as well as expanding to the Caucasus. In a point, Russia managed to annex a large territory of Eastern Europe, Finland, Central Asia, Mongolia and, in some parts, encroached into Turkish, Chinese, Afghan and Iranian territories. Various ethnic minorities have become increasingly viral and integrated into the mainstream Russian society, and created a mixing picture of racial relations in modern Russian nationalist mindset. The work of understanding different ethnic minorities in relations with Russian state had to be traced from the work of Philip Johan von Strahlenberg, a Swedish war prisoner who became a geographer of the Tsarist Russia.

The concept is understood strongly by the learning of various minorities in Russia. The Volga Tatars and Bashkirs, the two main Muslim people in Russia, have long been lauded as model minorities in Russia, and has been historically seen more positive in the eyes of Russian nationalist movement. Furthermore, Tatar and Bashkir imams have worked to spread the Russian nationalist ideology in accordance to its Islamic faith.[38][39]

In the Caucasus, Russia gained significant supports from the Ossetians, one of the few Christian-based people in the mountainous region.[40] There was also strong support for Russia among Armenians and Greeks, largely due to similar in religion with the Orthodox government of Russia.[41][42]

The Koryo-saram (Koreans) have also been regarded as model minority of Russia, and has been used to colonize in sparsely less-populated part of Russia, this was inherited from the Tsarist era and continued to even today, since Koreans were not hostile to Russian nationalism. Although the Korean diaspora in the Russian Far East were loyal to the Soviet Union and underwent cultural Russification, they were deported to Central Asia by the Soviet government 1937-1938, based on erroneous charges of being aligned with the Japanese. When Khrushchev allowed deported nationalities to return, Koreans remained restricted and not rehabilitated.[43] On 26 April 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, under its chairman Boris Yeltsin, passed the law On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples with Article 2 denouncing all mass deportations as "Stalin's policy of defamation and genocide".[44]

Ukrainians in Russia have been largely integrated and the majority of them pledged loyalty over Russia, while some Ukrainians managed to occupy significant positions in Russian history. Bohdan Khmelnytsky is one of Russia's most celebrated figures who brought Ukraine to the Tsardom of Russia throughout the Pereyaslav Council.[45] Ukrainian Prince Alexander Bezborodko was responsible for manifesting the modern diplomacies of Russia under the reign of Catherine the Great.[46] Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev, Konstantin Chernenko and Mikhail Gorbachev also had some ancestral connections to Ukraine.[47][48][49] In addition, Russia's biggest opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, is also of paternally of Ukrainian origin as well as being a potential Russian nationalist.[50]

RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan, who is of Armenian descent, spoke out against the 2022 anti-war protests in Russia, stating that "If you are ashamed of being Russian now, don't worry, you are not Russian."[51]

Akhmad Kadyrov and his son Ramzan defected to Russia during the Second Chechen War, pledging loyalty to Russia following the fear of Wahhabi takeover in Chechnya.[52] Vladislav Surkov, who is of Chechen origin, was the chief figure who initiated the idea of Russian managed democracy, in which nationalism is a part of the ideology.[53]

Georgians in Russia have been not very positive of Russian nationalism, with some maintain a neutral or negative opinion.[54] However, Russian expansion into the Caucasus mountains has been driven by Georgian figures such as Pavel Tsitsianov, who initiated the conquest of Caucasus.[55] Pyotr Bagration was another Georgian who went on to become one of Russia's most celebrated heroes. Soviet Union's transformation into a superpower was the work of yet another Russified Georgian, Joseph Stalin, whom had a complex relationship with Russian nationalism.[56]

Some of Dagestan's revered figures have long been respected by Russian nationalists, such as Rasul Gamzatov, who is one of Russia's most respected poets despite his Avar origin.[57] Khabib Nurmagomedov's rise to popularity and fame has earned a divisive opinion among Russians and Dagestanis.[58] Many Dagestanis supported Russia against Chechnya, during the previous Caucasian War when the Dagestanis found Chechens incapable to obey and follow order, and during the Second Chechen War, owning by Chechen expansionist attempt to conquer Dagestan in 1999.[59]

Germans in Russia have long been treated with privileges under the Tsarist government and many Germans became prominent in Russian politics, education and economy, including the Tsarist House of Romanov, which also included many German-based figures, most notably Catherine the Great.[60][61][62] Many Germans fought in the Russian Civil War and regarded themselves as Russian nationalists.[citation needed] The Baltic German nobility were significantly loyal to the Russian empire, but were resistant to nationalism until the Russian Revolution, identifying mainly as members of the Russian nobility.[63]

Parties and organizations

See also

References

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Further reading

  • John B. Dunlop
    • The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism. Princeton University Press, 1983.
    • The New Russian Nationalism, 1985

Bibliography

in Russian